Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[dps]

Anyway, the West sold out Poland and the rest of eastern Europe at Yalta, so I don't see any convincing argument that says we won't do it again.

I don't see any convincing argument that says you will sell out Poland and the rest of eastern Europe, either, though.  Were you even at Yalta?  I thought it a bit before your time.

I don't claim to have been at Yalta, but I know pretty much what was agreed to there.  And I didn't say that there was any convincing argument that we will sell out eastern Europe again, merely that there is no convincing argument that the contrary is true, either.

[Syt]

The inevitability that any NATO-WP conflict would escalate to nuclear warfare was precisely why there was never any NATO-WP conflict.  Having Moscow convincingly believe in that inevitability is what guaranteed it.

No, what prevented it was that the Soviets were never quite sure they would win, and were too cautious to attack if they weren't sure of winning.  Why should they--they thought that in the long run, their victory was inevitable, because they thought the West would collapse, not them. 

To be clear, they did think that a nuclear war was winnable (at least their political leadership did;  it's not clear that their senior military leaders agreed), but they were never in a position in which they thought that they were assured of being the winners of a military confrontation.

Didn't they actually plan for massive use of tactical nukes at the start of a war with NATO, because they knew that nuclear escalation was unavoidable? At least that's what I recall from their maneuver plans used in the 60s through 80s.

[Sheilbh]

I don't claim to have been at Yalta, but I know pretty much what was agreed to there.  And I didn't say that there was any convincing argument that we will sell out eastern Europe again, merely that there is no convincing argument that the contrary is true, either.

No fait accompli in the advancing Red Army?

The West did fight for Berlin and in other contested areas where the Soviets weren't in occupation like Italy and Greece.

[grumbler]

I don't claim to have been at Yalta, but I know pretty much what was agreed to there.  And I didn't say that there was any convincing argument that we will sell out eastern Europe again, merely that there is no convincing argument that the contrary is true, either.

Why would you sell out Eastern Europe?  What do you have to gain?  The argument against, I suppose, is that I haven't agreed to sell out eastern Europe, and see no reason to believe that you and the people like you will get the final say over me and the people like me, especially since people like me have a treaty on our side.

[dps]

I don't claim to have been at Yalta, but I know pretty much what was agreed to there.  And I didn't say that there was any convincing argument that we will sell out eastern Europe again, merely that there is no convincing argument that the contrary is true, either.

Why would you sell out Eastern Europe?  What do you have to gain?  The argument against, I suppose, is that I haven't agreed to sell out eastern Europe, and see no reason to believe that you and the people like you will get the final say over me and the people like me, especially since people like me have a treaty on our side.

You know, a schoolteacher, even if not an English teacher, should probably know the difference between first person plural and first person singular.

[DontSayBanana]

Unfortunately, you've been too indoctrinated over the course of your career by the Military-Industrial Complex, which has convinced you--contrary to every possible example since Clauswitz--that Great Power warfare can be limited and contained.  Dickhead.

Unfortunately, I have read history, and noted the lack of gas warfare in WW2 - an example of where Great power warfare was limited and contained.  Sorry that you think that being knowledgeable is being a dickhead.

Being knowledgeable isn't, but calling oneself knowledgeable is generally considered pretty poor form, yeah.

[Berkut]

Can we frame the basic debate here?

Is it simply that Seedy believes that it is essentially not possible to have a war of any kind between Russia and the West without it ending in a full on strategic nuclear exchange?

If so, what are the implications of that - Russia gets a free hand to do whatever they like?

[CountDeMoney]

Can we frame the basic debate here?

Is it simply that Seedy believes that it is essentially not possible to have a war of any kind between Russia and the West without it ending in a full on strategic nuclear exchange?

If so, what are the implications of that - Russia gets a free hand to do whatever they like?

Russia and an invasion of a NATO member, please.  If you're going to go about framing the debate over what I posit, at least frame it correctly.

[Berkut]

Can we frame the basic debate here?

Is it simply that Seedy believes that it is essentially not possible to have a war of any kind between Russia and the West without it ending in a full on strategic nuclear exchange?

If so, what are the implications of that - Russia gets a free hand to do whatever they like?

Russia and an invasion of a NATO member, please.  If you're going to go about framing the debate over what I posit, at least frame it correctly.

OK, so you think that if Russia invades a NATO member, then the only possible responses are global thermonuclear war and NATO rolling over and letting it happen?

Is that correct?

If so, does that mean we should give Russia a free hand to invade whomever they choose, since it isn't really worth ending civilization in order to protect Poland?

[Tamas]

Can we frame the basic debate here?

Is it simply that Seedy believes that it is essentially not possible to have a war of any kind between Russia and the West without it ending in a full on strategic nuclear exchange?

If so, what are the implications of that - Russia gets a free hand to do whatever they like?

Russia and an invasion of a NATO member, please.  If you're going to go about framing the debate over what I posit, at least frame it correctly.

OK, so you think that if Russia invades a NATO member, then the only possible responses are global thermonuclear war and NATO rolling over and letting it happen?

Is that correct?

If so, does that mean we should give Russia a free hand to invade whomever they choose, since it isn't really worth ending civilization in order to protect Poland?

Well, if NATO and Russia starts shooting at each other directly, the only alternative to global thermonuclear war is a nice game of chess a draw. Which BTW in this scenario would suit NATO's needs. Basically they stand up to the local self-defense forces armed with top tier Russian gear and special forces training, and just keep containing whatever Russia throws at them.

Now, whether Russia/Putin would have the common sense to not go all the way in an effort of avoiding losing face, THEN if NATO would be smart enough to grant Putin a face-saving exit is another matter.

But even if NATO wouldn't nuke over their troops failing and the Baltic States overran, Russia would sure as hell nuke over NATO troops approaching Moscow.

[Berkut]

NATO troops approaching Moscow?

WTF are you babbling about? Who said anything about THAT?

[Tamas]

NATO troops approaching Moscow?

WTF are you babbling about? Who said anything about THAT?

Theoreticals.

But I am sorry, I realised too late that I stepped into another round of grumbler vs. Berkut, I should have known better. Carry on.

[Berkut]

This is why we can't have nice things on Languish.

This has nothing to do with grumbler OR Berkut or even Seedy or Tamas for that matter.

It is entirely possible to have a simple discussion you know, without dragging in all the personal bullshit.

I am trying to figure out Seedy's actual stance - I don't even necessarily disagree with it, at some level. I actually think the West has handled Russia pretty terribly over the last decade or so, and pretending like they are not what they are (a great power if only because they have a shitload of nukes) is incredibly dangerous.

I am not sure I can agree that the answer, if that is what he is saying, is to simply give them free reign to do what they like though...

[CountDeMoney]

OK, so you think that if Russia invades a NATO member, then the only possible responses are global thermonuclear war and NATO rolling over and letting it happen?

Is that correct?

What I am saying is that a Russian invasion of a NATO member nation would eventually expand into a larger, more complex war that would involve tactical nuclear weapons, and with them, the unfortunate escalations.  Now, whether it graduates to GLOBUL THERMONUKULAR WAR in the days, weeks or months after a conflict begins isn't just up to NATO.  In fact, the onus would be on Russia as the aggressor--but do we really want Russia in the position to dictate that?

According to Amy Woolf of the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. has about 200 such weapons in Europe, some of which are available for use by local allies in a war.  Woolf says Russia has about 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads in its active arsenal — many of them within striking distance of Ukraine — and that successive revisions of Russian military strategy appear "to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons" to balance the U.S. advantage in high-tech conventional weapons.
A 2011 study by the respected RAND Corporation came to much the same conclusion, stating that Russian doctrine explicitly recognizes the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression.  Not only does Moscow see nuclear use as a potential escalatory option in a regional war, but it also envisions using nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conflict.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/04/24/four-ways-the-ukraine-crisis-could-escalate-to-use-of-nuclear-weapons/

Why Russia calls a limited nuclear strike "de-escalation"
By the next year, Russia had issued a new military doctrine whose main innovation was the concept of "de-escalation"—the idea that, if Russia were faced with a large-scale conventional attack that exceeded its capacity for defense, it might respond with a limited nuclear strike.
http://thebulletin.org/why-russia-calls-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation

The doctrine introduced the notion of de-escalation—a strategy envisioning the threat of a limited nuclear strike that would force an opponent to accept a return to the status quo ante. Such a threat is envisioned as deterring the United States and its allies from involvement in conflicts in which Russia has an important stake, and in this sense is essentially defensive. Yet, to be effective, such a threat also must be credible. To that end, all large-scale military exercises that Russia conducted beginning in 2000 featured simulations of limited nuclear strikes.

In keeping with the security concept it is intended to complement, the new doctrine appears to lower the threshold for Russia's use of nuclear weapons below what was stated in the national security concept that was issued in 1997. Whereas the 1997 concept allowed the first use of nuclear arms only "in case of a threat to the existence of the Russian Federation," the new doctrine allows nuclear weapons use "in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation."
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_05/dc3ma00

You know, I'm not just making this shit up or pulling it out of my ass;  while Russia has walked it back a bit in the 2010 doctrine review compared to the 2000 review, it's still Russian policy to introduce nukes into a conventional conflict if they're getting their asses handed to them.
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf

Here's the RAND report from 2011, Nuclear Deterrence in Europe: Russian Approaches to a New Environment and Implications for the United States
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1075.html

Needless to say, I don't agree with grumbler's assertion that Russia wouldn't go nuclear in a shooting war because Putin's cronies would stop him when compared to
1) my "delusions" about documented and established Russian strategic policy,
2) my "delusions" about the inherent physics of Russian nationalism and its inability to contain itself once it gets all frothy-like, or
3) my "delusions" of Putin as a grudge-nursing, supremely megalomaniac egoist that is, well, one hell of a sore fucking loser.   

And if, in a robust conventional defense of Poland and/or the Baltics, we start hitting Russian soil (airbases, munitions, ports, staging areas, etc.), people think they'll do nothing to escalate in response, especially if they're getting their asses handed to them conventionally?  And, if they do, what exactly would be the political and military response in America to the nuclear removal of substantial portions of a U.S. Brigade Combat Team from the battlefield in Estonia?  And I'm the delusional one?

If so, does that mean we should give Russia a free hand to invade whomever they choose, since it isn't really worth ending civilization in order to protect Poland?

Kinda puts a dent in the concept of a collective security model by saying that, in the NATO framework, one member is less valuable than another.  Warsaw is as important as Berlin is as important as London is as important as Washington, DC.  To say otherwise throws out the very concept of what a mutual defense treaty is, and what it means.  And if that's the case, then you don't have to worry about potential enemies not believing in it and calling the bluff, because you don't have confidence in it yourself.  That actually makes the potential for conflict more likely in the nuclear age.  No, they need to believe that NATO is inviolate, and it's game over for them.  They need to believe that Moscow is as important as Warsaw.

I would hate to think, with the very cornerstone of post-WW2 American foreign policy and the foundation of its defense for 70 years, that Poland and the Baltics were sold a bad bill of goods when it came to membership.  Maybe they should change the abbreviation from "NATO" to "MEH".

[grumbler]

So, Seedy, are you conceding what your sources (and I) argue:  that it is Russia's current weakness relative to NATO that increases the potential for the regime to use nuclear weapons, rather than NATO's weakness?  Or do you retain your delusions against all the evidence?

As for "the inherent physics [sic] of Russian nationalism and its inability to contain itself once it gets all frothy-like" I'm gonna take the word of the frothy on frothiness, but note that it doesn't matter much.

I'd also note that the last source you cite has the Russians saying that there is now a "decline in the threat of the unleashing of a large-scale war, including a nuclear war" and that "the threat of direct military aggression in traditional forms against the Russian Federation and its allies has declined."  Rather frothy, those bits.

As for "saying that, in the NATO framework, one member is less valuable than another," you are the only person implying that, as far as I know.  Your argument that, if the Russian attack the Baltics, they will melt the world unless NATO gives them the Baltics is the only rationale I can think of for surrendering the Baltics.  Luckily, no one in authority seems to agree with you that NATO will have to choose between abandoning the Baltic states or ending civilization.