Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-23 and Invasion

[Tamas]

Prigozhin come close to calling for a coup:

https://twitter.com/officejjsmart/status/1657385383208820737?s=61&t=cBoSWWDwmbHHrcVUYZ2drw

I can imagine a scenario where Putin is grooming Shoigu to be the bad boyar responsible for all of the war's failings, and using Prigozhin to make a grassroots case for it.  In a country with no rule of law only calling for an uprising against the head of the family is a coup, other capos are just business.

Yes, good point. I think the key Kremlinology question at the moment if Prigozhin is still an actual Putin ally or not. Either it's what you are saying -he is painting the picture so Shoigu can become the sacrificial lamb after defeat, or Putin has let Prigozhin's hand go (or Putin just mostly has lost actual power) and he is lashing out to try and steer up a coup before he falls out of a window.

[Threviel]

If Putin want Shoigu to go he would just kill him, why bother with an outsider like Prigoswhatever?

Putin is loyal to those that are loyal to him and Shoigu is loyal. Sure, he might get the boot some day, but there is no actual evidence of any kind of real pressure on Putin to remove Shoigu. Prigowhatever is just some useful assclown without any real clout in the Kremlin.

[Sheilbh]

Putin is loyal to those that are loyal to him and Shoigu is loyal. Sure, he might get the boot some day, but there is no actual evidence of any kind of real pressure on Putin to remove Shoigu. Prigowhatever is just some useful assclown without any real clout in the Kremlin.

I think this is true but only to a point. I think the people Putin is loyal to either have links to him in his St Petersburg days, or through shared siloviki background/ties.

Shoigu is loyal but, I think, to Putin he is a tool. Like others from similarly non-martial backgrounds like Medvedev. I think at the minute he's probably a useful human shield to take the blame for the war not progressing to Russia's advantage (same with Gerasimov etc).

At the same time, the same applies to Prigozhin. I think that, again, he is providing a service to the state and is perhaps a helpful lightning rod/focus for critics of the military establishment. In a similar way as, say, Girkin is a useful focus for critics from within the military establishment of Wagner. I think Prigozhin, ultimately, is making a plea to the Kremlin and is entirely dependent on the Kremlin - he might get more ammo for it and getting his excuses in why Russia can't even mark the taking of a regional town on Victory Day. And there is something pathetic in his comments the attacks on Shoigu and the MoD is because he relies on them for supplies and logistics and transport. Without them he literally has nothing but cannon fodder.

As ever with the Kremlin it doesn't matter how useful you were yesterday. Wagner's period of use maybe coming to an end. The worth of Wagner troops are probably lower to the Kremlin now given general mobilisation - but they've been getting themselves shredded and from what I've seen seem to have been the main focus of Russian forces for the last few months - which I assume has preserved big chunks of those mobilised troops and let them get seasoned.

To zoom out slightly I think a lot of the focus on Prigozhin is perhaps a little overblown. I suspect he maybe bought a little of his own hype (but always knew who was really in charge). Ultimately large chunks of Wagner are basically melting away/being ground down in Bakhmut (the real professionals are still working and earning money in Africa). Prigozhin/Wagner can't withdraw because logistically and for transport they utterly depend on the Russian army and would obviously be seen as treachery by Putin (who doesn't take a dim view of such betrayals). Wagner may not even be a functional force in a few months time and Prigozhin (having done the state some service). They weren't able to achieve much, but it also didn't cost much from the Russian treasury or armed forces and, from the Kremlin's perspective, I wonder if that isn't a result overall?

Interesting that I've read other companies with military enterprises or not are either being encouraged to support the state or expand into that area. But they are generally providing the type of specialist troops/forces that you'd associate Wagner with in Africa. But I wonder if, in a way, Wagner for all the hype was a bit like the military equivalent of the state getting oligarchs to pay for new stadiums for the world cup?

[Tamas]

If Shoigu is to take the blame for a lost war the case must be built. People must believe it was him.

[Hamilcar]

If Lukashenka is really dead, what do you think the odds are that the Poles will help the Belarusian government in exile to take power?

[Tonitrus]

I'd like to be that optimistic, and there'll likely be some street protests...but I gotta think that the Kremlin has enough of their people in Minsk that they will (or are already) work out a way to just move up the Union State plan and go for a formal annexation.

Then it really just depends on which way the military/security power structure bends.

[Josquius]

If Lukashenka is really dead, what do you think the odds are that the Poles will help the Belarusian government in exile to take power?

1%.

The recent thing with Russia saying its under their nuclear umbrella and having large amounts of troops there is too scary.

[Jacob]

If Putin want Shoigu to go he would just kill him, why bother with an outsider like Prigoswhatever?

Putin's game is setting up excuses and scapegoats to keep his own head above water. When (if) the Russian people - or members of the various power cliques - get fed up with the course of the war, it is very convenient for Putin to be able to offer them up as sacrifices to appease those baying for his blood. If Putin unceremoniously liquidate those people now they'll be ineffective as scapegoats.

[DGuller]

If Putin want Shoigu to go he would just kill him, why bother with an outsider like Prigoswhatever?

Putin is loyal to those that are loyal to him and Shoigu is loyal. Sure, he might get the boot some day, but there is no actual evidence of any kind of real pressure on Putin to remove Shoigu. Prigowhatever is just some useful assclown without any real clout in the Kremlin.

The point is not to remove Shoigu.  Shoigu is and always has been a safe non-entity, which is why he prospered for so long.  The point is that someone who is not Putin has to take the fall (I mean figuratively, not literally, or at least figuratively first before literally). 

Shoigu doesn't seem to have enough powerbase for anyone to care whether he's loyal or not, he seems to be modern day Kalinin.  Regardless, while it is true that Putin makes it a point to be loyal to those who are loyal to him, he's never had his back against the wall.  When sociopaths are sinking, they'll pull their best friend under water if that will help them stay afloat.

[DGuller]

I'd like to be that optimistic, and there'll likely be some street protests...but I gotta think that the Kremlin has enough of their people in Minsk that they will (or are already) work out a way to just move up the Union State plan and go for a formal annexation.

Then it really just depends on which way the military/security power structure bends.

Yeah, I'm pessimistic.  If Lukashenka dies soon, then it's probably part of the Russian plan, and I assume that the next step of that plan is not to let pro-Western government take power.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

I'd like to be that optimistic, and there'll likely be some street protests...but I gotta think that the Kremlin has enough of their people in Minsk that they will (or are already) work out a way to just move up the Union State plan and go for a formal annexation.

Then it really just depends on which way the military/security power structure bends.

Yeah, I'm pessimistic.  If Lukashenka dies soon, then it's probably part of the Russian plan, and I assume that the next step of that plan is not to let pro-Western government take power.

it would also open up the north again, in theory if not in practice

[DGuller]

What I fear is that as bad as Lukashenka is, he has been trying his hardest not to suicide Belarus.  Putin's risk calculus is probably very different.  Getting Belarus more actively involved in the war might end badly for Belarus in many ways, such as military defeat or a bloody rebellion, but why would that be Putin's problem?  On the other hand, if they somehow manage to comply, then at the very least he's got another source of non-Russian bodies to throw at Ukrainians.

[Josquius]

What I fear is that as bad as Lukashenka is, he has been trying his hardest not to suicide Belarus.  Putin's risk calculus is probably very different.  Getting Belarus more actively involved in the war might end badly for Belarus in many ways, such as military defeat or a bloody rebellion, but why would that be Putin's problem?  On the other hand, if they somehow manage to comply, then at the very least he's got another source of non-Russian bodies to throw at Ukrainians.

I'm not sure he would. I'm far from an expert on Belarus but I get the feeling odds are good the army would mutiny and join Ukraine.

[DGuller]

I'm not sure he would. I'm far from an expert on Belarus but I get the feeling odds are good the army would mutiny and join Ukraine.

They might mutiny, but it may still be bloody if the mutiny doesn't happen quickly and overwhelmingly.  Belorussian KGB has a lot of people in it, and they've been carrying out Lukashenka's repression for decades, they may not look forward to a successful mutiny by the army.  The Russians also probably have deeply infiltrated everything in Belarus, which makes it hard to rebel in an organized way.  They Russians may also just straight up occupy Belarus, much like Hitler occupied Italy when Mussolini's power evaporated.

[Razgovory]

I'm not sure he would. I'm far from an expert on Belarus but I get the feeling odds are good the army would mutiny and join Ukraine.

They might mutiny, but it may still be bloody if the mutiny doesn't happen quickly and overwhelmingly.  Belorussian KGB has a lot of people in it, and they've been carrying out Lukashenka's repression for decades, they may not look forward to a successful mutiny by the army.  The Russians also probably have deeply infiltrated everything in Belarus, which makes it hard to rebel in an organized way.  They Russians may also just straight up occupy Belarus, much like Hitler occupied Italy when Mussolini's power evaporated.

The Russians are in no position to invade anyone at the moment.