Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[Malthus]

Merkel is citing the NATO-Russia Founding Act in opposing placing NATO troops in Eastern Europe:

http://www.dw.de/no-permanent-nato-troop-presence-in-eastern-europe-merkel-says/a-17897288


Problem is, Russia seems to have already violated that agreement.

The Act's provisions state as follows:

NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. Accordingly, it will have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks. In this context, reinforcement may take place, when necessary, in the event of defence against a threat of aggression and missions in support of peace consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE governing principles, as well as for exercises consistent with the adapted CFE Treaty, the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994 and mutually agreed transparency measures. Russia will exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.

The restraint applied to "the current and foreseeable security environment", as of 1997. It isn't a pledge never to post permanent bases again, should the "security environment" change - as it obviously has.

[Malthus]

Really? Georgia was huge news over here.

What is big however is that France has just suspended delivery of the first Mistral.

Reactions were muted. The general impression was that Russia was in the wrong and ought to be spanked for it, but actually spanking Russia over Georgia - tiny and remote from anywhere important - was a bad idea: Russia was too important otherwise.

The feeling is different this time around.

[Warspite]

The members have a lot of divisions, but are united as one in not trusting Putin.

It's one thing to agree on the diagnosis of the problem, but another to agree on the course of action - particularly if different members have very different vulnerabilities to different actions.

To get a collective stance from NATO that means something, you have twenty-five European countries, each with their own head of government, various competing bureaucracies, electoral dynamics, economic priorities, internal political currents, continental (EU) political dynamics, and different sensitivities and vulnerabilities to what Russia is doing.

All in all, it's a wonder NATO manages to do anything in this crisis, particularly when its founding purpose was straightforward territorial defence and the Afghan turn 2006-14 has not, shall we say, been universally popular.

This is why the Summit is important: if at least the declarations and agreements in Wales are credible, then there's hope for a useful alliance. But if they're watered down and mealy-mouthed, then NATO broadcasts its own irrelevance.

[Warspite]

Really? Georgia was huge news over here.

What is big however is that France has just suspended delivery of the first Mistral.

Reactions were muted. The general impression was that Russia was in the wrong and ought to be spanked for it, but actually spanking Russia over Georgia - tiny and remote from anywhere important - was a bad idea: Russia was too important otherwise.

The feeling is different this time around.

But you've seen the polling data that a worryingly significant proportion of Europeans think Putin is somewhat justified in what he's doing? Someone posted a map on this earlier, I believe.

[Malthus]

The members have a lot of divisions, but are united as one in not trusting Putin.

It's one thing to agree on the diagnosis of the problem, but another to agree on the course of action - particularly if different members have very different vulnerabilities to different actions.

To get a collective stance from NATO that means something, you have twenty-five European countries, each with their own head of government, various competing bureaucracies, electoral dynamics, economic priorities, internal political currents, continental (EU) political dynamics, and different sensitivities and vulnerabilities to what Russia is doing.

All in all, it's a wonder NATO manages to do anything in this crisis, particularly when its founding purpose was straightforward territorial defence and the Afghan turn 2006-14 has not, shall we say, been universally popular.

This is why the Summit is important: if at least the declarations and agreements in Wales are credible, then there's hope for a useful alliance. But if they're watered down and mealy-mouthed, then NATO broadcasts its own irrelevance.

Statements like this by Merkel are not helpful:

"When it comes to the question of the defense of the Baltic countries, I assume that the territorial integrity of these countries will be preserved," Merkel said, discussing Moscow's intentions in the region.

Yeah, nice assumption there. Hardly reassuring to those actually living in said countries!  As if Putin has shown himself a big respecter of other countries' "territorial integrity" in the past ... lord, does she ever sound as clueless as Chamberlain. 

[DGuller]

No shit.  Germans need to put Schroeder back ASAP.

[Malthus]

Really? Georgia was huge news over here.

What is big however is that France has just suspended delivery of the first Mistral.

Reactions were muted. The general impression was that Russia was in the wrong and ought to be spanked for it, but actually spanking Russia over Georgia - tiny and remote from anywhere important - was a bad idea: Russia was too important otherwise.

The feeling is different this time around.

But you've seen the polling data that a worryingly significant proportion of Europeans think Putin is somewhat justified in what he's doing? Someone posted a map on this earlier, I believe.

It is significant, but decreasing, was my impression.

[frunk]

Yeah, nice assumption there. Hardly reassuring to those actually living in said countries!  As if Putin has shown himself a big respecter of other countries' "territorial integrity" in the past ... lord, does she ever sound as clueless as Chamberlain.

Whew, I was worried Obama had pulled that part in this re-enactment.

edit: So we've got:

Russia - Germany
Germany - UK
Georgia - Austria
Ukraine - Czechoslovakia
Baltic States - Poland
China - Japan
Hungary - Italy

The similarities break down with the US/NATO.  France maybe?  I hope not.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

Well, they are weird about them. Supposedly a separatist badge, combining Soviet and Tsarist flag. I think the only thing important for them about those insignia is that it conjures nostalgia about a strong Russia.

national Bolshevik vibe that

[KRonn]

"When it comes to the question of the defense of the Baltic countries, I assume that the territorial integrity of these countries will be preserved," Merkel said, discussing Moscow's intentions in the region.   

Sounds like some of the US leadership too at times. I just hope a strongly worded letter is sent along to convey this sentiment. That'll show 'em!   

[Jacob]

It is disjointed, reactionary, and there isn't any consensus among the actors on this side as to how to respond, which I would expect if the response was planned out prior to the provocation (ie, if Putin does this, we all agree to do that in response).

That seems less of an issue of "strategy" and more of an issue of "facts on the ground". Europe is like a herd of cats with different priorities; their disinclination to getting lined up nicely behind a robust plan is something you need to have a strategy to navigate, not evidence of a lack of strategy, IMO.

How can *you* tell that this is a strategy, rather than just a reaction to someone else driving events?

Oh, I can't 

It's just that I can't think of a better alternative if there was a strategy, so I don't see it as evidence of the absence of one either.

I've never once heard of an aggressive actor like Putin, throughout history, ever being deterred from what they want to do by relatively light economic sanctions.

I can't think of any examples. The question, however, is what are the alternatives? Are we ready to do what it takes to effectively and thoroughly deter Putin, whatever it is? It seems to me that we'd need to be ready to step up to full out war with Russia for that, and I'm not sure that's worth it.

And what is more, so far as we can tell, the sanctions have not deterred Putin one bit. He took Crimea, and didn't care what the international community thought, and the international community obliged him by doing...nothing.

Now he has invaded yet ANOTHER country, and we threaten to not sell him grapes? Pfft. I suspect that this is exactly the kind of "response" that Putin predicted and counted on.

I'm under the impression that the sanctions - especially if escalation continues - has the potential to do significant damage to the Russian economy. While it may not be enough to cause Putin to back down, it's not nothing either, IMO.

Sever econoic sanctions. Refuse to purchase gas.

Start sending arms to the Ukraine. Publicly and loudly prove to the world that we know Russians are inside the Ukraine. Call this what is is - a war of aggression against a sovereign nation.

I think that's where we are headed.

I don't care at all about leaving Putin room to back down - I don't think he has proven time and again that he doesn't operate in that fashion. He doesn't look at a "mealy mouthed" response as "Hey, they are giving me some room to retire gracefully, I should take it..." he looks at as "Fucking pussies, I knew they wouldn't call me on it. I am going to take the rest of the Crimea as well. Or Georgia. Or Azerbaijan".

Wanting to give someone room to back down is the kind of thing that is important when you are dealing with actors that are operating under the same basic operating principles as the rest of the west operates under, where the goal of everyone, 99% of the time, is to de-escalate situations far, far, FAR short of violence.

Putin has proven that he is not that kind of actor, and treating him as if he was someone "looking for some room to back down while saving face" is going to (and has, time and again) simply backfire.

It's not just about leaving him room to back down, it's also about avoiding putting ourselves in a corner where we have to follow through with something we don't actually want to do (or back down).

That said, I could be wrong and I'm very open to hear how and why.

I am, as always, happy to help.

I knew I could count on you

[Martinus]

Yeah, nice assumption there. Hardly reassuring to those actually living in said countries!  As if Putin has shown himself a big respecter of other countries' "territorial integrity" in the past ... lord, does she ever sound as clueless as Chamberlain.

Whew, I was worried Obama had pulled that part in this re-enactment.

edit: So we've got:

Russia - Germany
Germany - UK
Georgia - Austria
Ukraine - Czechoslovakia
Baltic States - Poland
China - Japan
Hungary - Italy

The similarities break down with the US/NATO.  France maybe?  I hope not.

Poland is probably the new France.

[frunk]

Poland is probably the new France.

I wonder who is going to end up as Russia.  I suppose China could, but I doubt it.  Iran?

[DGuller]

Poland is probably the new France.

I wonder who is going to end up as Russia.  I suppose China could, but I doubt it.  Iran?

Definitely China.  Two bad actors teaming up to do mayhem together.

[frunk]

Definitely China.  Two bad actors teaming up to do mayhem together.

I still think they are Japan.  They are focused on aggravating their Pacific Ocean neighbors and I doubt Russia would be dumb enough to attack them.

I suppose I might be saying the same thing in the fall of 1940 about Germany/USSR, but still.