The Israel-Iran War ?

[Admiral Yi]

Avert your eyes if you're triggered by AI.

"The Circular Error Probable (CEP) of Iranian ballistic missiles varies significantly depending on the specific missile system. Some short-range missiles have a CEP of 10-100 meters, while longer-range missiles like the Shahab-3 have a CEP of around 2,500 meters (2.5km) according to open-source defense assessments and Wikipedia. "

These are not precision strikes.

[Razgovory]

Turns out bombing a hospital is fine after all.  It just has to have the right type of people in it.

Do you recognize the hypocrisy of your previous positions now?

No, walk me through it.

[Razgovory]

Iran has bombed an Israeli hospital.

Truly a monstrous state.  Only monsters would do that.

Iran shouldn't bomb hospitals.

But I am pretty sure that never happened. I was told Trump made the toothless.

Who told you that?

[crazy canuck]

Turns out bombing a hospital is fine after all.  It just has to have the right type of people in it.

Do you recognize the hypocrisy of your previous positions now?

No, walk me through it.

You defended military strikes on hospitals, but now it is wrong for you based on who is inside.

Consider taking the position that attacking hospitals is always wrong.

[The Minsky Moment]

I think he saw a unique confluence of diplomatic and military events that meant there was an opportunity where this could be done.

That window of opportunity opened up in November-December 2024, when both Hezbollah and Assad were taken off the board. The question is why in that six-month period, this particular week was chosen.

[The Minsky Moment]

The collapse of Assad's government and the crushing of Hezbollah within the last year has opened a window through which the Israeli's can attack and only be retaliated against by Iran itself. That wasn't possible before.

Agreed, but per above that explains why the attack happened in 2025, not specifically mid-June 2025

[PJL]

I think he saw a unique confluence of diplomatic and military events that meant there was an opportunity where this could be done.

That window of opportunity opened up in November-December 2024, when both Hezbollah and Assad were taken off the board. The question is why in that six-month period, this particular week was chosen.

That's easy. Israel took action once the IAEA report last week said Iran had been in breach of non-proliferation obligations. Given that France, Germany & the UK back the motion, that would also explain muted European reaction to Israeli strikes in Iran. This was a justified CB for Israel to do this.

[grumbler]

I think he saw a unique confluence of diplomatic and military events that meant there was an opportunity where this could be done.

That window of opportunity opened up in November-December 2024, when both Hezbollah and Assad were taken off the board. The question is why in that six-month period, this particular week was chosen.

It could easily be that it took that long to complete the reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering needed to make the attack effective.

[grumbler]

That's easy. Israel took action once the IAEA report last week said Iran had been in breach of non-proliferation obligations. Given that France, Germany & the UK back the motion, that would also explain muted European reaction to Israeli strikes in Iran. This was a justified CB for Israel to do this.

That would be an amazingly humorous rationale, given that Israel is MASSIVELY in breach of non-proliferation obligations. In fact, they are in breach about as much as it is possible for a nation to be.

[Grey Fox]

TACO is chickening out. Leavitt just said decision in the next 2 weeks.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Yeah, could be a little bit of both + it appears at least probable the U.S. helped in having a meeting with Iranian negotiators scheduled for Sunday, while likely knowing Iran was going to be attacked on Friday. My guess is the Iranians were not on their highest alert because they were making the assumption Netanyahu wouldn't independently attack them as long as Trump was still at the negotiating table, since we had seen "official leaks" earlier in the week that Trump had forbidden Netanyahu to attack Iran for the time being.

[Razgovory]

Turns out bombing a hospital is fine after all.  It just has to have the right type of people in it.

Do you recognize the hypocrisy of your previous positions now?

No, walk me through it.

You defended military strikes on hospitals, but now it is wrong for you based on who is inside.

Consider taking the position that attacking hospitals is always wrong.

I see you don't read what I write.  I argued that a hospital loses it's protected status if it used for military purposes.  If it is being used as a command and control center for combatants it becomes a legitimate target.  If attacking a hospital is always wrong, then someone could fire shoot from the hospital with impunity.  Perhaps you should consider that.

What I was noting in my post was that I see that many antizionists are fine with a blowing up a hospital, if it is an Israeli hospital.  They do NOT think that blowing up a hospital is always wrong, it is wrong for the Israelis to blow up a hospital.

[Zoupa]

TACO is chickening out. Leavitt just said decision in the next 2 weeks.

I've lost count of how many "2 weeks warning" he gave to Putin.

[The Minsky Moment]

As I say I do wonder if, on the hawkish side, there's an opportunity to bind the US more tightly to Europe and to in effect bring the US in on the other side of a (different) conflict with a Russian aligned state and if there's opportunity there for European Ukrainian policy. But that strikes me as very, very high risk.

More like indulging in fantasy.

Before Jan 2025, the two pillars of US foreign policy were containment of Russian aggression in Europe and containment of PRC aggression in the Pacific.  Aside from the historic cultural, economic, and diplomatic affinities between the US and Europe, those priorities fundamentally aligned with European interests as well. As a consequence and as a consequence of the Russian fiasco in Ukraine, NATO strength and cohesion reached an apex in the late Biden presidency.

Trump has openly repudiated pillar one and less directly repudiated pillar two. There is little doubt that Trump could care less if Russia annexed Ukraine, or for that matter the Baltic States.  On Taiwan there has been a clear retreat form the Biden committment to defend the island.  This has been characterized by some as a return to strategic ambiguity but IMO that is an overly hopeful reading.  Trump did speak concretely on the matter when he told Xi that a PRC invasion on Taiwan would prompt US retaliation . . . in the form of higher tariffs.  This is close to an indirect signal that the US will not use military assets to protect Taiwan. 

And that reading is reinforced by the Trumpian gestalt - does anyone think Trump really cares whether TSMC is controlled by Chinese speaking Taiwanese or Chinese speakers from the mainland?  Trump's affinity for Putin stems from the fact that they share the late 19th century mindset of great power politics and spheres of influence: Trump implicitly accepts the Russian droit de seigneur over Ukraine and the "slavic lands" and the PRC's over Taiwan, even as he asserts his own claims to Canada, Greenland, Panama, etc.

Europe is silent because Europe is still processing the trauma of the sudden shattering of the Atlantic system.  Like Linus, it wanders about clutching its tattered security blanket, lacking the emotional strength to discard it. And Europe is silent because it lacks the physical strength as well: its military forces are glaringly inadequate and the timeline for their restoration is uncertain.

It is tempting for the Europeans to align with the US and Israel against Iran in this context. Few tears will be shed by anyone over the humbling of one of the most violent and nasty regimes on the planet. And it is tempting to see weakening a Russian ally as a means of weaking Russia.  But the latter point misunderstands the nature of the Russian-Iran-NK-PRC axis generally, and more specifically Iran's role in it from the Russian POV.  The axis is not a traditional military alliance.  Neither Russia nor the PRC are counting on support from the Iranian army in the event of war with the West. Iran's role is a supplier of energy to the PRC, and as a potential denier of energy to Russian and Chinese foes.  But it also serves Russian interest as a valuable combatant in Russia's shadow wars: the vast network of sanctions busters, gray market traders, money launderers, cyber-criminals, drug smugglers, internet troll farms, counterfeiters, and scam artists - fueled by a mafia-espionage complex in which the state fuses together its security services with organized crime networks. No barrage of bunker busters can touch that complex; conflict and ruin only strengthen it.

Viewed coldly from the perspective of European interest, it makes little sense to degrade a significant non-Russian supplier of oil and gas to world markets.  From the perspective of European interest, an Israel-Iran conflict is a best a sideshow and at worst a negative. From the perspective of European interest, Iran poses no meaningful threat to its security but may have resources to offer.*  Will Europe pursue its interests openly, in contradiction to US policy?  No they will not, they will continue to clutch the blanket for now.  But it is still very early in the timeline of the new security architecture to come.



*BTW virtually all the same things could be said from the US perspective.  But there, the complex interactions with Israel influence policy outcomes.

[Sheilbh]

I don't believe Europe has independently tried to exert influence reliant on power projection essentially since the Suez crisis (?).

Bosnia and Libya.  Then there's France acting solo in the Sahel and the UK solo in Falklands and Sierra Leone.

Since Cold War I'd say that's about right.

Starting since Suez - on the British side I'd add the Konfrontasi and Aden, as well as the great national humiliation of the Cod War. For France after Suez I'd add Algeria and Cameroon. Both played a role in the Nigerian Civil War/Biafran War supporting different parties and to different degrees.