Israel-Hamas War 2023

[Razgovory]

Iran wants an end to the war in Gaza so it can save Hamas.

[OttoVonBismarck]

I think the main question on the Houthis is Iran, more than Yemen.

Iran obviously has spent a lot of time and money building the "Axis of Resistance", primarily to undermine both American power and Saudi influence in the Middle East.

But did they build them to fight some large, pitched war against Israel or the West? I have seen some pundits openly say that, but I'm not really sure I agree. Despite its (well earned) reputation for being a shit head country, Iran has actually quite regularly backed down over the course of the last 20 years whenever escalations with the United States were obviously "getting too serious."

I think Iran wants to undermine the U.S., but doesn't want to get into an actual war. I think Iran genuinely fears being the target of a bombing campaign from the U.S., and has fairly regularly backed off of various behaviors when it was clear that level of escalation was "on the table." After Trump assassinated Soleimani, it is interesting to note Iran's only actual response was a symbolic, well telegraphed bombing of a few U.S. bases in Iraq (which Iran knew would be largely ineffective because the personnel had so much warning of the bombings and bunkered down.)

I will also note it seems like the targets hit yesterday were primarily logistical--the largest port that the Houthis control was extensively bombed. My guess is they are thinking they want to make it more logistically difficult for Iran to resupply the Houthis.

Actually attacking the resources that launch cheap drones and rockets is probably a losing game, I am guessing the logic is "but if we make it so it is harder and more expensive to ship materials to the Houthis, that complicates the situation for both them and Iran."

Obviously a day's strikes by itself won't move the needle dramatically on that count, but it sends a "shot across the bow" that follow ups could be possible.

There's obviously limits to what pure bombing campaigns can achieve, the Houthis themselves are not likely that concerned either way, they were bombed for like 10 years by KSA. But Iran has shown every indication over the last 20 years it genuinely fears escalating too much with the U.S. And I think that speaks to the differences between an actual functioning state like Iran vs a quasi-state terror group like the Houthis. Iran doesn't want to live like ISIS and al-Qaeda, Iran has a lot of under the surface instability and dissatisfaction with the regime. If things got to a real exchange with Iran, which would almost certainly dramatically reduce Iranian quality of living and infrastructure, it would be the sort of blow the Ayatollah (and his predecessor even), pretty clearly worked to avoid for basically the entire history of the Islamic Republic.

[Grey Fox]

Of course the Guardian called it a dangerous escalation. I just don't get this attitude. Yemenis attacking civilian shipping wasn't the dangerous escalation, the civilised world's response is? Is it because they consider brown people too inferior to have the concept of escalation or what?

Anyways, I do hope India joins in on the strikes. I fail the see the choice here. Reignite inflation in our countries and suffer the economic and perhaps more importantly political consequences lest some Iranian mercenaries die?

Everything is an escalation. Only the status quo with nothing happening is not an escalation. The Guardian, nimby at home & nimby in the world.

Here is a front page opinion piece to help you understand:
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/jan/12/yemen-houthi-militia-israel-gaza-red-sea

By bombing Yemen, the west risks repeating its own mistakes
Mohamad Bazzi
Instead of retaliating against the Houthi militia, the US and its allies should be pressing Israel to end its invasion of Gaza and accept a ceasefire

The appropriate state response to violence is to do what the aggressor demands, apparently. Assuming the aggressor is Muslim, anyways.

I guess Mister Bazzi doesn't believe Israel has the right to exist. :sigh:

[Tamas]

The way I see it there are two basic options:
1. do nothing - Iran gets the destabilisation and damage it wants by causing economic and thus political damages for its perceived rivals. Succeed or fail, there's no risk or high cost for Iran and its allies.

2. return fire - Iran may or may not get the destabilisation and damage it wants via triggering further escalation in the region. Succeed or fail, there's significant risk and cost for Iran and its allies.

It's a no-brainer. The only guaranteed way for us to lose is to not hit back.

Or

3. Figure out a way to stop the fighting.

The true answer lies with a mix of 2 and 3. Israel getting back to sanity is very possible which should cool things there but of course that's not happening overnight and in the meantime we have to defend ourselves.

Trying to pressure Israel in the background is one thing.

But I couldn't possibly fathom a worst response to violence on your own civilians, than doing exactly what the perpetrator wants you to do. There MUST be an answer to that.

Or do you suggest the world just does whatever the Houthis want from now on until eternity?

In other words: don't be this guy:

[Sheilbh]

The way I see it there are two basic options:
1. do nothing - Iran gets the destabilisation and damage it wants by causing economic and thus political damages for its perceived rivals. Succeed or fail, there's no risk or high cost for Iran and its allies.

2. return fire - Iran may or may not get the destabilisation and damage it wants via triggering further escalation in the region. Succeed or fail, there's significant risk and cost for Iran and its allies.

It's a no-brainer. The only guaranteed way for us to lose is to not hit back.

There was a large naval presence in the region that was shielding from attacks/shooting down missiles. My understanding is that basically worked militarily but not economically.

So the next step is as you say strikes. I think that is a step up or escalation from what we've been doing for the last week or two. Those strikes are so far limited and I suspect will have limited impact.

As I say, I hope it all turns out well - my suspicion is it won't have much impact and we'll face the choice of more of strikes or escalating in a different way. For a US that has been trying for 15 years to disentangle itself from the Middle East that's not ideal. And it shows Europe's dependence again - broadly US trade isn't massively hit (though some trade from China goes through the Red Sea). Europe is, but need the US to respond and to lead the response (although France, UK, Netherlands, Spain and others are participating - the French with an independent command separate from the US lead coalition ).

All of which is to say I don't think escalation is good or bad, but I think it is factually an escalation from what we were doing yesterday. I'm not sure if this is the right choice or not - and I don't think any of the choices are particularly appealing.

I think the main question on the Houthis is Iran, more than Yemen.

Yeah but I think the Houthis have a role. The Houthis are, as you say, basically a quasi-state actor at this point. They effectively run a country - they are not like the Taliban or al-Qaeda in that sense. They're closer to Hezbollah or Hamas in Gaza.

There are pressures and strands within them, like Hamas and Hezbollah where they are allies of Iran rather than just pure proxies. So the first regional response to 7 October was the Houthis firing missiles at Israel - from my understanding that was very much not what Iran wanted at that point. Similarly I believe the Houthis have had recruitment drives of Gaza, including even (falsely) saying that if you sign up you might even be sent to Gaza to fight there. Iran has a lot of influence, they are allies and Iran is the leader of that alliance but I don't think the Houthis just do as they're told.

The other side is Saudi as there is a peace deal now more or less agreed with Saudi - which basically involves the Saudis paying lots of money to the Houthis. They will basically unfreeze revenue from the sale of oil and gas from Houthi areas to pay the salary of public employees in Houthi held Yemen which the Houthis haven't been paying - and restoring the capaciy of export more generally.

What's interesting is that the Houthis have been very much trying to separate what they're doing in the Red Sea (which would, obviously impact their own ability to export) from that peace deal. They're basically saying they're two separate tracks. So far the Saudis have gone along with that. And you can sympathise with the Saudis wanting to keep their peace deal separate from these attacks too - the West tolerated their war in Yemen and provided the weapons, but we didn't rush aircraft carriers when Houthi missiles were being fired into Saudi. Why should they put peace and the security of their southern border on hold because now the West cares.

[Tamas]

It is not an escalation. Side A was shooting at Side B. Side B is now shooting back. The point of escalation was Side A starting to shoot.

It's only in a passive nihilistic time like ours that it could ever be expected by anyone that such attacks would have been kept without a reply.

[The Minsky Moment]

Pre Oct 2023, Iran's most significant diplomatic initiative was detente with Saudi Arabia, with the effect that the Yemini Civil War went from a hot war to an effectively frozen conflict. By taking it to the Little Satan Zionist Entity, the Houthis may be inoculating themselves from further Saudi aggression on the theory that the Saudis wouldn't want to be perceived as indirectly supporting Israel. 

But it's hard to see the logic in that because there wasn't any indication the Saudis had any plan to restart hostilities.  Quite to the contrary, the one thing that could endanger the solid Houthi position is if other outside powers got involved in an escalating conflict.  Before Oct 23, the Biden administration indirectly facilitated the cease fire by halting support for the Saudis in Yemen, which in turn prompted the Saudis to entertain the Iranian diplomatic initiatives.  Pissing off the USA and drawing the US Navy into the region seems like a very risky move, the one thing that could conceivably result in an event chain that could worsen the Houthi position in Yemen.  Biden is notoriously wary of getting entangled in overseas deployment but attacking shipping lanes in an election year where consumer prices is a major issue is going to prompt a response from even the most reluctant C-in-C. And there is no cover or couterweight to appeal to: the Russians are otherwise engaged and the one thing China and the US can still agree on is that you don't screw around with commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

[The Minsky Moment]

And you can sympathise with the Saudis wanting to keep their peace deal separate from these attacks too - the West tolerated their war in Yemen and provided the weapons, but we didn't rush aircraft carriers when Houthi missiles were being fired into Saudi. Why should they put peace and the security of their southern border on hold because now the West cares.

Sure but MBS is not known for his humility and extreme caution.  He is likely to stick with the current policy as things stand for the moment, but if the Houthi-US tit-for-tat escalates and an opportunity arises to restart the conflict on a more favorable correlation of forces, will he roll the dice? 

[Josquius]

Egypt is a big potential interesting factor in all this.
Obviously with their population they have to be on the Gazans side....but at the same time the shit in the red sea and shipping avoiding suez is not acceptable for them.

Also, there must be serious resources and effort going into anti drone r & d.
It's just crazy it takes a million pound missile to stop a 2000 pound drone.
I wonder whether anti drone drones are an option.

The way I see it there are two basic options:
1. do nothing - Iran gets the destabilisation and damage it wants by causing economic and thus political damages for its perceived rivals. Succeed or fail, there's no risk or high cost for Iran and its allies.

2. return fire - Iran may or may not get the destabilisation and damage it wants via triggering further escalation in the region. Succeed or fail, there's significant risk and cost for Iran and its allies.

It's a no-brainer. The only guaranteed way for us to lose is to not hit back.

Or

3. Figure out a way to stop the fighting.

The true answer lies with a mix of 2 and 3. Israel getting back to sanity is very possible which should cool things there but of course that's not happening overnight and in the meantime we have to defend ourselves.

Trying to pressure Israel in the background is one thing.

But I couldn't possibly fathom a worst response to violence on your own civilians, than doing exactly what the perpetrator wants you to do. There MUST be an answer to that.

Or do you suggest the world just does whatever the Houthis want from now on until eternity?

In other words: don't be this guy:

But you're proposing doing exactly what they want and escalating.

What they do or don't want is a factor but only so far as it informs understanding their overall goals and how to stop them achieving them. We shouldn't automatically do the complete opposite just to spite them.

That they want us to start bombing an escalate doesn't mean that option should be totally off the table. But it does mean we have to put a bit of thought into it.

[Sheilbh]

Sure but MBS is not known for his humility and extreme caution.  He is likely to stick with the current policy as things stand for the moment, but if the Houthi-US tit-for-tat escalates and an opportunity arises to restart the conflict on a more favorable correlation of forces, will he roll the dice? 

Fair point. In a way I think if the Saudis waded back in that would be even more likely than US action to regionalise things, because I think to OvB's point Iran will be more careful with the US.

I think the US had a role in causing the shift from Saudi, but I also think they lost. They weren't anywhere near obtaining their obectives in Yemen and it was becoming (not for the first time) a bit of a quagmire for Saudi (and friends). Sitting in London and seeing a crisis around the Red Sea, transit through Suez and the North of Yemen - I'm not as convinced of how easy it would be to weaken the Houthis position.

Although is Biden notoriously wary? I'd thought that through his career Biden (thinking back to the Senate) was normally pretty gung-ho/interventionist on the going in, but did tend to turn more quickly on the pulling out? Is that not fair?

China - and Trump - I think are other interesting angles where I'm not sure how they'd land if this is an ongoing problem.

[Razgovory]

But you're proposing doing exactly what they want and escalating.

What they do or don't want is a factor but only so far as it informs understanding their overall goals and how to stop them achieving them. We shouldn't automatically do the complete opposite just to spite them.

That they want us to start bombing an escalate doesn't mean that option should be totally off the table. But it does mean we have to put a bit of thought into it.

What makes you think they want to escalate?

[Zoupa]

Yemen is in a state of civil war. No one recognizes the Houthis as the official state reps. I hope the west are funding the actual Yemeni government forces in the South.

We're really back to the Cold War shenanigans aren't we. Fucking russians.

[Josquius]

But you're proposing doing exactly what they want and escalating.

What they do or don't want is a factor but only so far as it informs understanding their overall goals and how to stop them achieving them. We shouldn't automatically do the complete opposite just to spite them.

That they want us to start bombing an escalate doesn't mean that option should be totally off the table. But it does mean we have to put a bit of thought into it.

What makes you think they want to escalate?

October 7 and the red sea attacks?

[Razgovory]

But you're proposing doing exactly what they want and escalating.

What they do or don't want is a factor but only so far as it informs understanding their overall goals and how to stop them achieving them. We shouldn't automatically do the complete opposite just to spite them.

That they want us to start bombing an escalate doesn't mean that option should be totally off the table. But it does mean we have to put a bit of thought into it.

What makes you think they want to escalate?

October 7 and the red sea attacks?

As much as the US and Israel have tried to pin the blame on Iran, it seems the Iranians weren't directly involved.  The Iranians do not appear to want to escalate.  If they did they could done quite a bit more like launch a full strike on Israel from the North, right now they seem to just want the war to end so Hamas survives.  The Houthis attacking shipping might be a way to put pressure on Western governments so they put pressure on the Israelis to stop the war and save Hamas.

[OttoVonBismarck]

I think if the Houthis had actually been able to competently target only "Israeli-linked shipping" it may have had a better affect, but because they either lack the ability to discern that or just want to target everyone (their public statements even as of today say they only target Israeli shipping, which is not accurate), they have launched attacks on ships totally unrelated to Israel, imperiling Suez trade in general.

Israel is actually less dependent on Suez economically than an umber of other regional players--and importantly China ships a lot of things through Suez and is generally double plus unhappy with anything that negatively impacts its trade.