Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-23 and Invasion

[grumbler]

Probably quite a few, given that Ukraine consciously uses old guys to avoid a demographic collapse. 

However, the point wasn't even about that, but about the culture.  If you were a Ukrainian doing your two years in 1995, you would still be doing those two years in the army run by ex-Soviet officers.  Probably the same goes for 2000, or 2005.  If you were doing your two years in 2010, most of your officers probably didn't serve in the Soviet army, but they served in the Ukrainian army in 1995, or 2000, or 2005.  Culture doesn't change on a dime, especially when until 2014 Ukrainian army wasn't under any pressure to be effective.

What culture in the Ukrainian Army of, say, 2010 told the soldiers that their commanders would waste their lives in a war? The Soviets had tried to move away from that sort of military post-WW2 when they became so heavily mechanized specifically to avoid the need for human wave tactics.

Soviet military culture definitely included the brutalization of first-year conscripts by second-year conscripts, but that seems more like a Russian cultural trait than a Soviet military cultural trait.

[DGuller]

What culture in the Ukrainian Army of, say, 2010 told the soldiers that their commanders would waste their lives in a war? The Soviets had tried to move away from that sort of military post-WW2 when they became so heavily mechanized specifically to avoid the need for human wave tactics.

I'm not an expert on military, but I've heard the sentiment shared widely enough by those who would know more.  No country is deliberately trying to get their people killed, but different priorities on other matters like command flexibility implicitly defines the tradeoff between reaching objectives and conserving manpower.  Ultimately it doesn't even matter whether the perception is justified (or was justified, but not anymore), what matters is the perception of people being drafted to fight. 

Soviet military culture definitely included the brutalization of first-year conscripts by second-year conscripts, but that seems more like a Russian cultural trait than a Soviet military cultural trait.

I think that was a Soviet military trait.  And second-year conscripts couldn't just decide to do that without being enabled by the professional officers, the ones that would stick around for more than two years and would set the tone for the whole generation of recruits.

[Josquius]

What culture in the Ukrainian Army of, say, 2010 told the soldiers that their commanders would waste their lives in a war? The Soviets had tried to move away from that sort of military post-WW2 when they became so heavily mechanized specifically to avoid the need for human wave tactics.
.

Isn't the Soviet approach less about mobile warfare and more quickly blowing the shit out of somewhere with artillery before sending in the troops, the tanks and APCs are there to move quickly taking sites as they're destroyed, rather than anything about encirclement et al- their artillery shortage leaving them quite out of ideas and resorting to just sending in the troops.
I'd say there is a bit of a case this could still be considered human wave to an extent (albeit waves in vehicles securing rubble rather than being the element intended to do most of the fighting). Certainly quite different to how NATO works.

I'm not an expert on military, but I've heard the sentiment shared widely enough by those who would know more.  No country is deliberately trying to get their people killed, but different priorities on other matters like command flexibility implicitly defines the tradeoff between reaching objectives and conserving manpower.  Ultimately it doesn't even matter whether the perception is justified (or was justified, but not anymore), what matters is the perception of people being drafted to fight.

The way I've heard it put about Soviet/Russian thinking is commanders are given a "box of goodies"- manpower being a primary one- to accomplish a fixed goal. Accomplishing this short term goal in their own individual sector is all that matters.
However many of your supplies you use up to accomplish your goal doesn't matter too much, and the big picture isn't really relevant- if the sector next door runs into trouble, thats the problem of that commander/the higher ups.
You don't stop trying to accomplish your assigned goal until it is accomplished or the box is empty- that after a failed operation some of the troops you used might still be alive and well, cut off in no-mans land, is irrelevant.

I can see some degree of soviet economic style thinking at play- the old thing of accomplishing just as much as expected and trying to ensure you don't get your "budget" cut in the next round.

[Razgovory]

No, blow it away with artillery is how the US does things.  The Soviet method was about movement.

[Josquius]

No, blow it away with artillery is how the US does things.  The Soviet method was about movement.

That's backwards.
The US cares a bit about minimising civilian casualties. Its more about precision weapons than just levelling cities

[Tonitrus]

No, blow it away with artillery air superiority is how the US does things.  The Soviet method was about movement.

Fixed. 

[Admiral Yi]

Daily Mail video on Abrams losses, vulnerabilities, strengths, etc.  Very well done, very informative IMO.

Daily Mail reporters in the trenches in the Donbas.

I watched a bunch of these last night and liked them.

The battle for Hostomel Airport.

[Sheilbh]

Can't remember thread but talking with Zanza and CrazyIvan I think about what Russia is doing in the rest of Europe - and this story broke today in the UK. But there's a similar story in Germany:

Russia suspected of planting device on plane that caused UK warehouse fire
Exclusive: Police investigate whether spies placed incendiary package that caught alight in Birmingham
Dan Sabbagh Defence and security editor
Wed 16 Oct 2024 16.45 BST

Counter-terrorism police are investigating whether Russian spies planted an incendiary device on a plane to Britain that later caught fire at a DHL warehouse in Birmingham, the Guardian can reveal.

Nobody was reported injured in the fire on 22 July at a warehouse in the suburb of Minworth that handles parcels for delivery, and the blaze was dealt with by the local fire brigade and by staff.

The parcel is believed to have arrived at the DHL warehouse by air, though it is not known if it was a cargo or passenger aircraft, nor where it was destined for. There could have been serious consequences if it had ignited during the flight.

A similar incident occurred in Germany, also in late July, when a suspect package bound for a flight caught fire at another DHL facility in Leipzig, and investigators are looking at links between the two. German authorities warned this week that had the parcel caught fire mid-air it could have downed the plane.

Thomas Haldenwang, the head of Germany's domestic intelligence service, told members of the country's parliament on Monday that had the Leipzig package started burning during a flight "it would have resulted in a crash".

However, the incident in Birmingham was only disclosed after joint inquiries by the Guardian and German broadcasters WDR and NDR, prompting questions as to why the authorities did not reveal it earlier.

A Metropolitan police counter-terrorism spokesperson said: "We can confirm that officers from counter-terrorism policing are investigating an incident at a commercial premises in Midpoint Way, Minworth.

"On Monday 22 July, a package at the location caught alight. It was dealt with by staff and the local fire brigade at the time and there were no reports of any injuries or significant damage caused."

British investigators suspect that the incendiary device is part of a wider campaign that Russian spies have been carrying out across Europe this year, which has been condemned as rash and careless by spy chiefs in the UK and elsewhere.

Ken McCallum, the head of MI5, warned last week that Russia's GRU military intelligence appeared to be on "a sustained mission to generate mayhem on British and European streets: we've seen arson, sabotage and more".

The British spy chief accused Russia of engaging in "dangerous actions conducted with increasing recklessness" and argued that the plotting was counter-productive for the Kremlin because it was "driving increased operational coordination with partners across Europe and beyond".

Russia's motive appears to have been to try to inflict a cost on western allies of Ukraine, though the plots are at times precise and at others poorly coordinated and amateurish. But the Kremlin usually denies it is engaged in sabotage activity and has in the past dismissed its accusers of engaging in conspiracy theories.

A warehouse in east London belonging to a company linked to Ukraine caught fire in a suspected arson attack in March. Seven men have been charged with involvement in the incident, which has been linked to a Russian plot.

A shopping centre in Warsaw was destroyed by a fire in May. Shortly after, Poland's prime minister, Donald Tusk, said was "quite likely" that the blaze was caused by operatives from Russia's intelligence services.

However, the most serious plot uncovered was an attempt to assassinate Armin Papperger, the chief executive of the German arms maker Rheinmetall. In July, it was reported that US intelligence services had foiled Russian plans to murder him.

Met counter-terrorism police are leading the Birmingham investigation with support from specialist officers from the West Midlands, and are comparing notes with investigators around Europe.

Last month, DHL said the package that started burning in Germany was originally posted from Lithuania. The company said at the time it had tightened "security protocols and procedures" in line with advice from European authorities.

The German newspaper Tagesspiegel reported that the incendiary device had started burning in Leipzig as it was about to be loaded on a cargo plane. The flight had been delayed. If the plane taken off on time, it would have ignited mid-air.

If a Russian connection to Birmingham or Leipzig incidents is proved, it is not immediately obvious what plotters were seeking to achieve. Any plot that would have led to the bringing down of a plane would have attracted widespread international condemnation.

Though Haldenwang did not say Russia was behind the German fire when he gave evidence at the Bundestag, he accused the Kremlin's spy agencies of engaging in "aggressive behaviour" that was "putting people's lives at risk".

No arrests have been made in relation to the Birmingham fire, and British police inquiries are continuing. "Officers are liaising with other European law enforcement partners to identify whether this may or may not be connected to any other similar-type incidents across Europe," the police spokesperson said.

Approached for comment, DHL said it was taking action "to secure its network, staff and assets as well as customer shipments" in reaction to what it described as "ongoing investigations by authorities from several countries".

I think this makes sense from the Russian perspective but it feels like only a matter of time (given two recent examples) before there's a serious incident.

[Josquius]

Not sure how wise it is from the Russian perspective really.
Their best route to winning the war is western apathy. Ukraine has really fallen off the news - I bet if you ask a few people on the street about the war a sizable number will be shocked to hear its still happening.
These attacks on the west... They really give us a poke to say "hey. Over here. Rogue state still invading it's neighbour"


Things aren't looking great at the moment. Even the US election if it goes the right way may not be the boost that was hoped.

I do increasingly suspect peace is due before too long and it will be with big gains for Russia. The thing at the moment is that Russia is in  the ascendancy so they have no need to freeze things.

You get many who say "you can't make peace with Russia. It'll only be temporary"
Which... Yes. Yes it will. But a frozen conflict should play far more in Ukraines favour than Russias.
The Russian economy is absolutely borked in a way merely not being at war won't fix (providing sanctions are kept up). On the contrary having all those unemployed soldiers returning home should provide a huge degree of extra instability.
It does seem logical for them to turn their attention elswhere (Azerbaijan? Kazakhstan?) shortly after to keep the war economy going. Sort of, if you're in a burning truck going down a mountain keep hold of the wheel.

Ukraine on the other hand... Not being constantly bombed and having western aid coming in to rebuild...they could really get into a good place taking a breather.

Of course it sucks massively for those left under Russian occupation and it's a huge gamble - how do you even start the war again? But I don't think it pays as favourably for Russia as many would say.
Still hoping the US pulls its finger out and releases more of its stockpiles.
And elsewhere we finally get arms manufacture up to a decent enough level to support them. Ukraine has taught us we need huge stockpiles. Both for a theoretical war of our own and for supporting another situation like this.

[Sheilbh]

I didn't say wise - I said it makes sense from their perspective.

The Russian perspective is that Ukraine is not a real functioning state, it does not have a Ukrainian people and it does not have agency. Everything Ukraine is doing it is doing because of the West (not just in material support but more literally).

I think for them, this is the equivalent of Ukrainian sabotage of Russian logistics in Russia. We are the rear of Ukraine, because Ukraine is simply an extension of Western policy.

There has been talk in Ukraine of the Croatian example of a ceasefire in the Yugoslav wars, which the Croats used to build up their forces from a bad position to basically win the Croatia that exists today. I've read some argument that Russia's change in nuclear doctrine is more about preventing that than the current conflict. "Aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state, but with the participation or support of a nuclear state, be considered as their joint attack on the Russian Federation" would very clearly apply to Ukraine ever trying to recover territory far more than the current war. I think Russia could bed in pretty effectively - and, like in that proposed doctrine change, have more effective deterrence of any attempt by Ukraine to recover any territory.

Ukraine is not in a position to take a breather. It's in a total war that will need total recovery afterwards. The Ukrainian economy is many many times more negatively affected by that than Russia is by sanctions. It is surviving in large part because of Western financial support to keep it going.

I'd add Russia hasn't really fully mobilised on to a war economy yet which I think is very striking. The hawks have been pushing it for a while but it hasn't happened. I think the assessment is still that the political cost is too high. Instead there is a war economy that's going full tilt where there's lots of money to be made - and still profit taking and corruption. The focus on that is degrading other services and bits of the economy - but Russia as a whole has not moved to a war footing. I'd add that obviously given Russia's fossil fuel production what happens in Iran will have a big impact here too.

But I agree that I think both sides are staking out positions that are looking at defining what comes next. I think those positions are very distant still.

Not sure anyone in Europe's in a position to criticise the US. I don't mean to pick on them, but for example I saw that the Dutch announce that they're buying some new equipment for their military which is good. It'll arrive in 2029 - that's more time than the US was in the second world war. Europe is capable of arming Ukraine and itself, there is a lack of urgency (we will start building stockpiles in 2029 at the start of the next budgetary cycle by which time hopefully everything's calmed down again). With a few notable exceptions - Poland, most strikingly - very few European countries have matched the rhetoric, public opinion, private concerns about the US with a policy shift because I think it raises really difficult decisions: either trade-offs with domestic spending, or getting rid of EU fiscal rules (especially in the Eurozone), or common European debt for arms (if possible given Hungary, now, increasingly Slovakia and soon, perhaps, Austria - but also while I think it's always been a little exaggerated I think it would be a challenging conceptual leap for a Nobel peace prize winning peace project).

[Crazy_Ivan80]

And now north Korea also entering the war, next to Iran....

[Zoupa]

Europe simply doesn't want to spend the money. It's still gambling and hoping that this will all go away soon.

It's absolutely mind boggling that we STILL haven't learnt our lessons when it comes to autocracies. The dude that'll come after putin will be just as bad.

Meanwhile North Korea is invading Europe, Iranian drones fly over NATO territory and we can't even be arsed to shoot them down. Fucking Belarus shot down more russian drones than Poland or Romania.

We're in for a bad couple of decades.

[Josquius]

I didn't say wise - I said it makes sense from their perspective.

The Russian perspective is that Ukraine is not a real functioning state, it does not have a Ukrainian people and it does not have agency. Everything Ukraine is doing it is doing because of the West (not just in material support but more literally).

I think for them, this is the equivalent of Ukrainian sabotage of Russian logistics in Russia. We are the rear of Ukraine, because Ukraine is simply an extension of Western policy.

Fair enough.
Though I do wonder how much of this is the face they put on for consumption of people outside the government inner circle and how much the Russian leadership has actually swallowed this themselves. As it is pretty clearly nonsense from the slightest understanding of the setup

There has been talk in Ukraine of the Croatian example of a ceasefire in the Yugoslav wars, which the Croats used to build up their forces from a bad position to basically win the Croatia that exists today. I've read some argument that Russia's change in nuclear doctrine is more about preventing that than the current conflict. "Aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state, but with the participation or support of a nuclear state, be considered as their joint attack on the Russian Federation" would very clearly apply to Ukraine ever trying to recover territory far more than the current war. I think Russia could bed in pretty effectively - and, like in that proposed doctrine change, have more effective deterrence of any attempt by Ukraine to recover any territory.

Hadn't heard that on Russia changing its policy but it does make sense.
The nuclear factor is a key issue I had in mind when I referenced the difficulty restarting the war again.
I'd think it would require waiting until Putin is gone and hoping Russia becomes very unstable...but even then someone would have that nuclear button and if they're a weak wannabe nationalist strongman of the sort that is the only allowable opposition in Russia they're a lot more likely to press it than a reasonably stable dictator.
Its tricky.

Ukraine is not in a position to take a breather. It's in a total war that will need total recovery afterwards. The Ukrainian economy is many many times more negatively affected by that than Russia is by sanctions. It is surviving in large part because of Western financial support to keep it going.

Sure.
But it has this western support and it has great fundamentals and room to grow. Its also a considerably smaller economy than Russia.
The sanctions will continue to screw Russia and send it in a downwards spiral. With Ukraine its the constant bombing that is screwing it over.
I do think if the war magically stops tomorrow then in 5 years or so Russia will be even worse off and dealing with some serious shit whilst Ukraine will be coming along nicely.

I'd add Russia hasn't really fully mobilised on to a war economy yet which I think is very striking. The hawks have been pushing it for a while but it hasn't happened. I think the assessment is still that the political cost is too high. Instead there is a war economy that's going full tilt where there's lots of money to be made - and still profit taking and corruption. The focus on that is degrading other services and bits of the economy - but Russia as a whole has not moved to a war footing. I'd add that obviously given Russia's fossil fuel production what happens in Iran will have a big impact here too.

An interesting one I read about the other day- Saudi Arabia ramping up production to push down prices. This should hurt Russia too.

Not sure anyone in Europe's in a position to criticise the US. I don't mean to pick on them, but for example I saw that the Dutch announce that they're buying some new equipment for their military which is good. It'll arrive in 2029 - that's more time than the US was in the second world war. Europe is capable of arming Ukraine and itself, there is a lack of urgency (we will start building stockpiles in 2029 at the start of the next budgetary cycle by which time hopefully everything's calmed down again). With a few notable exceptions - Poland, most strikingly - very few European countries have matched the rhetoric, public opinion, private concerns about the US with a policy shift because I think it raises really difficult decisions: either trade-offs with domestic spending, or getting rid of EU fiscal rules (especially in the Eurozone), or common European debt for arms (if possible given Hungary, now, increasingly Slovakia and soon, perhaps, Austria - but also while I think it's always been a little exaggerated I think it would be a challenging conceptual leap for a Nobel peace prize winning peace project).

I do think there is space to criticise the US.
Europe has scraped beyond the bottom of the barrel in terms of giving Ukraine their excess stocks. We've simply nothing left to give.
The US meanwhile has vast stockpiles of spare equipment. Literal fields full of armoured vehicles.

Yes if someone wants to make this US vs. Europe they can knee jerk and go "Thats because Europe failed to invest properly in the past!" but it is the reality we've got.

Europe is certainly failing too. Its ramping up arms production but not at anything like the speed necessary. But Europe is failing to support Ukraine in the longer term- the US has at its finger tips the immediate support Ukraine needs.

[Zoupa]

Ukraine starting to say the obvious: either we get into NATO or we will pursue nuclear weapons.

Great conflict escalation management from Biden & co.

In 20, 50 or 100 years nobody will care or remember your inflation reduction act, they'll remember how you mishandled this conflict.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

Ukraine starting to say the obvious: either we get into NATO or we will pursue nuclear weapons.

Great conflict escalation management from Biden & co.

In 20, 50 or 100 years nobody will care or remember your inflation reduction act, they'll remember how you mishandled this conflict.

assuming they remember him much at all