Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-23 and Invasion

[Berkut]

https://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/unmitigated+disaster

[Tamas]

I think what has been clear for quite a while is that this is going to be a strategic defeat for Russia. The moment Ukrainians decided to resist as opposed to the Russian expectations of giving up, that was decided.

However, there are various levels of strategic defeat, and those can have different levels of impact on Putin personally.

This is why I am reading this non-consequential speech as the worst possible scenario unfolding for Putin - declaring victory and giving up was an option. Doubling down by ordering general mobilisation was another. Not doing the first seems to indicate he is too weak on the frontlines to do it. Not doing the second one seems to indicate he is too weak on the homefront to do it.

[Jacob]

I guess pulling back probably means losing all the gains in Ukraine, including Crimea.

[DGuller]

I guess this is the best way the day could've gone.  I imagine a lot of Russians were not paying much attention to the formal event, and were waiting for a shoe to drop.  In the end a lot of them were probably going "that's it?", which is probably not what you shoot for when you publicly jerk off to your historical victory.

[grumbler]

I saw an interview with Wesley Clark yesterday in which he argued that time is not on the side of Ukraine, because their infrastructure is slowly being demolished and they cannot rebuild it while the war goes on.  Clark said that, if the Ukrainians cannot push the Russians out this summer, their opportunity for doing so will pass, because they won't have the infrastructure next summer to even hold the east of the country.

[alfred russel]

I saw an interview with Wesley Clark yesterday in which he argued that time is not on the side of Ukraine, because their infrastructure is slowly being demolished and they cannot rebuild it while the war goes on.  Clark said that, if the Ukrainians cannot push the Russians out this summer, their opportunity for doing so will pass, because they won't have the infrastructure next summer to even hold the east of the country.

The GDP of Ukraine was $181 billion. The military aid that Ukraine has received is a not so insignificant percentage of that. I think I posted upthread that the annual military budget of Russia is about $61 billion.

Ukraine seems on track to end up with more toys than Russia, and they probably will have an advantage in men under arms within Ukraine unless Russia decides to change course. It isn't obvious why they toys we are sending Ukraine couldn't include toys to rebuild infrastructure, and that actually might be possible to do directly: you can't deploy your own soldiers to fight within Ukraine, but it seems you could send a construction crew to repave a road or rebuild a bridge. At the same time there is no reason that Ukraine can't use its toys to mess with Russia's infrastructure.

[The Minsky Moment]

"infrastructure" in this context means principally rail, no?  And both armies rely on rail transport for supply and revitalization.

It would seem what whatever infrastructure difficulties Ukraine might have holding ground in the east would equally be a problem for Russia holding the same ground, with the added headache of partisan activity.

[grumbler]

"infrastructure" in this context means principally rail, no?  And both armies rely on rail transport for supply and revitalization.

It would seem what whatever infrastructure difficulties Ukraine might have holding ground in the east would equally be a problem for Russia holding the same ground, with the added headache of partisan activity.

It apparently doesn't seem that way to Wesley Clark. Maybe he knows something that we don't?

[The Minsky Moment]

It apparently doesn't seem that way to Wesley Clark. Maybe he knows something that we don't?

I didn't hear the whole interview.  Your report didn't indicate whether he gave an opinion on Russia's ability to hold that ground.

[DGuller]

One good thing for Russians is that it's a lot easier to improve from awful than it is from really good.  It's hard for Ukraine to punch much harder than it has been so far, but if Stalin could learn to delegate to able professionals and sideline the loyal but hopeless cronies, then so can Putin.

[The Brain]

It depends on why you're awful.

[The Minsky Moment]

One good thing for Russians is that it's a lot easier to improve from awful than it is from really good.  It's hard for Ukraine to punch much harder than it has been so far, but if Stalin could learn to delegate to able professionals and sideline the loyal but hopeless cronies, then so can Putin.

Their equipment advantage to the extent it still exists is a wasting asset as their initial inventories are expended and Ukraine receives massive support from NATO.  It doesn't seem likely morale will improve.  And as of now, Russia is choosing not to mobilize its theoretically greater manpower, forfeiting that theoretical advantage.  It's not clear where the improvement is going to come from.  Getting generals killed could be addition by subtraction, or it could just be subtraction.

[Malthus]

One good thing for Russians is that it's a lot easier to improve from awful than it is from really good.  It's hard for Ukraine to punch much harder than it has been so far, but if Stalin could learn to delegate to able professionals and sideline the loyal but hopeless cronies, then so can Putin.

I dunno - it looks to me like in the short to medium term, time is on the side of Ukraine.

it seems to me that the Russian problems are essentially structural. As in, they require a complete reform of how their military is organized - more emphasis put on training NCOs, rooting out corruption in procurement and logistics, more focus on small unit tactics and all-arms cooperation, etc.

None of that is possible on the fly - it takes months if not years - the Ukrainians had the advantage of years of Western assistance in training and reorganization.

There is no evidence so far that the Russians are actually acting to redress these deficiencies.

Instead, they are apparently doing stuff like mashing depleted units together from those knocked about near Kyiv, calling them fully functional military units, and sending them right back into battle in the East - again a bad idea, for many reasons. A short term win solution (use greater manpower to overwhelm the Ukrainians) rather than a long term win solution (fix glaring problems in the army, use improved army to smash Ukrainians). If the short term win fails ... 

The Ukrainian military is deficient in weaponry, but this can be made good out of the Western arsenal in the short to medium term.

[Jacob]

General Clark raises an interesting perspective, though. I've read a whole bunch about Ukrainian effectiveness in depleting Russian military capabilities and the likely difficulties in rebuilding said capabilities due to the effect of sanctions and general Russian corruption.

I've also read a good bunch Russian atrocities. But what I don't have a sense of is how damaging the Russian attacks are to Ukraine and its economy. I think the West is likely to continue being pretty supportive. And on a super high level I'm pretty confident that the West can outsupply Russia and sustian Ukraine to the victory... but what does that look like? How long can Russia last? What are the critical points for Ukraine along the path to victory?

And, say, Ukraine pushes Russia back out of its territory - even out of Crimea- what then? Does Russia admit defeat, or will there be a long, sustained border war, keeping Ukraine (and Russia) trapped in war-footing forever? What does that end-game even look like?

[Sheilbh]

And, say, Ukraine pushes Russia back out of its territory - even out of Crimea- what then? Does Russia admit defeat, or will there be a long, sustained border war, keeping Ukraine (and Russia) trapped in war-footing forever? What does that end-game even look like?

That's what peace looked like from 2014 - my suspicion is it would be the same. Donetsk and Luhansk were, I think, admitted into the Russian Federation so, they would argue, it was an occupation of Russian territory they were resisting.

But I think there'd be other consequences before then. If that's the option - complete battlefield failure in the Donbas (and even Crimea), then I think the alternative of an agreed withdrawal will start to look very tempting.

It's something we should try to find out. I think the Ukrainian ambition of removing Russian forces from their territory is right and sensible, and we should arm them to do it.