US - Greenland Crisis Thread

[Savonarola]

If it came to a vote on authorizing force against Denmark/Greenland, do you think it would pass?

I wouldn't think so.  There's very little public support for acquiring Greenland.  Trump hasn't made any effort to explain why we need it, much less why we need to seize it by force.  The Republican majority in the house is narrow, and a number of Republican congressmen are leaving at the end of this term (and so have nothing to lose by defying Trump.)

On a much less optimistic note, though, I expect Trump plans to bypass Congress in his attempt to acquire Greenland.

[The Brain]

How many divisions does Clowngress have?

[The Minsky Moment]

How do you bypass a void?

[HisMajestyBOB]

If it came to a vote on authorizing force against Denmark/Greenland, do you think it would pass?

Yes, the Republicans would roll over in a minute if told.  The Democrats are and have been completely ineffectual for years. 

That's not true. They're very effective at sending out fundraising emails.

[crazy canuck]

How do you bypass a void?

This

[Jacob]

Yes I've been misattributing it. Not Jacques Delors, but Jean Monnet: "Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises".

But as the Bruegel think tank paper on European defence noted in their view Ukraine is the first crisis that has not resulted in further integration. I would only disagree to say that I think their assessment the Eurozone crisis and covid were leaps forward - I think both were stalls at best. So I think that process has broken down since the crash (like a lot in Europe).

Has it not resulted in further military integration?

It is my impression that the war in Ukraine has pushed Europe closer in that area, but maybe that's mainly rhetoric and not actually practical?

I get what your saying - my point is as America's no longer a friend we need some. Russia ain't it. I'm not sure on China either (I think their relationship is close if not quite the "friendship without limits" the've declared). I think we need to look to the rest of the world and I think that means taking on board some of their perspective or imagining how this looks from their position.

As I say - look at Brazil. Lula is pointing out this is the last chance to do a deal with Mercosur and (after 30 years of negotiations) it might get blocked by Europe. Lots of Europeans ahve complained about him not standing up on Ukraine while we've done exactly the same on Gaza and Venezuela. I think we need to engage literally the rest of the world if we're now facing off with the US and Russia and (maybe) China - and that's going to mean putting ourselves in their shoes, caring about their issues.

Agreed. I just think Mercosur and Venezuela matters much more to Brazil than Gaza - so that's where the effort should be focused when engaging with them.

As I say I don't think I agree on China and Russia. I think that relationship is key for both parties - and there are multiple gas pipelines coming online in the next few years which will further cement. What Europe has to offer is a market which is valuable and an industry which can't compete.

Time will tell. There's some momentum to the China-Russia alliance, but I don't think it's permanent.

Fundamentally I don't think Trump, or Russia, or China see Europe as a player - I think they see it as prey. And I'm not sure they're wrong. A bit like China in the 19th century - I think it's rich, weak and ill-equipped for the century its in. Honestly I'm not entirely sure that Trump, Russia and China wouldn't work together to press their advantage (this is again why I think we do need to engage the rest of the world with appropriate humility given all our history and recent indifference).

I agree that Europe is potentially poised to start a Chinese style century of humiliation. However, I think it would be the wrong approach to accept it as inevitable and act as if it is an established fact.

Edit: Just on the European side - the UK and France have been working on a "coalition of the willing" to support Ukraine after any peace deal. It's never been fully clear what it's role would be but I think primarily as a reassurance force in the rear in Ukraine. The key sticking point was trying to get US buy in for air support (which apparently they now have - I am very doubtful that will materialise).

When it was initially floated, the plan was for about 60,000 troops with hopes that multiple European countries would participate with the UK and France sending about 10k each. Ata meeting of European Defence Ministers the Lithuanian Defence Minister was reported to have told her counterparts "Russia has 800,000 troops. If we can't even raise 64,000 that doesn't look weak - it is weak." Other participants described her comments as "strident and inspiring". A report I read from some think tank said that would be difficult to sustain for the UK and France for long. They also estimated the minimum for it to be effective would be 30,000 (again they sketched out what that force would look like).

The news today is that the UK and France are the only countries willing to participate and it's now down to 15,000 (basically 7,500 each). For the UK at least apparently that is going to be a stretch to maintain for any period of time and the briefing is that 15,000 might be optimistic. Rreportedly this would have an impact on the British Army mission in Ukraine helping train and support Ukrainian troops as "we can't be in two places at once". I'm really sorry to say but this is the two most militarily capable European states trying to propose a European solution to something that almost all European countries agree is a strategic priority. The UK and France aren't able to cobble together and sustain much but have something and are willing to try (although as I say I'm very dubious on the actual plan) - but no-one else is even wiling to contribute (I have some sympathy with the Eastern Flank countries who don't want to dilute their border defences). But I think this is the context for conversations about what Europe can do.

That's pretty grim. One hopes Europe is taking appropriate action to remedy this.

[Zanza]

I don't think the problem with Europe is lack of potential capability, but political will.

We obviously have the capability to hurt China, Russia or even the United States. Maybe not to the same level as at least China and the United States could hurt us, but still significantly enough to cause pain and deter.

But there is very little political will to pay the necessary price - mainly due to domestic pressures to continue with the peace dividend. Our populace has grown too complacent - not just in geopolitics, but also in private economic competition. And politicians fear that and are not willing to go against their voters' complacency.

There are some mini steps to actually pay the price (e.g. reintroduction of conscription, some industrial policy to safeguard supply chains etc.). But not nearly enough. I guess it needs to become worse and more tangible for the populace before a need for action is accepted. 

The only thing that could make it even worse is if the sellouts like Bardella, Farage or Weidel take power.

[Jacob]

... so the path to taking it seriously is for traitors to get into positions of influence, fuck over Europe (but not enough to permanently cripple Europe), and thus cause the population to take things seriously enough to create the conditions for necessary reform?

That's essentially Putin and Trump's assessment of Europe, the only difference is that they seek to actively exploit and increase that weakness rather than remedy it.

[Zanza]

... so the path to taking it seriously is for traitors to get into positions of influence, fuck over Europe (but not enough to permanently cripple Europe), and thus cause the population to take things seriously enough to create the conditions for necessary reform?

Huh? Not sure how that follows from my post.

[Jacob]

Huh? Not sure how that follows from my post.

Let me outline the reasoning (and you can point out what I misunderstood and/or where you disagree with my reasoning):

• Zanza: There's a lack of political will to pay the necessary price.
• Zanza: I guess there's a need for something worse to happen for that political will to exist.
• Zanza: Things will get worse if the political sell-outs and traitors like Bardella, Farage, and Weidel get power.
• Jacob: If things get worse (satisfying point 2) in the case of Bardella, Farage, and/ or Weidel taking power (as per point 3) that may generate the political will required to pay the necessary price (step 1).
• Jacob: ... though I suppose that if Bardella/ Farage/ Weidel gain power they might fuck things up enough that Europe becomes less able to take the necessary steps, even if it generates the political will to take them.
• Jacob: Therefore, the path to generating the required political will and for it to lead to the necessary action is for the traitors to gain enough power to make sufficient trouble to make the need obvious to a large step of the population, but not so much that they damage Europe's ability to actually take the step (assuming such a condition is possible).

The line of reasoning may contain somewhere between 10 to 70% bleak humour rather than being a serious suggestion for the path forward.

[OttoVonBismarck]

I view Europe as the political equivalent of a concept in the business world, that of the "lifestyle company."

A lifestyle company is a business created primarily to support the owner's desired lifestyle, allowing them to maintain a work-life balance while generating income. These businesses often focus on personal fulfillment and flexibility rather than aggressive growth or high profits.

The term is most frequently used as a pejorative by people who consider the firm to be a "laggard" that doesn't pursue growth opportunities because it would upset the comfort of the leisure focused owners.

[Tonitrus]

If it came to a vote on authorizing force against Denmark/Greenland, do you think it would pass?

No.  But the bigger question is if the vote comes before it happens, or after it has already happened.

[Zanza]

Huh? Not sure how that follows from my post.

Let me outline the reasoning (and you can point out what I misunderstood and/or where you disagree with my reasoning):

• Zanza: There's a lack of political will to pay the necessary price.
• Zanza: I guess there's a need for something worse to happen for that political will to exist.
• Zanza: Things will get worse if the political sell-outs and traitors like Bardella, Farage, and Weidel get power.
• Jacob: If things get worse (satisfying point 2) in the case of Bardella, Farage, and/ or Weidel taking power (as per point 3) that may generate the political will required to pay the necessary price (step 1).
• Jacob: ... though I suppose that if Bardella/ Farage/ Weidel gain power they might fuck things up enough that Europe becomes less able to take the necessary steps, even if it generates the political will to take them.
• Jacob: Therefore, the path to generating the required political will and for it to lead to the necessary action is for the traitors to gain enough power to make sufficient trouble to make the need obvious to a large step of the population, but not so much that they damage Europe's ability to actually take the step (assuming such a condition is possible).

The line of reasoning may contain somewhere between 10 to 70% bleak humour rather than being a serious suggestion for the path forward.

Rereading my post let me understand what you mean.

The two uses of worse in sequence are not a proper structure.

The first was meant to refer to how Europeans will only accept action if the geopolitical situation deteriorates further, i.e. gets worse.

The second was in my mind not referring to the first, but rather to the existing feeble attempts of our politicians to act. In comparison to their insufficient attempts, the right populists I named would not even try to further European interests, but rather just sell us out to the highest bidder, be it US, Chinese or Russian interests. Which would be worse.

[Jacob]

Yeah fair enough Zanza. It was a bit of a tongue in cheek comment on my part

[Sheilbh]

Has it not resulted in further military integration?

It is my impression that the war in Ukraine has pushed Europe closer in that area, but maybe that's mainly rhetoric and not actually practical?

No - and part of this could be defensive. Under the treaties foreign and security policy are for the member states and, crucially, at a European level require unanimity. It's part of the reason I've thought in the pas that "minilateralism" might be the best/more plausible route to European defence.

From the Bruegel report the Commission's 2025 budget proposal (for the next seven years) had allocations of €125 billion (or €18 billion annually). As Bruegel notes "in other words (likely guided by the political directives received from member states [...]), the Commission suggests keeping military issues as overwhelmingly member-state governed responsibilities, and does not intend to propose a material shift in long-term EU budget resources towards European rearmament." The very particular challenge with that is without a European level, it means Europe's defence policy and rearmament is in very tied to Europe's budget rules and national, member state fiscal constraints. That's why basically the only big EU countries with significant increases in defence spending in recent years are Germany and Poland.

But again to go back to Bruegel (I'm 50% with them on the NextGen EU Covid spending - but have some reservations):

COVID-19 for the first time breached the political 'urgency threshold' for largescale issuance of common EU debt, in the form of NGEU. With an EU candidate country already under direct military attack and seemingly no progress towards similar largescale direct common EU debt issuance in response, other non-war political topics in the EU seem similarly unlikely to rise above the urgency
threshold that would enable common debt issuance. The basic political reality of required unanimity among EU member states for common EU debt issuance also undermines any otherwise sensible functional arguments in favour of more common European debt to improve the functioning of European financial markets11 or – a more recent policy priority for many top EU officials – promote the global role of the euro in the international financial system12.
[...]
The warning signs for further EU integration are already flashing and the Ukraine War may become the first large crisis to affect the EU in decades that does not lead to meaningful additional institutional EU integration.

At an October 2025 summit of EU leaders, the European Commission presented a new Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 (European Commission, 2025c) but EU heads of state made no new concrete defence-related decisions at the EU level. This was despite the Commission's explicit allocation of leadership in European military and defence matters to member states, noting: "Member States are and will remain sovereign for their national security and defence. They are responsible for defining the capability objectives required to ensure the readiness of their national armed forces so that they can fulfil their strategic-military missions, including those undertaken within NATO. Their respective national objectives and the associated timelines for achieving them are a sovereign decision." (European Commission, 2025c).

The big that has been talked up (and is not nothing) is a €150 billion loan instrument for a few categories of defence (and I think as much industrial as defence policy - not a criticism necessarily) - but again that is for member states to spend (and I've mentioned before - but the third biggest recipient is...Hungary? ). But to put in context, the scale of post-covid common European debt, that was at about €800 billion. The agriculture budget alone is around €400 billion. I think common debt is key because it's the way for Europe to mov to greater than the sum of its parts.

Agreed. I just think Mercosur and Venezuela matters much more to Brazil than Gaza - so that's where the effort should be focused when engaging with them.

I agree with Latin American countries (at least the post-pink tide ones, not the Operation Condor wannabes) - I also think it'd be a helpful way for Europe to go on the offensive. I don't buy the western hemisphere stuff about Trump (maybe true for some of those around him).

But I think Gaza is a huge issue for a lot of the global south. I think we underestimate the impact of the perceived hypocrisy.

Time will tell. There's some momentum to the China-Russia alliance, but I don't think it's permanent.

No doubt. I mean the North Atlantic Alliance isn't permanent - but it's seriously consequential.

I suppose what matters is whether it's opportunistic and what the window of opportunity is or if it's a fairly structural alignment for a while. 3-5 years? The estimate for Europe to fill some capability gaps and the range between the Danish and Norwegian estimate of when Russia could start messing with the Baltics - I think it's 5-10 for Russia to do something major.

I agree that Europe is potentially poised to start a Chinese style century of humiliation. However, I think it would be the wrong approach to accept it as inevitable and act as if it is an established fact.

I agree and I think this is to Zanza's point where, again, I agree - the potential capacity is there. Europe is rich, it's got innovative technically brilliant countries, it's got an industrial base in strategically important industries. There are structural challenges (no energy resources) but I don't think there's anything insurmountable.

My concern is around where we are, how long we've got and how fast we're moving.