Brexit and the waning days of the United Kingdom

[Sheilbh]

Agree with this piece as a permanently disappointed republican

Have Meghan and Harry moved the monarchy closer towards its end? If only
Jonathan Freedland
Republicans hope that the latest crisis may finally topple the institution. But the odds remain stacked in the royals' favour
Fri 12 Mar 2021 16.29 GMT

Will this be the moment? Will Meghan and Harry do to the monarchy what Diana threatened but never quite achieved, shaking the institution so severely it eventually collapses? Those who believe Britons should be able to choose their head of state have waited patiently for the crisis that finally undoes the House of Windsor, but this week they allowed themselves an excitement they had not known since the 1990s. Polling is stubbornly consistent, showing support for a republic flatlining at around 20%, but might the Oprah interview and all it revealed trigger a shift? Could this, at last, be it?

The case for republican optimism begins with an acknowledgment that this latest twist is hardly unprecedented. On the contrary, each generation seems to have its own iteration of the same plotline, a tale of love and marriage revealing a cold, closed institution thwarting the happiness of its young. It was Edward and Mrs Simpson for my grandparents; Margaret and Group Captain Peter Townsend for my parents; Charles, Camilla and Diana for me – and now the Sussexes for my kids. The public splits on generational lines, the young shaking their fists at the palace as monarchists feel a tremor of fear, anxious that the public will finally turn on the institution and demand its abolition.

Usually it comes to nothing but, says the republican optimist, this time is different. Harry and Meghan have introduced a new, radioactive element into the mix: race and racism. The coming generation will not tolerate that, just as they will not forgive the callous dismissal of a declared mental health problem. True, Diana made that latter complaint too, but attitudes to mental health have advanced since then. In this view, the Windsors have crossed two lines that, for younger Britons, must never be crossed – and that could destroy the public consent on which monarchy rests.

The racism accusation is particularly lethal, because the conventional remedies are not available to royalty. They cannot promise to "prioritise diversity" or to ensure their personnel "better reflect Britain in 2021" because that's not how a hereditary monarchy works. It allocates its – and therefore our – top job by bloodline. The role is reserved for the members of a single white Protestant family. You can't "modernise" your way out of that ancient fact, one that contradicts everything we tell ourselves about our society. We like to speak of inclusivity, but forget that the role of head of state is determined by genetic exclusivity.

Meghan could have represented an answer of sorts to that, bringing some diversity to the family. Instead, republicans can feel relieved that the monarchy had a chance to deepen its support among black and mixed-race Britons – and blew it. What's more, the palace cannot comfort itself that this week was a one-off: the Sussex bombardment might well continue, with Netflix as the launching platform.

Relevant too is the fact that the monarchy's prize asset is a single, mortal individual. Malcolm Turnbull, the former Australian prime minister who led the 1999 referendum campaign to remove the Queen as that country's head of state, told me this week of "the huge reservoir of respect and affection" that exists for the monarch and which has long blocked the path to change. That's truer still in the UK, where Elizabeth serves as the last living symbolic link to what is the foundational event of modern Britain – 1940, our finest hour – and meets a deep need for constancy and continuity, connecting the present to an almost unrecognisable past.

But the Queen will be 95 next month; the second Elizabethan era will one day draw to a close. Her success has been predicated on a fastidious neutrality and the mystique of silence, two qualities that her eldest son will not be able to replicate: we know where he stands because he's talked a lot.

All of which allows republicans to expect a shift. And yet, even though I share their conviction that in a democracy we should elect our head of state, I'm not hopeful that a breakthrough is imminent. First, there's the history. The Windsors have survived much greater challenges than an Oprah interview: Edward VIII abdicated and Diana ended up dead, the latter generating a wave of fury that engulfed the streets rather than Twitter. For the Mirror to call this week's events the "worst royal crisis in 85 years" shows nothing so much as forgetfulness.

Second, revelations of family dysfunction don't undermine the monarchy so much as explain its enduring appeal. One of royalty's advantages over electing an aged eminence as president, Ireland-style, is that it provides a rolling soap opera, a perpetual source of gossip, human drama and distraction. "It's reality TV," says Turnbull. The dysfunction is part of its function. Royal rifts and scandal are not a bug; they're a feature.

Which means republicans don't win when they rest the case against monarchy on the flaws of those who currently inhabit it. Far better to make the case in principle. In Australia, that's easy because the principle is so simple: Australia's head of state should be Australian. The case here – that Britain can never be democratic or equal when the top rung of our national ladder is in the permanent grip of a single family – is also strong, but it can rapidly sound abstract or dry, lost in the arid wastelands of "constitutional reform". This is the republican paradox: the exciting arguments don't work, the powerful ones are boring.

Some reformers believe their moment will come when the Queen's reign ends. Once it's no longer about her, people will be receptive to the republican argument. That forgets, though, that the system allows no such interval for debate on the merits of Charles III. It will be: "The Queen is dead, long live the King".

There's a reason the monarchy has stood as long it has. For all the Windsors' glaring deficiencies, the odds remain stacked in their favour. Republicanism is a just cause – but, for now at least, it seems a lost one.

    Jonathan Freedland is a Guardian columnist

[Tonitrus]

Possibly because December/January is dreary everywhere and most tourists go to London or Edinburgh which are great places even in dreary weather?

I get slightly miffed that foreign tourists don't get about the country a bit more; so many great places to visit. But I suppose it is the same everywhere; I loved messing about in Germany when I was free to do so (and will do again ,,,retirement in two weeks    ) and there were hardly any foreign tourists in lots of places.

One of the upsides to (what will be) having lived here for three years is that if/when I come back as a tourist (much more likely, as COVID hit much of that time for six) I should be eminently comfortable getting around the countryside/renting and driving a car, etc.

[Zoupa]

I haven't read it but I think NI is poised to be a lucrative smugglers market of unregulated shit pouring into the EU. Clearly neither Britain nor the EU have any desire whatsoever to restart the NI civil war over trade barriers.

There's going to be a real drop in european buying UK products if that happens. At least in France. Everyone I know maniacally checks country of provenance.

Once you get a bad rep, real or imagined, that's pretty much it.

[Zanza]

Consumers matter for food, but not much else. Most trade is in supply chains of multinationals. They will neither smuggle through Northern Ireland nor stop buying British on emotional grounds. They will however exclude Britain from supply chains if they can source competitively elsewhere, be it reduced border friction, less regulatory overhead or more reliable delivery times. Also making imports to the UK harder as is bound to happen eventually, even if it was just postponed, will make a value chain involving Britain less competitive. Not just in trade with Europe, but globally. All of which will negatively impact British companies.

The second category of exports that will suffer is of course services which rely heavily on freedom of movement and fulfilling regulatory requirements in the market you want to sell to. Both not perfect in the EU, but better than in any FTA worldwide. And again, a smaller home market does nothing to increase British competitiveness globally.

Brexit will make Britain more insular, with less contacts to the continent, both cultural and economic, and less competitive. Having the largely theoretical possibility to diverge in regulations will not compensate that.

[Sheilbh]

I'd broadly agree with all of that - I think the risk of Northern Ireland becoming some sort of entrepot that breaches the Single Market is very, very slim.

And also frankly for the UK to be exporting unregulated goods into the single market through Northern Ireland would require one hell of a shift in our economy towards manufacturing/production which just feels very unlikely.

I'm not so sure about insularness - I think it will in relation to the European continent. But, for example, net migration to the UK hasn't change - EU levels have fallen, non-EU levels have risen. We have seen the first few thousand Hong Kong BNOers applying for visas if that does (hopefully) turn into a few hundred thousand or million. So I'm not sure the UK will be more insular in general, though it definitely will be in relation to Europe and, obviously, because geography, that will have the biggest impact economically.

I agree on diverging in regulations - I always like Dan Davies (formerly of the BofE) line that regulation is infrastructure. I think the benefit of lower regulation in the City for example is relatively low. You might be able to help small businesses a little bit by changing some regulations. I think the benefit will be in areas where the UK can, in effect, get first mover advantage - AI would be the one I'd be pushing.

The vaccine program strikes me as an interesting example because the MHRA won about one third of EMA contracts for doing regulatory reviews etc. I think Brexit has helped in the UK going in a different direction where they got first mover advantage, and supported companies manufacturing - VDL's comparison of a speed boat v a navy (which used to be a Brexiteer line here). But the reason it makes me think of Brexit is in the long-run do we lose more from not having the regular trade/work of that one third of EMA contracts than we gain from a big one off event where the ability to react quickly and be relatively nimble is key? I think generally it's pretty unlikely that there'll be enough big one off events to compensate the sort of day-to-day loss.

[Tamas]

And also frankly for the UK to be exporting unregulated goods into the single market through Northern Ireland would require one hell of a shift in our economy towards manufacturing/production which just feels very unlikely.

You don't have to produce it yourself you can import it.

[Sheilbh]

You don't have to produce it yourself you can import it.

Okay but they'd still have to meet UK regulations for importing which are basically the same as the EU's at the minute for stuff coming into GB - then go to Northern Ireland and then go to Europe. It's possible but it still seems relatively unlikely/quite a small risk.

[Tamas]

You don't have to produce it yourself you can import it.

Okay but they'd still have to meet UK regulations for importing which are basically the same as the EU's at the minute for stuff coming into GB - then go to Northern Ireland and then go to Europe. It's possible but it still seems relatively unlikely/quite a small risk.

Probably, yeah, but I don't expect us staying aligned with the EU on the long term. "Smuggling" through the Irish border will probably never become an economically significant or major thing, but it will be an embarrassment to both the UK and the EU.

[Sheilbh]

Probably, yeah, but I don't expect us staying aligned with the EU on the long term. "Smuggling" through the Irish border will probably never become an economically significant or major thing, but it will be an embarrassment to both the UK and the EU.

Smuggling through the Irish border has always been a thing - but it's normally for things like petrol or products where VAT is different

I think on goods and food we will be broadly aligned - the divergence will probably be when new regulations are introduced.

But I think the risk to the Northern Irish peace process from any border is pretty high. Both the EU and the UK said they wanted to preserve the peace process, but both had goals/red lines that made that very difficult. For the UK ending free movement and the (theoretical) ability to diverge and for the EU the desire to protect the single market - I think both of those are reasonable. But I think both sides need to compromise on those points to preserve the peace process. I think the focus needs to be very close to the 1.9 million people in Northern Ireland and their kind of weird political concerns.

[Valmy]

The one day I spent in England was a gorgeous clear sunny day in Summer. Smiles were on the faces of all the people.

I choose to imagine that is how it is in London every day.

[Sheilbh]

The one day I spent in England was a gorgeous clear sunny day in Summer. Smiles were on the faces of all the people.

I choose to imagine that is how it is in London every day.

I genuinely think London is the most improved city in the world on sunny summer day v winter. The building's look gorgeous in the sun, everyone's happy and there's outdoor drinking on every street corner. It's the best 

[Iormlund]

But I think both sides need to compromise  ...

No. The EU didn't tear down the status quo. It should not have to compromise at all, much less on the integrity of the Single Market. If the UK's actions result in further violence in NI that falls entirely and exclusively on the Brits.

[Josquius]

Yep. The EU laid out the options from the start. The earlier analysis of the UK behaving like its dealing with an equal is the problem. Its really not and the quicker the UK recognises this the better.

[Sheilbh]

No. The EU didn't tear down the status quo. It should not have to compromise at all, much less on the integrity of the Single Market. If the UK's actions result in further violence in NI that falls entirely and exclusively on the Brits.

In response to the Brexit vote which tore down the status quo both sides said Northern Ireland peace was a priority. Both sides had redlines that mean there will be a border somewhere which will seriously threaten peace - whether it's a land border or a sea border.

So both sides have to consider whether their other redlines matter more than the peace process - which is different from what everyone's been saying for 5 years - or they need to compromise on those redlines in relation to Northern Ireland only, which is a small province of under 2 million people. Or make that border workable for individuals and retailers in Northern Ireland - I think that boat may have sailed following the Article 16 mistake which has had an enormous impact on politics in Northern Ireland, especially among unionists.

I think both sides can do that without sacrificing their wider redline.

Edit: And for what it's worth this is the take from a Northern Ireland political reporter which I saw being shared by unionists and nationalists online:

Sam McBride: Northern Ireland is now a proxy battleground for the EU and the UK – and that is dangerous
Over recent weeks, a paradox has emerged: Boris Johnson says that he wants to remove the Irish Sea border, but is trying to save it; the EU says that it wants to keep the Irish Sea border, but is acting to make it unworkable.
By Sam McBride
Saturday, 6th March 2021, 7:01 am

Mr Johnson has appeared discomfited, if not quite embarrassed, by the emergence of a physical border within the United Kingdom which he swore would be unthinkable and which he assured the public would not happen even when his own government made clear in writing that he had agreed to such an outcome.

Under pressure from the DUP – and, curiously, now from Tory backbenchers in the right-wing ERG faction – to effectively abandon the NI Protocol which creates the border, the Prime Minister has talked tough and acted soft.

As the person who agreed to the protocol, abandoning it would be an embarrassing admission that his critics were right, showing that his claims there would be no Irish Sea border to be either duplicitous or the product of a mind unable to comprehend the central details of the most important document he ever negotiated.

More significantly, such a move would inevitably draw retaliatory action from Brussels. It would be remarkable for a populist to suddenly care so much about Northern Ireland that he would sacrifice the economic prosperity of the part of the UK which elected him for somewhere the Tories have almost no votes and about which he has shown scant interest.

Mr Johnson has given "assurances" – a word which does not carry the meaning attached to it by the dictionary when linked to Mr Johnson – that if necessary he will trigger Article 16 of the protocol to stop some of the red tape. However, he has done nothing to suggest that such a move is likely.

That context is key to understanding Mr Johnson's move on Wednesday to unilaterally extend the grace periods which delay parts of the Irish Sea border from being implemented.

While interpreted by the EU as a provocative move to tear up their agreement, there is every reason to believe that this is Mr Johnson attempting – perhaps even desperately – to salvage the protocol from an EU which increasingly appears unaware of how it is undermining the deal.

In a video call with print journalists on Thursday, NI Secretary of State Brandon Lewis – a loyal lieutenant of Mr Johnson's in implementing the protocol – said so bluntly. Asked if the unilateral move was adding to tensions, he said "I would argue quite the opposite", acknowledging that this is not what unionists want to hear.

In Mr Lewis's telling, "the EU needs to understand and accept the lasting and the long impact that that Friday night action [to trigger Article 16 over vaccine protectionism] had".

That night, Mr Lewis said, the EU claims about acting purely to defend the Good Friday Agreement were exposed. In his words, "they proved otherwise that Friday night".

A key element of the government's decision this week not to enforce parts of the new border relate to food crossing from GB to NI. Mr Lewis said that without urgent action, "there's a very real risk that actually what we've had in a few weeks would have been back to the issues of empty shelves...[and] we'd have seen a further lack of confidence and undermining of the protocol itself...the work we're doing is to ensure it doesn't get further undermined."

With a background in the food industry, Mr Lewis stressed that supermarkets work far in advance and the EU-UK negotiations were grinding along at a slow rate where one grace period expired a fortnight ago and a far greater hardening of the food border is due at the end of this month. Another last-minute deal would be of little help in those circumstances, he argued.

However, the EU and the Irish government were outraged, with Irish Foreign Minister Simon Coveney saying that the EU was now dealing with a country it couldn't trust.

Yet the Irish opposition to this move has been entirely procedural – they have for weeks accepted that the grace periods urgently need extended.

The European Commission's position is less clear. Over recent weeks Maroš Šefčovič has argued that the Irish Sea border checks needed to be expanded, and has berated the UK for not implementing the protocol more rigorously.

At a time where the protocol is causing major practical and economic difficulties, where most of unionism is dismayed at the scale of what is involved, and when potentially dangerous levels of anger are building within loyalism, the EU appears blind to how its dogmatic approach appears to those it claims the protocol exists to protect.

The EU can plausibly argue that the Irish Sea border is necessary to protect its single market. But rather than make that nakedly economic argument, it has claimed that what it is doing is to protect the Good Friday Agreement.

The fact that almost all of unionism – including David Trimble, the key unionist architect of that Agreement – say that the protocol itself undermines the 1998 accord is implicitly dismissed by the commission's actions.

Although the absence of an EU office in Belfast may partially explain the commission's apparent ignorance of how it is perceived here, and it may also have mistakenly believed that Mr Johnson was representing unionism's interests, it is remarkable that so long into the Brexit process the EU does not appear to understand some of the basic aspects of political division in a region whose peace it says has been central to its stance.

Even before the hardening of the Irish Sea border which is to come, its scale is becoming increasingly hard to justify. In staggering evidence to a Stormont committee on Thursday, Northern Ireland's chief vet said that when one of the grace periods – that on moving GB supermarket goods into Northern Ireland – expires, the number of agri-food checks required at the Irish Sea border will be close to the number currently processed by the EU as a whole.

With just 12 vets at his disposal, Robert Huey said that he had told the commission that he was simply unable to undertake that level of work.

Dr Huey's boss, Department of Agriculture permanent secretary Denis McMahon, told MLAs that food and plant safety checks currently only applied to 30% of the agri-food goods that will be potentially subject to the new processes when an exemption period for retail and supermarket goods expires.

Mr McMahon said that Northern Ireland was processing a greater volume of documentation "than all other entire countries across the European Union".

Some in the EU have privately lampooned Brandon Lewis's claim that there is no Irish Sea border and that comment showed the Secretary of State's questionable understanding of how his words are received in Northern Ireland.

But it should alarm Brussels that even Mr Lewis sounds genuinely concerned that the EU does not comprehend that with which it is dealing.

The EU is now demanding that the UK abandon its unilateral action, with the European Parliament postponing ratification of the EU-UK trade deal in protest and the commission preparing for legal action Yet if the UK acquiesces – as it may well do – that would arguably further undermine support for the protocol, showing again to Northern Ireland that both the EU and the UK are prepared to put their procedural debates ahead of what both of them accept are serious practical difficulties here.

While both sides claim to care passionately about peace in Northern Ireland, increasingly this region appears to be a proxy battleground far from the centres of power in two large blocs where they can express frustrations with each other without consequence for areas about which they care more deeply.

Given Northern Ireland's bloody history, the danger of such a stance ought to be self-evident.

[Iormlund]

In response to the Brexit vote which tore down the status quo both sides said Northern Ireland peace was a priority. Both sides had redlines that mean there will be a border somewhere which will seriously threaten peace - whether it's a land border or a sea border.

So both sides have to consider whether their other redlines matter more than the peace process - which is different from what everyone's been saying for 5 years - or they need to compromise on those redlines in relation to Northern Ireland only, which is a small province of under 2 million people. Or make that border workable for individuals and retailers in Northern Ireland - I think that boat may have sailed following the Article 16 mistake which has had an enormous impact on politics in Northern Ireland, especially among unionists.

Our compromise was to allow NI to remain inside. It's done.

Furthermore, I don't think saving NI from the English is more important than the integrity of the EU.

If this mess leads to another bout of the Troubles then we should provide help and mediation efforts. But NI cannot become a backdoor to the Single Market.