Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-23 and Invasion

[Crazy_Ivan80]

Most railway lines in Ukraine are still operational, pretty impressive.

https://www.businessinsider.com/on-board-the-mobile-command-thats-keeping-ukraines-trains-running-2022-3

As long as the proper sections are sabotaged so that the russians can't just roll in.

[Syt]

From this thread (with sources and further details): https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1502915584496971778

[Josquius]

What's happening with transnistria anyway?
Russians just sitting there acting like nothing happening?

[Jacob]

On a personal level I find it intriguing how I feel the impact of the of the propaganda war.

I read the reports of Russia positioning additional troops, attacking with missiles, Russian willingness to commit atrocities, and the resolve of Putin and his inner circle - and it seems Ukrainian defeat (as opposed to Russian victory) is inevitable.

Then I read Ukrainian reports of losses inflicted and operational superiority, of the impact of sanctions (and they seem to keep coming too), and of Ukranian resolve and I regain hope.

And the truth is, I don't have the insight to confidently determine which is more accurate, or whether splitting the difference even makes sense.

[frunk]

The way I think of it is that Russia has the power to win, however Ukraine is making it difficult.  The longer it takes the more expensive in men and material it is for Russia, and the more likely that outside factors (peace deal, Russian government collapse) intervene before Ukraine is defeated.

[Syt]

I occasionally check what TASS and RT is saying, but their English pages are obviously heavily biased, but not as rabid as you'd think (unlike english.pravda.ru which is far more tabloid like and peedles their propaganda between "alternate science" articles). They're very light on covering any military actions, though.

[The Brain]

The Kremlin doesn't actually believe that a NATO Ukraine is an existential threat to Russia. That's just one of their standard lies.

[Berkut]

THe Ukraine becoming more Western is not an existential threat to Russia.

And even the Russians are perfectly aware of that.

Just because they say they believe something is true, doesn't mean they actually believe it to be true.

I feel like we had this argument once already....

[Valmy]

The Kremlin doesn't actually believe that a NATO Ukraine is an existential threat to Russia. That's just one of their standard lies.

Yeah the whole idea NATO is going to invade Russia is stupid. The US couldn't even get NATO to invade Iraq, I cannot imagine all the members would be lining up for the joy of what would probably be a suicide mission.

[OttoVonBismarck]

THe Ukraine becoming more Western is not an existential threat to Russia.

And even the Russians are perfectly aware of that.

Just because they say they believe something is true, doesn't mean they actually believe it to be true.

I feel like we had this argument once already....

I think the point Mearsheimer (and maybe Sheilbh) are making is that American foreign policy at least needs to consider how other countries interpret things even if those interpretations are not rational. If you come upon a bear in the woods eating the carcass of a deer, the bear might attack you because it thinks you are trying to steal its food. Even though eating a raw deer carcass is the furthest thing from your list of desires at that moment, to the bear that is reality, and you would be unwise not to understand that about the bear.

I don't think it means America has to simply concede to anything Russia irrationally wants--and I don't think we have. But I do think we should have a sober look at why we made our 2008 NATO declaration in Bucharest saying we were going to bring Ukraine in, and by 2014 when Russia took Crimea they still were not in, and by 2022 when Russia invaded the country, they still weren't in. Why did we pursue this series of events? Why make the 2008 statement when anyone with a functioning brain knew that we were never going to get agreement across the alliance to bring Ukraine in, at any time in this generation, it just makes no sense.

Does it justify or, by itself, explain the annexation of Crimea and the current war? Of course not--nothing justifies this naked war of territorial aggression. Does it explain it? Nah, it doesn't even do that--which I think is where Mearsheimer is wrong, I think Putin is doing this because he wants to take portions or all of Ukraine into Russia, but I do think things like the Bucharest statement contributed to an environment where it was easier for Putin to sort of build up in his mind justification for invading.

[grumbler]

I don't understand the assumption by Mearsheimer and OvB that NATO did not at all consider how Russia would interpret its (unanimous, btw) 2008 invitation to Ukraine and Georgia to begin the process of joining NATO.  Myself, I need some evidence that that this assumption is true.

Ukraine didn't join NATO because the Ukrainian government of Viktor Yanukovych, elected in 2010, did not want to.  It wasn't because of a lack of agreement within NATO. 

[Jacob]

If any of you are interested in the intellectual & philosophical underpinnings of Putinism, this article on Alexander Dugin in the Jewish Chronicle is pretty enlightening. It touches on the whole "existential threat" and "irrational/rational" thing that a couple of folks have been discussing in this thread already.

Aleksandr Dugin: The sinister ideologue who's Putin's favourite philosopher
Dugin's death cult seeks the total destruction of his opponents

The Russian invasion of Ukraine seems to be completely irrational. As well as worrying about how to stop the aggression, many of us are trying to understand why it is happening.

Aleksandr Dugin, a Russian philosopher, historian and sociologist, is not well known, but it might help to understand his thinking and influence. Known as "Putin's philosopher" by some, Dugin is nostalgic for a simpler time. He mistrusts technology and dreams about closing down the internet. It is modernity itself that he doesn't like. To put that another way, he wants to radically change our world.

Dugin derives his worldview from that of German philosopher Martin Heidegger, who joined the Nazis and ran the University of Heidelberg for them, implementing their "racial" exclusions. Like Heidegger, Dugin sees technology as eroding identity and promoting individualism, helped by "globalist elites" seeking to control the world. His "counter-revolution" aims to end the rights, liberties, science and internet of the Western world.

Adopted by educational institutions across Russia, Dugin's influential 1997 book Foundations Of Geopolitics advocates for Russian rule "from Dublin to Vladisvostok" using military means, disinformation and leveraging natural resources. "Eurasia" is Dugin's term for the new Russian Empire. Long before the recent invasion, he saw Ukraine as an integral part of this vision, and that Russia not controlling Ukraine would be "an enormous danger for all of Eurasia". So it is unsurprising that in 2015, Dugin was sanctioned by the US for "actively [recruiting] individuals with military and combat experience" to fight on behalf of Russia-backed forces in Ukraine.

[Admiral Yi]

Very cool map Syt.

Can you tell what the multi-colored shields next to the Ukrainian units mean?

Higher unit organization, like division or corps, I'm guessing but I can't tell from the key.

[Jacob]

On the same topic, Kamil Galeev has a pretty informative twitter thread on "how to defeat Putin". It makes clear what Putin means when he says "de-nazification". It fits very well within the Dugin-Putinist framework outlined above.

In essence it's a "no true Scotsman" argument where "Nazi = not Russian" because anyone who's not a Nazi will embrace being Russian. Geleev goes into a bit more detail about how and why, and the history, but that's the TLDR.

In general, I've found Galeev to be pretty interesting reading. In general he is very much on the "smack Putin hard in the nose right now, do not provide an exit ramp" side of things.

The thread also includes this image, which indicates Putinist opinion on America - which I think American Putin/ Russia supporters should know and own:

[OttoVonBismarck]

I don't understand the assumption by Mearsheimer and OvB that NATO did not at all consider how Russia would interpret its (unanimous, btw) 2008 invitation to Ukraine and Georgia to begin the process of joining NATO.  Myself, I need some evidence that that this assumption is true.

Ukraine didn't join NATO because the Ukrainian government of Viktor Yanukovych, elected in 2010, did not want to.  It wasn't because of a lack of agreement within NATO. 

I think you might need to check your history (of course that would mean acknowledging you may have typed something incorrect, which I would wager I have a better chance of witnessing the heat death of the universe than witnessing that.) NATO made a non-binding statement that Ukraine and Georgia were going to join NATO, this did not constitute really an "invitation", and also specifically did not begin the real accession process (a major defect in how it was operated), and is thus highly questionable as a decision.


NATO actually has an open doors policy, as a matter of treaty policy any European country is welcome to seek membership. So in a sense NATO can't formally be closed to any state that meets the broad guidelines of the treaty.

Under article 10 it also says that not only do all existing treaty states have to approve a new member, individual treaty states can put conditions or requirements onto applicants as they see fit. This has taken on various forms over the years--Greece for example blocked North Macedonia over its use of the name Macedonia, and Turkey has blocked Cyprus over the fact Turkey illegally occupies half of Cyprus and wants the international community to settle that situation in Turkey's favor. So while NATO has an open doors policy, it also has an "everyone gets a veto" policy--and further it should generally be understood NATO expansion has always been driven by the desires of the United States and the willingness of the rest of the alliance to follow those desires (which they have not always done.)

In 1999 all of the member states agreed to the formalized "Membership Action Plan" process for bringing in new members. The MAP process includes a list of things that are relatively difficult for any state that isn't fairly stable without any major enemies to actually meet.

The actual history is that Ukraine filed notice that it sought to begin the Membership Action Plan--it was not "invited" to do so (openly--very likely Bush Admin had been talking to Ukraine/Georgia)--and in fact under the terms of the treaty no such invitation is required, any European country can ask to enter into a Membership Action Plan (NATO is not obligated to begin a MAP for them or to progress to conclusion of the MAP.) In March 2008 Viktor Yushchenko sent formal notice that he was seeking for Ukraine to be given a MAP that it could begin progressing through. At the Bucharest summit around a month later, all members agreed to a statement that then Secretary-General of NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer read that basically said "in principle at some point Georgia and Ukraine will join NATO." (This is what you refer to as unanimous, but it wasn't an invitation since NATO doesn't have an invitation process, and it wasn't actually even part of the process of accession NATO has.) Germany and France both vetoed actually starting Ukraine or Georgia into MAPs--without a MAP they were not and could not seriously begin the membership process. That situation remained until the present day--neither country has ever been extended a MAP.

A number of concerns of existing treaty states would have had to have been resolved for a MAP to have been offered, and Ukraine also in its request for a MAP said that it would not actually accede to the treaty without things like a popular referendum being held in Ukraine to support it--which for the time between 2008 and 2014 that referendum very likely would never have succeeded. I think polling before 2014 commonly found that as low as 15% of Ukrainians favored joining NATO, and something like 35% favored joining Russia's CSTO. Even after the seizure of Crimea the NATO question was close to 50/50 in Ukraine (often with NATO not polling above 50), up until 2019 or so when Ukraine drifted more pro-NATO due to obvious problems with Russia getting much worse.


Now, as a matter of fact, it is well known that President Bush favored NATO expansion, and it is unlikely Ukraine and Georgia would have pursued MAPs without Bush's backing, and it is unlikely that (despite reservations--as evidenced by the lack of MAP approval) NATO would have issued the Bucharest statement that the two countries "would join NATO" without Bush backing that as policy. Let's be clear, NATO is an American lead treaty organization in every meaningful way, and always has been. The Ukraine/Georgia statement would never have occurred in the way it did if not for specific decisions made by the Bush Administration. I think assuming that Bush deeply understood the threat Putin represented actually conflicts with the historical evidence that is clear Bush largely underestimated Putin for almost his entire Presidency--not taking him seriously as a threat until he invaded Georgia at the very end of his second term. NATO did express concern about Putin/Medvedev's take on these countries joining NATO, and that was a major part of why Germany and France vetoed any actual move toward bringing Ukraine in.

My core point here is the Bucharest statement was meaningless drivel. If NATO was not interested in formalizing a MAP, it was likely needlessly stupid to make the statement as it was.