The EU thread

[Duque de Bragança]

Things must look really bad if they expect Iberian reinforcements for Bornholm instead of Germany, Sweden and Poland, for Bornholm is part of their Baltic hinterland. 

[Jacob]

I think Iberians were mentioned to make a rhetorical point about the risk of fracturing EU and NATO cohesion.

As in, the person making the point thinks the Iberians are least likely to offer support in case of war. I don't know how true it is, though?

[Duque de Bragança]

I understand that, if only for logistical reasons. Even land movement is a problem with different rail gauges; the Catalonian high-speed link is under-used and not for heavy freight trains anyways. Not applicable directly to Bornholm, anyways.

Besides, spending is barely at 2% not likely to increase, namely for Spain"Russia won't reach the Pyrenees" (How is the P line these days? https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Línea_P).

The Portuguese prime minister stated his intention to increase spending, unlike the Spanish PM, however.

[Jacob]

That said, presumably the Spanish and Portuguese could deploy some naval and air force assets to the Baltic theatre if the situation called for it.

[Duque de Bragança]

That's the extent of it I believe, plus some marines, if needed.

By the time they arrive, it could be too late, however, assuming the Russians somehow circumvent or secure Swedish Gotland first.

[Legbiter]

Following the ongoing situation in Iran, I am convening a special Security College on Monday.

https://x.com/vonderleyen/status/2027756878575362119



I'd go of course if urgent but things will still be exploding when I get back on Monday. 

[Jacob]

Video overview of the Joint Expeditionary Force - a UK led grouping of North European militaries (UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania).

[Sheilbh]

I think the JEF is a good idea and is the sort of organising approach I mean when I talk about minilateralism of one or two bigger countries helping coordinate smaller countries with a regional/niche focus within European defence rather than thinking about "European defence" at a European level. And at a day-to-day operational level they work together a lot.

But I hate to be negative but the UK is the proble here because we're just not spending enough on defence and we're not increasing spending enough. There was a JEF event very early in his premiership when Starmer spoke about the need to increase defence spending, but also to balance that against justified public demand for increased spending on the health service - which is why we'd be increasing defence spending by 1% of GDP over the next decade. Sat behind him was the Estonian PM who looked like he was chewing bees

(FWIW there is a similar problem with Italy and France - we are fiscally constrained on defence. Germany isn't and might be able to lead.)

[Jacob]

Don't lie. You don't hate being negative about the UK   

[Sheilbh]

[Legbiter]

Really good overview video Jacob. I learned quite a bit. I didn't know the Dutch had such a good marines contingent.

[Jacob]

That said, even if the UK isn't expanding and modernizing at a pace you (and I) find desirable, your current capabilities are still substantial and worthwhile in the context of the JEF.

Several of the constituent members ARE increasing their financial commitments and modernizing (some from lower baselines, admittedly), so capabilities are continually increasing.

Currently according to the video, the JEF nations colletively have roughly the following assets:

Active Personnel: ~400 000
Reserve Personnel: ~1.6 million
Naval Displacement: 700 000 tonnes
MBTs: ~1 000
Artillery: 3-4 000
Fighter Aircraft: ~700
Drones: ~3 000+
SOF Personnel: ~10 000

Obviously not all of them are likely to be deployed to a given hotspot (and the video touches on some of the constraints), but it is a non-trivial set of assets to provide second thoughts for any Russian invasion planners.

The key point here, I think, is that there are real capabilities with real and practiced interoperability, and that those capabilities are attached to a decision-making structure that is more nimble and more closely aligned in values. In case of a potential Russian attack on say a Baltic nation, there could be a credible response on a much faster timeline than one that had to defer to EU decision-making speeds (whether a need for longer German deliberation processes or Orbanesque obstruction) or catering to whatever narcissistic self-dealing dog-and-pony show the US might require.

It also, I think, provides an existing structure for other aligned nations to attach to in case they are inclined to respond more quickly - say the French or Canada or Poland or Germany.

Yes more materiel and capability would be better, and there are legitimate criticisms about defence policy and spending (both past and present) for each of the constituent nations, but practiced interoperability and the ability to sidestep more cumbersome decision making in case of emergency is valuable and - to me - reassuring.

Maybe JEF can't hold a concerted Russian attack back singlehandedly at length (wouldn't it be nice if it could), but if it can respond quickly to minimize initial Russian gains and bloody Russian noses while the EU and NATO at large get their shit together, that's very valuable. And it is something that Russian planners will have to account for, that can potentially make an initial attack less appealing.

[Legbiter]

Canada seems like a shoo-in for JEF once they've beefed up their military. You'd be the Finland-like meatshield in the West like Finland is in the East.

[Jacob]

Really good overview video Jacob. I learned quite a bit. I didn't know the Dutch had such a good marines contingent.

[Sheilbh]

Those are all very fair points Jake despite my doom and gloom.

I think Canada would make sense as an addition but I would resist expanding this - instead I'd suggest taking it as a model.

The reason I say that is that I think fundamental challenge for European defence is not actually lack of material or even lack of political will - but that there is not a shared strategic and risk perception. Which makes perfect sense - the view fom different bits of Europe of where and how threats are materialising is different. I don't think there's a cynical or negative reason for that - I simply think things look differently in Dublin and Riga or Oslo and Athens. Which is why I think in that context European coopertion has been hugely enabled by American hegemony. Because there was an external, overwhelming power doing quite a lot of heavy lifting and basically setting the strategic direction (which has been fraying increasingly since the end of the Cold War).

So for me post-American hegemony the question of how you get Europe capable of acting is how you deal with those different strategic perceptions? And I think this is where and why the EU has historically struggled on this (while it being a source of strength in other areas). There isn't a hegemon, foregn and security policy requires unanimity, there is always small state suspicion of big states and fundamentally there are very different views of where risk is. So I think adding more states even with the best intentions would dilute the effectiveness if there's not a clear strategic rationale.

That's why I think expanding the JEF to include Canada, but also (if they want in) Iceland and Greenland would make sense and use it to focus on the North Atlantic/Baltic Seas/High North region - probably coordinated (in that constellation) by the UK and Canada. I think similarly Germany and Poland are investing hugelt - and their focus is obviously on land forces and again I'd suggest they could coordinate with the Baltics on land and other interested (non-hostile) CEE states on that "theatre" for want of a better phrase. France has already developed very close defence relationships with Romania and Greece - so that to me looks like another strategic region around South-East Europe and the Med. I think that way you build from a shared strategic region - with optionalities depending on who can contribute what and who is "willing". There may be some countries that just aren't interested/actively hostile and in many current European constellations that's a serious obstacle. But I think you would then hope to have coordination between those "theatres" in a way that respects the risks and strategic assessments of each area without the direction of a hegemon.

FWIW the British (and I assume Canadian) focus on the High North and North Atlantic, (West) German focus on land forces in Central Europe and Italy in the Med would also basically replicate the more specific roles those nations played in Cold War NATO. So you'd hope it kind of echoes existing capabilities and strategic thinking.