Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[Eddie Teach]

We could all learn a lot from Michael Scott.

[DGuller]

Which is not the point I was making. 911 was not the case of "defending a member state's territory". It was a case of a hostile terorrist action carried out in a member state's territory. Not the same thing.

Well, NATO differed with your interpretation, but feel free to try to re-define your way into not being wrong if that makes you feel smarter.

NATO may call it whatever it wants, with no self-serving explanation I'm sure, but we all know what was meant.  NATO's potential bluff against Russia has never been called yet.

[KRonn]

My view is that Russia will follow a similar but less forceful game plan as he's doing with Ukraine to make moves on the Baltic states. Russian operatives will foment protests among the Russian speaking residents but this time Russia will keep a much lower profile, at first. The protests will get stronger and more vehement over time, prompting Putin to start blustering about the injustices to Russian minorities. In the ensuing fighting it'll be made more to look like local forces against the government so as not to provoke NATO (too much). Fighting will be more like civil unrest, civil war, and unless it gets to a point where Russian forces, equipment and advisors move in as they did early on in Ukraine then Putin may be able to stall any NATO action until it's too late. But then, without Russian equipment the insurgency can't likely win so Putin will try to find ways to justify helping the minority Russians/Russian operatives/special forces or to do so in much less visible ways, having learned from Ukraine. It's a gamble but probably Putin's most logical potential move, as I do think he'll really want to move on the Baltics. I do't see any such plan working with Poland though.

[The Minsky Moment]

There is no way Russia goes after Poland.  No way.
Baltics are a different story.  Still unikely, but not impossible some sort of indirect subversion type tactics could be attempted.

[jimmy olsen]

So he basically drew a red line? 

If he backs down on this one he'll destroy 70 years of American foreign policy. I don't think you really think it's comparable to what he said about Syria.

[Baron von Schtinkenbutt]

So he basically drew a red line? 

Actually, Truman drew that red line.

[derspiess]

So he basically drew a red line? 

Actually, Truman drew that red line.

At the Baltics?  I guess he had even more balls than I thought.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

My view is that Russia will follow a similar but less forceful game plan as he's doing with Ukraine to make moves on the Baltic states. Russian operatives will foment protests among the Russian speaking residents but this time Russia will keep a much lower profile, at first. The protests will get stronger and more vehement over time, prompting Putin to start blustering about the injustices to Russian minorities. In the ensuing fighting it'll be made more to look like local forces against the government so as not to provoke NATO (too much). Fighting will be more like civil unrest, civil war, and unless it gets to a point where Russian forces, equipment and advisors move in as they did early on in Ukraine then Putin may be able to stall any NATO action until it's too late. But then, without Russian equipment the insurgency can't likely win so Putin will try to find ways to justify helping the minority Russians/Russian operatives/special forces or to do so in much less visible ways, having learned from Ukraine. It's a gamble but probably Putin's most logical potential move, as I do think he'll really want to move on the Baltics. I do't see any such plan working with Poland though.

Don't see how it can really work as everyone will see right through it from the start. No russian minority will be trusted again on the borders with Russia due to Putin's shenanigans. And if they as much as make a stink the fingers will be pointing to Putin

[Berkut]

Yeah, and pointing fingers at Putin has been shown to be an effective way of stopping him.

[derspiess]

If he backs down on this one he'll destroy 70 years of American foreign policy. I don't think you really think it's comparable to what he said about Syria.

I'm not sure "70 years of foreign policy" weighs that much on his mind.  Anyway it was a throw-away comment.  I don't know if he's serious or not, but I just thought I'd make mention of him talking tough before.

[KRonn]

There is no way Russia goes after Poland.  No way.
Baltics are a different story.  Still unikely, but not impossible some sort of indirect subversion type tactics could be attempted.

Agreed on Poland, no way. Not even a subversion campaign will have any effect. But I won't be surprised if protests and unrest start in some of the Baltic states after Ukraine, in a couple of years or sooner, especially if events in Ukraine don't damage Putin/Russia too much with sanctions and European/US reactions.

[CountDeMoney]

Well I guess we will see - if Russia invades a NATO state, wouldnt that be the first time NATO actually has to defend any member state's territory?

It would be the second.  9/11 was the first.

Thankfully we have your attention to nitpickery to highlight the largely ceremonial invocation of Article 5 against a non-state actor.

[CountDeMoney]

Which is not the point I was making. 911 was not the case of "defending a member state's territory". It was a case of a hostile terorrist action carried out in a member state's territory. Not the same thing.

Don't fuck with grumbler, he will out-lawyer you.  A is A.

[KRonn]

My view is that Russia will follow a similar but less forceful game plan as he's doing with Ukraine to make moves on the Baltic states. Russian operatives will foment protests among the Russian speaking residents but this time Russia will keep a much lower profile, at first. The protests will get stronger and more vehement over time, prompting Putin to start blustering about the injustices to Russian minorities. In the ensuing fighting it'll be made more to look like local forces against the government so as not to provoke NATO (too much). Fighting will be more like civil unrest, civil war, and unless it gets to a point where Russian forces, equipment and advisors move in as they did early on in Ukraine then Putin may be able to stall any NATO action until it's too late. But then, without Russian equipment the insurgency can't likely win so Putin will try to find ways to justify helping the minority Russians/Russian operatives/special forces or to do so in much less visible ways, having learned from Ukraine. It's a gamble but probably Putin's most logical potential move, as I do think he'll really want to move on the Baltics. I do't see any such plan working with Poland though.

Don't see how it can really work as everyone will see right through it from the start. No russian minority will be trusted again on the borders with Russia due to Putin's shenanigans. And if they as much as make a stink the fingers will be pointing to Putin

Putin ripped off a chunk of Georgia and Crimea under similar pretexts as in Ukraine and he may have more Russian minorities in some of the Baltic states. He's threatening Kazakhstan and probably other of those eastern/southern former USSR republics. I think he's going after all he can and the Baltics are a choice for him, as in at least one case there are 30% Russian minorities, if I remember that right. Plus he can really mess with NATO, maybe try to push NATO to the breaking point with a subversive campaign that they won't know how to really respond. The West may bluster but will NATO go in if the a Baltic state's problems look more internal, even while knowing that Putin has a big hand in things? I would hope NATO would react but Putin would like nothing better than to bring NATO down a couple of notches as well as to gain back some land. And he can always back down if NATO does respond and things aren't going the way he wants.

[Tamas]

Yes, correct me if I am wrong but relatively speaking, compared to the Baltic States there are like no Russians at all in Ukraine.