US - Greenland Crisis Thread

[Razgovory]

Denmark could announce Chinese and Russian troops now have a base there.

[Darth Wagtaros]

I still refuse to countenance that even Donald Trump's band of bandits would throw away everything in this strange gamble.

Me to. I have a hard time believing it.

But he has managed to cross those lines of unbelievability several times. I thought this guy was total scum, the human embodyment of everything I hated about the United States, prior to him ever running for President or leading some weird Obama birther movement. But somehow he still manages to shock and amaze me at what a piece of shit he is.

So it might happen.

All he has to do is  blame it on Hunter Biden and Obama and his base will rally around it.  The drooling morons will eat that up.  The careerist hypocrits are too scared shitless to say a word against it and may come out claiming that Putin is legit a US ally instead.  The business interests are almost completely focused on short term profits.

[Sheilbh]

Yeah my thoughts on this are similar to when the question came up in the other thread whether Germany could move troops across the country.  Of course they could.  And of course Europe could move troops to Greenland. They have boats and planes, they have people that can use them.  You can debate how many and how fast, and whether the transport operation would meet the highest of operational standards.  But it could be done.

In the context of American opposition and America trying to seize Greenland?

I'd add on the Germany thing - which is why I think Merz's focus on infrastructure spending as well as the military is so important - the common much you could deploy came from a redacted US military report. The US had to move to barges and river transport for transporting material to Ukraine because of the state of the rail and road system. I don't think that's minor.

I harp on about it because from what I've read from European defence commentators and analysts these are big issues. Maybe they aren't - I could be totally wrong. For example Dr Alexandra Hoop de Scheffer of the German Marshall Fund that Europe is "hyper-dependent" on the US, with particular gaps in "intel, satellites, transportation of troops and air-to-air refuelling". Her assessment is that some of those capability gaps could be filled - with focus and spending - in three years, some probably within five years. I still don't see that focus or spending. But I would say here everyone seems fairly sanguine about Europe's current, immediate capacities right now. I hope you're right but other stuff I read seems quite worrying on that front - and I feel like the last few years have broadly lead me to not taking a sanguine view of things

And I think that's reflected in the way European leaders behave which is incredibly weak towards the US because of our weakness. Combined with, I think, fairly minimal progress on building up independent European defence because those leaders are can't imagine how to convince the public or aren't capable of imagining it themselves (there are exceptions: Denmark has linked higher defence spending to raising the retirement age to 70). I think all of that is captured in the fact that as European spending on defence has increased, for most coutries so has the share of that spending going to American defence companies. (Including Poland who I'm generally very admiring of - but that's in the context of building a diverse base so US spending has increased, but so's spending with French and Korean companies.)

[grumbler]

All he has to do is  blame it on Hunter Biden and Obama and his base will rally around it.  The drooling morons will eat that up.  The careerist hypocrits are too scared shitless to say a word against it and may come out claiming that Putin is legit a US ally instead.  The business interests are almost completely focused on short term profits.

There are no short-term profits to be made in Greenland (or Venezuela, for that matter).

[mongers]

I think people underestimate the sheer power of attraction that displays of force have for these people, and for many others as well. Especially these days.

Sadly, too true in the current of climate of peak bullshit.

[Darth Wagtaros]

All he has to do is  blame it on Hunter Biden and Obama and his base will rally around it.  The drooling morons will eat that up.  The careerist hypocrits are too scared shitless to say a word against it and may come out claiming that Putin is legit a US ally instead.  The business interests are almost completely focused on short term profits.

There are no short-term profits to be made in Greenland (or Venezuela, for that matter).

Look for the memorial coin and the NFT.

[Jacob]

In the context of American opposition and America trying to seize Greenland?

I suspect there may be two different conversations going on based on two different ideas of what the point of stationing troops in Greenland is.

You seem to be framing it in terms of being able to militarily repulse an American assault on Greenland and conclude (rightly IMO) that that is going to fail; and therefore, it seems you conclude (wrongly IMO), that there is no point in stationing troops and that Denmark + any European allies are powerless.

Another framing - and one which I think merits serious consideration - is that there are essentially two scenarios of a hypothetical American annexation of Greenland by force.

One is where the US rolls in unopposed, put up their flag, and proceed to run the place. The other is one where there are Danish (and potentially other European) troops there that resist, resulting in casualties - on the Danish/ European side for sure, but potentially on the American side also.

There are a number of different consequences between those two scenarios - geopolitically, in terms of domestic politics (in the US, Denmark, individual European states, and within Europe), economically, and so on. Denmark - and Europe - are not powerless in that they have the choice of which path to offer Trump; and Trump and his handlers will have to choose their path forward based on that.

Perhaps a "deft manoeuvre" - to use the Brain's term - is best for Denmark and Europe when taking a wider strategic view. But perhaps increasing the price - for Denmark & Europe, for the decrepit Western Alliance, and for the US - is a better move because it ends up being enough of a deterrent; or perhaps because it will become a clarifying and galvanizing moment for Europe. An alternate reason for increasing the price of a hostile annexation is that to accede would cement Europe's sense of powerlessness and result an more and greater bad consequences down the road.

There are analysts - in Denmark, the US, and elsewhere (and it seems you are among them?) - whose analysis boils down to "there's nothing Denmark and Europe can do to stop the US militarily if they put their mind to it" (which is true I think), "... so therefore Denmark and Europe are powerless and might as well accept the US' diktat" (which is not true IMO).

[frunk]

Trump very much operates on the Bully principle.  If he can get away with it he will.  If Greenland is left undefended he'll take it, if there's any kind of resistance (particular one that might escalate) he won't.  I think it matters less how effective the resistance is, just that it's there.

[OttoVonBismarck]

They won't do it because of the innate spinelessness of Europe, but the best defense would be the larger European economies making a public pact to sell off all U.S. treasuries the instant the U.S. violates Greenland's territorial integrity by making any proclamation or assertion that the U.S. now controls Greenland.

[The Minsky Moment]

In the context of American opposition and America trying to seize Greenland?

Yes of course.  Could they survive a determined US attack?  Probably not.  But slaughtering a bunch of NATO troops defending a member state's territory is very different than knocking off a handful of hapless Venezuelan drug mules in the ocean. I don't think Trump is prepared to go that far. 

For example Dr Alexandra Hoop de Scheffer of the German Marshall Fund that Europe is "hyper-dependent" on the US, with particular gaps in "intel, satellites, transportation of troops and air-to-air refuelling". Her assessment is that some of those capability gaps could be filled - with focus and spending - in three years, some probably within five years. I still don't see that focus or spending. But I would say here everyone seems fairly sanguine about Europe's current, immediate capacities right now.

We are talking about different things. One is the ability to deploy and use modern military forces at peak efficiency.  The other is whether it is physically possible to move military assets that have some non-trivial level of combat power.  Even if the European members of NATO committed massive investments for years and integrated far more tightly, they would probably still be hard pressed to hold off a determined US invasion of Greenland.  But I doubt that is what is required.

A joint Danish force supported by other NATO members of roughly batallion size could be sent now and deliver the message that the EU takes territorial integrity seriously.  That show of strength is the only language Trump respects.

[Sheilbh]

I suspect there may be two different conversations going on based on two different ideas of what the point of stationing troops in Greenland is.

You seem to be framing it in terms of being able to militarily repulse an American assault on Greenland and conclude (rightly IMO) that that is going to fail; and therefore, it seems you conclude (wrongly IMO), that there is no point in stationing troops and that Denmark + any European allies are powerless.

Another framing - and one which I think merits serious consideration - is that there are essentially two scenarios of a hypothetical American annexation of Greenland by force.

One is where the US rolls in unopposed, put up their flag, and proceed to run the place. The other is one where there are Danish (and potentially other European) troops there that resist, resulting in casualties - on the Danish/ European side for sure, but potentially on the American side also.

There are a number of different consequences between those two scenarios - geopolitically, in terms of domestic politics (in the US, Denmark, individual European states, and within Europe), economically, and so on. Denmark - and Europe - are not powerless in that they have the choice of which path to offer Trump; and Trump and his handlers will have to choose their path forward based on that.

Perhaps a "deft manoeuvre" - to use the Brain's term - is best for Denmark and Europe when taking a wider strategic view. But perhaps increasing the price - for Denmark & Europe, for the decrepit Western Alliance, and for the US - is a better move because it ends up being enough of a deterrent; or perhaps because it will become a clarifying and galvanizing moment for Europe. An alternate reason for increasing the price of a hostile annexation is that to accede would cement Europe's sense of powerlessness and result an more and greater bad consequences down the road.

There are analysts - in Denmark, the US, and elsewhere (and it seems you are among them?) - whose analysis boils down to "there's nothing Denmark and Europe can do to stop the US militarily if they put their mind to it" (which is true I think), "... so therefore Denmark and Europe are powerless and might as well accept the US' diktat" (which is not true IMO).

Okay. I don't think some European troops would help deter Trump. I don't really buy the bully argument about Trump - to me that doesn't fit the assassination of Soleimani, the bombing of Iranian nuclear sites or what's just happened in Venezuela. I think Trump is very reluctant to put boots on the ground in a serious way but pretty reckless on things that are overwhelmingly tilted in the favour of the US/remote.

The only way I think that works is if you buy the (in my view, nonsense) argument that Europe taking Arctic security seriously would address US concerns. I don't think there are US concerns. I think there's whim and Trump wants it - nothing more complex.

I'm not sure that serious talk - though true - about NATO or international law will help either because I don't think Trump cares about either. Though, perhaps, others in the administration do and you can help try to manage and massage them to the extent they matter (particularly as - and I'm not a conspiracy theorist on this - I do think Trump looks less well than he has).

I don't think it would be galvanising but fracturing for Europe. Especially because we're not just facing Trump. Literally today we've got the UK and France and that "coalition of the willing" apparently getting US agreement to back a "reassurance force" in Ukraine (I'll believe it when I see it). We can assume that's gone. I'd assume any American involvement in European security is - so I think there's a question of how Russia would respond as well.

I don't think there are any good options and I don't think Europe has any credible deterents. I think Europe's strategic dilemma is that we are vulnerable economically, on security and on energy - with China, America and Russia able to take advantage and pick at us on all of those. None of them are a solid base. In terms of what I think Europe should do I think it's probably what European leaders are doing. It is the policy of Starmer, Macron, Merz, Tusk - as insipid and emotionally unsatisfying as it is. Try to use diplomacy, try to persuade, try to keep the US engaged in order to help fend off Russia and China - while increasing our own capacities (3-5 years - which is roughly in line with Danish and Norwegian public assessments of when Russia might come again after a deal on Ukraine). I'd probably broadly push for the same policy towards China to be honest.

The only thing I'd add at this point is that I think Europe should be very clear and condemn what's happened in Venezuela. We cannot be simultaneously panicked about the sovereignty of a colony of the Kingdom of Denmark when we're not willing to care at all about the kidnapping of a head of state of a sovereign Latin American country. As with Ukraine and Gaza I just think how this looks from literally anywhere but Europe and it's hypocritical Eurocentrism - and why should anyone anywhere care. We need to start laying the groundwork I think for reaching out to the global south and I think particularly Latin America (also a shot across the bow of what happens when international norms, like the Monroe Doctrine, wither) and particularly Brazil. One challenge there is that after 30 years of negotiating a trade deal with Mercosur (which Lula has already said is the last chance for such a deal), France and Italy under pressure from their farming lobbies are trying to block it. But condemning Venezuela is laying the groundwork to go all in on trying to build new relationships with the rest of the world - which will also involve listening (I think Kaja Kallas probably has to go).

But while I don't think we've got much in way of a deterrent, I think we probably need to think the unthinkable because that might well happen so what the response would be. I think there's something to how do we respond if America uses their force to threaten us and we target America's force. So (very much from Chatham House stuff on this) I'd think about closing American bases or increasing their cost, not refueling American ships, refusing to take American personnel into European military hospitals - we're a base for America. If they're focused on the Western hemisphere, then do what we can to limit them to it.

There'll be trade-offs for that. We'll need to really have focus and spending to pick up the slack on defence (3-5 years). That probably means hard trade-offs and choices on domestic politics and confronting voters with it. And I think it probably means shafting Ukraine to try and, for a while, relieve the pressure from Russia and China.

Fundamentally I think it is probably a choice of trying to keep the Americans engaged while we push Russia (and China) or try to reach a new modus vivendi with Russia and China in order to push back on America - I don't think we can do all three. And that's why my fear is the forces in the world are more likely to split than galvanises Europe - because to go back to the point of different European countries having different risk perceptions which mitigates against common security and defence policies, I think European countries make differet choices over who to confront.

[Tonitrus]

In the context of American opposition and America trying to seize Greenland?

Yes of course.  Could they survive a determined US attack?  Probably not.  But slaughtering a bunch of NATO troops defending a member state's territory is very different than knocking off a handful of hapless Venezuelan drug mules in the ocean. I don't think Trump is prepared to go that far. 

Sadly agree.  Trump may never actually shoot someone in the middle of 5th Avenue...but the US killing a bunch of Danish soldiers (and then posting the faces of those dead...both men and women...in the media) would be as close as one can get.  It would be...should be...as dreadful and shameful image on us and our foreign policy as the My Lai massacre.  Moreso even. 

[The Minsky Moment]

Attacks on Iran can always be justified to a US population that fears and despises that regime and views them as terrorist mastermind.  But even there it's interesting that in both the Soleimani case and the strike last year, Trump was very insistent on saying that the strikes were purely one-off matters and that he sought immediate de-escalation.  Wiping out a battalion of NATO troops is very different matter.  His hedge fund friends, oil execs and real estate pals aren't going to want the fallout of a hot conflict with the entire Eurozone.

[mongers]

In the context of American opposition and America trying to seize Greenland?

Yes of course.  Could they survive a determined US attack?  Probably not.  But slaughtering a bunch of NATO troops defending a member state's territory is very different than knocking off a handful of hapless Venezuelan drug mules in the ocean. I don't think Trump is prepared to go that far. 

Sadly agree.  Trump may never actually shoot someone in the middle of 5th Avenue...but the US killing a bunch of Danish soldiers (and then posting the faces of those dead...both men and women...in the media) would be as close as one can get.  It would be...should be...as dreadful and shameful image on us and our foreign policy as the My Lai massacre.  Moreso even. 

I was thinking earlier I've not heard this level of BS from the WH and attempts to paint a fake reality since the last years of the Vietnam war.

But at that time Nixon was also doing other, real world politically consequential stuff; this WH it's just a stream of shit, endless polluting the public spaces, driving out important politics. 

[Tonitrus]

The big difference with My Lai, of course, it that the US government didn't do it intentionally, though it was an unintended consequence of our policy.  In this hypothetical, it would be a direct, fully attributable consequence of a policy of the Commander in Chief.