Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[Sheilbh]

Agreed. The onus is on the west to hold the line with sanctions and not doing business with Russia (and Ukraine with the actual fighting of course. But they will)

Apparently newspapers are seeing less traffic on Ukraine stories - so this will start slipping from the front-page/lead story soon. It will be crowded out by other news and domestic issues I imagine over the next month. So that will be when the challenge hits on sanctions.

The other side of that is that a lot of the companies pulling out of Russia haven't done so because of sanctions. They basically self-sanctioned because of the reputational hit of staying in Russia (though, of course, many didn't). We've already seen Renault re-open their plant in Moscow - there's lots of capital in that plant, apparently its about 70%+ Russian parts so probably more exposed to the nationalisation threat than most. I'd watch because I think the vast majority of companies that have suspended their business in Russia will slope back once attention dies down. I'd note there's been some rumours around Renault re-opening being discussed with French leadership which has also apparently not been pushing very much for companies to leave Russia.

Unless there is a new escalation - such as chemical or biological weapons - I think holding the line on the current sanctions (and especially the self-sanctions) will be challenging. On the other hand, I'm not sure if Russia can or is willing to take the steps necessary to maintain this war.

[crazy canuck]

I wonder if that is part of why Putin has raised the possibility of nuclear war.  He needs the West to put pressure on Ukraine to make peace before the West loses interest?

[Admiral Yi]

Apparently newspapers are seeing less traffic on Ukraine stories - so this will start slipping from the front-page/lead story soon. It will be crowded out by other news and domestic issues I imagine over the next month. So that will be when the challenge hits on sanctions.

I think at least part of that is because there's sort of a lull in the fighting.

[alfred russel]

Right now, I feel we're heading towards a "War in Donbass on steroids" scenario, where Russia can't progress much further, but Ukraine can't dislodge them from the occupied cities. This can last for several years, unless something changes inside Russia.

I really don't see Russia able to survive for years under this level of sanctions.

Russian plan now seems to be to force a victory in Ukraine, present it as an fait accompli to the West and try to get partial sanctions lifted.  If there's ongoing fighting hard to see how the West budges.

Hugo Chavez not only lived out his life under sanctions that completely crippled his country but passed his rule onto his bus driver crony. North Korea is going strong. Castro lived out his life in charge. Hell, Iran and Iraq fought each other for years and took significantly more casualties than Russia has experienced in Ukraine with less population. Neither experienced regime change, even after GWI and much more significant sanctions on Iraq, until direct invasion in GWII.

Russia might collapse. Expecting it from sanctions or 15-20k dead in a country of 140 million plus is optimistic. Especially with buyers of oil and the country increasingly becoming a petrol state.

[Jacob]

Right now, I feel we're heading towards a "War in Donbass on steroids" scenario, where Russia can't progress much further, but Ukraine can't dislodge them from the occupied cities. This can last for several years, unless something changes inside Russia.

I don't see any real reason to assume Ukraine can't dislodge Russia from the occupied cities, to be honest given sufficient support, the rate of Russian losses, and the difficulties Russia will have replacing their losses.

It's not a given that Ukraine will succeed, but I don't think it's a given that they cannot.

[OttoVonBismarck]

My problem with assuming a war with Russia wouldn't go nuclear is: how else would it end?

I mean, sure maybe a regime change in Russia would give them an opportunity to make peace without the people in power destroying themselves, but otherwise? NATO (probably fairly easily) overpowers and largely destroys the Russian air force and chase their land forces out of Ukraine. So after a couple of months and a lot of collateral damage on both sides there are armies watching each other on the Baltic, Polish, and Ukrainian borders.

What's next?

I think the lessons of WWI/II are sometimes overstated--in human history the vast majority of wars were limited, not total, wars. It stands to relative reason that just like almost every other war in human history, if his forces were massively vanquished on the field of battle, and his enemies were willing to come to terms with him that let him keep his country and his head, like many Tsars and Kings before him, Putin would negotiate. There is a belief that this would be impossible because no dictator can lose a war and survive, but there's plenty of evidence against that--autocrats have lost a number of such wars in the 20th century and continued on for years--Saddam basically fought an unsuccessful war against Iran, a far more unsuccessful war against Kuwait, and he didn't lose power until a big U.S. Army rolled into Baghdad and took it from him by force. The people who so casually talk of Putin losing power over losing face, in my opinion, massively underestimate what this modern Russian Chekist, this creature of Kremlin intrigue and the security state, has done to make it almost impossible for any clique to remove him from authority.

[Berkut]

I think OvB is right, and that is one of the reason one thing we should stop talking about is regime change in Russia as any kind of outcome of Putin's War.

That would be foolish to put forth as a condition.

[PDH]

The only way I see regime change is if the Russian Army morale does collapse.  Not just in the north, but spreading throughout the army.  Russian soldiers can and will endure a lot, but they have reached the breaking point before.  Given some of the reports, it is not out of the realm of possibilities (though I think that it is more likely in certain areas like north of Kyiv).  If the army basically votes with their feet, then the regime is in trouble.

[Admiral Yi]

Maybe the Rwanda model, where some generals think it will help their war crimes odds if they overthrow Putin.

[Berkut]

The only way I see regime change is if the Russian Army morale does collapse.  Not just in the north, but spreading throughout the army.  Russian soldiers can and will endure a lot, but they have reached the breaking point before.  Given some of the reports, it is not out of the realm of possibilities (though I think that it is more likely in certain areas like north of Kyiv).  If the army basically votes with their feet, then the regime is in trouble.

That would be great - I would love to see Putin fall for sure.

But if that is going to happen, it has to happen within Russia. 

What we should not be doing is talking about regime change as any kind of condition on the outcome of the war. That would just drive Putin to be ever more intractable. 

There has to be some kind of off ramp for him.

[Jacob]

Maybe the Rwanda model, where some generals think it will help their war crimes odds if they overthrow Putin.

My understanding (from Kamil Galeev) is that the army is very low status, and closely watched by a vast array of security services. This, in part, explains the low morale and efficacy of the Russian armed forces. Kamil suggests that any revolt is going to come from securocrats rather than generals, as they are the one who wield real power in Russia at the moments.

[mongers]

Is Putin able to admit to himself a defeat or at least stalemate in this war? Or will he escalate or widen the crisis before coming to terms with the Ukrainians?

[PDH]

That would be great - I would love to see Putin fall for sure.

But if that is going to happen, it has to happen within Russia.

What we should not be doing is talking about regime change as any kind of condition on the outcome of the war. That would just drive Putin to be ever more intractable.

There has to be some kind of off ramp for him.

First off, as I said, I don't see it happening (a full collapse). However, the Russian/Soviet Army has had complete morale collapse before.  My thinking isn't that this leads A, B, C to regime change, but instead some sort of massive chaos inside Russia as the bite of sanctions and the visceral reaction to the losses are realized.  This is not fighting for the Motherland, this is a fight to recreate the Russian Empire - and not having an deep emotional stake in the war lends greater uncertainty.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Maybe the Rwanda model, where some generals think it will help their war crimes odds if they overthrow Putin.

My understanding (from Kamil Galeev) is that the army is very low status, and closely watched by a vast array of security services. This, in part, explains the low morale and efficacy of the Russian armed forces. Kamil suggests that any revolt is going to come from securocrats rather than generals, as they are the one who wield real power in Russia at the moments.

Every analysis I've seen jives with this 100%--Putin has been (accurately) I think, described as a modern day version of the Soviet chekist. Chekism was the system by which the security services exerted tremendous control over the life of the country--and the course of its political outcomes as well. Siloviki is a Russian term with two meanings--its most basic is just any member of the Russian security services, it also sometimes is used to mean members of the Russian political apparatus who come from that same background. Putin is thus the big dog silovik of the country. He has no genuine military background like some of the Soviet leaders did, and he has no traditional party machine background like most other Soviet leaders had. Putin's analogue from Soviet history would be the briefly-tenured Yuri Andropov, who came from a siloviki background as well.

Due to Putin's background and how he seized power, he understands that the siloviki are the real levers of power in Russia, or at least the Russia in which he seized power and that he has built over the last 20 years. Thus the economic oligarchs and the military have little "hard power" that can easily be used against Putin. The oligarchs have no real hard power at all. The military has hard power, but no easy means to exercise it. Top military leaders are kept isolated and physically distant from one another, under tremendous security observance. Putin does not even allow the regular military to have units near Moscow--the Rogsvardia unit that is ostensibly there to defend Moscow is lead by a Putin loyalist silovik who is not from the military hierarchy. On top of that Putin has like 20,000 members of his Secret Service as a sort of last ditch Praetorian Guard that remain around Moscow at all times.

If one of Russia's commanders in the field wanted to go after Putin, they have no means to do it in a quick Putsch or coup. It would be a big mobilization of an Army that would have to move on Moscow. Problem is again, all the Putin loyalists seeded within the military would do everything they could to stop that, let's say a field commander just had enough support that his guys kill all the Commissars and still march on Moscow--the field general has no obvious or easy way to coordinate with other generals, he has no way to know that Putin won't have loyalist members of the Air Force swoop in and erase the column from the earth etc etc. Putin has quite honestly thought about these scenarios and there would be no easy route for military removal of Putin.

The only thing that could potentially happen would be more akin to a WWI style military "mutiny" where literally such a huge portion of all the fighting men themselves just refuse to keep going. That would present a difficult situation, because there is no obvious tool to put them down, and the mutiny would severely undermine Putin's rule and probably put him at risk of one of his siloviks deciding Putin was now too risky and needed to have a "heart attack" or something and be removed. But such large scale military mutinies are quite rare in modern history.

[viper37]

Russia might collapse. Expecting it from sanctions or 15-20k dead in a country of 140 million plus is optimistic. Especially with buyers of oil and the country increasingly becoming a petrol state.

I totally agree with you on this.  Russia's current regime can stay on indefinately.  The population is still massively behind their leader and they still see themselves as an Empire.  As long as imperialism live on, Russia will endure.