Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[crazy canuck]

Maybe, but then you seem to ignore that NATO does not have to cease being NATO in reality. It only needs to do so in Putin's head. The same head where marching into Ukraine unopposed was a done deal.

That would be a better argument.  But that is not the argument made in the video.  Listen again to the two assumptions which the presenter was careful to establish before getting into his analysis.

[Jacob]

I disagree with your assessment of Nielsen's argument CC, but I'm more interested in discussing the issue itself than whether the video itself was correct or not.

I think the argument that any potential Russian attack on a NATO country will be aimed at destabilizing the NATO alliance rather than to take territory is persuasive; and that the attack likely be designed to maximize the likelihood of a "it doesn't make sense for us to respond" responses from the governments and populations of of the countries that are not attacked.

Therefore I think an attack is going to be more likely the more power isolationist or Putin-understander politicians have in NATO countries (especially, of course, the GOP and Trump in the US). Similarly, I find it a reasonable scenario that an attack may be aimed in a remote part (less likely for people to care about it) and at a country that can kind of handle itself (no need to help).

Conversely, to lower the risk of a Russian attack it makes sense to me for NATO partners to reinforce structures that automatically would get them in the line of fire and drawn in if Russia acts. Similarly, I think it makes sense for non-US militaries to ensure capabilities to act independently - especially European militaries.

[Josquius]

Also worth considering that Russia probably wouldn't just storm its tanks over the Lithuanian border one day.
They'd likely take the Donbas approach of stirring shit with sympathetic locals and steadily ramping up their involvement. It will be hard to say just when the line is crossed.

Optimistically though this is hopefully all elementary and the west will get their shit in order soon to rearm Ukraine.

[Sheilbh]

Again, struck with the urgency of action in Finland and Poland v everyone else:

Minna Ålander 🌻
@minna_alander
Jan 28
Finland has quietly filled its wartime stockpiles and is activating some of the so-called "production reservation agreements" which means that companies produce at the armed forces' request what is needed for logistics - basically wartime economy light
The Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) received extra money right in the spring of 2022 and started working on increasing stockpiles immediately, "luckily before many other European states woke up to the issue", says the logistics chief - which means that the orders have been coming in
The analysis what is needed is based both on long-term assessments and the analysis of Ukraine's ammunition consumption. Finland is already producing 5 times more heavy artillery munitions than pre-2022 but the capacity isn't at max yet
It's not only about ammo though, but everything that is needed to sustain long-time war fighting operations. Luckily thanks to its security of supply "philosophy", Finland had stockpiles of raw materials and production lines ready to be taken into use if needed
Apart from domestic arms industry, like Patria, the "production reservation agreements" include a number of civilian companies as well. Sometimes the FDF have supplied the companies with the necessary production equipment that is now to be test-activated.
Beyond the domestic arrangements, Finland is working on at least doubling its ammunition production capacity, which can make it one of the largest producers in Europe. The aim is twofold: to secure own stockpiles and to maintain capacity to support Ukraine for years to come

Struck reading a piece on, I think Rheinmetall too, which noted that they just weren't receiving sufficent orders to increase production which seems mad given that the money is there.

Edit: It feels this is indicative of Europe's wider security problem - it should be increased through pooling of defence either through NATO or EU. But instead has ended up a little tragedy of the commons where the countries who are able to respond/are shifting on this are those who've always felt they might have to rely on the solely national (or have done) like the US, Poland, Finland etc.

Edit: Also I admire the Finns, but it should be an embarassment to everyone else in Europe if they end up as one of the largest producers of ammo on the continent during a war with one side we're all supporting.

[Tamas]

I really don't get it why politicians are not jumping on this. It's a cynical view but they have a war that's likely to consume whatever they can feed it. They could get the benefits of a wartime production boom without having to suffer the negative effects of war, except maybe for higher taxes. And as a bonus they'd be doing the right thing and making their people more secure.

[crazy canuck]

I disagree with your assessment of Nielsen's argument CC, but I'm more interested in discussing the issue itself than whether the video itself was correct or not.

I think the argument that any potential Russian attack on a NATO country will be aimed at destabilizing the NATO alliance rather than to take territory is persuasive; and that the attack likely be designed to maximize the likelihood of a "it doesn't make sense for us to respond" responses from the governments and populations of of the countries that are not attacked.

Therefore I think an attack is going to be more likely the more power isolationist or Putin-understander politicians have in NATO countries (especially, of course, the GOP and Trump in the US). Similarly, I find it a reasonable scenario that an attack may be aimed in a remote part (less likely for people to care about it) and at a country that can kind of handle itself (no need to help).

Conversely, to lower the risk of a Russian attack it makes sense to me for NATO partners to reinforce structures that automatically would get them in the line of fire and drawn in if Russia acts. Similarly, I think it makes sense for non-US militaries to ensure capabilities to act independently - especially European militaries.

But once again, it is only persuasive if one accepts the assumption that NATO will not react as NATO.


If that happens, then yes of course NATO will be undermined.  By definition. 

[Jacob]

But once again, it is only persuasive if one accepts the assumption that NATO will not react as NATO.

If that happens, then yes of course NATO will be undermined.  By definition.

It's not the assumption, it's the question. Will NATO act as NATO, or will it not?

And the hypothesis is that a potential Russian attack is going to be designed to 1) force that question 2) in a way designed to increase the odds in favour of "it will not."

[grumbler]

CC may I recommend you watch the video?

The video is about the suggested folly of expecting Russia vs. a NATO country happen in a scenario where escalation into  a war against whole of NATO is a near-certainty. For example attacking a Baltic state would no doubt drag Poland in as a bare minimum and it'd escalate from there as not even Putin can doubt NATO's resolve to partake in defending those countries. And of course there's the tiny detail that Russia is in no shape to undertake such a plan.

But what if, as the video suggests, Russia pokes at the remotest areas of Finland such as saying they need X area as a security buffer and move in? This would:

a) potentially make it less likely that NATO countries -and the video doesn't limit this to Trump's or other's USA- and their leaders/population can be convinced to mobilise for war because of a corner of Karelia
YET it would still be a big hit in the belief in Article 5 if they didn't honor it

and

b) if NATO countries DO honor Article 5 to defend the remotest corner of Karelia, then the remotest corner of Karelia is far easier for Russia to de-escalate and retreat from than let's say Estonia.

I did watch it, and if you listen carefully to the caveats he makes about the assumptions necessary for his scenario to make any sense, you will see (or hear) that his first assumption is that NATO will not function as designed, but instead it will effectively cease to exist according to its own founding Charter. 

The folks who listened to this video without keeping the opening assumptions carefully in mind might be lulled into thinking it is plausable.  But so long as NATO is actually NATO his scenario is not possible.

Actually, his explicit statement is that it is erroneous to assume that NATO absolutely will function as currently intended.  He is noting that people thinking about this scenario should not do as you do, and assume that NATO will react as the treaty requires.

He is no assuming that NATO will not function, he is rejecting the assumption that it surely will.  And I agree with him.

[crazy canuck]

CC may I recommend you watch the video?

The video is about the suggested folly of expecting Russia vs. a NATO country happen in a scenario where escalation into  a war against whole of NATO is a near-certainty. For example attacking a Baltic state would no doubt drag Poland in as a bare minimum and it'd escalate from there as not even Putin can doubt NATO's resolve to partake in defending those countries. And of course there's the tiny detail that Russia is in no shape to undertake such a plan.

But what if, as the video suggests, Russia pokes at the remotest areas of Finland such as saying they need X area as a security buffer and move in? This would:

a) potentially make it less likely that NATO countries -and the video doesn't limit this to Trump's or other's USA- and their leaders/population can be convinced to mobilise for war because of a corner of Karelia
YET it would still be a big hit in the belief in Article 5 if they didn't honor it

and

b) if NATO countries DO honor Article 5 to defend the remotest corner of Karelia, then the remotest corner of Karelia is far easier for Russia to de-escalate and retreat from than let's say Estonia.

I did watch it, and if you listen carefully to the caveats he makes about the assumptions necessary for his scenario to make any sense, you will see (or hear) that his first assumption is that NATO will not function as designed, but instead it will effectively cease to exist according to its own founding Charter. 

The folks who listened to this video without keeping the opening assumptions carefully in mind might be lulled into thinking it is plausable.  But so long as NATO is actually NATO his scenario is not possible.

Actually, his explicit statement is that it is erroneous to assume that NATO absolutely will function as currently intended.  He is noting that people thinking about this scenario should not do as you do, and assume that NATO will react as the treaty requires.

He is no assuming that NATO will not function, he is rejecting the assumption that it surely will.  And I agree with him.

Right, his assumption is that NiATO will not function as it is currently designed to function. 

That's an interesting hypothesis, and it is interesting that you agree with it, but it is still an assumption that is yet to be proven true.

One is to assume that NATO will not function properly then it is really quite misleading to say that Russia is viable adversary against NATO.

The much more accurate claim is that if NATO is no longer NATO than Russia will become a viable adversary.

That is the risk. If people say it plainly, then it is less likely to happen.  The obfuscation of the claim actually being made is dangerous.

[The Brain]

To me the wording of Article 5 seems to allow a fair bit of wiggle room when designing a response.

[crazy canuck]

To me the wording of Article 5 seems to allow a fair bit of wiggle room when designing a response.

Yes, there is discretion. But a response is required, especially when considering article 6 in conjunction with article 5.

[The Brain]

To me the wording of Article 5 seems to allow a fair bit of wiggle room when designing a response.

Yes, there is discretion. But a response is required, especially when considering article 6 in conjunction with article 5.

If a party deems a response necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. In the face of possible grave consequences it might not deem action necessary. I have to assume that the weak wording of Article 5 was deliberate to make it possible to avoid WW3 if desired.

I think that it is within the realm of the possible for NATO to work as designed (given the wording of Article 5) and still be weakened by a limited attack by a hard target, if the responses of NATO members are underwhelming (compared to commonly expected responses).

In a more general sense, I think a lesson from history is that diplomatic pieces of paper that are not aligned with actual desires cannot be relied upon. These days the desires of some NATO countries, significantly the US, are in doubt. And AFAIK Article 5 has only been invoked against a soft target, we lack empirical evidence regarding hard targets.

[DGuller]

Another thing that makes me wonder is how diplomatic reputation squares with democratic societies.  In the past, countries often abided by treaties to avoid the consequences of being perceived as unfaithful allies, as that could come back to bite them severely later.  It seems harder to do for a democratic society than for an authoritarian society. 

In the past some democratic societies still got into wars for those reasons, but I would speculate that it's a lot harder to do these days.  I think even democratic societies were willing to leave foreign policy to the experts in the past, at least for a while before war weariness went up, whereas these days, I'm not sure many Western government would be able to join a defensive alliance war if their population was not onboard.

[The Minsky Moment]

To me the wording of Article 5 seems to allow a fair bit of wiggle room when designing a response.

We only have one precedent: September 11, 2001.  The nature of that attack left considerable room to wiggle, yet the members opted for a broad interpretation and responded.  So our one empirical data point is positive. That said, responding to the Article V invocation on 9/11 was both "cheap" (e.g. it did not commit the responder to direct military confrontation with a nuclear power) and in the self-interest of the responding members. It was also a European response to an attack on the USA and not the other way around. 

There is no point in being elliptical; there is an issue about the credibility of the American guarantee through Article V, that issue has a name, and the name is Trump.  Pre-2017 we would not be talking about this; it would be a given that the US would respond to a Russian attack on NATO territory.  But if Trump was in charge, no one has a clue what he would do, perhaps not Trump himself.  But in any case, what he does will not turn on the specific language contained in Article V; the presence or absence of linguistic ambiguity in a written treaty means little to a functionally illiterate decision maker.

[crazy canuck]

To me the wording of Article 5 seems to allow a fair bit of wiggle room when designing a response.

We only have one precedent: September 11, 2001.  The nature of that attack left considerable room to wiggle, yet the members opted for a broad interpretation and responded.  So our one empirical data point is positive. That said, responding to the Article V invocation on 9/11 was both "cheap" (e.g. it did not commit the responder to direct military confrontation with a nuclear power) and in the self-interest of the responding members. It was also a European response to an attack on the USA and not the other way around. 

There is no point in being elliptical; there is an issue about the credibility of the American guarantee through Article V, that issue has a name, and the name is Trump.  Pre-2017 we would not be talking about this; it would be a given that the US would respond to a Russian attack on NATO territory.  But if Trump was in charge, no one has a clue what he would do, perhaps not Trump himself.  But in any case, what he does will not turn on the specific language contained in Article V; the presence or absence of linguistic ambiguity in a written treaty means little to a functionally illiterate decision maker.

Agreed, this is not about NATO, this is about Trump and the destruction of the GOP.