What does a TRUMP presidency look like?

[The Minsky Moment]

Seeing commentary that Musk torpedoed the bill because it had provisions that would have placed scrutiny and restrictions on companies operating in China. Any truth to that?

There were controls on US investment in China that were pulled from the bill, specifically in the AI and other tech sectors. 

[frunk]

I agree to a point.

But I think the "everyone's taking us for a ride" on trade and defence is something Trump was saying in 2000 and in the 80s - and I think it involved bullying countries who need America more than America needs them (Canada, Europe). So I think he will follow through on pushing for a significant increase in defence spending in Europe. In his last presidency Europe did end up increasing spending (though not enough), I suspect the same will happen - and if that does it's bad news for Putin.

Which, coincidentally is when Trump first started traveling to the Soviet Union.  The point of the "demand more spending or the US is out of NATO" isn't a coherent position, it's to sow discord and dissension within the alliance.  Can you think of a time when a sovereign country was publicly threatened by an ally and this resulted in productive change?  In no way does this threatening make it easier for NATO countries to increase spending, it only hardens the domestic resistance to increasing spending.

[crazy canuck]

If the people voting on the plan get their information about it from Musk then I think the problem isn't Musk.

I think his misinformation is less egregious than him threatening congress members to fund their opponents in primaries which given his deep pockets (thanks Citizens Unites) and ownership of Twitter could lead to him quite literally buying the legislature.

This

[crazy canuck]

Seeing commentary that Musk torpedoed the bill because it had provisions that would have placed scrutiny and restrictions on companies operating in China. Any truth to that?

There were controls on US investment in China that were pulled from the bill, specifically in the AI and other tech sectors. 

And since the bill that passed looks a lot like the first bipartisan bill, with this exception, one wonders why Elon wasn't railing against spending again.

[Sheilbh]

Which, coincidentally is when Trump first started traveling to the Soviet Union.  The point of the "demand more spending or the US is out of NATO" isn't a coherent position, it's to sow discord and dissension within the alliance.  Can you think of a time when a sovereign country was publicly threatened by an ally and this resulted in productive change?  In no way does this threatening make it easier for NATO countries to increase spending, it only hardens the domestic resistance to increasing spending.

If you're looking at outcomes - then I think there is an argument for European defence spending 2016-20 when it started to increase significantly (from a very low base). Broadly EU and Canada spending increased from €250 billion in 2015 to about €320 billion in 2020, with the biggest increase in 2017. It certainly increased significantly more than under Clinton, Bush and Obama who had all tried to diplomatically persuade Europe to increase their defence spending. The 2% target was introduced in 2014 following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. European defence spending fell the next year to a record low.

But also Suez springs to mind - which delivered the results the US wanted, forcefully moved the UK from attempting any form of independence to the most loyal ally (more complicated with France) and, I think, was correct for the UK. I think there's a similar argument around American pressure/threats/abandonment in Asia after WW2 (particularly basically making clear there was no support for the Dutch trying to re-impose control in Indonesia).

Our most durable and important alliances were forged from absolute triumph and reconstruction of two or three key partners which was enforced, coercive and productive. I think the very foundation of our alliance in other contexts such as why Greece or Italy are in it point to factors beyond diplomatic cajoling wary of the impact on domestic politics.

To put it another way I think the limits of diplomacy have been pretty evident in the last year with Biden's position towards Israel. I think at some point pressure needs to move from verbal to having consequences. And part of the reason Biden had so little sway over Netanyahu is precisely because Netanyahu knew the domestic constraints in the US would prevent that policy becoming anything more than verbal calls for restraint.

And I don't think not wanting to give in to Trump/American pressure has been any part of European discourse on defence spending. I think that might apply to allies trying to pressure America, which is powerful. I'm not sure it applies the other way round because ultimately we are weaker so a shift in American politics is a fact that we need to respond to - it's not like de Villepin and Guardian readers on Iraq.

If the outcome is the same again - that's not great for Russia.