The EU thread

[Tamas]

Talking of annexing, was thinking it would be great if Ireland annexed us, it would be a great way of coming back to the EU. Would never happen, of course, but nice to think about it.

BTW Trump is really showcasing the folly of Brexit. We have locked ourselves out of the EU gate, and what we are left with is groveling to the big psycho outside the gate so it'd refrain from eating us while he thinks us entertainingly subservient.

Do recall that as UK citizens, we are entitled to live and work in Ireland.

Meh. Rather Poland for me, then.

Very similar type of life to the UK

Well, Ireland, like Poland, has been, on average, on the wrong end of the... uhm, phallos of history. Might as well settle somewhere familiar then.

However, I am not looking to abandon ship. This is home now. But that makes me more frustrated about things like Brexit, not less.

[garbon]

Well, Ireland, like Poland, has been, on average, on the wrong end of the... uhm, phallos of history. Might as well settle somewhere familiar then.

However, I am not looking to abandon ship. This is home now. But that makes me more frustrated about things like Brexit, not less.

Understandable.

[Jacob]

On the EU - if I had influence on the direction of the EU I would look at finding ways to attack the influence and standing of the pseudo-oligarchs who are driving the attacks on Europe; so Thiel, Musk, Lauder, and others. They have declared themselves enemies of the EU and are actively pushing for its destruction and the subordination of its peoples.

There's no need to let them operate with impunity inside the EU's economies or political spheres.

[Valmy]

On the EU - if I had influence on the direction of the EU I would look at finding ways to attack the influence and standing of the pseudo-oligarchs who are driving the attacks on Europe; so Thiel, Musk, Lauder, and others. They have declared themselves enemies of the EU and are actively pushing for its destruction and the subordination of its peoples.

There's no need to let them operate with impunity inside the EU's economies or political spheres.

Why the Democrats allowed obvious partisan actors like Musk continue to get government contracts blew my mind.

Don't make the same mistake. Ban these bad actors from your shores. Punish them for attempting to weild undemocratic political power.

[HisMajestyBOB]

On the EU - if I had influence on the direction of the EU I would look at finding ways to attack the influence and standing of the pseudo-oligarchs who are driving the attacks on Europe; so Thiel, Musk, Lauder, and others. They have declared themselves enemies of the EU and are actively pushing for its destruction and the subordination of its peoples.

There's no need to let them operate with impunity inside the EU's economies or political spheres.

Why the Democrats allowed obvious partisan actors like Musk continue to get government contracts blew my mind.

Don't make the same mistake. Ban these bad actors from your shores. Punish them for attempting to weild undemocratic political power.

 

[Sheilbh]

Why the Democrats allowed obvious partisan actors like Musk continue to get government contracts blew my mind.

Don't make the same mistake. Ban these bad actors from your shores. Punish them for attempting to weild undemocratic political power.

Not just get government contracts - from my understanding, without policy decisions under Obama on roll out of EVs and Space X contracts, Musk would have gone under.

To be honest I think part of it was that they were not read/understood as they are now, then. I remember the glowing, excited articles about the future of politics following Obama's campaign which was apparently based on microtargeting. The exact same technology and platforms that were, in 2016, weaponise in a plot against democracy. I don't know with that sort of thing or with Musk the extent to which they have changed (ie we were right in 2012 - and they're not the same person) or the extent to which our perspective has shifted and we read it wrong then? I'm genuinely not sure (my own view is probably just that wealth and power and their class position will always be hostile to democratic power - but so are the cuddly billionaires ).

On the EU, there are mechanisms for doing that sort of thing - like the Digital Services Act which has mechanisms to act against the platforms. My own view is the real problem is that it would be a political decision and require politics - Europe operates at the level of technical policy making and "rule of law". There are rules and laws around how and when the EU could do that sort of thing. The EU successfully dealt with Microsoft over competition - but it took about a decade of deeply technical work and court cases. If your view is around threats to democracy then that's not going to be a viable solution - and that is the EU's MO (for very good reasons). I think part of the EU reluctance is also a bit like why Europe is not just spending Russian assets - it could be a very dangerous precedent.

I mentioned elsewhere that just last month the other problem is that for some of these services there is no European alternative. I mentioned it but the French intelligence service recently extended their contract with Palantir (agreed last month). This was a deal they entered into very quickly after the Bataclan attack and the renewal was framed around a successful Olympics. For better or worse, Europe has not developed a big data powered panopticon that will help intelligence agencies prevent terrorist attacks. As I say there's a better and worse side of that but I think that is an important part of the context for this - that at least in part the trade off decision-makers have is do you put money in Peter Thiel's pocket, or do you decommission a supplier that is credibly reducing the risk of another Bataclan attack? I hate to say it but we'd be in a better position if there were European companies specialising in spying on us all - sadly they're all American or Israeli.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

Which is what De Wever also mentioned in that little video I posted over in the Greenland thread: Europe is not sovereign digitally and it needs to be. The Chinese are because they've been smart (and cutthroat, and thieving too) about it.

[Baron von Schtinkenbutt]

Part of Europe's disadvantage to the US and China here is that "Europe" isn't sovereign in anything.  Despite the EC being able to pass directives that bind members to do things, it's still a collection of individual states with individual (and sometimes conflicting) motivations.  It leads to a classic failure mode where everyone can agree there's a problem, but nobody can agree on a solution (the parts that don't involve restricting the activities of non-European entities, at least).

As much as I hate centralization, the fundamental first step to addressing many of these issues is increasing it in the EU.

[Sheilbh]

Yeah I think that's right.

Part of that is, ultimately, the problem that has always been identified from a pro-European perspective which is that there isn't a European demos. There is a symbolic, legal, formal side of this which the EU has been trying to create: flag, European anthem, citizen of the EU etc. But I think that only gets you so far.

This slightly goes to OvB's point of the willingness of, say, the Portuguese to fight Estonia's war. The way democratic states work is that there is a sense of the shared identity/demos which means that I live in one of the safest Labour seats in the country which was I think 80% Remain (and I'm part of that majority) but accept that I am bound by and the legitimacy of a government primarily elected by, say, Red Wall voters who want Brexit and swing between Labour, Tory and Reform. At a even more basic level that is, in part, what Scottish and Welsh nationalism is - it rejects the British identity/demos and state.

I know I always go back to the Eurozone crisis - but I think it's because it's key and the huge fork in the road when Europe decisively took the wrong path on basically every front. But at the core stake, at the moment of global financial crisis and dealing with ideas of assuming common/shared debt, revenue and costs - it was all pinned on the member states. I think this is part of the challenge the EU has had for the last 15 years - that it is (in my view) at the edge of what's possible under the treaties and from a democratic perspective, but the next leap requires a European demos, a European democracy and the possibiliity of, at the most benign end, Dutch taxpayers on the hook for Greek indulgence and at the most extreme Spanish soldiers dying in a frozen field in North-East Europe.

Two slightly disconnected thoughts.

One is whether we're going into a neo-Medieval world anyway - so I think that shared identity/demos is fraying at the national state level already. Whether it's in Britain over Brexit and the IndyRef or the US with Trump or Greece with Syriza - I think this will continue with the RN in France. I feel like we are in an age where people are increasingly dissatisfed with accepting their fellow citizens democratic power over them. I can't remember who - it might have been Hedley Bull - but there was an English school international relations theorist who talked about that state based identity being quite novel and wondering about an emerging neo-Medievalism where people had more attachment and identity at the local and the transnational level. So people identify with their state or city or sub-national unit and with something at the transnational level (like Christendom - or the "West"). I think I see it in London where lots of people feel Londoner and also feel they've more in common with say New York than Middlesbrough. I think this is particularly the case when we all have and live onthe American internet so Mamdani is a huge hit globally and what lessons can we learn etc. And part of me slightly feels that no British person should really have an opinion about the Mayor of New York because it doesn't matter to us But on the sort of transnational level it does - we're in the same sphere, like Christendom or the ummah.

In relation to Europe I think the inevitable question from that is whether it is a twentieth century slightly modernist state building project in a state-dissolving post-modern 21st century?

The other thing I slightly wonder about Western leaders - and Europe's the extreme example - is it seems to me a little bit that the quality of statecraft by Western leaders is inversely proportional to the regularity of their meetings. And I know there's a bit that's just quite tongue-in-cheek about that but I do think there is something to it, especially at the European level with so many regular European Councils of the different ministers. I think we've all worked in an organisation where having another meeting is the same as doing something. But I also wonder if it slightly distorts leaders' views were increasingly their "stakeholders" are not voters or their party but each other and the NGOs and lobbyists and CEOs they meet in the rolling calendar of summits and councils and forums. It's almost too easy to see and visit and speak to each other which is producing its own form of paralysis.

In the specific European context I think it has empowered the European Council over the European Commission and that is a huge part of why integration has stalled in recent years because historically the Commission is the engine of integration.

[Sheilbh]

Interesting Politico piece - I doubt this alignment will be permanent for all the reasons in the article:

The EU's new power couple: Merz and Meloni
As relations between Berlin and Paris falter, Germany's chancellor is identifying Italy's prime minister as a key ally.

January 23, 2026 4:04 am CET
By James Angelos, Giorgio Leali, Nette Nöstlinger and Ben Munster

BERLIN — As Europe's traditional Franco-German engine splutters, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is increasingly looking to team up with hard-right Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni as his co-pilot in steering the EU.

The two are set to meet at a summit in the opulent Villa Doria Pamphilj in Rome on Friday to double down on their budding alliance. They are both right-wing Atlanticists who want to cool tensions with U.S. President Donald Trump. And they both have their frustrations with French President Emmanuel Macron.

In years past, Germany would traditionally have turned to France at decisive moments to map out blueprints for the EU, so it's significant that Merz is now aligning with Meloni in his attempt to drive forward core European priorities on trade, industry and relations with the U.S.

"When Berlin and Rome work closely together, it is not out of routine, but out of conviction, because Europe's future, freedom and power to shape the world depend on it," German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul told POLITICO's Berlin Playbook.

In part, Merz's gravitation toward Meloni is driven by annoyance with France. Berlin is irritated that Paris sought to undermine the landmark Mercosur trade deal with South America, which the Germans have long wanted in order to promote industrial exports. Germany is also considering pulling out of a €100 billion joint fighter-jet program over disputes with the French.

Against that backdrop, the alignment with Rome has a compelling logic.

During Friday's summit, Merz and Meloni are expected to sign up to cooperation on defense, according to diplomats working on the preparations. It's not clear what that involves, but Germany's Rheinmetall and Italy's Leonardo already have a joint venture to build tanks and other military vehicles. In all, the meetings will involve 21 top ministers from the two countries, who are expected to seal some 10 agreements, according to the Italian government.

Perhaps most ambitiously, Italy and Germany are teaming up to draft a new game plan to revive EU industry and expand exports in a joint position paper for the Feb. 12 European Council summit. Berlin and Rome style themselves as the "two main industrial European nations" and have condemned delays to the Mercosur agreement.

That language will grate in Paris.

In for the long haul

For Giangiacomo Calovini, a lawmaker from Meloni's Brothers of Italy party, who heads the parliament's Italian-German friendship group, the Merz-Meloni alliance makes sense given Macron's impending departure from the European stage after next year's French election.

"[Our] two countries have stable governments, especially if compared with France's," he said. "It is clear that Meloni and Merz still probably have a long path ahead of them, during which they can work together."

Safeguarding the relationship with Trump is crucial to both leaders, and both Merz and Meloni have sought to avoid transatlantic blow-ups. They have been supported in their firefighting by their foreign ministers, Wadephul and Antonio Tajani.

"Giorgia Meloni and Friedrich Merz have represented the European wing most open to dialogue with President Trump," said Pietro Benassi, former Italian ambassador to Berlin and the EU. "The somewhat surreal acceleration [of events] driven by the American president is confirming a convergence in the positions of Italy and Germany, rather than between Italy and France, or France and Germany."

In contrast to the softly-softly approach in Rome and Berlin, Calovini accused Macron of unhelpfully "contradictory" behavior toward Trump. "He acts as the one who wants to challenge the United States of America but then sends texts — that Trump has inelegantly published — in which he begs Trump to have dinner," he complained.

Good chemistry

Officials in Berlin now privately gush over the growing cooperation with Meloni, describing the relationship with Rome as dependable.

"Italy is reliable," said one senior German government official, granted anonymity to speak candidly. It's not an adjective authorities in Berlin have often used to describe their French counterparts of late.

"France is more verbal, but Italy is much more pragmatic," said Axel Schäfer, a senior lawmaker in Germany's Social Democratic Party long focused on German-Italian relations.

An Italian official also praised the "good chemistry" between Merz and Meloni personally. That forms a marked contrast with the notoriously strained relations between Meloni and Macron, who have frequently clashed.

In their effort to draw closer, Merz and Meloni have at times resorted to hyperbole.

During his inaugural visit to Rome as chancellor last year, Merz said there was "practically complete agreement between our two countries on all European policy issues."

Meloni returned the sentiment.

"It is simply impossible to cast doubt on the relations between Italy and Germany," she said at the time.

Marriage of convenience

That is overegging it. The two leaders, in fact, have considerable differences.

Meloni refused to support an ultimately doomed plan, pushed by Merz, to use frozen Russian assets to finance military aid for Ukraine. Meloni also briefly withheld support for the Mercosur trade deal in order to win concessions for Italian farmers before ultimately backing it.

Critically, Rome and Berlin are likely to prove very awkward allies when it comes to public finances. Italy has long pushed for looser European fiscal policy — and been a natural ally of France on this point — while Germany has served as the continent's iron disciplinarian on spending.

But even here there has been some convergence, with Meloni cutting Italy's spending and Merz presiding over a historic expansion in debt-fueled outlays on infrastructure and defense.

Fundamentally, much of the growing alliance between Merz and Meloni is a product of shifts undertaken for their own domestic political survival.

Meloni has dragged her nationalist Brothers of Italy party to the center, particularly on foreign policy matters. At the same time, the rise of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party in Germany has forced Merz to shift his conservative party sharply to the right on migration.   

This ideological merging has allowed for a warming of relations. As Merz has sought partners on the European level to drastically reduce the inflow of asylum seekers coming to Europe, to reduce regulation and to push for more trade — and provide a counterbalance to Macron — Meloni has become an increasingly important figure for the chancellor.

Still, Stefano Stefanini, a former senior Italian diplomat and NATO representative, said there would always be limits to the relationship.

"It's very tactical," he said. "There's no coordinated strategy. There are a number of issues on which Meloni and Merz find themselves on the same side."

Stefanini also noted that spending commitments — particularly on military projects — would be an area where Rome would once again find itself in a more natural alliance with France.

"On defense spending Italy and France are closer, because Germany has the fiscal capacity to spend by itself, while Italy and France need to get as much financial support as they can from the EU," he said.

Despite such differences, Meloni has seized her opening to get closer to Merz.

"Meloni has understood that, as there is some tension in the France-Germany relationship, she could infiltrate and get closer to Germany," said Marc Lazar, an expert on Franco-Italian relations who teaches at the Luiss University in Rome and at Sciences Po in Paris.

This story has been updated.

Rasmus Buchsteiner contributed to this report.

I think part of this reflects a very long-standing German frustration with Macron (under Merkel, Scholz and Merz).  I think Macron has actually spoken about this. His way of framing it is that he has a strategy to provoke or to make rhetorical provocations in the hope of shaping the outcome/making the rhetorical reality (most recently on Greenland but it's only the latest time it's happened - it goes right back to the "brain death of NATO" comment). I think from a German perspective (and actually much of the rest of Europe) it is experienced as him trying to bounce them into something and seize leadership rather than working with European partners to get aligned before announcing something.

I'm kind of torn on it because I think in terms of the analysis and what he's saying Macron is the only European leader in the last 15 years who has had an analysis that I think is basically right and a strategy to deal with it. I also think he did the stuff Germany (and others) had long said they would need from France for more integration: structural reforms, spending cuts, difficult pension reforms. He helped make France the "responsible partner" that was apparently lacking and, having done that, Germany and others then showed no interest whatsoever in Macron's plans for Europe (laid out in his Sorbonne speech immediately after becoming President). But at the same time he does have a habit of basically trying to bounce the rest of Europe into a decision in a fairly self-aggrandising manner.

So not entirely a surprise to see other states looking to work together instead. But I think for all of his problems at a European level we will probably miss Macron as I'm not sure there is another European leader with the type of analysis and vision that he's had annoying as he is

[Jacob]

I tend to align in favour of the Mercosur deal, but am distinctly unimpressed by the Merz and Meloni instinct to suck up to Trump.

For the European project, I lean more towards Macron.

[Valmy]

but am distinctly unimpressed by the Merz and Meloni instinct to suck up to Trump.

There has always been this belief that Trump can be charmed and manipulated.

That has only failed every time for 40+ years.

[Solmyr]

Should we be worried about Germany and Italy being aligned?