The China Thread

[Josquius]

I can't remember where I heard it, but I heard a good description of why China does so well somewhere. It's basically because of their system of local government, albeit with local governers sent from the centre, and all of these provinces competing against each other to meet their numbers.
Which has the expected side effects of temptation to fudge numbers.
Also less reported is the massive inefficiencies this introduces if everyone is trying to do the same thing and not collaborating.
It does strike me Switzerland is a close democratic example with huge power for local authorities and canyons all competing in a race to the bottom.... Which works when you're a tiny nation that can slip under the radar and has long had an economy based on financial shenanigans. Less translatable to larger and more normal democracies and real race to the bottom issues if many try to replicate

[DGuller]

On the efficacy of Chinese autocracy: the Chinese system definitely has some serious inefficiencies, primarily around corruption and the risk of group think / the impulse to preserve face (for the state/ party/ officials). It is my belief that liberal democracy will produce better results over the long term. That said, liberal democracy is under attack. I have no reason to believe that Trumpist autocracy in the US or Orbanesque autocracy in Europe has any competitive advantages against Chinese autocracy. In fact, I expect that Chinese autocracy for all its faults still has an underpinning of "serving the people" and mechanisms for removing incompetent officials (beyond at the very top); something which I don't believe are features of the Trumpist oligarchs nor Orban's regime.

To be honest, I think it depends on what kind of liberal democracy you're talking about.  I think that when it comes to leaps in infrastructure that we discussed, it's not China looking good so much as certain flavors of liberal democracy looking very bad.  In NYC city, it cost billions to build a few miles of new subway line.  Ezra Klein recently put in writing what has been on my mind for a while:  big city liberal governance is a great advertisement for other systems of governance, any system of governance that's not that.

[dist]

In NYC city, it cost billions to build a few miles of new subway line.  Ezra Klein recently put in writing what has been on my mind for a while:  big city liberal governance is a great advertisement for other systems of governance, any system of governance that's not that.

That's a very US-centric perspective. Costs of infrastructure projects in the US (and to a certain degree the rest of the Anglo word) is off the chart compared to other large Western European cities. For example, the light-rail in the US cost as much and/or more per km than a km of subway in Paris. And Paris is an expensive and dense city, with an underground full of holes and difficult conditions.

edit: So it's possible to live in a "liberal" city and have "cheap" infrastructure projects. The issue is how these projects are structured, planned and conducted in the US.

[DGuller]

In NYC city, it cost billions to build a few miles of new subway line.  Ezra Klein recently put in writing what has been on my mind for a while:  big city liberal governance is a great advertisement for other systems of governance, any system of governance that's not that.

That's a very US-centric perspective. Costs of infrastructure projects in the US (and to a certain degree the rest of the Anglo word) is off the chart compared to other large Western European cities. For example, the light-rail in the US cost as much and/or more per km than a km of subway in Paris. And Paris is an expensive and dense city, with an underground full of holes and difficult conditions.

edit: So it's possible to live in a "liberal" city and have "cheap" infrastructure projects. The issue is how these projects are structured, planned and conducted in the US.

I agree, that's why I made a point about just certain iterations of liberal democracies.  I don't think the ability to get things done is incompatible with liberal democracy, but I do think that certain flavors of liberal democracy have become very sclerotic, and thus self-discrediting.

[Sheilbh]

On the efficacy of Chinese autocracy: the Chinese system definitely has some serious inefficiencies, primarily around corruption and the risk of group think / the impulse to preserve face (for the state/ party/ officials). It is my belief that liberal democracy will produce better results over the long term. That said, liberal democracy is under attack. I have no reason to believe that Trumpist autocracy in the US or Orbanesque autocracy in Europe has any competitive advantages against Chinese autocracy. In fact, I expect that Chinese autocracy for all its faults still has an underpinning of "serving the people" and mechanisms for removing incompetent officials (beyond at the very top); something which I don't believe are features of the Trumpist oligarchs nor Orban's regime.

I agree with a lot here.

On the CCP specifically I think the other side I'd make is that it has proven remarkably adaptable - especially when you compare it wit the Soviet system or other Communist regimes. Whether it's able to deal with corruption for example is unclear but it is evident that part of the shift after Hu was because of the realisation that corruption was an existential threat for the party. But I think you look at the change that's been managed in China over the last 40-50 years and there's clearly an effective technocratic and political class.

I know others disagree but on mindset/underpinning of the CCP I think it matters that they come from a Marxist-Leninist tradition - there is intellectually a telos to Marxism. There is drive to history through material (and political) forces. Obviously that's a massive shift from an "empires arise from chaos and empires collapse back into chaos" way of viewing the world - but I also think it's different from a lot of the West. I know I bang on about it but I'm reminded of Macron's call for a return of grand narratives and "political heroism" - I don't know if it's possible but I think we need to re-capture a vision of the possibilities of progress/common endeavour (it's why I think some ways of framing climate are unhelpfully de-politicising and disempowering). Obviously a democratic vision of that is different than one where the party is the engine, but it's why I think there's a risk in letting change and urgency become "Trumpian" or "Muskian" and accidentally tying up opposition to that type of politics with preserving the status quo.

I agree on liberal democracy. I'd slightly re-frame whether it's under attack because I think the challenges have been internal. They've come from within, rather than outside forces attacking democracy - my view is that it's been failures within our politics that has produced a counter-reaction. And I think DG's point is something to that - I think part of the problem has actually been a degree of sclerosis and local governance in the US is a really interesting example of that. The one that always sticks in my head is how Texas is storming ahead on low carbon energy infrastructure compared with California despite very different politics of energy transition, simply by virtue of it being easier to build infrastructure in Texas than California.

[Sheilbh]

That seems like a very impractical way of landing troops or vehicles in a combat situation.  One cruise missile or drone strike would take out the whole system. An amphibious landing needs to use amphibious assets.

Sorry totally forgot - but meant to post this article which seems to include comments explaining some of those issues in a way that I thought was interesting. I know nothing about military stuff though so interesting to get your take:

China has debuted its new landing barges – what does this mean for Taiwan?
Sighting of Shuiqiao ships provides insight into China's integration of its military, paramilitary and civilian operations – and its plans for a potential invasion
Helen Davidson in Taipei
Thu 20 Mar 2025 04.49 GMT



The short video is shot from a public beach in China's Guangdong province, the unidentified filmer standing quietly by some fishing boats and a few tourists out for a walk.

Just to their right, a line of strange looking ships loom in the mist. The enormous ships are unmoving, raised above the waves by thick pylons. Drop-down bridges connect them to each other, the front one extending down to the sand.

The original video reportedly disappeared from WeChat shortly after it was uploaded, but copies circulated widely among watchers of China-Taiwan hostilities. The 19-second clip was their first clear look at what many believe are China's newest tool for its Taiwan invasion plans.

The barge-like Shuiqiao ships were first seen during the construction phase in January, and reported by Naval News. The Zhanjiang beach test showed how together they can create a loading dock from almost a kilometre out to sea – exactly what China needs to overcome one of the key challenges of any land invasion of Taiwan.


Annotated satellite image of the Guandong shipyard in early February 2025 Photograph: Planet Labs PBC

They also provide crucial insight into China's advancing integration of its military, paramilitary and civilian operations.

Under the rule of Xi Jinping, China's military is pursuing the capability to forcibly annex Taiwan if it fails to convince or coerce the island's government to submit peacefully. Most annexation scenarios involve a full ground invasion of Taiwan's main island, but there are fewer than 20 beaches on which an amphibious assault could land, and in wartime those can be defended, filled with anti-landing equipment.

Analysts say these barges can negate that key defence and, potentially, give the People's Liberation Army (PLA) direct access to any road within about 150 clear metres of the shore. Taiwan has more than 1,500km (930 miles) of coastline which several major roads and highways closely skirt, including as close as 30km to central Taipei.

"These bridge-barges are purpose-built for a Taiwan invasion scenario," said Andrew Erickson, a professor of strategy at the China Maritime Studies Institute. "They embody the seriousness with which China under Xi is pursuing absorption of Taiwan by any means possible.

"The Shuiqiao barges are not a panacea that can overcome all difficult landing conditions, but they definitely provide PLA planners with more options along far greater stretches of Taiwan's coastline."

Many have noted the barges' vulnerabilities. Yu Pei-chen, a former army major general turned city councillor, told local media that Taiwan's military could use its newly acquired Himars rocket systems to quite easily take them out.

"China should build more barges of the same kind and send them to Taiwan. That would save the ammo for our armed forces," Yu said.

But Lu Li-Shih, a retired navy major and now political commentator, urged careful evaluation, telling a political talkshow he expected the barges wouldn't be deployed until Taiwan's armed forces "lose their control of the air and sea".


Picture from Chinese state media of tanks being loaded on to a car ferry that has been converted to carry military vehicles Photograph: CCTV 7/YouTube

Jason Wang, chief executive of Ingenispace, a geospatial analysis company, said the ships were a clear sign of China's "creativity".

"They can produce the ships really fast – four to six months – and get them into theatre," Wang said. "They can also iterate improvements faster than everybody else."

Several analysts said it was highly unlikely the barges would be used in a first wave of attack. Instead they'd be part of a follow-on landing, servings as a causeway to help deliver large numbers of troops, vehicles and artillery transferred from accompanying vessels. High-resolution satellite imagery seen by the Guardian shows the barges at Zhenjiang were also carrying amphibious vehicles on their decks.

The Zhanjiang beach where the vessels were filmed is near a PLA Navy facility, the headquarters for the PLA's Southern Theatre Command, which runs operations targeting Taiwan.

US intelligence has said Xi has ordered the PLA to be capable of invasion by 2027, although military experts have noted that a number of variables – including ongoing corruption issues in the PLA and the unpredictability of US support for Taiwan under Trump – could push that in either direction.

Regardless, the PLA is now undergoing one of the biggest military buildups since the second world war. Xi has overhauled the command structure, boosted missile and nuclear stocks, and strengthened paramilitary arms including the coastguard and the paramilitary fleet of fishing boats known as the maritime militia. The different groups are cooperating more than ever on joint operations.

Satellite images show the barges were escorted by at least two civilian ships from a nearby civilian dock, and that several other boats – including some marked as fishing vessels on their tracking ID – were sailing laps behind them, appearing to practise running interference.

At least three more barges are under construction or in early testing. The barge design suggests they have been built to work with the roll-on, roll-off ferries that China has been repurposing or building to bring tanks and another heavy armoured vehicles across the Taiwan Strait.

Shipbuilding is a key part of the expansion of the PLA, which has the world's largest navy. In a recent report on China's growing "dual use" shipbuilding industry, the Centre For Strategic and International Studies said China's largest single state-owned shipbuilder had built "more commercial vessels by tonnage in 2024 than the entire US shipbuilding industry has built since the end of world war two".

Additional research by Jason Tzu Kuan Lu

This article was amended on 2 April 2025 to correct the spelling of Shuiqiao.

[Jacob]

Minor China anecdote: this time back in  Chengdu, we were surprised by how many birds there were everywhere. My in-laws have a place where there's been trees for a long time and therefore even a few birds; but this time it was a veritable racket of bird noises during the daytime. Not only that, but many other parts of the city (barring the purely paved over commercial centre areas) had lots of trees, bushes, flower beds and so on and plenty of birds. It's a noticeable difference.

Chatting with a friend, apparently there's been a noticeable change in Shanghai as well.

Not sure what the underlying reason(s) could be - maybe more greenery, maybe less polluting industry, maybe less insecticide usage.

More cats running around as well.

[mongers]

Minor China anecdote: this time back in  Chengdu, we were surprised by how many birds there were everywhere. My in-laws have a place where there's been trees for a long time and therefore even a few birds; but this time it was a veritable racket of bird noises during the daytime. Not only that, but many other parts of the city (barring the purely paved over commercial centre areas) had lots of trees, bushes, flower beds and so on and plenty of birds. It's a noticeable difference.

Chatting with a friend, apparently there's been a noticeable change in Shanghai as well.

Not sure what the underlying reason(s) could be - maybe more greenery, maybe less polluting industry, maybe less insecticide usage.

More cats running around as well.

 

Civilised people.

[Josquius]

Potentially a positive?
Though with everything else being so crap I can't help but imagine it could just be due to the destruction of the countryside meaning they adapt to city life or just die.

[Jacob]

Another random China observation:

You know when you go to the airport and they ask you "did you pack any aerosol, batteries, etc in your checked luggage"?

They take that very serious in China now. You check your luggage, then you have to wait nearby next to a special room where all the checked luggage is scanned. If you have anything dubious - like say a battery operated device - they call you in and you open your luggage and they examine the items. Lithium batteries are a no-no for example, unless they have the label that they're safe for flights. Even so, you have to take them in your carry on.

They were pleasant and polite about it (not always a given), but it was definitely something they took serious.

That's a change from last time.

[Sheilbh]

Yeah I think I've seen something similar in other Asian airports - not mainland China.

In Hong Kong, Taiwan (last year) and Singapore there was a big thing about the maximum number of battery packs you could take in different bits of luggage, which types of batteries were allowed in which luggage (I think lithium had to be carry on etc). So I'm not sure if that's just rules rolling out from mainland China affecting the entire region or something more general?

The signs and people actually being pulled aside reminded me of the 100ml limit on liquids in carry on bags (which seems to be starting to abate in Europe) and taking electronic devices out of bags for separate scans which is something I feel like I've only started to see in the last year or two.

Edit: On security - Singapore's the only airport I've been to with a security scan process for arrivals, also two separate security checks in departures. Lots of security in Jakarta too (not so much the airport - more generally).

[Sheilbh]

Incidentally on China in terms of seriousness and intent:
https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1152261/Hengli-Heavy-looks-to-hire-30000-for-new-China-shipyard

Chinese shipbuilder looking to hire 30,000 workers (to increase to 50,000) for a new 2million square metre factory across 17 large workshops that was completed in 153 days.

[Jacob]

I think it's a generally agreed truism that one of the reasons the Allies won WWII was that they could outproduce the Axis by a significant margin.

I wonder if there's a full conflict between the US and China - with the relevant supply chains constrained as well - which of the two economies is better placed to outproduce the other.

Secondly I wonder to what degree Europe has the potential to change that on either side - as an ally, as a quiet supporter (i.e. what China is doing for Russia now), or as a unaligned free trader and profiteer selling to both sides.

And thirdly I wonder to what degree the US is potentially able to damage Chinese production by attacking the mainland directly; but then I also wonder what the Chinese response would be to such an attack. Would they be able to target the US mainland in a meaningful way? Would it trigger a nuclear response?

[Sheilbh]

Yeah. On the first point I think it is exactly what China has been building towards - it's why they're relying less on Europe too. They want domestic supply chains, that's been a goal of the state for at least the last ten years (I actually think it started with the Iraq war).

The other challenge for Europe is of course their own trade policy to China. There are multiple view but the EU imposed tariffs on Chinese EV manfacturers (who have responded by building up factories within the EU customs union - particularly Hungary and Turkey) based on the amount of state aid they're getting. So it goes up to 38% which is a world away from Biden's 100% tariff, far less Trump's.

A large part of that was concerted pressure from the US under Biden. But there's also been domestic push for it. There are strong voices in Europe pointing out that Chinese exports to Europe are surging, while EU exports to China are plateauing. They point to Chinese "overproduction" as a big cause of European de-industrialisation (I slightly struggle with this criticism given Europe's strategy has been so heavily based on cost suppression and exports for the last 25 years).

This is where I think the challenge is sharpened for Europe. The response to Trump's tariffs has been to discuss reducing those tariffs with China. It's tough to square that with protecting European industry - and if production matters in great power competition, how does further de-industrialisation affect Europe's security (especially if China continues to be a quiet supporter of Russia). It's why I think the economic/trade and security really can't be divided for Europe (and the same goes for energy). The US, China and Russia all have at least one of those angles without big external dependencies - I don't think that's true for Europe at this point. The big change could be massive investment from Germany and if the EU is able to unlock common funds for defence - that might create the sort of internal demand that would help support industry and free up other policy options.

Edit: And one other point on Europe's options - I think basically all of them involve very significant rapprochement with Turkey. As ever when there's a need for a cynical bit of realism, the Italians have got there first with Italian defence companies setting up JVs on drone development. Not sure there's a route on energy, or security, or industry that doesn't involve Turkstream gas (plus Ankara and Italy cooperating on Libyan energy, and Turkey exploring Somalia for gas), the second larges army in NATO and a significant defence sector. They're a near neighbour  and not sure what concessions they want (I've heard some stuff about wanting accession talks formally re-opened) - and obviously no idea how this will look with the deepening political crisis.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

that might create the sort of internal demand that would help support industry and free up other policy options.

if europe wants to support industry those energy prices need to come down, massively. That probably means throwing out a big part of the Green Steel.