Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[grumbler]

Theoreticals.

But I am sorry, I realised too late that I stepped into another round of grumbler vs. Berkut, I should have known better. Carry on.

  Interesting that you go straight to the personal insults before even reading the thread.  I am not arguing with Berkut here about anything - he and I are in complete agreement.

Better luck next troll.

[Ed Anger]

NATO troops approaching Moscow?

WTF are you babbling about? Who said anything about THAT?

Theoreticals.

But I am sorry, I realised too late that I stepped into another round of grumbler vs. Berkut, I should have known better. Carry on.

Go beet it, kid.

[CountDeMoney]

So, Seedy, are you conceding what your sources (and I) argue:  that it is Russia's current weakness relative to NATO that increases the potential for the regime to use nuclear weapons, rather than NATO's weakness?  Or do you retain your delusions against all the evidence?

Not only does this have nothing to do with answering the question Berkut had asked, I have not argued otherwise.

As for "the inherent physics [sic] of Russian nationalism and its inability to contain itself once it gets all frothy-like" I'm gonna take the word of the frothy on frothiness, but note that it doesn't matter much.

Go ahead and dismiss Russian nationalism as a driving force in foreign policy--even if Georgians, Ukrainians and the rest of eastern Europe can't.

I'd also note that the last source you cite has the Russians saying that there is now a "decline in the threat of the unleashing of a large-scale war, including a nuclear war" and that "the threat of direct military aggression in traditional forms against the Russian Federation and its allies has declined."  Rather frothy, those bits.

I am sure "the threat of direct military aggression in traditional forms against the Russian Federation and its allies" has declined, yes--but that also has nothing to do with Russia being an aggressor and invading a NATO member, which is the question Berkut has asked. 

My concern is whether strikes against Russian soil in any future conflict would be interpreted as "direct military aggression in traditional forms" by Moscow. 

As for "saying that, in the NATO framework, one member is less valuable than another," you are the only person implying that, as far as I know.

Meh, Otto's implied it as well.  He doesn't see Germany coming to the rescue of the Baltics, for instance.  Latvia and Estonia have requested more NATO forward force positioning, and have been rejected.  That the Poles have their concerns doesn't mean I'm just making this shit up.  There's quite a few concerns about whether or not NATO would stick together.  So no, I'm not the only person implying that.

Your argument that, if the Russian attack the Baltics, they will melt the world unless NATO gives them the Baltics is the only rationale I can think of for surrendering the Baltics.  Luckily, no one in authority seems to agree with you that NATO will have to choose between abandoning the Baltic states or ending civilization.

Luckily, I have not said anything of the sort.  "If the Russian (sic ) attack the Baltics, they will melt the world" is not my argument.  My argument is that any Russian invasion of a NATO member would turn into a conflict that could eventually lead to nuclear weapons.  I'm not saying that it would be birds over the polar cap on D-Day+10 minutes, or whether escalation destroys the world--that's something you and Berkut insist on extrapolating. I would very much like that to be the policy, since its worked since the 1950s.  It's kept the peace.

But I am quite sure that once a shooting war starts and eventually ends, and Eastern Europe is mostly vaporized but we're not, you'll be the first in line to tell me "I told you so!", unless Berkut beats you to it first.

[derspiess]

This thread needs more "[sic]" inserted into quoted replies.

[CountDeMoney]

"I didn't even know Gloria was sick."

[Jacob]

This thread [sic]needs more "[sic]" inserted into [sic]quoted replies.

You [sic] bastard!

[mongers]

Insert some comment about an unheard of East European country not being worth the blood of a single Prussian human resources worker/community service conscript.

[The Minsky Moment]

"I didn't even know Gloria was sick."

Dangers of mass transit.

[grumbler]

"I didn't even know Gloria was sick."

Dangers of mass transit.

On Monday.

[Berkut]

OK, so you think that if Russia invades a NATO member, then the only possible responses are global thermonuclear war and NATO rolling over and letting it happen?

Is that correct?

What I am saying is that a Russian invasion of a NATO member nation would eventually expand into a larger, more complex war that would involve tactical nuclear weapons, and with them, the unfortunate escalations.  Now, whether it graduates to GLOBUL THERMONUKULAR WAR in the days, weeks or months after a conflict begins isn't just up to NATO.  In fact, the onus would be on Russia as the aggressor--but do we really want Russia in the position to dictate that?

According to Amy Woolf of the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. has about 200 such weapons in Europe, some of which are available for use by local allies in a war.  Woolf says Russia has about 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads in its active arsenal — many of them within striking distance of Ukraine — and that successive revisions of Russian military strategy appear "to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons" to balance the U.S. advantage in high-tech conventional weapons.
A 2011 study by the respected RAND Corporation came to much the same conclusion, stating that Russian doctrine explicitly recognizes the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression.  Not only does Moscow see nuclear use as a potential escalatory option in a regional war, but it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conflict.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/04/24/four-ways-the-ukraine-crisis-could-escalate-to-use-of-nuclear-weapons/

Why Russia calls a limited nuclear strike "de-escalation"
By the next year, Russia had issued a new military doctrine whose main innovation was the concept of "de-escalation"—the idea that, if Russia were faced with a large-scale conventional attack that exceeded its capacity for defense, it might respond with a limited nuclear strike.
http://thebulletin.org/why-russia-calls-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation

The doctrine introduced the notion of de-escalation—a strategy envisioning the threat of a limited nuclear strike that would force an opponent to accept a return to the status quo ante. Such a threat is envisioned as deterring the United States and its allies from involvement in conflicts in which Russia has an important stake, and in this sense is essentially defensive. Yet, to be effective, such a threat also must be credible. To that end, all large-scale military exercises that Russia conducted beginning in 2000 featured simulations of limited nuclear strikes.

In keeping with the security concept it is intended to complement, the new doctrine appears to lower the threshold for Russia's use of nuclear weapons below what was stated in the national security concept that was issued in 1997. Whereas the 1997 concept allowed the first use of nuclear arms only "in case of a threat to the existence of the Russian Federation," the new doctrine allows nuclear weapons use "in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation."
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_05/dc3ma00

You know, I'm not just making this shit up or pulling it out of my ass;  while Russia has walked it back a bit in the 2010 doctrine review compared to the 2000 review, it's still Russian policy to introduce nukes into a conventional conflict if they're getting their asses handed to them.
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf

Here's the RAND report from 2011, Nuclear Deterrence in Europe: Russian Approaches to a New Environment and Implications for the United States
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1075.html

Needless to say, I don't agree with grumbler's assertion that Russia wouldn't go nuclear in a shooting war because Putin's cronies would stop him when compared to
1) my "delusions" about documented and established Russian strategic policy,
2) my "delusions" about the inherent physics of Russian nationalism and its inability to contain itself once it gets all frothy-like, or
3) my "delusions" of Putin as a grudge-nursing, supremely megalomaniac egoist that is, well, one hell of a sore fucking loser.   

And if, in a robust conventional defense of Poland and/or the Baltics, we start hitting Russian soil (airbases, munitions, ports, staging areas, etc.), people think they'll do nothing to escalate in response, especially if they're getting their asses handed to them conventionally?  And, if they do, what exactly would be the political and military response in America to the nuclear removal of substantial portions of a U.S. Brigade Combat Team from the battlefield in Estonia?  And I'm the delusional one?

If so, does that mean we should give Russia a free hand to invade whomever they choose, since it isn't really worth ending civilization in order to protect Poland?

Kinda puts a dent in the concept of a collective security model by saying that, in the NATO framework, one member is less valuable than another.  Warsaw is as important as Berlin is as important as London is as important as Washington, DC.  To say otherwise throws out the very concept of what a mutual defense treaty is, and what it means.  And if that's the case, then you don't have to worry about potential enemies not believing in it and calling the bluff, because you don't have confidence in it yourself.  That actually makes the potential for conflict more likely in the nuclear age.  No, they need to believe that NATO is inviolate, and it's game over for them.  They need to believe that Moscow is as important as Warsaw.

I would hate to think, with the very cornerstone of post-WW2 American foreign policy and the foundation of its defense for 70 years, that Poland and the Baltics were sold a bad bill of goods when it came to membership.  Maybe they should change the abbreviation from "NATO" to "MEH".

I don't disagree with much here, just don't accept the extreme of the interpretation of what it means.

Basically, I think Russia is incredibly dangerous. We cannot count on them acting in a manner that we would define as strictly rational when it comes to nuclear policy, so we need to be very careful in how we do handle them - IMO, we have not been at all, and have not only not been careful, our carelessness has almost seemed to be calculated to be as insulting and provocative to a nation of paranoid assholes as possible.

What I mean by that is that we haven't just stepped on Russian interests, we've *ignored* Russian interests, which is, in many ways, actually worse than consciously working against them. We've basically said "Russia doesn't matter" when it comes to how we engage with Eastern Europe.

Obama, now, seems like his goals with Russia are just like all of his foreign policy goals, so far as I can tell. How can we do as little as possible about the problem and hope it goes away because I don't really want to think about it very much...if at all. If it gets worse, I will think about it a little more, but still not really enough.

I am actually very concerned about Russia and how the West has handled the multiple crisis they've formented. It mostly seems like we are completely reactionary, have no actual policy or ideology, and are just kind of half-heartedly lashing out against Russia without really even trying to understand what is going on, and why.

Europe itself is likely incapable of acting even if they wanted to, as they've nearly completely neutered their ability to respond militarily to even moderate conventional threats. Which I've been saying for years and years, of course, and the response has always been that they spend so much more than Russia collectively, why, there is nothing to worry about. Oops!

What a mess.

[mongers]

In the long run is it in anyone's interest to have NATO tanks parked north of Kiev?

[grumbler]

In the long run is it in anyone's interest to have NATO parked north of Kiev?

Ran this through my gibberish-English translator and it still came out gibberish.  Can anyone translate "NATO parked north of Kiev" into English?

[DGuller]

I don't buy into the notion that the West has trampled on Russia much.  Russians have never come to peace with the fact that they lost the Cold War to hamburger-eating obese morons who can't even find them on the map.  I don't think anything the West could've reasonably done would've blunted the edge of such humiliation.  Therefore, it was only a matter of time before a dangerous demagogue tapped into that bile.

[mongers]

In the long run is it in anyone's interest to have NATO parked north of Kiev?

Ran this through my gibberish-English translator and it still came out gibberish.  Can anyone translate "NATO parked north of Kiev" into English?

Do fuck off.

[garbon]

I believe it is when a bunch of people are in a cadillac eating breaded, stuffed chicken.