Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[Berkut]

Yeah, Turkey is a genuinely useful NATO ally, and despite Erdogan's relatively warm relationship with Putin, he has allowed a lot of things to flow out of Turkey during this war that have killed a lot of Russians, that kind of shows that even he is firmly committed to NATO however much he likes playing footsie with Putin.

I take Erdogan's comments on Finnish and Swedish accession to be more of a staking out a position so he can get some sort of deal on some things he might want politically, I suspect a deal can and will be done, what exactly he gets I don't know.

Agreed. My read on Erdogan's comments is that they have left enough wiggle room for him to change position - from what I've read it's more "I won't support" than "I will block permanently". I think it's a shakedown because he's got a veto position, so he has leverage.

I think that is what I mean though - why should he have that leverage?

It's an artifact of NATOs structure that doesn't really make sense any more.

[Berkut]

For two organizations born out of WW2, NATO and the EU sure failed to safeguard against member states spiraling into dictatorships.

For NATO at least it was never all about keeping dictatorships out.  Portugal and Turkey were all dictatorships when they entered, and Greece went through a period of dictatorship.  You just had to be the right kind of dictatorship.

Again when NATO was pretty much a straight up, defensive alliance against Soviet agression, that made sense.

It has a broader purpose now, and the ability for the dictators to block action in support of fellow dictators, or block non-dictator countries from joining "just because" doesn't make much sense. 

THe historical prestige is sufficient to make it worthwhile to not mess with though. Just seems unfortunate that there can't be some leverage applied more directly in the opposite direction to countries like Turkey.

[Zanza]

Maybe Hungary annoys Poland enough that they would agree to an Article 7 TEU decision to suspend Hungarian voting rights in the EU. As a non-voting member, Hungary would be harmless...

[Sheilbh]

I think that is what I mean though - why should he have that leverage?

It's an artifact of NATOs structure that doesn't really make sense any more.

At its heart NATO is about article 5 - that an attack on one is an attack on all. I think it's very reasonable for that to be based on unanimity for new members, because all existing members are having to sign up to defend any new member. I don't think you can force that on existing members.

Having said that I think we are moving into a new phase of how our security arrangements work in the West. I've mentioned it before but I think the emergence e of "minilateralism" is a really striking trend where in addition to, or supplementing, existing broad alliances like NATO there are mini "coalitions of the willing" for want of a better phrase that want to cooperate more deeply.

In Europe I think the best example is the Franco-Greek relationship - I would not be surprised to see that expand to also include Romania in the near-ish future. I wouldn't be surprised to see more formal structures put in place around the Joint Expeditionary Force in the North (UK, Baltics, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and Iceland). And I think it'll develop in Asia too - AUKUS is an early example. Arguably five eyes was an early example.

It's a bit like the old concept of a multi-speed Europe except I think instead of it being built around a core that is going further with a periphery, we're going to instead see more and more of these minilateral groups of countries who want to cooperate more intensively in particular areas or in response to a particular threat - in addition to their general NATO or other security/alliance relationships. If anything I think these groups are more likely to spring up in the periphery (Greece, Baltics, Finland) because those are the countries exposed to higher risks who will want to create these slightly more intensive security relationships.

[OttoVonBismarck]

There's a pretty big work around if a Hungary or Turkey simply said no to Sweden/Finland for example--the U.S. could simply say it has entered into a bilateral agreement with those countries to come to their aid if they are attacked, which would likely pass the U.S. Senate fairly easily. They would also agree to maintain their militaries to NATO standards and to maintain relationships with the "NATO command structure."

There you go, they are basically in NATO in all but name--not to sound American-centric, but the promise of American military retaliation has always been the core threat of NATO towards Russian aggression. Like Spain and Italy are pleasant countries but no one really expected them to have a lot to contribute to anything serious in terms of a Russian war.

[Berkut]

There's a pretty big work around if a Hungary or Turkey simply said no to Sweden/Finland for example--the U.S. could simply say it has entered into a bilateral agreement with those countries to come to their aid if they are attacked, which would likely pass the U.S. Senate fairly easily. They would also agree to maintain their militaries to NATO standards and to maintain relationships with the "NATO command structure."

There you go, they are basically in NATO in all but name--not to sound American-centric, but the promise of American military retaliation has always been the core threat of NATO towards Russian aggression. Like Spain and Italy are pleasant countries but no one really expected them to have a lot to contribute to anything serious in terms of a Russian war.

Sure, but that won't have the same prestige value of the existing NATO, which has some meaning, presumably.

[Berkut]

I think that is what I mean though - why should he have that leverage?

It's an artifact of NATOs structure that doesn't really make sense any more.

At its heart NATO is about article 5 - that an attack on one is an attack on all. I think it's very reasonable for that to be based on unanimity for new members, because all existing members are having to sign up to defend any new member. I don't think you can force that on existing members.

But that isn't the leverage I am talking about.

I am talking about the leverage to say "Well, we are totally cool with Sweden joininig NATO in regards to the *purpose* of NATO, but we want to use this as an opportunity to leverage some other shit that has nothing to do with the actual purpose of NATO, like forcing current NATO members to sign off on us killing us some more Kurds!"

[Grey Fox]

Erdogan would have been right on China & Russia's steps for their new world order had the Ukraine invasion actually worked.

[Josquius]

I'm surprised turkey /Russia relations are keeping so well still considering Turkey just whupped Russia in a proxy war in Armenia.

Incidentally that's hard. I've a lot of sympathy for the Armenians and NK self determination... But they've found themselves on the wrong side.

[Barrister]

I'm surprised turkey /Russia relations are so well still considering Turkey just whupped Russia in a proxy war in Armenia.

Incidentally that's hard. I've a lot of sympathy for the Armenians and NK self determination... But they've found themselves on the wrong side.

Their interests align in Syria.

[Jacob]

There's a pretty big work around if a Hungary or Turkey simply said no to Sweden/Finland for example--the U.S. could simply say it has entered into a bilateral agreement with those countries to come to their aid if they are attacked, which would likely pass the U.S. Senate fairly easily. They would also agree to maintain their militaries to NATO standards and to maintain relationships with the "NATO command structure."

There you go, they are basically in NATO in all but name--not to sound American-centric, but the promise of American military retaliation has always been the core threat of NATO towards Russian aggression. Like Spain and Italy are pleasant countries but no one really expected them to have a lot to contribute to anything serious in terms of a Russian war.

Works for me.

[Barrister]

Remember retired colonel Mikhail Khodaryonok who gave such a negative impression of Russia's chances a couple days ago?

Well here he is today being far more bullish.


https://twitter.com/francis_scarr/status/1526998913986842624

[Josquius]

Remember retired colonel Mikhail Khodaryonok who gave such a negative impression of Russia's chances a couple days ago?

Well here he is today being far more bullish.


https://twitter.com/francis_scarr/status/1526998913986842624

I hope his daughter is OK.

[grumbler]

Remember retired colonel Mikhail Khodaryonok who gave such a negative impression of Russia's chances a couple days ago?

Well here he is today being far more bullish.


https://twitter.com/francis_scarr/status/1526998913986842624

I hope his daughter is OK.

State Political Reeducation Uranium Mine #14 has lost very few workers during their first two weeks of mining.  Mortality does not reach 100% until the fourth month.

[Solmyr]

Mother of all Freudian slips.

https://twitter.com/sahilkapur/status/1527092111195226114

Former President George W. Bush: "The decision of one man to launch a wholly unjustified and brutal invasion of Iraq. I mean of Ukraine."