It's Bibipalooza! Live, from Congress! One show only!

[garbon]

Let's say Iran is afraid of a US attack.  Then building nukes is a terrible idea, it makes it far more likely that the US would use its far more devastating and reliable nuclear arsenal against Iran which even if it developed weapons would be hard pressed to hit the USA.

Let's say Iran thinks that the US will attack conventionally but will not if Iran has nukes.  Nope - not rational.  Because:
(1) It takes time to develop nukes so developing them only increases the likelihood of the feared for attack.  And the fact that attack has nonetheless materialized despite years and multiple presidencies proves that the initial fear of attack was horribly misplaced to begin with.
(2) The US attacked Iraq despite -- nay, BECAUSE of --  the fact that the US believed the Iraq had developed deployable weapons of mass destruction.

QED

Let's quantify the chances of attack.  Let's say that every year there is a 3% chance the US will attack Iranian targets.  If Iran is building a nuclear weapon it increases the chance of attack to 6% every year.  Let us say it takes five year to build a bomb.  After which, chance of the US attacks on Iran are only .1% every year.  Is it rational to build this weapon now?

Now of course I made these numbers up.  I'm not good with stats, the US has attacked targets of the Iranian republic in the 1980's several times and zero times in the 1990's, 2000's and 2010's that I know of. So statistically the chance of an overt military attack may actually go down while they are building a bomb.

Let's say Iran is afraid of a US attack.  Then building nukes is a terrible idea, it makes it far more likely that the US would use its far more devastating and reliable nuclear arsenal against Iran which even if it developed weapons would be hard pressed to hit the USA.

Let's say Iran thinks that the US will attack conventionally but will not if Iran has nukes.  Nope - not rational.  Because:
(1) It takes time to develop nukes so developing them only increases the likelihood of the feared for attack.  And the fact that attack has nonetheless materialized despite years and multiple presidencies proves that the initial fear of attack was horribly misplaced to begin with.
(2) The US attacked Iraq despite -- nay, BECAUSE of --  the fact that the US believed the Iraq had developed deployable weapons of mass destruction.

QED

Let's quantify the chances of attack.  Let's say that every year there is a 3% chance the US will attack Iranian targets.  If Iran is building a nuclear weapon it increases the chance of attack to 6% every year.  Let us say it takes five year to build a bomb.  After which, chance of the US attacks on Iran are only .1% every year.  Is it rational to build this weapon now?

Now of course I made these numbers up.  I'm not good with stats, the US has attacked targets of the Iranian republic in the 1980's several times and zero times in the 1990's, 2000's and 2010's that I know of. So statistically the chance of an overt military attack may actually go down while they are building a bomb.

Is that actually a response to Joan's posts as it doesn't really seem to address anything he said.

[Razgovory]

If you're going to call the hostage rescue attempt an attack I'm not going to bother fact checking the others.

That is very short sighted of you.  It was my understanding Operation Eagle Claw was a military operation.  We never stated if an attack is unjustified or not, and the Iranians would almost certainly see US military vehicles flying into their capital as an attack.

From Wikipedia:

The operation was designed as a complex two-night mission. On the first night, the aircraft would enter Iran in a remote coastal area 60 miles west of Chabahar,[7] and fly to Desert One (33°04′23″N 55°53′33″E)[7] via the Dasht-e Lut desert. Desert One would be secured and established with a protection force and approximately 6,000 gallons of jet fuel would be brought to the area in collapsible fuel bladders carried by United States Air Force (USAF) C-130 aircraft. Three EC-130Es (Call signs: Republic 4 to 6) would carry the Delta Force and other protection elements and three MC-130E Combat Talons (Call signs: Dragon 1 to 3) would carry the logistical supplies. Next, eight United States Navy (USN) RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters from HELMINERON 16 (Call signs: Bluebeard 1 to 8) would arrive from the USS Nimitz. The helicopters would refuel and fly the Delta Force soldiers 260 miles further to Desert Two (35°14′00″N 52°09′00″E),[7] located 52 miles short of Tehran. Because it would be close to morning, the helicopters and ground forces would hide during the day at Desert Two.

The second night would involve the rescue operation. First, CIA agents who were already inside Iran would bring trucks to Desert Two. Together, the CIA agents and ground forces would then drive from Desert Two into Tehran. While the main assault force was moving to Tehran, other US troops would disable electrical power to the area, in an effort to slow any response from the Iranian military. In addition, AC-130 gunships would be deployed over Tehran to provide any necessary supporting fire. Lastly, Army Rangers would capture the nearby Manzariyeh Air Base (34°58′58″N 50°48′20″E) so that several C-141 Starlifters could arrive. The ground troops would then assault the embassy and eliminate the guards. Afterwards the hostages and troops would rendezvous with the helicopters across the street at the Shahid Shiroudi Stadium. Finally, the helicopters would bring everyone to the Manzariyeh Air Base, where the C-141s could fly everyone back to friendly territory.

Protection for the operation was to be provided by Carrier Air Wing 8 (CVW-8) operating from the USS Nimitz and CVW-14 operating from the USS Coral Sea. For this operation, the aircraft bore special invasion stripes identification on their right wings. CVW-14 Marine F-4Ns had a red (VMFA-323) or yellow (VMFA-531) stripe enclosed by two black stripes. CVW-14 attack aircraft (A-7s and A-6s) had an orange stripe enclosed by two black stripes. Nimitz aircraft were marked in a similar fashion to help differentiate US aircraft from Iranian aircraft purchased from the US (F-14 Tomcats and F-4 Phantoms).

This sounds very much like a military raid, not unlike where POWs are rescued during wartime.  Do you disagree with that characterization?

[Razgovory]

Is that actually a response to Joan's posts as it doesn't really seem to address anything he said.

Well not when you post it over and over again.  JR's argument is based on increasing and decreasing the chance of an attack.  He claims that building the bomb actually increases the chance of attack, though this is by no means certain.  If there is chance every year that US will attack Iran then eventually the US will attack given enough time.  If having a bomb eliminates that chance, but increases the chance of attack while the bomb is being built then it may very well be rational to accept a short period of additional risk.

[Ed Anger]

Blow the motherfucking Iranians up. We owe them for '79 at least.

[Admiral Yi]

This sounds very much like a military raid, not unlike where POWs are rescued during wartime.  Do you disagree with that characterization?

Are you arguing that it's smart for Iran to build nukes, because we tried to rescue the embassy hostages?

[frunk]

Let's say Iran is afraid of a US attack.  Then building nukes is a terrible idea, it makes it far more likely that the US would use its far more devastating and reliable nuclear arsenal against Iran which even if it developed weapons would be hard pressed to hit the USA.

Let's say Iran thinks that the US will attack conventionally but will not if Iran has nukes.  Nope - not rational.  Because:
(1) It takes time to develop nukes so developing them only increases the likelihood of the feared for attack.  And the fact that attack has nonetheless materialized despite years and multiple presidencies proves that the initial fear of attack was horribly misplaced to begin with.
(2) The US attacked Iraq despite -- nay, BECAUSE of --  the fact that the US believed the Iraq had developed deployable weapons of mass destruction.

QED

What would be a rational reason for Iran to build Nukes?

[Grinning_Colossus]

Given the timing of its revival (1989), the Iranian nuclear program was probably originally aimed at Iraq. Nukes would have been a deterrent against another Iraqi invasion.

[jimmy olsen]

The French action he supports won't influence the Israelis even if the US supported it, since the US would never go further than that, so I don't see a way that we can prevent them from doing whatever they want. They won't pay any price.

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2015/03/benjamin_netanyahu_isn_t_the_problem_the_united_states_has_enabled_israel.html

The Price Israel Must Pay

4.4k
98
2.5k
We no longer have a Netanyahu problem. We have an Israel problem.

By William Saletan

Two weeks ago, the United States had a Benjamin Netanyahu problem. The Israeli prime minister seemed to have gone rogue. His ambassador to Washington had secretly negotiated with Republicans to have Netanyahu address a joint session of Congress. Against the Obama administration's wishes, Netanyahu spoke on the floor of the House of Representatives against U.S. foreign policy. He told members of Congress that the speech wasn't political. Then he went home and used video of their applause in an ad promoting his re-election.

In the final days of his campaign, Netanyahu pitched himself to Israelis as the candidate who would stand up to President Obama, "American money," the "international community," and Israel's Arab minority. He bragged that he had used settlements to seize strategic Palestinian land, and he vowed to keep doing so. A day before the election, he renounced Israel's commitment to a Palestinian state. He pledged that if he were re-elected, he wouldn't permit such a state. He implored Jews to flock to the polls and drown out the ballots of Arab Israelis.

Many Americans, including me, thought these rants would hurt Netanyahu. We were wrong. In those final days, his support soared. On Tuesday, Netanyahu's party, Likud, won a plurality of seats in Israel's parliament. Thirty-three percent of Israelis voted for Likud or for smaller parties that officially rejected a Palestinian state. Another 15 percent voted for Jewish nationalist or ultra-Orthodox parties that have blocked Palestinian independence. A further 7 percent voted for a Likud offshoot that is expected to round out the new government. That adds up to more than 55 percent of the electorate. It's more than 60 percent of Israel's Jewish voters.

Netanyahu can no longer be dismissed as a rogue. He has proved that his people stand behind him. They have given him more seats in parliament than he had before and a more hawkish coalition of ruling parties. We don't have a Netanyahu problem anymore. We have an Israel problem.

Israel and the United States have a long, deep friendship. It's based on shared interests and values. But it's no longer clear that the old interests and values are shared. The U.S. government believes that Palestinian Arabs, like Jews, are entitled to a sovereign state. We believe it's wrong to build settlements on land that doesn't belong to you. We believe that ethnic minorities are entitled to participate in the political process and that they shouldn't be vilified to scare up votes. The events of the past week suggest that the prime minister of Israel doesn't believe these things and that most of his people either agree with him or don't care enough to vote the other way.

It's true that Israelis have other concerns, such as the high cost of housing. But when you set aside an issue, such as the rights of Palestinians, you're saying it isn't important to you. It's also true that it's easy for Americans like me to talk about this without facing the threat of terrorism. But sometimes distance is helpful. A friend can help you see changes in yourself. The constant pressure of war, terrorism, and peril has hardened Israel's heart.

In the days since Netanyahu's victory, some people have suggested that he didn't really mean what he said about rejecting Palestinian statehood. They argue that it was just an election ploy and that he can "walk it back." Please. Netanyahu would never accept such an excuse from a Palestinian leader who disavowed his prior commitment to peace. Netanyahu would say that such a leader couldn't be trusted, that he wasn't a "partner for peace," and that his use of such a ploy to win votes showed the true belligerence of his people. For years, Arabs have said that Netanyahu behaves like a man who's trying to prevent a Palestinian state. Now he has openly admitted as much. Why should they believe he didn't mean it?

When you look for a pattern in Netanyahu's behavior—the settlements, the ethnic demagoguery, the speech to Congress, the retraction of his commitment to an independent Palestine—no moral principle unites them. What unites them is audacity and calculation. Netanyahu does whatever he thinks he can get away with. That's how he describes the thinking of his adversaries, because that's how he thinks, too. If you listen to Israeli leaders who are trying to influence the behavior of their nation's enemies, the word you'll hear again and again is price.

That's why Israel has descended to its current level of disregard for others. It hasn't paid a price. Even in the face of Netanyahu's unwelcome speech to Congress, the Obama administration sent officials to AIPAC's annual conference to pledge that the United States would stand by Israel no matter what. "We have Israel's back, come hell or high water," national security adviser Susan Rice assured the crowd. So Netanyahu delivered his speech, went home, and gave the United States, Europe, and the Palestinians more hell. And Israelis re-elected him.

We have enabled this behavior, and we must end it. Friends don't let friends drive drunk. We must clarify the price Israel will pay for continuing to flout international norms and commitments. The challenge is to find the right measure. It can't be destructive, vengeful, or disproportionate. That rules out sanctions, cutting military aid, and subjecting Israel to prosecution under the International Criminal Court. It also rules out supporting a Palestinian-backed United Nations resolution that would demand the establishment of a Palestinian state within a year, with no corresponding promises to Israel.

The right vehicle is a different resolution, floated three months ago by France, which would authorize a two-year timetable for resolving the terms of statehood. It would stipulate a "non-militarized" Palestine, as well as a "full-phased withdrawal of Israeli security forces." The terms of the French draft aren't much different from what the United States informally accepts. But by endorsing the resolution and making clear that we will no longer use our veto in the Security Council to fend off such measures, the United States would signal to Israel that our patience has run out. Israel can join the discussions and move toward recognition of Palestine. Or it can stand alone.

[Valmy]

Not to state the obvious here but establishing a State in Palestine with a political culture of corruption on one end and Islamism on the other end, all while the region is erupting in flames is a pretty much impossible task. It would be hard under ideal circumstances.

No to mention that after the failure of Gaza Israel is not going to be unoccupying any more land.  And even if they did the Palestinians would keep attacking them. But they won't, somebody would have to force them to do it which we won't and the Europeans can't. As for Israel won't pay a price, oh they paid a price alright. The Palestinians made sure they paid dearly for pulling out of Gaza.

It is an ethnic conflict and there is really nothing to be done until both sides are tired of fighting. When somebody actually wants peace again, then we can talk. Until then the peace process is not so much a process as another arena of conflict to jostle for position.

And while all this is going on, this region is the most prosperous and stable in the neighborhood. Ah the Middle East.

[The Minsky Moment]

  If there is chance every year that US will attack Iran then eventually the US will attack given enough time. 

Only true if each year's annual chance of attack is completely independent of the next year's probability which is obviously false; i.e. it works only if you assume the "US" (its interests/outlooks/personnel/policy apparatus) completely and randomly resets every year.

[The Minsky Moment]

What would be a rational reason for Iran to build Nukes?

There are rational reasons which may even be the real reasons, like:
+ Lots of money made by politically connected contractors/suppliers/importers.  AKA the Rev Guards
+ Lots of opportunities for politically powerful types to get bribed
+ A large group of engineers, technicians and other relatively high status types get nice employment and hence a reason to support the program and regime.
+ When the inevitable criticism from the West comes, it is useful tool for using nationalism to rally popular support to the regime.

But I assumed Yi meant rational in an objective security sense.

[The Brain]

If I were Iran I would try to get nukes. The prize is too great to ignore.

[11B4V]

The French action he supports won't influence the Israelis even if the US supported it, since the US would never go further than that, so I don't see a way that we can prevent them from doing whatever they want. They won't pay any price.

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2015/03/benjamin_netanyahu_isn_t_the_problem_the_united_states_has_enabled_israel.html

The Price Israel Must Pay

4.4k
98
2.5k
We no longer have a Netanyahu problem. We have an Israel problem.

By William Saletan

Two weeks ago, the United States had a Benjamin Netanyahu problem. The Israeli prime minister seemed to have gone rogue. His ambassador to Washington had secretly negotiated with Republicans to have Netanyahu address a joint session of Congress. Against the Obama administration's wishes, Netanyahu spoke on the floor of the House of Representatives against U.S. foreign policy. He told members of Congress that the speech wasn't political. Then he went home and used video of their applause in an ad promoting his re-election.

In the final days of his campaign, Netanyahu pitched himself to Israelis as the candidate who would stand up to President Obama, "American money," the "international community," and Israel's Arab minority. He bragged that he had used settlements to seize strategic Palestinian land, and he vowed to keep doing so. A day before the election, he renounced Israel's commitment to a Palestinian state. He pledged that if he were re-elected, he wouldn't permit such a state. He implored Jews to flock to the polls and drown out the ballots of Arab Israelis.

Many Americans, including me, thought these rants would hurt Netanyahu. We were wrong. In those final days, his support soared. On Tuesday, Netanyahu's party, Likud, won a plurality of seats in Israel's parliament. Thirty-three percent of Israelis voted for Likud or for smaller parties that officially rejected a Palestinian state. Another 15 percent voted for Jewish nationalist or ultra-Orthodox parties that have blocked Palestinian independence. A further 7 percent voted for a Likud offshoot that is expected to round out the new government. That adds up to more than 55 percent of the electorate. It's more than 60 percent of Israel's Jewish voters.

Netanyahu can no longer be dismissed as a rogue. He has proved that his people stand behind him. They have given him more seats in parliament than he had before and a more hawkish coalition of ruling parties. We don't have a Netanyahu problem anymore. We have an Israel problem.

Israel and the United States have a long, deep friendship. It's based on shared interests and values. But it's no longer clear that the old interests and values are shared. The U.S. government believes that Palestinian Arabs, like Jews, are entitled to a sovereign state. We believe it's wrong to build settlements on land that doesn't belong to you. We believe that ethnic minorities are entitled to participate in the political process and that they shouldn't be vilified to scare up votes. The events of the past week suggest that the prime minister of Israel doesn't believe these things and that most of his people either agree with him or don't care enough to vote the other way.

It's true that Israelis have other concerns, such as the high cost of housing. But when you set aside an issue, such as the rights of Palestinians, you're saying it isn't important to you. It's also true that it's easy for Americans like me to talk about this without facing the threat of terrorism. But sometimes distance is helpful. A friend can help you see changes in yourself. The constant pressure of war, terrorism, and peril has hardened Israel's heart.

In the days since Netanyahu's victory, some people have suggested that he didn't really mean what he said about rejecting Palestinian statehood. They argue that it was just an election ploy and that he can "walk it back." Please. Netanyahu would never accept such an excuse from a Palestinian leader who disavowed his prior commitment to peace. Netanyahu would say that such a leader couldn't be trusted, that he wasn't a "partner for peace," and that his use of such a ploy to win votes showed the true belligerence of his people. For years, Arabs have said that Netanyahu behaves like a man who's trying to prevent a Palestinian state. Now he has openly admitted as much. Why should they believe he didn't mean it?

When you look for a pattern in Netanyahu's behavior—the settlements, the ethnic demagoguery, the speech to Congress, the retraction of his commitment to an independent Palestine—no moral principle unites them. What unites them is audacity and calculation. Netanyahu does whatever he thinks he can get away with. That's how he describes the thinking of his adversaries, because that's how he thinks, too. If you listen to Israeli leaders who are trying to influence the behavior of their nation's enemies, the word you'll hear again and again is price.

That's why Israel has descended to its current level of disregard for others. It hasn't paid a price. Even in the face of Netanyahu's unwelcome speech to Congress, the Obama administration sent officials to AIPAC's annual conference to pledge that the United States would stand by Israel no matter what. "We have Israel's back, come hell or high water," national security adviser Susan Rice assured the crowd. So Netanyahu delivered his speech, went home, and gave the United States, Europe, and the Palestinians more hell. And Israelis re-elected him.

We have enabled this behavior, and we must end it. Friends don't let friends drive drunk. We must clarify the price Israel will pay for continuing to flout international norms and commitments. The challenge is to find the right measure. It can't be destructive, vengeful, or disproportionate. That rules out sanctions, cutting military aid, and subjecting Israel to prosecution under the International Criminal Court. It also rules out supporting a Palestinian-backed United Nations resolution that would demand the establishment of a Palestinian state within a year, with no corresponding promises to Israel.

The right vehicle is a different resolution, floated three months ago by France, which would authorize a two-year timetable for resolving the terms of statehood. It would stipulate a "non-militarized" Palestine, as well as a "full-phased withdrawal of Israeli security forces." The terms of the French draft aren't much different from what the United States informally accepts. But by endorsing the resolution and making clear that we will no longer use our veto in the Security Council to fend off such measures, the United States would signal to Israel that our patience has run out. Israel can join the discussions and move toward recognition of Palestine. Or it can stand alone.

That's what happens when the president is a rabid anti-Semite.

[11B4V]

First the Semites next the Ottomans. Sad state of affairs really.

[jimmy olsen]

First the Semites next the Ottomans. Sad state of affairs really.

The Ottoman Empire fell 97 years ago.