US - Greenland Crisis Thread

[mongers]

The big difference with My Lai, of course, it that the US government didn't do it intentionally, though it was an unintended consequence of our policy.  In this hypothetical, it would be a direct, fully attributable consequence of a policy of the Commander in Chief.

I meant the Vietnam war as a whole, the 'we're saving the democratic Vietnamese republic from international communism' justification vs the current BS of 'defending Americans from being killed by evil foreign drugs/cartels/immigrants'.

[Jacob]

Okay. I don't think some European troops would help deter Trump. I don't really buy the bully argument about Trump - to me that doesn't fit the assassination of Soleimani, the bombing of Iranian nuclear sites or what's just happened in Venezuela. I think Trump is very reluctant to put boots on the ground in a serious way but pretty reckless on things that are overwhelmingly tilted in the favour of the US/remote.

There is obviously some disagreement on the degree of deterrence from NATO troops and the risk of bloodshed.

I would say that Trump's inclination to action is towards ones where he can bullshit his way out of any consequences, and less likely

And, to be blunt, shedding white people blood (Trump recently asked for more immigrants from Denmark) may play differently for a white supremacist government than shedding brown people blood, even if the US wants to undermine Europe by "saving" it.

The only way I think that works is if you buy the (in my view, nonsense) argument that Europe taking Arctic security seriously would address US concerns. I don't think there are US concerns. I think there's whim and Trump wants it - nothing more complex.

I agree it's a whim thing, but I think that's an argument for deterrence rather than against it.

I'm not sure that serious talk - though true - about NATO or international law will help either because I don't think Trump cares about either. Though, perhaps, others in the administration do and you can help try to manage and massage them to the extent they matter (particularly as - and I'm not a conspiracy theorist on this - I do think Trump looks less well than he has).

Agreed that talk about international law - or even NATO - doesn't really matter. Action and consequence does. Taking action to ensure that the consequences will be greater in practical economical terms (and I think Trump will come around to the idea that killing European soldiers is likely to result in greater practical consequences) increases the chances of Trump backing down. Maybe not sufficiently, of course.

I don't think it would be galvanising but fracturing for Europe. Especially because we're not just facing Trump. Literally today we've got the UK and France and that "coalition of the willing" apparently getting US agreement to back a "reassurance force" in Ukraine (I'll believe it when I see it). We can assume that's gone. I'd assume any American involvement in European security is - so I think there's a question of how Russia would respond as well.

I thought you subscribed to the view that the greatest leaps in European unity and cohesion is in response to crises?

I don't think there are any good options and I don't think Europe has any credible deterents. I think Europe's strategic dilemma is that we are vulnerable economically, on security and on energy - with China, America and Russia able to take advantage and pick at us on all of those. None of them are a solid base. In terms of what I think Europe should do I think it's probably what European leaders are doing. It is the policy of Starmer, Macron, Merz, Tusk - as insipid and emotionally unsatisfying as it is. Try to use diplomacy, try to persuade, try to keep the US engaged in order to help fend off Russia and China - while increasing our own capacities (3-5 years - which is roughly in line with Danish and Norwegian public assessments of when Russia might come again after a deal on Ukraine). I'd probably broadly push for the same policy towards China to be honest.

For someone who decries British and European inability to act, you certainly seem to embrace assumed helplessness 

I mean, I don't disagree that maintaining ambiguity and relying on diplomacy as long as possible while building up strength and capacity may be the best path forward. I simply disagree that it's the only path forward, or obviously and inherently the superior one.

The only thing I'd add at this point is that I think Europe should be very clear and condemn what's happened in Venezuela. We cannot be simultaneously panicked about the sovereignty of a colony of the Kingdom of Denmark when we're not willing to care at all about the kidnapping of a head of state of a sovereign Latin American country. As with Ukraine and Gaza I just think how this looks from literally anywhere but Europe and it's hypocritical Eurocentrism - and why should anyone anywhere care. We need to start laying the groundwork I think for reaching out to the global south and I think particularly Latin America (also a shot across the bow of what happens when international norms, like the Monroe Doctrine, wither) and particularly Brazil. One challenge there is that after 30 years of negotiating a trade deal with Mercosur (which Lula has already said is the last chance for such a deal), France and Italy under pressure from their farming lobbies are trying to block it. But condemning Venezuela is laying the groundwork to go all in on trying to build new relationships with the rest of the world - which will also involve listening (I think Kaja Kallas probably has to go).

I think Europe is largely irrelevant enough already that making righteous statements about Venezuela or not already doesn't matter. If Europe takes actual concrete action to embrace Venezuela (or otherwise work against American global policy priorities) in a practical sense (economic ties, repealing sanctions, whatever) that matters. Writing a letter of condemnation or support (or equivocating down the middle) matters only a tiny little bit.

Europe absolutely can be way more worried about Greenland or Ukraine than it is about Gaza or Venezuela, and Europe absolutely can be Eurocentric in their perspective. What Europe can't do is pretend that that difference of worry level represents some absolute objective high moral ground that other countries secretly think as morally persuasive. Actions, not words, is what matters.

But while I don't think we've got much in way of a deterrent, I think we probably need to think the unthinkable because that might well happen so what the response would be. I think there's something to how do we respond if America uses their force to threaten us and we target America's force. So (very much from Chatham House stuff on this) I'd think about closing American bases or increasing their cost, not refueling American ships, refusing to take American personnel into European military hospitals - we're a base for America. If they're focused on the Western hemisphere, then do what we can to limit them to it.

Agreed on those being practical levers that Europe can use. To take it back to the earlier part of the conversation, I also think it's more likely that those levers will be pulled if the US kills a bunch of Danish and French soldiers in Greenland, which thereby increases the deterrence value of those troops.

There'll be trade-offs for that. We'll need to really have focus and spending to pick up the slack on defence (3-5 years). That probably means hard trade-offs and choices on domestic politics and confronting voters with it. And I think it probably means shafting Ukraine to try and, for a while, relieve the pressure from Russia and China.

Fundamentally I think it is probably a choice of trying to keep the Americans engaged while we push Russia (and China) or try to reach a new modus vivendi with Russia and China in order to push back on America - I don't think we can do all three. And that's why my fear is the forces in the world are more likely to split than galvanises Europe - because to go back to the point of different European countries having different risk perceptions which mitigates against common security and defence policies, I think European countries make different choices over who to confront.

Agreed that European countries make different choices based on individual priorities, and that that presents an additional challenge for Europe (not to mention the risk of Trump or Putin sympathizers taking over national governments in different European countries).

On Ukraine I think Europe needs to figure out how to go it on Ukraine alone.

On the whole "Europe vs Russia, China, and the US at the same time" thing - I'm much less certain that China will continue to support Russia to the degree it does now if Europe is less supportive of the US. While these things are complex and multifaceted, IMO one of the significant drivers for China's support of Russia is to undermine the alliance that it faces in the Pacific.

While acknowledging that China doesn't desire good things for Europe, the threat of driving Europe into closer collaboration with China at the cost of the US could also serve as a deterrent for US perfidy.

Basically I agree with you that Europe can't hold back China, Russia, and the US all at once... but I don't think it's a given that compromising with the US to fight China is the best course for Europe (I think we agree that holding back Russia is). China is further away and does not have an explicitly stated goal of reshaping Europe to it's liking. Maybe there's more room to work with China to lessen the threat from Russia and the US.

[Oexmelin]

Surrender is such an ugly word. Deft maneuvering sounds better.

Delft maneuvering is always required when something is fragile and brittle.

[Sheilbh]

I thought you subscribed to the view that the greatest leaps in European unity and cohesion is in response to crises?

Yes I've been misattributing it. Not Jacques Delors, but Jean Monnet: "Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises".

But as the Bruegel think tank paper on European defence noted in their view Ukraine is the first crisis that has not resulted in further integration. I would only disagree to say that I think their assessment the Eurozone crisis and covid were leaps forward - I think both were stalls at best. So I think that process has broken down since the crash (like a lot in Europe).

For someone who decries British and European inability to act, you certainly seem to embrace assumed helplessness 

I mean, I don't disagree that maintaining ambiguity and relying on diplomacy as long as possible while building up strength and capacity may be the best path forward. I simply disagree that it's the only path forward, or obviously and inherently the superior one.

Fair. And I could very well be wrong - in many ways I hope I am. (And I am fully aware I may just be a little scarred from recent years when few shocks have gone a positive way from my pov.)

I think Europe is largely irrelevant enough already that making righteous statements about Venezuela or not already doesn't matter. If Europe takes actual concrete action to embrace Venezuela (or otherwise work against American global policy priorities) in a practical sense (economic ties, repealing sanctions, whatever) that matters. Writing a letter of condemnation or support (or equivocating down the middle) matters only a tiny little bit.

Europe absolutely can be way more worried about Greenland or Ukraine than it is about Gaza or Venezuela, and Europe absolutely can be Eurocentric in their perspective. What Europe can't do is pretend that that difference of worry level represents some absolute objective high moral ground that other countries secretly think as morally persuasive. Actions, not words, is what matters.

I get what your saying - my point is as America's no longer a friend we need some. Russia ain't it. I'm not sure on China either (I think their relationship is close if not quite the "friendship without limits" the've declared). I think we need to look to the rest of the world and I think that means taking on board some of their perspective or imagining how this looks from their position.

As I say - look at Brazil. Lula is pointing out this is the last chance to do a deal with Mercosur and (after 30 years of negotiations) it might get blocked by Europe. Lots of Europeans ahve complained about him not standing up on Ukraine while we've done exactly the same on Gaza and Venezuela. I think we need to engage literally the rest of the world if we're now facing off with the US and Russia and (maybe) China - and that's going to mean putting ourselves in their shoes, caring about their issues.

On the whole "Europe vs Russia, China, and the US at the same time" thing - I'm much less certain that China will continue to support Russia to the degree it does now if Europe is less supportive of the US. While these things are complex and multifaceted, IMO one of the significant drivers for China's support of Russia is to undermine the alliance that it faces in the Pacific.

While acknowledging that China doesn't desire good things for Europe, the threat of driving Europe into closer collaboration with China at the cost of the US could also serve as a deterrent for US perfidy.

Basically I agree with you that Europe can't hold back China, Russia, and the US all at once... but I don't think it's a given that compromising with the US to fight China is the best course for Europe (I think we agree that holding back Russia is). China is further away and has not have an explicitly stated goal of reshaping Europe to it's liking. Maybe there's more room to work with China to lessen the threat from Russia and the US.

As I say I don't think I agree on China and Russia. I think that relationship is key for both parties - and there are multiple gas pipelines coming online in the next few years which will further cement. What Europe has to offer is a market which is valuable and an industry which can't compete.

Fundamentally I don't think Trump, or Russia, or China see Europe as a player - I think they see it as prey. And I'm not sure they're wrong. A bit like China in the 19th century - I think it's rich, weak and ill-equipped for the century its in. Honestly I'm not entirely sure that Trump, Russia and China wouldn't work together to press their advantage (this is again why I think we do need to engage the rest of the world with appropriate humility given all our history and recent indifference).

Edit: Just on the European side - the UK and France have been working on a "coalition of the willing" to support Ukraine after any peace deal. It's never been fully clear what it's role would be but I think primarily as a reassurance force in the rear in Ukraine. The key sticking point was trying to get US buy in for air support (which apparently they now have - I am very doubtful that will materialise).

When it was initially floated, the plan was for about 60,000 troops with hopes that multiple European countries would participate with the UK and France sending about 10k each. Ata meeting of European Defence Ministers the Lithuanian Defence Minister was reported to have told her counterparts "Russia has 800,000 troops. If we can't even raise 64,000 that doesn't look weak - it is weak." Other participants described her comments as "strident and inspiring". A report I read from some think tank said that would be difficult to sustain for the UK and France for long. They also estimated the minimum for it to be effective would be 30,000 (again they sketched out what that force would look like).

The news today is that the UK and France are the only countries willing to participate and it's now down to 15,000 (basically 7,500 each). For the UK at least apparently that is going to be a stretch to maintain for any period of time and the briefing is that 15,000 might be optimistic. Rreportedly this would have an impact on the British Army mission in Ukraine helping train and support Ukrainian troops as "we can't be in two places at once". I'm really sorry to say but this is the two most militarily capable European states trying to propose a European solution to something that almost all European countries agree is a strategic priority. The UK and France aren't able to cobble together and sustain much but have something and are willing to try (although as I say I'm very dubious on the actual plan) - but no-one else is even wiling to contribute (I have some sympathy with the Eastern Flank countries who don't want to dilute their border defences). But I think this is the context for conversations about what Europe can do.

[Jacob]

Well, it's nice to see some Republicans pushing back against Trump and Miller's Greenland gambit: https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/07/gop-lawmakers-denounce-trump-seize-greenland-00714611

[Darth Wagtaros]

Well, it's nice to see some Republicans pushing back against Trump and Miller's Greenland gambit: https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/07/gop-lawmakers-denounce-trump-seize-greenland-00714611

One was saying that the Danes needed to surrender it since Americans died defending it.

[Valmy]

Well, it's nice to see some Republicans pushing back against Trump and Miller's Greenland gambit: https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/07/gop-lawmakers-denounce-trump-seize-greenland-00714611

Yeah but who cares? Congress has given up all its power to the President to declare war. And it isn't like they are going to pass some kind of bill saying he can't invade Greenland. That would require them to stand up to Trump.

[Zoupa]

Lots of Europeans ahve complained about him not standing up on Ukraine while we've done exactly the same on Gaza and Venezuela.

Gaza operations were justified following Oct 7th. We can argue about methods. Venezuela was illegal in every sense, a violation of sovereignty, but the dude did rig elections, kill his people and smuggle drugs. Ukraine, on the other hand, was just minding their own business and has the misfortune of being neighbours with a nation full of psychopaths. Lula's position on Ukraine is despicable. Sorry.

The news today is that the UK and France are the only countries willing to participate and it's now down to 15,000 (basically 7,500 each). For the UK at least apparently that is going to be a stretch to maintain for any period of time and the briefing is that 15,000 might be optimistic. Rreportedly this would have an impact on the British Army mission in Ukraine helping train and support Ukrainian troops as "we can't be in two places at once". I'm really sorry to say but this is the two most militarily capable European states trying to propose a European solution to something that almost all European countries agree is a strategic priority. The UK and France aren't able to cobble together and sustain much but have something and are willing to try (although as I say I'm very dubious on the actual plan) - but no-one else is even wiling to contribute (I have some sympathy with the Eastern Flank countries who don't want to dilute their border defences). But I think this is the context for conversations about what Europe can do.

[Admiral Yi]

Yeah but who cares? Congress has given up all its power to the President to declare war. And it isn't like they are going to pass some kind of bill saying he can't invade Greenland. That would require them to stand up to Trump.

They just stood up to Trump. 

[Josquius]

Yeah but who cares? Congress has given up all its power to the President to declare war. And it isn't like they are going to pass some kind of bill saying he can't invade Greenland. That would require them to stand up to Trump.

They just stood up to Trump. 

They passed a no Greenland bill?

[Admiral Yi]

They passed a no Greenland bill?

Not AFAIK.  Are you proposing a debate on the meaning of stand up to?

[Zoupa]

Yeah but who cares? Congress has given up all its power to the President to declare war. And it isn't like they are going to pass some kind of bill saying he can't invade Greenland. That would require them to stand up to Trump.

They just stood up to Trump. 

Who did, and how exactly?

[Admiral Yi]

Well, it's nice to see some Republicans pushing back against Trump and Miller's Greenland gambit: https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/07/gop-lawmakers-denounce-trump-seize-greenland-00714611

[bogh]

If it came to a vote on authorizing force against Denmark/Greenland, do you think it would pass?

[Darth Wagtaros]

If it came to a vote on authorizing force against Denmark/Greenland, do you think it would pass?

Yes, the Republicans would roll over in a minute if told.  The Democrats are and have been completely ineffectual for years.