Brexit and the waning days of the United Kingdom

[Sheilbh]

The article says it's in texts they've had with a shadow cabinet minister.

And I remember thinking that about the Blair-Brown spats when those stories came up. Since they've both left office and the memoirs have come out it's clear that the media only got 10% of it and it was far worse than any of us knew.

It strikes me as believable - as I say my general impression of Labour is that at the minute the factions are all focused on winning control of the Labour Party/destroying the other and not focused on the country.

[Josquius]

I see that from the right and the left of the party for sure.
Starmer always struck me as stuck in the middle, futily waving his arms about and shouting at the others to stop fighting.

[Sheilbh]

I think he's an actor on it and right now I think he's on the right of the party. I mean he was forced to sideline Jenni Chapman (now Baroness Chapman after she lost her seat in 2019) who ran his leadership campaign because she was briefing against Rayner, so Chapman is now shadowing Lord Frost on EU stuff.

Really interesting, lengthy summary of the UK in a Changing Europe "Brexit Witness" project:
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-923X.13031

'Since this is a Document of Record': Collecting the Oral Histories of the Brexit Parliament
Alan Wager
First published: 02 July 2021
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.13031

[...]

Key to parsing the lessons from this period is understanding what changed in the nature of the relationship between Parliament and the government during this period, how these changes were perceived by MPs, and why Boris Johnson was ultimately able to reverse this rebalancing of executive-legislative relations. Three interconnected developments throughout the course of the Parliament stand out as important from these interviews—each challenging, in different ways, the conception of the House of Commons as a place with a conservative notion of responsibility and accountability, and strong majoritarian government.4

The first was an increasing culture of informal forms of cross-party activity in the House of Commons. The idea that the May administration could complete the Brexit process was disabused by the biggest, and then the third biggest, defeat on record in the House of Commons. The result was attempts by pro-European MPs, first through cross-party talks and a process of indicative votes, then through cross-party organisation by opposition politicians, to find a cohesive alternative to Brexit as pursued by Theresa May and Boris Johnson.

The core activity of this cross-party activity was an effort to rebalance legislative-executive relations in favour of an increased role for the House of Commons. Amid the ultimate failure of those advocating a 'soft' Brexit or no Brexit at all, the high points of cross-party activity among backbench and opposition MPs were two private member's bills, the first in April 2019 (the 'Cooper-Letwin Act') and the second in September (the 'Benn-Burt Act'), both designed to force the government into requesting an extension of Article 50 to avoid a no deal Brexit. Parliament was able to generate additional levers of influence, which the executive assumed the legislature had not held, as a means of avoiding the UK leaving the European Union without a withdrawal agreement in place. This process was described in the press as a 'very British coup', the contention being that the House of Commons would ultimately—by creating the precedent that it could control the order paper, and issue instructions on negotiations by legislative fiat—be transforming executive-legislative relations.5

The third was a temporary fluidity of the party system in the country—which emboldened those calling for an intensification of cross-party activity, but ultimately led to Labour and the Conservatives taking opposing sides on a further referendum about the UK's membership of the European Union. These fast-moving developments throughout 2019 included the creation of the Brexit Party by Nigel Farage; the formation of The Independent Group by a group of Labour MPs led by Chuka Umunna, which morphed into Change UK led by the former Conservative MP Heidi Allen; and the failure of this new party triggering rising support for the Liberal Democrats. All this led many in the Conservative and Labour parties to fear for the long-term oligopoly of two-party politics in Britain as opinion polls regularly showed a new four-party politics.6 For the Conservatives, the electoral threat of Nigel Farage drove them to the leadership of Boris Johnson.

[...]

Cross-party activity in the House of Commons

[...]

While key whipping operations were successful, the lack of formal organising structures meant that collective action was difficult. Then Conservative MP Dominic Grieve put it that: 'The remorseless logic was that the House of Commons, if it wanted to do something else, had to seize control of the order paper and say what it should be—including, potentially, a second referendum. But, you know, that's rather like trying to get octopuses into a string bag.' This meant during key periods where procedural successes could have been built upon—for example following the Supreme Court's decision that Boris Johnson's attempt to prorogue Parliament was illegitimate—Grieve felt opponents of the government were 'left floundering around'.

The development of the idea of a 'government of national unity' was a natural progression to solve these organisational and procedural hurdles. John Bercow says that 'I don't think it was the majority chance, but I did think that that might happen'. Yet the ideational and cultural blocks on cross-party activity—tribal loyalties, the group dynamics that make rebellion often so difficult, and residual distrust—did not go away, even for those who became increasingly detached from their party machinery. When discussion of a government of national unity was broached, then Conservative MP Philip Lee says, 'there was a nervousness about it because everyone is quite party loyal, quite tribal'. For the SNP, Joanna Cherry felt: 'A Government of National Unity, the name itself, is something that is really difficult for the SNP to be part of. If you had called it a Temporary Emergency Government or something, yes ... I think a lot of people in our group felt that.'

For the Labour Party, John McDonnell says that—while he was increasingly in favour of co-operation, 'We weren't willing to go into coalitions. We weren't willing to form a national government. They don't usually tend to do too well for Labour administrations, really, and I didn't want Jeremy as Ramsay Mac-Corbyn.' Meanwhile, Conservatives such as Dominic Grieve saw Jeremy Corbyn as an intractable block. Hilary Benn put it that: 'There was certainly a discussion about it. But it would only have happened if the Labour Party had been prepared to support it with a Prime Minister who wasn't then leader of the Labour Party. It was quite clear that was never going to happen.'

The electoral consequences of cooperation were felt to be a barrier to entry into any cross-party government. Senior figures in the Corbyn leadership view countenancing a cross-party, pluralistic approach to cooperation as a fatal mistake for a Corbyn project which had prided itself on its extra-parliamentary and outsider credentials. James Schneider, the Director of Strategic Communications for Jeremy Corbyn, puts it that 'there was all the ludicrous nonsense over the summer, with the Government of National Unity and all that absolute anti-democratic jibber-jabber'. This, he felt, was key to Boris Johnson's popular appeal in the 2019 general election.

Efforts to rebalance legislative-executive relations

At the time, it was thought that the procedural innovations that took place could permanently upend the relationship between the executive and the legislature. With the benefit of hindsight, our interviewees reflected on why that revolution had failed.

[...]

Elite reflections on why Bercow's rules failed to have a lasting effect focus in part on the process that underpinned them. For example, Gavin Barwell, Theresa May's Chief of Staff, reflecting on the Cooper-Letwin process, argued that 'If the House wanted to do that, it would've been much better if he'd granted some time, in a general debate, for a motion on House business, where the House could have formally changed its rules to say that that was okay. Just putting it through by edict, I thought, was very bad.'

While clearly denied on-the-record by those organising both private member's bills and the Speaker, there was a feeling that this was a coordinated process. The perception of one Leave-supporting Cabinet minister, Chris Grayling—that 'Parliament was only able to do what it did because of Bercow, who rewrote the rules and made no attempt to hide the fact he was a fierce Remainer'. Caroline Flint—a Labour MP who opposed some of this legislation—argues that 'from my standpoint, where I was sitting, there was clearly a lot of tactical planning going on behind the scenes that involved Remainers on our side and the Speaker.'

However, some of our interviewees were acutely sensitive to the charge that they were subverting the 'rules of the game' of Westminster. As Hilary Benn puts it: 'Take control of the order paper' has this connotation of MPs behaving improperly. If MPs are not going to determine what Parliament discusses and how it votes, then we are sunk. I always pointed out that the Cooper Bill and the Benn Bill, as they became known, were simply private member's bills taken not on a Friday.' Whatever the truth, this perception that the Speaker's rulings were ad hoc and partisan has served to weaken their historical and institutional importance, and has made it more difficult to argue they are part of a meaningful evolution in executive-legislative relations.

An increasingly fluid party system

[...]

For Labour, granular polling evidence from YouGov, delivered to the Shadow Cabinet in the summer of 2019, showed that the party would be wiped out by a Liberal Democrat surge. This was persuasive for a sufficient number of the Labour Cabinet to view cross-party working as necessary. John McDonnell's fear was 'a split of 60 or 70 Labour MPs away from us, and then us almost becoming no longer the major Opposition party because other coalitions would form'.

It is the contention of key figures in the People's Vote campaign such as Alastair Campbell that the best route to a further referendum was through a united Labour Party rather than splintered pro-Remain forces in the House of Commons. The partial co-option of the People's Vote campaign by the Labour Party was a response to the threat, with Labour being the rallying point. John McDonnell sets out the pro-referendum conundrum as:

Do they stick with us and try and see if we can get something sorted round the People's Vote, or do they go with the split group? I can remember sitting on the frontbench with Keir in one debate, and Chuka Umunna made some intervention. I said to Keir, "Look, there is something he said another time. I will check". I texted Alastair Campbell, and he sent down a piece of information that then Keir got up and used in the debate. So that confirmed in my mind that Alastair and others had taken a tactical or strategic, I am not sure which, decision to run their strategy through the Labour Party.

This decision to fit the pro and anti-referendum debate within the two-party system clearly stabilised the Labour Party—McDonnell describes private polling showing pro-Remain voters slowly returning to Labour from the early autumn onwards. However, once a no-deal Brexit appeared unlikely, Labour's co-option of the pro-referendum campaign reduced the likelihood of further fluidity of party identities and increased the logic of a general election as a route to resolving the parliamentary deadlock.

For the Conservative Party, the same aim of reuniting voters it had lost in the first half of 2019 involved a different set of tactical calculations. Paul Stephenson, a member of the Conservative 2019 election campaign, recounts that the plan within Boris Johnson's inner circle was: 'We are going to push so hard to get out come what may and the other side are going to have to do something pretty severe to us to try and stop it. If they do that, we're then going to be able to smash them in the election because they will basically have shown they do not believe in democracy.' Paul Stephenson claims the symbolic utility of being blocked by Parliament was the core element of the Conservative Party campaign, quoting the campaign head Isaac Levido as saying: 'Parliament has been stopping the people from being able to do what they want and this cannot go on any longer. It's a broken parliament and that's why I'm now dissolving it.' That had to be the launch of the campaign. It doesn't matter we lost a few days in the grid. That had to be the launch of the campaign.'

[...]

The perception of our interviewees was that it also tapped into a broader anti-Parliament sentiment in the country. Most—but not all—of our interviewees were clear that the general election of 2019, and the political strategies that proceeded that election, marked a permanent shift in the ideological trajectory of the Conservative Party. Gavin Barwell describes a Conservative Party that is 'more anti-establishment, less respectful of convention, more high spending, and less free market.' David Gauke, a senior Cabinet minister in the May administration and former Conservative, argues that: 'I think, once you start going down the route that the party has gone down, there's quite a big cost to give up all of that. I think you have to keep, if you like, giving those voters what they want.'

The piecing back together of the Conservative Party was electorally successful, but not complete. Philip Hammond, reflecting on the causes and consequences of the Conservative Party's general election victory, put it that 'I think you can't save the people from themselves every time. You have to just say, "That's what they've decided". In my view, more fool them, but that's it.'

Lessons

Those studying Brexit have spent the past half-decade explaining that the structural drivers of Brexit did not appear out of nowhere on the morning of 23 June 2016. The raw material of these transcripts is often instead about tactical choices made by elites in SW1, interpreted by these same elites. Yet, there is also a significant utility in using the accounts of those who were there, precisely because some important—potentially even historically pivotal—aspects of Brexit politics can be reduced to a series of tactical choices made by political elites in SW1.

The key lies in understanding what these partial accounts of 'situated agents'—both affected by their structural and institutional context, but also able to affect that context—reveal about British politics both then, and now.8 They can be interpreted by those sitting outside the Westminster village, and with greater historical distance than we have today, who are prepared, as Andrew Gamble put it, to read elite history with an eye to 'the wider context in which governments operate, in particular the structures of power that shape British society and the British state'.9 Using these interviews is therefore a matter of interpretations of interpretations, from which we can draw out some systemic conclusions about our parliamentary system and British party politics.

This period provides a useful case study as to how our majoritarian political institutions—and the actors within them—operate when there is no such majority. The answer is that perceived popular support for majority government fuelled the tactics of those inside the Johnson government, and constrained the behaviour of those working against them. This sense that MPs are constrained by the fact that voters support strong, single-party government will have been boosted by the fact that the electorate gave their support to an explicit mandate for the Conservative Party to weaken the House of Commons, a mandate that looks to be in the process of being carried out. A further lesson from the experience of these practitioners is that effective coordination outside the trappings of formal party infrastructures is possible. However, it is hindered both by the fact the executive has control over the agenda of Parliament, and by ingrained party loyalties.

Executive dominance over the legislature was repeatedly put under challenge during this period of British politics. It could be argued that Parliament has arrived back to somewhere close to where we were before the whole Brexit process began. Yet, the cost of their 'near miss' in forming or forcing an alternative Brexit strategy, that runs through the testimonials of those who were in these private rooms and WhatsApp groups, was more profound than simply a failure to achieve their policy objectives on the European Union. If we take seriously the idea that the House of Commons was close to taking full control of the Brexit process—and that a failure to do so reinforced the perils of pluralism for MPs and demonstrated the benefits of a hyper-majoritarian approach to voters—then it really does begin to look like a consequential failure.

[Sheilbh]

Incidentally Matt d'Ancona has said this after the Hancock story "It has also left Number 10 fearful that this is only the beginning of a media feeding frenzy" and apparently they are worriesd are worried about the private life of a minister which could break at any moment.

Gove and his wife announced they're separating today and there are some truly mind-scarring rumours out there, plus journalists have apparently been sniffing round some stories about Gove lately (there was a very pointed question for the PM a while ago about use of the grace and favour flat in Admiralty Arch which is meant to relate to Gove). His wife is, of course, a Daily Mail columnist whose latest column was stuffed with innuendo - and I imagine more will come from her (though the separation is amicable and they have kids).

Apparently Downing Street has also refused to say whether Michael Gove has broken any social distancing rules, and there are questions journalists are looking into over his living arrangements during the lockdowns.

If the rumours are true - then this has the potential to be a full 90s style Tory sex scandal.

Maybe I'm wrong and the same old Tories line will work after all

Edit: Also, for Tyr from Chief Political Correspondent of the Times:

Henry Zeffman
@hzeffman
A leading supporter of Keir Starmer gets in touch:

"If you come at the leader of the Labour Party - you best not miss."

I really think politics would be better and more competent if everyone didn't have phones to WhatsApp and text their brain farts to journalists.

[Syt]

Merkel meeting the Queen is more adorable than I expected: https://twitter.com/PHuenermund/status/1327932592612577280?s=20

Merkel's "Joah" is such a casual thing. It's very much the expression, "Yeah, I guess you could say that"/"It is what it is". It's a very German expression.

[Sheilbh]

Yeah same - I saw this yesterday:
https://twitter.com/chrisshipitv/status/1411003411852636168?s=20

I thought there was something quite sweet about the familiarity at the beginning - the queen raising her arms and clearly seems quite happy to see Merkel, like any 90-something meeting a friend. Then they get into awkward small talk for the cameras

[mongers]

Last night was in a Lidl for the first time in ages, hardly any pasta, about a tenth of the expect cereals, some other things missing from the shelves.

Asked a employee about this, he said ' been like this for 3 to 4 weeks, a combination of not getting enough staff in the warehouses and a shortage of drivers to deliver it' ; welcome to Brexitland part 13. 

[Josquius]

Not noticed anything major in supermarkets up here lately.

[Sheilbh]

Not noticed anything major in supermarkets up here lately.

Same - it was fine in Lidl today. But I mainly use the weekly delivery services for most stuff so I'm not regularly in supermarkets.

I have seen loads of stories about the issue with hauliers and there is talk that they might be put on the list of jobs with easier immigration rules/don't need a visa. I suspect higher wages might also help reduce the shortage because that's how supply and demand works in every other bit of the economy, but employers feel entitled to be exempt from that apparently

Separately I could be wrong but I'm starting to think this government could have a poll tax in it - seeing some of the issues around how to pay for certain bits of the energy transition or even things like a proposed salt tax - I just slightly feel they have the potential to get wedded to an idea for possibly good reasons (energy transition, more funding for local government from local government etc) that makes sense to them in theory, but underestimating the political challenge/resistance they'll face. I think the out of touch/one rule for them stuff is a rich seam for opposition - not least because it's true.

[garbon]

Only thing I saw today was most of the beer section missing but I think there's a different reason for that.

[Sheilbh]

Wait, what?



I can see reasons this may make sense. The older people are more likely to rely on government services (or, indeed, income); young people who went to university basically pay 9%of their gross income on student loans (after a threshold) and use fewer public services.

Again - I'm very anti "demographics is destiny" as a theory for politics. But a low-tax, pro-austerity, pro-European Labour Party v a tax-and-spend, Brexiteering Tory Party would be quite the re-alignment/plot twist

[Josquius]

I guess the devil is in the details. Just what are people saying to cut?
. Weird results though.

[Sheilbh]

I guess the devil is in the details. Just what are people saying to cut?
. Weird results though.

My guess. The under 45s: cut pensions; the over 45s: cut everything but pensions

It seems like they were mainly focusing on tax rises and even there the results are odd:

A majority (51%)—including 56% of 2019 Conservative voters and 50% of 2019 Labour voters—think income tax should remain at current levels. However, Conservative voters (31%) are more likely than Labour voters (25%) to say income tax should increase, and, conversely, Labour voters (25%) are more likely than Conservative voters (13%) to say income tax should decrease. []

Views on capital gains tax are broadly similar among 2019 voters of the UK's two main parties. An overall majority (52%)—encompassing 52% of 2019 Conservative voters and 49% of 2019 Labour voters—favour capital gains tax remaining the same, while 36% of Conservative and 35% of Labour voters think capital gains tax should increase. At the same time, there is marginally more support among Labour (15%) than Conservative voters (12%) for decreasing it.

When it comes to inheritance tax, however, we again observe differences along partisan lines. With a plurality (49%) of respondents thinking inheritance tax should remain the same—including pluralities of both 2019 Conservative voters (49%) and 2019 Labour voters (48%)—we observe more support among Conservative (30%) than Labour voters (25%) for decreasing this form of tax, and more support among Labour (27%) than Conservative voters (20%) for increasing it.

Notably, respondents from both sides of politics are in favour of increasing taxes on tobacco and alcohol products. Indeed, 56% of 2019 Conservative voters and 50% of 2019 Labour voters—51% of our sample overall—say tobacco and alcohol tax should increase. At the same time, a sizable proportion of Conservative (35%) and Labour voters (36%) say that this form of tax should remain at the current level, and 9% and 14% respectively think it should decrease.

Looking toward the future, Britons are divided—and with little discernible difference along party lines—on whether to introduce an online sales tax: a plurality (35%) opposes introducing an online sales tax, 32% support it, and 25% neither support nor oppose such an introduction. These results mark a slight shift in public opinion compared to February, when a plurality of 39% of respondents supported and 31% opposed the introduction of an online sales tax, along with 24% who neither supported nor opposed it.

This trend of division in public opinion is also reflected in our findings on post-pandemic changes to taxation. In light of ongoing discourse on the financial burden of coronavirus on government coffers, we asked the British public to what extent, if at all, they would support or oppose paying more tax after the pandemic, finding that 38% oppose and 36% support this prospect, with 23% neither supporting nor opposing it.

[mongers]

Same - it was fine in Lidl today. But I mainly use the weekly delivery services for most stuff so I'm not regularly in supermarkets.

I have seen loads of stories about the issue with hauliers and there is talk that they might be put on the list of jobs with easier immigration rules/don't need a visa. I suspect higher wages might also help reduce the shortage because that's how supply and demand works in every other bit of the economy, but employers feel entitled to be exempt from that apparently

I'd guess they'll prioritise deliveries to stores nearer their warehouses, as that'll generate the same revenue for less logistical resources.

So Lidl will probably 'string along' non-metropolitan location with more sporadic deliveries and less choice of items?

[Sheilbh]

I don't know how it works to be honest - with the whole just-in-time/no stock room point.

If anything, my guess would be almost the opposite. You'd prioitise the big box stores in out of town/outskirts rather than say the Tesco Metro style stores (the Lidl near me is basically the same size as the Co-op). But I could be wrong.

Separately I posted earlier about why we should all order venison - an update. We may need a deer cull this year, so everyone should get on eating venison but I think the idea of using it to help address food poverty is a very good idea

As England's Deer Population Explodes, Some Propose a Mass Cull
A pandemic-fueled expansion of the herds threatens the plant life that many species depend on for survival. But will the public accept killing many more deer?


Red deer grazing in November in the Scottish Highlands. Britain's deer population is exploding.Credit...Jeff J. Mitchell/Getty Images

By Fleur Macdonald
July 3, 2021, 2:07 p.m. ET

CIRENCESTER, England — During a spring day of sun and showers in Gloucestershire in southwestern England, Mike Robinson, a restaurant owner and self-styled "hunter-gatherer," was out counting the deer on his land. On any given morning he can see up to 40. He spotted a hind, a female deer, walking more cautiously than normal, a sign that she had company.

"Generally baby roe deer are smaller than the height of the grass," he said. "So very often you just see the top of their heads or their ears." Hinds had only started giving birth in recent days. "We're going to see this colossal increase in numbers," he said, sounding worried.

In a normal year, deer hunters and government culling programs help limit the herd, and restaurants form an important market for the venison. With the pandemic, hunting and culling stopped, the market for venison collapsed and, as a result, the deer population of Britain is exploding, decimating the plant life that many species depend on.

"Heavy browsing and grazing can impact severely on woodland plants and heath land, and salt marsh habitats," said Martin Fowlie, a spokesman for the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds. That can lead to declines in bird populations, he added.

To avoid that, some wildlife experts now see a need for drastic action to reduce the deer herd, including through an expanded program of culling. In Britain, which prides itself as a nation of animal lovers, that might be hard for many people to accept.

For some, the answer to making a cull more acceptable is simple: "Anything shot must be eaten," says Tim Woodward, the chief executive of the Country Food Trust, a charity that distributes game meat, and who supports the idea of a mass cull. But even if that would make a large-scale cull more palatable to the public, it would present a steep logistical challenge that some are only now thinking about ways to meet.

While deer are difficult to count, the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals says the population exceeds two million, causing over 74,000 traffic accidents a year and inflicting heavy damage to crops, woodlands and marshes.


Deer from a park grazed outside homes near Romford, England, last year as the roads became quieter in lockdown.Credit...Leon Neal/Getty Images

Deer are also among the challenges to Britain's plans to reduce its carbon footprint. The government has said it hopes to increase tree planting to about 74,000 acres a year by 2025, up from about 25,000 acres a year now, to sequester carbon. Herds of voracious deer munching on unprotected saplings could undermine that effort.

Yet the idea of a rapid expansion of hunting and culling has the potential to cause upset in a country with a well-developed animal rights movement.

"We will never achieve ecological harmony through the barrel of a gun," Elisa Allen, the director of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals in Britain, said in an interview. "Killing them off only causes their population to rebound as lethal initiatives result in a spike in the food supply, accelerating the breeding of survivors."

Ms. Allen says there are many ways to deal with the deer population besides culling. "If deer numbers must be reduced," she says, "the key is to leave the deer in peace and target their food sources by trimming back low-hanging tree branches, keeping grasses cut short and shrouding saplings with corrugated plastic tubes or sleeves, deer netting or mesh."

Advocates of an accelerated cull say that passive measures like trimming branches and erecting tall deer fences are impractical on a nationwide basis.

Even such a potential critic as Chris Packham, a noted wildlife activist, has recommended the culling of deer that destroy the dry scrub habitat that serves as a nesting ground for nightingales, whose numbers have declined sharply in recent decades.

Charles Smith-Jones of the British Deer Society, a deer welfare group, also accepts the need for what he calls "active management," adding: "Of the active methods available, only shooting is really practical."

Advocates of a cull broad enough to bring the population into balance say it would ultimately require eliminating as many as a million deer through the combined efforts of private landowners, licensed shooters and public bodies like Forestry England, which manages the nation's forests, and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

Even if a program of that breadth could be organized, and if it proved politically possible, that would still leave the problem of what to do with all of the meat.

A major hurdle is resistance to venison, which has never been a popular menu item in the country. A cull large enough to reduce deer to manageable numbers would produce much more meat than could be consumed at current levels.

Yet even before the pandemic, nearly eight million people in Britain were struggling to get enough to eat, Parliament's Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee reported. Even with the pandemic beginning to ease, food charities around the country are coping with an increase in demand.


A volunteer handing out wild vension, which usually would have gone to restaurants, during a food distribution in London in March.Credit...Kirsty O'Connor/PA Images, via Getty Images

In Britain, venison is not typically eaten at home; it has a reputation of being a treat for special occasions.

A campaign started in September 2020 and headed by the Forestry Commission to get the British public cooking venison at home has yielded some results. The meat is being stocked in more supermarkets, and some game dealers are making a business of delivering it to people's doors.

But even as restaurants start to reopen, the supply of venison would still far outstrip demand if a cull were on the scale that advocates seek.

Advocates say some of the excess should go to the food banks that proliferated during the pandemic. City Harvest London supplied 300,000 meals in February 2020. A year later, it had provided over a million, some of them with venison.

Operating on an even larger scale is the Country Food Trust, which since its founding in 2015 has distributed over two million meals to more than 1,900 charities throughout Britain, often using cuts of meat from game dealers like Mr. Robinson and MC Kelly.

Since October, it has provided over 167,000 portions of venison Bolognese and a roughly equivalent amount of plain mincemeat. "The majority is prioritized towards children," said Tim Woodward, the trust's chief executive. "I would buy every bit of venison I could get my hands on now, because we have a never-ending need for it."

Forestry England, which is part of the Forestry Commission, sells about 265 tons of venison annually — enough for 2.4 million meals — to game dealers, among them MC Kelly, who then sell it on.

As a starting point, Mr. Woodward of the Country Food Trust has been lobbying for the Forestry Commission to donate all deer carcasses to his group as a cost-effective way for the government to tackle food poverty quickly.

That would be a huge undertaking and would require major changes to distribution. But the effort is gathering momentum. One prominent supporter of the Country Food Trust is Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, a longtime member of Parliament and the chairman of the All Party Parliamentary Group for Shooting and Conservation, which includes about 400 politicians.

In an interview, Mr. Clifton-Brown acknowledged that change could be slow, as Forestry England is an autonomous public body that is used to selling the deer, even at rock-bottom prices, rather than giving it away. "It's a whole change of psyche for them to do this."