Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-23 and Invasion

[Jacob]

Broadly speaking, I reckon it could be down to three categories of reasons why Putin acted now as opposed to some other time: 1) Internal readiness, 2) Internal political conditions, 3) External considerations.

So speculating here...

1) Internal readiness, I think, would be down to how long would it take to make the plans and mobilize the forces after the decision was made. We discussed a bit how some of the naval forces in place transited through the English channel in January. I don't know how long it would take to get those vessels ready for the mission once a decision was made, nor whether they were the slowest assets to preposition. Were there other more cumbersome assets that needed to be pre-positioned - and prior to that potentially undergo lenghty maintenance or other prep? But I guess we should look at the conditions at the beginning of the pre-positioning period to see what they were at that time.

2) Internal political conditions - is Putin sick and concerned about his legacy (I've seen speculation, but it's just that)? Did he project some sort of negative future (declining economy, for example) that he wished to turn around with a "quick victorious war"? Are there any internal factions that this war would put on the back foot (I don't think so, but who knows)? Or perhaps more likely (but who knows how likely) was this some way for Putin to "deftly" rebalance power and influence among factions (say military vs oligarchs vs securocrats) to keep everyone off balance and him securely on top? Another one, which feels reasonable to me is that Putin spent all that time isolated but with his history books, and he just got a little too high on his nationalist romanticist supply.

3) External considerations - I think the most likely one is a response to events in Ukraine that convinced Putin he needed to step to keep the country suffienctly under heel. I mean, I'm not unwilling to take Putin at face value about his concerns were about Ukrainian aligning further towards the EU and NATO. Alternatley (or additionally) it could be that the benefits from the Donbas situation were manifesting less so he felt the need to escalate. Finally there's the "hammer at the cracks in Western socieity" thesis. He seems to genuinely believe that the West is in terminal decline and that he could accelerate that. Maybe he thought the timing was right for that, one way or the other. Anti-vax shenanigans were on the increase, for example, and the culture war has not been abating either - maybe he thought this would exacerbate it (though alternately, it's possible that he tried to stoke those fires as much as he possibly could in anticipation of the invasion).

... ultimately I don't know (obviously), but I'm definitely interested in analysis and facts on this.

[Sheilbh]

1) Internal readiness, I think, would be down to how long would it take to make the plans and mobilize the forces after the decision was made. We discussed a bit how some of the naval forces in place transited through the English channel in January. I don't know how long it would take to get those vessels ready for the mission once a decision was made, nor whether they were the slowest assets to preposition. Were there other more cumbersome assets that needed to be pre-positioned - and prior to that potentially undergo lenghty maintenance or other prep? But I guess we should look at the conditions at the beginning of the pre-positioning period to see what they were at that time.

Worth noting there was a massive Russian training exercise in Crimea and on Ukraine's borders of around 50-60,000 troops. From what I've read analysts thought it was unusual but not totally out of character and possibly suggested some Russian attack on Ukraine but probably a more limited Donetsk/Luhansk/Crimea focused attack not a full invasion.

3) External considerations - I think the most likely one is a response to events in Ukraine that convinced Putin he needed to step to keep the country suffienctly under heel. I mean, I'm not unwilling to take Putin at face value about his concerns were about Ukrainian aligning further towards the EU and NATO. Alternatley (or additionally) it could be that the benefits from the Donbas situation were manifesting less so he felt the need to escalate. Finally there's the "hammer at the cracks in Western socieity" thesis. He seems to genuinely believe that the West is in terminal decline and that he could accelerate that. Maybe he thought the timing was right for that, one way or the other. Anti-vax shenanigans were on the increase, for example, and the culture war has not been abating either - maybe he thought this would exacerbate it (though alternately, it's possible that he tried to stoke those fires as much as he possibly could in anticipation of the invasion).

I  think Afghanistan's a factor. I think he might genuinely struggle to believe Zelensky had any popular support or that the government of Ukraine had any legitimacy - which is why he underestimated the level of resistance. That the "Ukraine is a colony run by a puppet regime" was something that Ukrainians also felt and I wonder if that was part of the expectation of very rapid results.

That, in his mind, they're both Western puppet regimes with no legitimacy. Put them under a bit of pressure and they will collapse incredibly rapidly and the West doesn't have the stomach to push back.

[Malthus]

Yeah, one of the impacts of this is that it has seriously undermined years of determined (and partly successful) effort by Putin to sow division among the population of Western nations.

Could it be that Putin largely believed that these efforts were so successful, that Western coordination in the face of a Russian attack would be completely compromised?

He was mistaken - but I think the western unanimity was largely the result of things Putin could not have predicted.

First, the resistance and surprisingly effective messaging by the Ukrainian leadership. I am convinced that this really roused popular and political support. Had the Ukrainian leadership (say) fled the country, I think the blowback could have been contained - and that appears to have been what the Russians expected.

Second, Western diplomacy has been surprisingly effective; I assume Biden is ultimately to take much of the credit for this. It was reasonable to assume that western outrage would amount to US imposing some sort of sanctions, and a bunch of half hearted meaningless platitudes from everyone else ...

[DGuller]

I suspect the explanation is not strategical, but personal, which is a very scary explanation.  I do think that something in Putin changed during the Covid isolation.  Maybe a reduced access to his inner circle, and the vastly increased geographic distance to his inner circle that did make it through, really did unhinge him.  It's not like him, or KGB agents in general, to make bold moves like a full-scale war; they are trained to get subtle victories by subtle, deniable means.

[Sheilbh]

Yeah - I think if the day one attack on Kyiv got rid of Zelensky and the government basically crumbled, I suspect there would have been normalisation by the West of the end result. Even if it was partition or occupation. The early and theatrical resistance by Zelensky I think had a huge effect on Western feelings about this and, I suspect, on Ukrainian morale.

To be honest I don't think it's necessarily division that made him think he'd get his way - I suspect it was the experience of the 2014 invasion, of the attack on the 2016 election, supporting Belarus, Armenia-Azerbaijan and not facing any significant pushback from the West. There were some sanctions which hit the economy but he was hosting the 2018 World Cup four years after invading Ukraine. I think he had been (and would continue) to push and probe in all directions until he met resistance and he hadn't yet, his mistake was thinking there wouldn't be any ever - and I am surprised how far sanctions are going and by Germany's switch etc. This is all far beyond what I thought would happen and I'm not sure I'm alone in that.

[Syt]

Russia's media watchdog bans Facebook

Russia has banned Facebook, according to a report by Russian state-owned news agency RIA Novosti.

It says the country's media watchdog Roskomnadzor decided to block access to the social media platform, adding there had been 26 cases of discrimination against Russian media by Facebook since October 2020, with access restricted to state-backed channels like RT and the RIA news agency.

[grumbler]

(snip) Finally there's the "hammer at the cracks in Western socieity" thesis. He seems to genuinely believe that the West is in terminal decline and that he could accelerate that. Maybe he thought the timing was right for that, one way or the other. Anti-vax shenanigans were on the increase, for example, and the culture war has not been abating either - maybe he thought this would exacerbate it (though alternately, it's possible that he tried to stoke those fires as much as he possibly could in anticipation of the invasion)

""We have only to kick in the door, and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down."

[Syt]

The early and theatrical resistance by Zelensky I think had a huge effect on Western feelings about this and, I suspect, on Ukrainian morale.

I wonder how much of that is informed by his career as entertainer, actor and comedian. I know he has a law degree and all that and can't really speak to his abilities as politician. But I have to wonder sometimes how much of his public persona at the moment is an act. Then again, most politicians are actors (though usually bad ones).

[DGuller]

Good point about the Armenia-Azerbaijan war last year.  I remember being surprised at how normalized it seemed for a country to solve its conflict by an open and unashamed military attack.  Maybe that signaled to Putin that open warfare is not the taboo is once was.

[Syt]

""We have only to kick in the door, and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down."

I had to think of that quote a lot in recent days in regards to Russian expectations.

[Zanza]

The big unknown is Germany because they're a large, rich country and spending more money is good but it'll be interesting to see how and where they prioritise that spend. I think until German strategy is clear it's going to be a bit difficult for other countries to coordinate - in relation to each other - because there'll be a big hole that could be anything.

Some immediate investments are pretty clear: F-35 to deliver American nukes, armed Heron drones from Israel, more PUMA IFVs, more ammunition and spare parts etc.
Rheinmetall has offered equipment worth 42 billion to the government...

Longer term investing into a new fighter aircraft and main battle tank with France

[Barrister]

Hey all - Valmy reached out to me on FB wanted to know my thoughts.

Unfortunately my thoughts don't go much more profound than "Russian vessel - go fuck yourself".

I don't know why, but I always kind of identified as Ukrainian-Canadian, even though by heritage I'm only half, I don't know more than about a dozen words of the language, and my ancestors came to Canada over 100 years ago from whatever bits of eastern europe they came from.  My last name isn't even a "real" Ukrainian name - it was mangled and anglicized somewhere along the way.

I'm a little bit of a flag nerd.  Back in 1990 or so I bought a full-size Ukrainian flag and hung it up on my wall in my parents house.  When Ukraine declared independence in 1991 I jury-rigged it to fly off of a lightpost in my parents front yard.

I still have that flag, although it's just been in a box or on a shelf for decades.  3-4 years ago I installed a flag pole in my front yard (like I said - flag nerd). 98% of the time it flies a Canadian flag, though I have flown a Alberta, UK, US, and German flag on special occasions (oh - also a Winnipeg Jets flag during playoffs).

Last week I flew my Ukrainian flag on the eve of invasion, and it remains flying.  My own totally meaningless sign of support for Ukraine.  Although I think it's slightly more meaningful than a social media post (which I've also done).

I keep doomscrolling news from Ukraine.  My work productivity has taken a nosedive.  I've caught myself in near tears a couple of times.

The news I get is all western or Ukrainian sourced - there's obviously no point in following Russian media.  But you have to follow with such a huge dose of salt it's hard to tell what's happening.  I saw multiple reports of the Ukrainian fighter ace, the "Ghost of Kyiv", who shot down 6 Russian jets in the first few days.  None of those reported were repeated by western media, and it was such obvious bullshit.

That being said, it is obvious the war is not going well for Putin, and as a result he's turning up the carnage on civilians.

No idea what the west can do though beyond what we're doing.  A "no fly zone" is a declaration of war on Russia, and I think we should kind of avoid doing that.  I do hope the west (mainly but not entirely the US) is sneaking in some special forces, drone operators and the like to get in some pot shots where we can.

It's amazing the turnaround in the West though.  There was serious doubt that Nord Stream 2 would be shut down, or that Russia would be cut off from Swift, but both have happened.  Germany promises a huge increase in it's military budget.  Finland and Sweden looking at joining NATO.  Ukraine as a EU member candidate - all would have been considered lunacy a week ago.

The only real hope though is regime change in Moscow.  Having lived through 1989 (and 1991) I know that regime change can be like bankruptcy - it happens so slowly then all at once.  But otherwise Putin's entire regime and legitimacy rests on his being "tough" - he can't accept anything other than near-total victory.  Throughout his career his military adventure have not always gone according to plan but he's always achieved victory of one sort or another, so he'll just keep doubling down again and again.  Short of regime change it's either the grinding horror of ongoing war / occupation / insurgency, or a Russian victory.

Slava Ukraini!  Shche ne vmerla Ukrainy!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7y8Iw6Oee8I&t=154s

[Malthus]

Yeah - I think if the day one attack on Kyiv got rid of Zelensky and the government basically crumbled, I suspect there would have been normalisation by the West of the end result. Even if it was partition or occupation. The early and theatrical resistance by Zelensky I think had a huge effect on Western feelings about this and, I suspect, on Ukrainian morale.

To be honest I don't think it's necessarily division that made him think he'd get his way - I suspect it was the experience of the 2014 invasion, of the attack on the 2016 election, supporting Belarus, Armenia-Azerbaijan and not facing any significant pushback from the West. There were some sanctions which hit the economy but he was hosting the 2018 World Cup four years after invading Ukraine. I think he had been (and would continue) to push and probe in all directions until he met resistance and he hadn't yet, his mistake was thinking there wouldn't be any ever - and I am surprised how far sanctions are going and by Germany's switch etc. This is all far beyond what I thought would happen and I'm not sure I'm alone in that.

I think the two go together - the experience of past military grabs with minimal blowback, plus the knowledge that his efforts at division have had some success. Both lead to the reasonable conclusion that a bigger military grab was doable.

I mean, if the West basically winked at his acts before, it would make sense that they would wink again - after years of division have weakened their resolve still further.

[Syt]

Hey Beeb, good to see you.

Wish it were in better circumstances.

[DGuller]

Yeah - I think if the day one attack on Kyiv got rid of Zelensky and the government basically crumbled, I suspect there would have been normalisation by the West of the end result. Even if it was partition or occupation. The early and theatrical resistance by Zelensky I think had a huge effect on Western feelings about this and, I suspect, on Ukrainian morale.

To be honest I don't think it's necessarily division that made him think he'd get his way - I suspect it was the experience of the 2014 invasion, of the attack on the 2016 election, supporting Belarus, Armenia-Azerbaijan and not facing any significant pushback from the West. There were some sanctions which hit the economy but he was hosting the 2018 World Cup four years after invading Ukraine. I think he had been (and would continue) to push and probe in all directions until he met resistance and he hadn't yet, his mistake was thinking there wouldn't be any ever - and I am surprised how far sanctions are going and by Germany's switch etc. This is all far beyond what I thought would happen and I'm not sure I'm alone in that.

I think the two go together - the experience of past military grabs with minimal blowback, plus the knowledge that his efforts at division have had some success. Both lead to the reasonable conclusion that a bigger military grab was doable.

I mean, if the West basically winked at his acts before, it would make sense that they would wink again - after years of division have weakened their resolve still further.

Yeah, it could also be a fear of missing out.  Maybe he understood that you can't keep prodding a sleeping giant forever, but there is also that fear that maybe you can prod him a whole lot more than you have been so far, and you'll be missing out on once-in-a-generation gains if you play it too cautiously.