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Does any other country do defence procurement as badly as the British? We'd do better just catapaulting burning bundles of £50 notes at our enemies.



http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/may/10/hammond-aircraft-carrier-u-turn

Philip Hammond insisted he would "not blindly pursue" a key defence programme personally endorsed by the prime minister as he announced a U-turn over the type of fighters needed for the military's two new aircraft carriers.

The defence secretary said the delays and costs of putting the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) wanted by Downing Street on the carriers were now too great, and the Ministry of Defence had accepted "our approach must change".

Putting a brave face on the decision, MoD officials admitted it was easy to be clever with hindsight, but rejected suggestions the about-face had been caused by the rush to complete the 2010 strategic defence and security review (SDSR).

In the review, David Cameron demanded the military buy the F35-C version of the JSF, which needs "cats and traps" to launch it from deck. He then mocked Labour for buying the less capable F35-B, which takes off like a harrier jump jet.

But the MoD has pirouetted again, with Hammond telling MPs the costs of converting the carriers to take "cats and traps" had risen so much, and the delays to the F35-C had become so great, it was right to revert back.

Defence officials said the MoD had already spent £40-50m to convert one of the carriers. They predicted the total cost of putting "cats and traps" on both of the new ships would total £5bn – 10 times the amount estimated in 2005.

However, a source denied Cameron's decision could be described as a mistake.

"Hindsight is an easy thing," said a senior source. "We can all make judgments about what happened last week. We know more now than we knew then. The judgment [in 2010] was a reasonable one. It is easy from this position to say we would have made a different choice." The source said further analysis of costs in recent months had shown "unexpected" problems.

In his statement to the Commons, Hammond also tried to deflect criticism from Downing Street. "The 2010 SDSR decision on carriers was right at the time, but the facts have changed."

The carrier programme has been dogged by delays and technical problems that were compounded by the decision to buy the F35-C. Though it is a better all-round fighter than its sister aircraft, putting "cats and traps" on the ships pushed up costs so much the MoD was told it would have to mothball the first of the carriers, the Queen Elizabeth, as soon as it was built.

By reverting back to the jump jet version of the JSF, which is much closer to production, the Queen Elizabeth should now be ready for operations, equipped with 12 fighters, by 2018.

The decision also means the RAF will fly the "B" version of the JSF, with each aircraft, being built by the US firm Lockheed Martin, now thought to cost between £50m and £100m.

The U-turn was supported by the heads of the three services and the chief of the defence staff, General Sir David Richards, as well as Hammond, the defence source said.

The defence secretary asked Downing Street to endorse the move in March, but was rebuffed.

During sharp exchanges at Westminster, the shadow defence secretary, Jim Murphy, accused the government of wasting two years, and claimed the government's approach was "as incoherent as it is ludicrous".

Murphy called on the prime minister to apologise for his incompetence, and questioned why the government had been in such a rush to scrap the UK's only aircraft carrier, Ark Royal, before a replacement was available.

"Standing at the dispatch box, the prime minister announced his plans to reverse Labour's carrier strike policy, scrap the Harrier, sell Ark Royal, build two carriers but mothball one, sack trainee pilots and downgrade British power at sea.

"But this U-turn has now gone full circle and nothing has been gained. Two years wasted."

The former Labour defence secretary Bob Ainsworth told MPs the government had taken the right decision. The U-turn had brought "some sanity" to the carrier programme, he said.

"But I can't go along with the excuse ... that the facts have changed," he said. "The fundamental facts were there at the time and have not changed. We have been in an extremely expensive cul-de-sac for the last 18 months as a result of a shambles of an SDSR."

Hammond said he was "not interested in trading insults about what happened in the past".

I don't think it's the fault of UK military procurement, but rather the fault of the very flawed JSF program.  We've been having similar fallout over our own plan to buy the planes as well.

Quote from: Gups on May 10, 2012, 08:51:41 AM
Does any other country do defence procurement as badly as the British?

Canada buys stuff from Britain that even you guys think is crap. :D

Quote from: Admiral Yi on May 10, 2012, 08:56:26 AM

Quote from: Gups on May 10, 2012, 08:51:41 AM
Does any other country do defence procurement as badly as the British?

Canada buys stuff from Britain that even you guys think is crap. :D

In our defence we didn't actually pay any money for those subs. -_-

Quote from: Barrister on May 10, 2012, 08:57:19 AM

Quote from: Admiral Yi on May 10, 2012, 08:56:26 AM

Quote from: Gups on May 10, 2012, 08:51:41 AM
Does any other country do defence procurement as badly as the British?

Canada buys stuff from Britain that even you guys think is crap. :D

In our defence we didn't actually pay any money for those subs. -_-

Beaver pelts?
55 Gallon drums of Poutine?
Celine Dion records?

Quote from: Gups on May 10, 2012, 08:51:41 AM
Does any other country do defence procurement as badly as the British?

Hells yeah; look at the US budget.

By trying to be all things to all people, the JSF has failed to meet anyone's requirements.

Late-stage simulations found the cats and traps wouldn't work on the target aircraft carriers as the arrestor hook was too close to the JSF wheels so it would skid off the deck and into the briny.

Is the jump jet version of the JSF going to possess supersonic capability?

Seriously, that fighter jet program is such a disaster.

Quote from: CountDeMoney on May 10, 2012, 09:26:48 AM
Is the jump jet version of the JSF going to possess supersonic capability?

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20100614/DEFSECT01/6140307/F-35B-STOVL-Fighter-Goes-Supersonic

E:  Here's the same one, BF-2, fucking around (sea trials) on the Wasp last year: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CLYrHlUOudc&feature=fvwrel

E2:  Well, I guess that could be either -2 or -4, since they were both apparently there.  Doesn't really matter.

One of the problems with the JSF program is the way other countries were given the option of coming in at the development stage in exchange for a break on per unit price.  If you change your mind deep into the development stage you're kind of fucked.

QuoteDoes any other country do defence procurement as badly as the British? We'd do better just catapaulting burning bundles of £50 notes at our enemies.

Clearly we have the best black projects in the world.
There must be a working time machine beneath Milton Keynes or somesuch.

Quote from: Brazen on May 10, 2012, 09:19:37 AM
Late-stage simulations found the cats and traps wouldn't work on the target aircraft carriers as the arrestor hook was too close to the JSF wheels so it would skid off the deck and into the briny.

Meh, the claims that the F-35C "won't work" are simply silly.

A problem was found in testing. That is the purpose of testing - to find problems. There is no reason to believe the problem is intractable.

The hook issue is fallout from this being the first stealth aircraft designed to land on a carrier. The tailhook has to be able to be covered up when not in use, and hence the design resulted in it being too close to that landing gear. They will fix it, and proceed.

The hysteria that "OMG THE CARRIER PLANE CAN NEVER LAND ON A CARRIER!" is silly.

I just do not understand how installing "cats and traps" can cost £2.5bn per vessel  :hmm:

Quote from: Richard Hakluyt on May 10, 2012, 10:11:45 AM
I just do not understand how installing "cats and traps" can cost £2.5bn per vessel  :hmm:

Well, not traps. I'd imagine installing the catapult would be a big deal though. I'm assuming they are steam-driven ones.

Quote from: Richard Hakluyt on May 10, 2012, 10:11:45 AM
I just do not understand how installing "cats and traps" can cost £2.5bn per vessel  :hmm:

Man, those must be some ferocious mice.  ;)

The way the author keeps saying 'cat and traps', do you think they don't know that they mean catapults and arrestor wires?

At any rate, yes the JSF has been a disaster, but it's hard to have sympathy for countries that thought that it would be a good idea to participate in US military procurement.

Quote from: Richard Hakluyt on May 10, 2012, 10:11:45 AM
I just do not understand how installing "cats and traps" can cost £2.5bn per vessel  :hmm:

In a properly designed ship, they wouldn't cost that much.  To retrofit, though?  :bleeding:

Think of all the steam lines you have to run from your steam generator to your catapult.  Think of all the machinery you have to displace to install the vast new water distillation plant to create the water needed to run the catapults.

I cannot imagine why anyone would think such a retrofit a good idea.  Or even a possible one, without having made space and weight reservations ahead of time.

An entire Nimitz class carrier only cost about $4 billion.  That's the same as the retrofit cost to ad catapults and arresting gear.

Quote from: Berkut on May 10, 2012, 10:10:36 AM

Quote from: Brazen on May 10, 2012, 09:19:37 AM
Late-stage simulations found the cats and traps wouldn't work on the target aircraft carriers as the arrestor hook was too close to the JSF wheels so it would skid off the deck and into the briny.

Meh, the claims that the F-35C "won't work" are simply silly.

A problem was found in testing. That is the purpose of testing - to find problems. There is no reason to believe the problem is intractable.

The hook issue is fallout from this being the first stealth aircraft designed to land on a carrier. The tailhook has to be able to be covered up when not in use, and hence the design resulted in it being too close to that landing gear. They will fix it, and proceed.

The hysteria that "OMG THE CARRIER PLANE CAN NEVER LAND ON A CARRIER!" is silly.

Yeah.  Duh!  "OMG Designs have to be modified on the drawing board 111oneoneone"

Quote from: Richard Hakluyt on May 10, 2012, 10:11:45 AM
I just do not understand how installing "cats and traps" can cost £2.5bn per vessel  :hmm:

Needing the system to also create tea jacked up the cost by 45% :bowler:

Quote from: grumbler on May 10, 2012, 01:13:53 PM

Quote from: Berkut on May 10, 2012, 10:10:36 AM

Quote from: Brazen on May 10, 2012, 09:19:37 AM
Late-stage simulations found the cats and traps wouldn't work on the target aircraft carriers as the arrestor hook was too close to the JSF wheels so it would skid off the deck and into the briny.

Meh, the claims that the F-35C "won't work" are simply silly.

A problem was found in testing. That is the purpose of testing - to find problems. There is no reason to believe the problem is intractable.

The hook issue is fallout from this being the first stealth aircraft designed to land on a carrier. The tailhook has to be able to be covered up when not in use, and hence the design resulted in it being too close to that landing gear. They will fix it, and proceed.

The hysteria that "OMG THE CARRIER PLANE CAN NEVER LAND ON A CARRIER!" is silly.

Yeah.  Duh!  "OMG Designs have to be modified on the drawing board 111oneoneone"

Well, I think the response of "Why the fuck didn't you people think of that BEFORE you built it!" is pretty valid.

Even the bitch that trying to make one plane do three pretty different roles was a giant mistake is pretty valid as well. Hard to imagine that it would have cost MORE to just design two planes....well, maybe not actually.

But the tone of several articles about this glitch has been one of "ZOMG THE CARRIER PLANE CANT LAND ON A CARRIER!" like this is some kind of impossible to resolve issue.

At this point I think they are still planning sea trials for next year - which would involve landing them on a carrier, so apparently they are not TOO concerned...

Quote from: JacobL on May 10, 2012, 01:16:28 PM

Quote from: Richard Hakluyt on May 10, 2012, 10:11:45 AM
I just do not understand how installing "cats and traps" can cost £2.5bn per vessel  :hmm:

Needing the system to also create tea jacked up the cost by 45% :bowler:

Well, you are creating all that steam anyway...seems kind of silly to waste it all without getting a nice brewup out of it, wot wot?

Quote from: Berkut on May 10, 2012, 10:10:36 AM

Quote from: Brazen on May 10, 2012, 09:19:37 AM
Late-stage simulations found the cats and traps wouldn't work on the target aircraft carriers as the arrestor hook was too close to the JSF wheels so it would skid off the deck and into the briny.

Meh, the claims that the F-35C "won't work" are simply silly.

A problem was found in testing. That is the purpose of testing - to find problems. There is no reason to believe the problem is intractable.

The hook issue is fallout from this being the first stealth aircraft designed to land on a carrier. The tailhook has to be able to be covered up when not in use, and hence the design resulted in it being too close to that landing gear. They will fix it, and proceed.

The hysteria that "OMG THE CARRIER PLANE CAN NEVER LAND ON A CARRIER!" is silly.

My understanding is that, due to the way an arrestor landing stresses the airframe, shifting the tailhook around is neither easy nor simple.

And a solution that works for a US carrier deck size doesn't necessarily work for the QE and PoW layouts.

People should remember this was originally spun as a job creation scheme by the then Labour government, that it was a corporate welfare programme was an unspoken secondary reason and their value as capital ships is entirely incidental as they'll never be used in naval warfare.

I predict one will spend virtually all it's life in Portsmouth as huge museum symbol of impotence and the 2nd will never be fully completed and will probably end up as an artificial reef and diving attraction off a major seaside town.  :bowler: 

Quote from: mongers on May 10, 2012, 02:13:01 PM
People should remember this was originally spun as a job creation scheme by the then Labour government, that it was a corporate welfare programme was an unspoken secondary reason and their value as capital ships is entirely incidental as they'll never be used in naval warfare.

Eh? The carriers were originally "spun" as an integral part of a UK defence capability focused on expeditionary operations - back in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. They were not built to take on the Japanese in the Pacific, no, but carriers provide an extremely useful ability to have graduated escalation, from off-shore presence all the way up to full on warfighting and even humanitarian relief.

Now, the decision to build them in Scotland may have been politically motivated...

Quote from: Gups on May 10, 2012, 08:51:41 AM
Does any other country do defence procurement as badly as the British? We'd do better just catapaulting burning bundles of £50 notes at our enemies.

Trick question - the rest of Europe has given up procuring anything. :p

We'd probably be better off just building "new" F-14s, F-16s, A-10s, F-15s, etc....

Quote from: Warspite on May 10, 2012, 02:05:41 PM

Quote from: Berkut on May 10, 2012, 10:10:36 AM

Quote from: Brazen on May 10, 2012, 09:19:37 AM
Late-stage simulations found the cats and traps wouldn't work on the target aircraft carriers as the arrestor hook was too close to the JSF wheels so it would skid off the deck and into the briny.

Meh, the claims that the F-35C "won't work" are simply silly.

A problem was found in testing. That is the purpose of testing - to find problems. There is no reason to believe the problem is intractable.

The hook issue is fallout from this being the first stealth aircraft designed to land on a carrier. The tailhook has to be able to be covered up when not in use, and hence the design resulted in it being too close to that landing gear. They will fix it, and proceed.

The hysteria that "OMG THE CARRIER PLANE CAN NEVER LAND ON A CARRIER!" is silly.

My understanding is that, due to the way an arrestor landing stresses the airframe, shifting the tailhook around is neither easy nor simple.

Well, there seems to be some dispute about that - the LM guys think a re-design of the tailhook will be adequate. Of course, their spokespeople are paid to say that, I suppose.

Quote
And a solution that works for a US carrier deck size doesn't necessarily work for the QE and PoW layouts.

I don't think that is actually the case - the problem is with the aircraft, not with the deck, regardless of size.

Quote from: Tonitrus on May 10, 2012, 02:19:51 PM
We'd probably be better off just building "new" F-14s, F-16s, A-10s, F-15s, etc....

A-10s did a good job in Stargate Atlantis. :area52:

Quote from: Gups on May 10, 2012, 08:51:41 AM
Does any other country do defence procurement as badly as the British? We'd do better just catapaulting burning bundles of £50 notes at our enemies.

That'd be a good tactic! Distract the enemy!    :D

Quote from: KRonn on May 10, 2012, 04:51:26 PM

Quote from: Gups on May 10, 2012, 08:51:41 AM
Does any other country do defence procurement as badly as the British? We'd do better just catapaulting burning bundles of £50 notes at our enemies.

That'd be a good tactic! Distract the enemy!    :D

Worked for Major Sharpe in Sharpe's Revenge.  :hmm:

Quote from: grumbler on May 10, 2012, 01:12:48 PM
An entire Nimitz class carrier only cost about $4 billion.  That's the same as the retrofit cost to ad catapults and arresting gear.

:huh:  Wow... Hey Brits, go with the plane that doesn't need the cats. Or just build a whole new carrier from scratch to handle catapults! It'd be cheaper.    :hmm:

Quote from: Tonitrus on May 10, 2012, 02:19:51 PM
We'd probably be better off just building "new" F-14s, F-16s, A-10s, F-15s, etc....

I ran a USN study for the next-generation strike aircraft back in the early 90s.  The choices were the F-14E, the A-6F, and the F-18 E/F (only the first having been actually built).  The F-14E was the clear winner, the F-18 E/F the clear loser.  I briefed all the way to the Defense Science Board.  The ultimate decision, of course, was to go with the clear loser. Bureaucracy has a way of defeating even the most blatant of facts.

I miss the F-14.

Quote from: grumbler on May 10, 2012, 05:26:53 PM

Quote from: Tonitrus on May 10, 2012, 02:19:51 PM
We'd probably be better off just building "new" F-14s, F-16s, A-10s, F-15s, etc....

I ran a USN study for the next-generation strike aircraft back in the early 90s.  The choices were the F-14E, the A-6F, and the F-18 E/F (only the first having been actually built).  The F-14E was the clear winner, the F-18 E/F the clear loser.  I briefed all the way to the Defense Science Board.  The ultimate decision, of course, was to go with the clear loser. Bureaucracy has a way of defeating even the most blatant of facts.

Then I blame you.

Stoopid F/18s.  :mad:

The Defense Science Board threw up too many strawmen.

Quote from: Admiral Yi on May 10, 2012, 07:08:59 PM
The Defense Science Board threw up too many strawmen.

:lmfao:

Quote from: mongers on May 10, 2012, 02:13:01 PM
People should remember this was originally spun as a job creation scheme by the then Labour government, that it was a corporate welfare programme was an unspoken secondary reason and their value as capital ships is entirely incidental as they'll never be used in naval warfare.

I predict one will spend virtually all it's life in Portsmouth as huge museum symbol of impotence and the 2nd will never be fully completed and will probably end up as an artificial reef and diving attraction off a major seaside town.  :bowler:

Given Argentina's sabre rattling and all the oil discovered in the Falklands I guarantee you they'll be finished.

Maybe we can trade some our old, unused carriers to the British for lease on some of their islands again...like the Falklands.  :P

Quote from: Ed Anger on May 10, 2012, 06:29:53 PM
I miss the F-14.

Too much awesome.  And I bet you it cost a fortune in maintenance, what with the VG wings.  It was all about saving money for a while there.  Peace dividend.

Quote from: Neil on May 10, 2012, 09:47:09 PM

Quote from: Ed Anger on May 10, 2012, 06:29:53 PM
I miss the F-14.

Too much awesome.  And I bet you it cost a fortune in maintenance, what with the VG wings.  It was all about saving money for a while there.  Peace dividend.

When the F/18s can't scramble far enough and fast enough to intercept the mega-ASMs from the Backfires, then we'll know what the real costs would be.

VAMPIRE! VAMPIRE!

Quote from: jimmy olsen on May 10, 2012, 07:47:00 PM

Quote from: mongers on May 10, 2012, 02:13:01 PM
People should remember this was originally spun as a job creation scheme by the then Labour government, that it was a corporate welfare programme was an unspoken secondary reason and their value as capital ships is entirely incidental as they'll never be used in naval warfare.

I predict one will spend virtually all it's life in Portsmouth as huge museum symbol of impotence and the 2nd will never be fully completed and will probably end up as an artificial reef and diving attraction off a major seaside town.  :bowler:

Given Argentina's sabre rattling and all the oil discovered in the Falklands I guarantee you they'll be finished.

The UK doesn't need brand new carriers do defeat Argentina militarily.

Quote from: CountDeMoney on May 10, 2012, 10:00:17 PM

Quote from: Neil on May 10, 2012, 09:47:09 PM

Quote from: Ed Anger on May 10, 2012, 06:29:53 PM
I miss the F-14.

Too much awesome.  And I bet you it cost a fortune in maintenance, what with the VG wings.  It was all about saving money for a while there.  Peace dividend.

When the F/18s can't scramble far enough and fast enough to intercept the mega-ASMs from the Backfires, then we'll know what the real costs would be.

I think this is the point where I suggest that if the US Navy can't afford swing with F-14s the Russian Long Range Strategic Air Forces can't really afford their Blackjacks and Backfires. At some point the speed of those missiles reach such a level that trying to chase them down no longer made any sense.

Soooo... anyone watch Newsnight last night?

QuoteUK RAF "overspent on Voyager air tanker contract by billions"

The UK Royal Air Force (RAF) is paying billions of pounds extra for the much-criticised lease of its new Voyager air-to-air refuelling aircraft, BBC Two Newsnight has claimed.

According to Newsnight, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) could have acquired 14 aircraft for a cost of GBP50 million each, instead of the GBP150 million each paid as part of a GBP10 billion leasing agreement.

Newsnight said it has seen evidence, including another buyer's contract, that the real price should be as little as GBP50 million, and expert opinion that there would be a discount available to customers buying 14 aircraft, plus an estimated GBP10 million conversion cost.
British Defence Secretary Philip Hammond defended the contract, but added: "I will go back to the MoD and look personally at what is being done around this PFI contract."

The British Government had signed a 27 year Private Finance Initiative (PFI) contract with Air Tanker, a consortium of Airbus, Rolls-Royce, Cobham, Thales, and Babcock, in 2008, despite warnings from prominent military and political figures.

As per the contract, 14 converted Airbus A330s, called Voyager by the RAF, are being leased to the military by the AirTanker for refuelling, transport, and medical flight missions, at a cost of GBP750 million each up to 2035.

Public Accounts Committee (PAC) chairwoman Margaret Hodge said: "What I now need to do is get the National Audit Office to do a further investigation of this contract."

Former Chief of the General Staff Lord Dannatt, who raised the issue of the Voyager cost with the incoming government two years ago, said: "If it does turn out to be factually correct that the MoD has paid two-to-three times more than it should have done for the same aircraft, then that is shocking."

Quote from: Viking on May 11, 2012, 07:29:55 AM
I think this is the point where I suggest that if the US Navy can't afford swing with F-14s the Russian Long Range Strategic Air Forces can't really afford their Blackjacks and Backfires. At some point the speed of those missiles reach such a level that trying to chase them down no longer made any sense.

Well, I was referencing the time frame of grumbler's developmental model, when the Soviet Naval Air Arm was still relevant.

However, the issue still stands with future standoff land-based ASMs in the South China Sea with ranges of 2,500km and packing 10,000lb conventional warheads.

The farther out they're intercepted, the better.

Quote from: Viking on May 11, 2012, 07:29:55 AM
I think this is the point where I suggest that if the US Navy can't afford swing with F-14s the Russian Long Range Strategic Air Forces can't really afford their Blackjacks and Backfires. At some point the speed of those missiles reach such a level that trying to chase them down no longer made any sense.

I think this is actually the point where you should have realized you don't have a clue, and so declined to post anything as silly as this (but then remembered that this is languish, where such realizations go to die).  :P

Quote from: CountDeMoney on May 11, 2012, 08:00:50 AM
Well, I was referencing the time frame of grumbler's developmental model, when the Soviet Naval Air Arm was still relevant.

It was Russia by then, not the USSR.  And we were doing strike aircraft as the primary measure, not air defense aircraft.  But the F-14E (which was the F-14D with the new engines and solid-state radar) still beat everything out there by quite a bit, and was the cheapest option by far, as well.

The airedales killed it by creating the requirement that the USMC fly the aircraft as well, and that the plane be capable of deploying 60-strong (five squadrons) per carrier.  The USMC had no interest in the F-14, as it was a two-seat aircraft and they were opposed to any more two-seat aircraft, and the larger size of the F-14 meant that the practical limit was 59 planes on a Nimitz-sized CVN.

QuoteHowever, the issue still stands with future standoff land-based ASMs in the South China Sea with ranges of 2,500km and packing 10,000lb conventional warheads.

The farther out they're intercepted, the better.

That will be the role for SAMs, not fighters.

Quote from: Admiral Yi on May 10, 2012, 07:08:59 PM
The Defense Science Board threw up too many strawmen.

That was the least of grumbler's problems.  The real challenge was working on a project whose ultimate purpose was ad hominem.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on May 11, 2012, 03:01:18 PM

Quote from: Admiral Yi on May 10, 2012, 07:08:59 PM
The Defense Science Board threw up too many strawmen.

That was the least of grumbler's problems.  The real challenge was working on a project whose ultimate purpose was ad hominem.

In military terms they call it "anti-personal".

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on May 11, 2012, 03:01:18 PM

Quote from: Admiral Yi on May 10, 2012, 07:08:59 PM
The Defense Science Board threw up too many strawmen.

That was the least of grumbler's problems.  The real challenge was working on a project whose ultimate purpose was ad hominem.

Do you mean "ad hominim"?

Quote from: grumbler on May 10, 2012, 05:26:53 PM

Quote from: Tonitrus on May 10, 2012, 02:19:51 PM
We'd probably be better off just building "new" F-14s, F-16s, A-10s, F-15s, etc....

I ran a USN study for the next-generation strike aircraft back in the early 90s.  The choices were the F-14E, the A-6F, and the F-18 E/F (only the first having been actually built).  The F-14E was the clear winner, the F-18 E/F the clear loser.  I briefed all the way to the Defense Science Board.  The ultimate decision, of course, was to go with the clear loser. Bureaucracy has a way of defeating even the most blatant of facts.

So ultimately, you are at fault.

"But you did not convince me!" is the logic.

Performance needs to be balanced with cost.  The biggest reason why the better performing F-14 was dropped was due to the high maintenance costs associated with extending the life of that platform or expanding it's mission.  A better performing plane does jack-all if you can't get it in the air because you don't have the parts for it onboard.  Also, tied in with defense procurement, it was simply more cost-effective to go a larger production line of the one-size-fits-all superhornet and trade-off performance vice funding another production line of F-14's that were rapidly becoming obsolete in other areas besides just engines and aviation electronics.

Also, this isn't the first time that we've stabbed Britain on defense procurement.  I don't think anyone remembers the Skybolt fiasco where Kennedy ultimately forced the British to pay exponentially more  cash for Poseidon and Trident missiles to fulfill their strategic policy.

Quote from: Kolytsin on May 11, 2012, 07:50:46 PM
Also, this isn't the first time that we've stabbed Britain on defense procurement.  I don't think anyone remembers the Skybolt fiasco where Kennedy ultimately forced the British to pay exponentially more  cash for Poseidon and Trident missiles to fulfill their strategic policy.

I don't.

Exponentially more cash than what?

More than they had expected to pay for the cancelled Air to ground Skybolt missile.  In the end, the crisis was fervently downplayed by both sides by pointing to the fact that the British were getting discounted Poseidon missiles, but that masks the fact that in the end the British were still forced to pay much more than they had originally planned.

Quote from: Kolytsin on May 12, 2012, 10:39:52 PM
More than they had expected to pay for the cancelled Air to ground Skybolt missile.  In the end, the crisis was fervently downplayed by both sides by pointing to the fact that the British were getting discounted Poseidon missiles, but that masks the fact that in the end the British were still forced to pay much more than they had originally planned.

I was curious so I Wikied Skybolt.  Not sure how you can fault the US for not delivering a missile that didn't work.  And not sure how the UK was forced to do anything.

Quote from: Kolytsin on May 11, 2012, 07:50:46 PM
Performance needs to be balanced with cost.  The biggest reason why the better performing F-14 was dropped was due to the high maintenance costs associated with extending the life of that platform or expanding it's mission.  A better performing plane does jack-all if you can't get it in the air because you don't have the parts for it onboard.  Also, tied in with defense procurement, it was simply more cost-effective to go a larger production line of the one-size-fits-all superhornet and trade-off performance vice funding another production line of F-14's that were rapidly becoming obsolete in other areas besides just engines and aviation electronics.

:lol:  No, that's not true at all.  The Super Tomcat (just the F-14D with some tweaks to carry the newer weapons) was already in production.  The Superhornet cost $86 billion to develop and build, whereas the Super Tomcat would have cost less than $20 billion to build in the same numbers.  Plus, it would have been in service far sooner.  The more militarily effect system was also by far the most cost-effective.

The F-18 E/F was selected, I think, because it was a single-seat aircraft and the airdale admirals had long wanted to get rid of the backseat guys.  It had nothing to do with spare parts (which would be available for either aircraft).

QuoteAlso, this isn't the first time that we've stabbed Britain on defense procurement.  I don't think anyone remembers the Skybolt fiasco where Kennedy ultimately forced the British to pay exponentially more  cash for Poseidon and Trident missiles to fulfill their strategic policy.

I admit that I don't remember the Skybolt "fiasco" like you do, but that was a terrible system.   The Brits were trying to get a strategic deterrent on the cheap, and that just wasn't possible.  here are very good reasons why no nation ever deployed an air-launched ballistic missile.

Quote from: alfred russel on May 11, 2012, 05:59:41 PM
So ultimately, you are at fault.

"But you did not convince me!" is the logic.

But I did convince them!  The DSB endorsed my study.  The reversal came later, for reasons that were never made clear.

Quote from: grumbler on May 13, 2012, 08:53:58 AM
The Super Tomcat (just the F-14D with some tweaks to carry the newer weapons) was already in production.  The Superhornet cost $86 billion to develop and build, whereas the Super Tomcat would have cost less than $20 billion to build in the same numbers.  Plus, it would have been in service far sooner.  The more militarily effect system was also by far the most cost-effective.

With the increased precision strike capability, was here any substantive degradation in the Super Tomcat's dog fighting capaabilities, or its ability to continue serving in a long range supersonic fleet interceptor platform?

QuoteThe F-18 E/F was selected, I think, because it was a single-seat aircraft and the airdale admirals had long wanted to get rid of the backseat guys.  It had nothing to do with spare parts (which would be available for either aircraft).

One pilot is cheaper to train and maintain than a pilot and a crewman.

Quotethe A-6F

I would've liked to have seen that.

Quote from: grumbler on May 13, 2012, 08:55:38 AM

Quote from: alfred russel on May 11, 2012, 05:59:41 PM
So ultimately, you are at fault.

"But you did not convince me!" is the logic.

But I did convince them!  The DSB endorsed my study.  The reversal came later, for reasons that were never made clear.

Hans fired the DSB.

Quote from: CountDeMoney on May 13, 2012, 09:04:16 AM
With the increased precision strike capability, was here any substantive degradation in the Super Tomcat's dog fighting capaabilities, or its ability to continue serving in a long range supersonic fleet interceptor platform?

No, the Strike Tomcat was as good as the base Tomcat in the air superiority role.

QuoteOne pilot is cheaper to train and maintain than a pilot and a crewman.

Without a doubt.  The delta in operating costs was dwarfed by the delta in development costs, though.

QuoteI would've liked to have seen that.

The A-6F was the first platform eliminated, despite its superior strike range.  The problem it had was utilizing that range in a world where, if the F-14 wasn't retained as a strike fighter, there was no aircraft that could escort the A-6F to the ranges where its superior load was an advantage.

The Strike Tomcat was essentially equal to the A-6F at ranges of 700 miles and less. Given the target packages selected by the Navy as mission-representative, that was good enough.

QuoteThe F-18 E/F was selected, I think, because it was a single-seat aircraft and the airdale admirals had long wanted to get rid of the backseat guys.  It had nothing to do with spare parts (which would be available for either aircraft).

:hmm:

The airdale admirals didn't seem to want to get rid of the NFOs all that much, since the F/A-18F is actually a two seater and it isn't just used as a trainer.   A whole bunch of those F-14 squadrons went to the F.

Excessively easy example (VFA-103):

(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.vf-103.com%2Fvfa103.jpg&hash=a62acfd566ebfbb2e2257a68a0369e7b8828bb8f)

Do you think it might have been wise to consider the possible advantages of dreadnought battleship construction?  All that firepower on target...

Quote from: grumbler on May 13, 2012, 08:53:58 AM

The F-18 E/F was selected, I think, because it was a single-seat aircraft and the airdale admirals had long wanted to get rid of the backseat guys. 

If that is your core argument, you might want to re-look at the seating specifications of the F-18-F.  As MBM pointed out, most F-14 squadrons converted to the two-seater F-18-F.  I do not believe that there was any reduction at all in the NFO community related to this decision.

While only the admirals who made the decision know for certain, my opinion remains that the F-14D was scrapped due to 1. Loss of mission relevance with the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the Tu-22M bomber, 2.  Increased obsolescence of its aviation electronics relative to the FLIR and AMRAAM capabilities of the F-18, and 3. High maintenance and labor costs relative to the F-18.  According to the Navy, at least, the F-18 takes 75% less labor time per flight hour and costs 40% less per flight hour relative to the F-14. 

Most arguments essentially boil down to that the Hornet and SH can not carry A-6 payloads A-6 distances. They also lack the range and super-long-range BVR capability of the F-14 which thus, so far as the Tomcat crowd is concerned, automatically makes the Hornet and Superhornet inferior.  But why? Are these factors really that important?  I would say not.  The Navy has shifted its stated emphasis to combat and strike in the littoral regions where the threat becomes several small attack aircraft armed with Exocet missiles.   This theater plays up to the capabilities of the Superhornet vice the Tomcat.  The days of massive Soviet bomber fleets armed with Anti-ship missiles with a 500 mile range are over.

While adding a few modifications may have made the F-14's paper capabilities better than that of the Superhornet, you are still left with the F-14's hydraulic control system, 1970's supply chain, and 1970's radar systems.  Considering the delays of the F-35 program, I feel the navy made the right decision to use an upgraded F-18 as a bridging fighter until the F-35 comes online while still maintaining the technical edge of the force.


With regards to the Skybolt side-comment.  The British didn't know and were not informed of the significant difficulties encountered by the Skybolt development program.  While hindsight makes it easy to lambast the Air-launched Ballistic Missile program, these facts were not known yet in the 1960's.  It was mismanagement of the political side of the program that created such a controversy.  The British were not informed of the significant difficulties of the program and it was cut without informing the British.  When McNamara went to London to inform the British and offer Poseidon missiles as a trade, he tied the Poseidon missile offer to NATO, unaware of the political stock the British placed in having their own independent deterrent.  Hence the flare-up in Anglo-American relations.  While it was the correct decision to cancel the Skybolt program, the Kennedy administration should have had far more communication with the British on the issue.


Edit:  Also confused on your statistics.  An F-18 E/F (including program costs) costs about $90 Million in 2012 dollars ($65 Million flyaway).  An original F-14B would cost (just flyaway costs) $45 million in 2012 dollars.  Add about 10 million for upgrades and I would expect the total flyaway cost to be around 55 million each for an upgraded version.  The total procurement costs to date of the F-18 E/F program have been $40 billion.  Not sure where these $80 billion and $20 billion statistics are coming from. . . .

Quote from: grumbler on May 13, 2012, 11:58:19 AM
The A-6F was the first platform eliminated, despite its superior strike range.  The problem it had was utilizing that range in a world where, if the F-14 wasn't retained as a strike fighter, there was no aircraft that could escort the A-6F to the ranges where its superior load was an advantage.

I want the Navy to go back to 1986.  :mad: :(

Quote from: Kolytsin on May 13, 2012, 02:24:23 PM

Quote from: grumbler on May 13, 2012, 08:53:58 AM

The F-18 E/F was selected, I think, because it was a single-seat aircraft and the airdale admirals had long wanted to get rid of the backseat guys. 

If that is your core argument, you might want to re-look at the seating specifications of the F-18-F.  As MBM pointed out, most F-14 squadrons converted to the two-seater F-18-F.  I do not believe that there was any reduction at all in the NFO community related to this decision.

While only the admirals who made the decision know for certain, my opinion remains that the F-14D was scrapped due to 1. Loss of mission relevance with the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the Tu-22M bomber, 2.  Increased obsolescence of its aviation electronics relative to the FLIR and AMRAAM capabilities of the F-18, and 3. High maintenance and labor costs relative to the F-18.  According to the Navy, at least, the F-18 takes 75% less labor time per flight hour and costs 40% less per flight hour relative to the F-14. 

Most arguments essentially boil down to that the Hornet and SH can not carry A-6 payloads A-6 distances. They also lack the range and super-long-range BVR capability of the F-14 which thus, so far as the Tomcat crowd is concerned, automatically makes the Hornet and Superhornet inferior.  But why? Are these factors really that important?  I would say not.  The Navy has shifted its stated emphasis to combat and strike in the littoral regions where the threat becomes several small attack aircraft armed with Exocet missiles.   This theater plays up to the capabilities of the Superhornet vice the Tomcat.  The days of massive Soviet bomber fleets armed with Anti-ship missiles with a 500 mile range are over.

While adding a few modifications may have made the F-14's paper capabilities better than that of the Superhornet, you are still left with the F-14's hydraulic control system, 1970's supply chain, and 1970's radar systems.  Considering the delays of the F-35 program, I feel the navy made the right decision to use an upgraded F-18 as a bridging fighter until the F-35 comes online while still maintaining the technical edge of the force.


With regards to the Skybolt side-comment.  The British didn't know and were not informed of the significant difficulties encountered by the Skybolt development program.  While hindsight makes it easy to lambast the Air-launched Ballistic Missile program, these facts were not known yet in the 1960's.  It was mismanagement of the political side of the program that created such a controversy.  The British were not informed of the significant difficulties of the program and it was cut without informing the British.  When McNamara went to London to inform the British and offer Poseidon missiles as a trade, he tied the Poseidon missile offer to NATO, unaware of the political stock the British placed in having their own independent deterrent.  Hence the flare-up in Anglo-American relations.  While it was the correct decision to cancel the Skybolt program, the Kennedy administration should have had far more communication with the British on the issue.


Edit:  Also confused on your statistics.  An F-18 E/F (including program costs) costs about $90 Million in 2012 dollars ($65 Million flyaway).  An original F-14B would cost (just flyaway costs) $45 million in 2012 dollars.  Add about 10 million for upgrades and I would expect the total flyaway cost to be around 55 million each for an upgraded version.  The total procurement costs to date of the F-18 E/F program have been $40 billion.  Not sure where these $80 billion and $20 billion statistics are coming from. . . .

Topcat ?

Quote from: mongers on May 13, 2012, 02:53:57 PM

Quote from: Kolytsin on May 13, 2012, 02:24:23 PM

Quote from: grumbler on May 13, 2012, 08:53:58 AM

The F-18 E/F was selected, I think, because it was a single-seat aircraft and the airdale admirals had long wanted to get rid of the backseat guys. 

If that is your core argument, you might want to re-look at the seating specifications of the F-18-F.  As MBM pointed out, most F-14 squadrons converted to the two-seater F-18-F.  I do not believe that there was any reduction at all in the NFO community related to this decision.

While only the admirals who made the decision know for certain, my opinion remains that the F-14D was scrapped due to 1. Loss of mission relevance with the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the Tu-22M bomber, 2.  Increased obsolescence of its aviation electronics relative to the FLIR and AMRAAM capabilities of the F-18, and 3. High maintenance and labor costs relative to the F-18.  According to the Navy, at least, the F-18 takes 75% less labor time per flight hour and costs 40% less per flight hour relative to the F-14. 

Most arguments essentially boil down to that the Hornet and SH can not carry A-6 payloads A-6 distances. They also lack the range and super-long-range BVR capability of the F-14 which thus, so far as the Tomcat crowd is concerned, automatically makes the Hornet and Superhornet inferior.  But why? Are these factors really that important?  I would say not.  The Navy has shifted its stated emphasis to combat and strike in the littoral regions where the threat becomes several small attack aircraft armed with Exocet missiles.   This theater plays up to the capabilities of the Superhornet vice the Tomcat.  The days of massive Soviet bomber fleets armed with Anti-ship missiles with a 500 mile range are over.

While adding a few modifications may have made the F-14's paper capabilities better than that of the Superhornet, you are still left with the F-14's hydraulic control system, 1970's supply chain, and 1970's radar systems.  Considering the delays of the F-35 program, I feel the navy made the right decision to use an upgraded F-18 as a bridging fighter until the F-35 comes online while still maintaining the technical edge of the force.


With regards to the Skybolt side-comment.  The British didn't know and were not informed of the significant difficulties encountered by the Skybolt development program.  While hindsight makes it easy to lambast the Air-launched Ballistic Missile program, these facts were not known yet in the 1960's.  It was mismanagement of the political side of the program that created such a controversy.  The British were not informed of the significant difficulties of the program and it was cut without informing the British.  When McNamara went to London to inform the British and offer Poseidon missiles as a trade, he tied the Poseidon missile offer to NATO, unaware of the political stock the British placed in having their own independent deterrent.  Hence the flare-up in Anglo-American relations.  While it was the correct decision to cancel the Skybolt program, the Kennedy administration should have had far more communication with the British on the issue.


Edit:  Also confused on your statistics.  An F-18 E/F (including program costs) costs about $90 Million in 2012 dollars ($65 Million flyaway).  An original F-14B would cost (just flyaway costs) $45 million in 2012 dollars.  Add about 10 million for upgrades and I would expect the total flyaway cost to be around 55 million each for an upgraded version.  The total procurement costs to date of the F-18 E/F program have been $40 billion.  Not sure where these $80 billion and $20 billion statistics are coming from. . . .

Topcat ?

Tommmmm.

Quote from: Kolytsin on May 13, 2012, 02:24:23 PM

Loss of mission relevance with the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the Tu-22M bomber,

Which hasn't disappeared.  Though we may not care anyway.  :P

Quote from: CountDeMoney on May 13, 2012, 02:41:41 PM

Quote from: grumbler on May 13, 2012, 11:58:19 AM
The A-6F was the first platform eliminated, despite its superior strike range.  The problem it had was utilizing that range in a world where, if the F-14 wasn't retained as a strike fighter, there was no aircraft that could escort the A-6F to the ranges where its superior load was an advantage.

I want the Navy to go back to 1986.  :mad: :(

Let's go back farther and bring back A-1 Skyraiders. 

Quote from: Kolytsin on May 13, 2012, 02:24:23 PM
If that is your core argument, you might want to re-look at the seating specifications of the F-18-F.

It's not a "core argument," it is an observation.  At the time of the study (and the decision), there were only going to be 8 F models per carrier (2 per squadron), to serve as strike leads.  Those planes would have two pilots each and no NFOs.

QuoteWhile only the admirals who made the decision know for certain, my opinion remains that the F-14D was scrapped due to 1. Loss of mission relevance with the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the Tu-22M bomber, 2.  Increased obsolescence of its aviation electronics relative to the FLIR and AMRAAM capabilities of the F-18, and 3. High maintenance and labor costs relative to the F-18.  According to the Navy, at least, the F-18 takes 75% less labor time per flight hour and costs 40% less per flight hour relative to the F-14.

The F-14D and the F-14E (which was, as noted, just new-production F-14D with some added software) was as fully-capable in terms of avionics as the F-18 E and F. It cannot be compared to the F-14A, which, as you note, was a maintenance hog, particularly compared to the much simpler and less capable contemporary F-18 A and B.

QuoteMost arguments essentially boil down to that the Hornet and SH can not carry A-6 payloads A-6 distances. They also lack the range and super-long-range BVR capability of the F-14 which thus, so far as the Tomcat crowd is concerned, automatically makes the Hornet and Superhornet inferior.  But why? Are these factors really that important?  I would say not.  The Navy has shifted its stated emphasis to combat and strike in the littoral regions where the threat becomes several small attack aircraft armed with Exocet missiles.   This theater plays up to the capabilities of the Superhornet vice the Tomcat.  The days of massive Soviet bomber fleets armed with Anti-ship missiles with a 500 mile range are over.

This is Cold War type thinking.  No one, when the study was done, was thinking in terms of Backfire bombers and As-4s.  The entire study was built around littoral operations.  And, in littoral operations, the F-14E outperformed the F-18 E and F significantly.  The difference between being able to strike targets 700iles away and being able to strike targets 350 miles away is significant, not only in terms of being able to reach further inland, but also in terms of being able to strike from further out, and thus increasing force security.

QuoteWhile adding a few modifications may have made the F-14's paper capabilities better than that of the Superhornet, you are still left with the F-14's hydraulic control system, 1970's supply chain, and 1970's radar systems.

I don't think anyone considered retaining F-14As (which had the hydraulic systems and older radar, as well as some significant shortcomings you don't mention, like massive fuel consumption upon launch).  The choice my group examined was between new-build F-14Es and new-build F-18Es.  I have no idea what a "1970s supply chain" is, or why you think it relevant to the late 1990s, when the aircraft we examined would have been put into service. 

QuoteConsidering the delays of the F-35 program, I feel the navy made the right decision to use an upgraded F-18 as a bridging fighter until the F-35 comes online while still maintaining the technical edge of the force.

I think the reverse is true; the delays in the F-35 make the decision to opt for the Super Hornet even more obviously a mistake.

QuoteWith regards to the Skybolt side-comment.  The British didn't know and were not informed of the significant difficulties encountered by the Skybolt development program.  While hindsight makes it easy to lambast the Air-launched Ballistic Missile program, these facts were not known yet in the 1960's.  It was mismanagement of the political side of the program that created such a controversy.  The British were not informed of the significant difficulties of the program and it was cut without informing the British.  When McNamara went to London to inform the British and offer Poseidon missiles as a trade, he tied the Poseidon missile offer to NATO, unaware of the political stock the British placed in having their own independent deterrent.  Hence the flare-up in Anglo-American relations.  While it was the correct decision to cancel the Skybolt program, the Kennedy administration should have had far more communication with the British on the issue.

The British knew perfectly well what was happening with the Skybolt development program, and were aware of the US considerations for dropping the program.  And, of course, they were aware that it had been cut.  To believe otherwise is to believe that the British didn't even read the newspapers!  :lol:

The problem was caused by the fact that the British had decided to stake their entire deterrent program on the Skybolt, which was the sort of penny-wise and pound-foolish thing we are seeing with their carriers today (though entirely in keeping with both British and US defense procurement "strategies").  When Skybolt was cancelled, for good and sufficient reasons, they were stuck.  The claim that Macnamara was "unaware of the political stock the British placed in having their own independent deterrent" is laughable; of course he knew what stock they placed in an independent deterrent; he just wanted to scotch the independence of that deterrent because he (and Kennedy) didn't want the Soviets to be tempted into an attack only on the British deterrent, as part of some independent British venture (something like the Suez fiasco) taken under the umbrella of that deterrent.  Of course, the very arguments Macnamara was using were undermined by the fact that Polaris wouldn't be subject to such a Soviet attack, and so, in the end, the british got Polaris and the independent deterrent, in what was a real steal price-wise.  There is no question that Polaris, though obviously more expensive than the el cheapo Skybolt route, was a much more credible deterrent, and that the Brits would have had to buy into Polaris or Poseidon at some point anyway, but without the leverage to get the deal they actually got.

QuoteEdit:  Also confused on your statistics.  An F-18 E/F (including program costs) costs about $90 Million in 2012 dollars ($65 Million flyaway).  An original F-14B would cost (just flyaway costs) $45 million in 2012 dollars.  Add about 10 million for upgrades and I would expect the total flyaway cost to be around 55 million each for an upgraded version.  The total procurement costs to date of the F-18 E/F program have been $40 billion.  Not sure where these $80 billion and $20 billion statistics are coming from. . . .

There were no development costs for the F-14E.  There were significant development costs for the F-18 E/F.  Remember, we are talking about decisions being made in 1991.  The E/F was just a concept (Hornet 2000) at that point.

FORCE DE FRAPPE! :w00t:

Wouldn't it have made more sense to use nuclear 15-inch shells, fired from the Vanguard?

Quote from: Neil on May 13, 2012, 09:23:35 PM
Wouldn't it have made more sense to use nuclear 15-inch shells, fired from the Vanguard?

I don't think the Vanguard was available in 1991.

Quote from: dps on May 13, 2012, 09:25:10 PM

Quote from: Neil on May 13, 2012, 09:23:35 PM
Wouldn't it have made more sense to use nuclear 15-inch shells, fired from the Vanguard?

I don't think the Vanguard was available in 1991.

I'm talking about Skybolt.  The air thing isn't really an issue.  The F-14 was obviously superior because it was in Top Gun and Macross and it had range and armament and Grumman is the premiere maker of naval aircraft.

Quote from: grumbler on May 13, 2012, 08:39:08 PM

QuoteIt's not a "core argument," it is an observation.  At the time of the study (and the decision), there were only going to be 8 F models per carrier (2 per squadron), to serve as strike leads.  Those planes would have two pilots each and no NFOs.

Perhaps.  I do not know exactly what they had planned with respect for wing make-up at that time.

QuoteThe F-14D and the F-14E (which was, as noted, just new-production F-14D with some added software) was as fully-capable in terms of avionics as the F-18 E and F. It cannot be compared to the F-14A, which, as you note, was a maintenance hog, particularly compared to the much simpler and less capable contemporary F-18 A and B.

Not true.  The proposed upgrades for the F-14 were incompatible with many of the precision-guided munitions that were being developed for the day.  To completely upgrade the F-14 would have cost substantially more money.  Please reference the GAO report at http://www.fas.org/man/gao/gao9512.htm or the 1992 Congressional Cost of Operational Effectiveness Analysis report at www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/docs/920630-cr.htm

Quote
This is Cold War type thinking.  No one, when the study was done, was thinking in terms of Backfire bombers and As-4s.  The entire study was built around littoral operations.  And, in littoral operations, the F-14E outperformed the F-18 E and F significantly.  The difference between being able to strike targets 700iles away and being able to strike targets 350 miles away is significant, not only in terms of being able to reach further inland, but also in terms of being able to strike from further out, and thus increasing force security.

Congressional reports at the time mark only marginal improvement over the capabilities of the F-18.  It was likely more capable individually, but more F-18's could be carried by a carrier than F-14's.  Any strike capability over 700 miles could be dealt with either by tomahawks or by the United States Air Force.  From the 1994 GAO report:

Quote
Upgraded F-14s generally have greater range than the F/A-18C and could possibly reach targets beyond the Hornet's range.  However, this capability may not be needed with the Navy's shift to a littoral warfare strategy.  In the Navy's revised strategy, "From The Sea," dated September 1992, it announced a need to concentrate on capabilities required to operate near the world's coastlines.  The Navy recognized that this direction represented a fundamental shift away from open-ocean war fighting and toward joint service operations conducted from the sea.  In defining this change of emphasis, the Secretary of the Navy said 85 percent of the Navy's potential targets are within 200 miles of the coast.  This is within the F/A-18C's range.  If greater range is needed, the Navy's Tomahawk cruise missile can attack targets up to a range of about 700 miles, and Air Force bombers have even greater range.  Both supplement and complement carrier aviation in striking deep within enemy territory.

QuoteI don't think anyone considered retaining F-14As (which had the hydraulic systems and older radar, as well as some significant shortcomings you don't mention, like massive fuel consumption upon launch).  The choice my group examined was between new-build F-14Es and new-build F-18Es.  I have no idea what a "1970s supply chain" is, or why you think it relevant to the late 1990s, when the aircraft we examined would have been put into service. 

F-14 upgrades considered at the time were directed towards avionics and armaments capabilities.  No upgrades were considered toward basic airframe capabilities (too costly and impossible to install without ripping apart the aircraft).  Basic flight systems such as hydraulic control would have been retained.  Your statement is incorrect.  Again, please see the GAO report at http://www.fas.org/man/gao/gao9512.htm.   "1970's supply chain" refers to the large Northrop-Grumman military-industrial complex which supported the F-14.  The F-14 program supported estimates of 80,000 jobs, many of which were redundant from other platforms.  Why pay for one F-14 technical assistant and one F-18 technical assistant when you can consolidate and only need one F-18 technical assistant?  Additionally, many subcontractors build components for the Navy, and these contractors disappear or bankrupt or consolidate over time.  If a part breaks, it must be specially ordered and manufactured if the company no longer exists.  A terrible waste of government money.  I have seen simple rotary telephones on Navy ships cost nearly $10,000 to replace.  Maintaining older supply chains of contractors and subcontractors costs more in long-term maintenance costs.  This was reflected in the operational estimates of the time.

QuoteI think the reverse is true; the delays in the F-35 make the decision to opt for the Super Hornet even more obviously a mistake.

Each man has his own opinion.  However, the decision to use the F-18 left us with a platform that could fully deploy the wide range of precision guided munitions, vice the limited PGM's supported by the F-14 upgrade.  Unquestionably, this was the most necessary ordnance in the tactical situations of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.  No "Top-gun" high-performance fighter was required in those conflicts.  What was needed was a platform that could deliver precision munitons on very narrow targets while minimizing civilian casualties. 

QuoteThe British knew perfectly well what was happening with the Skybolt development program, and were aware of the US considerations for dropping the program.  And, of course, they were aware that it had been cut.  To believe otherwise is to believe that the British didn't even read the newspapers!  :lol:

l. o. l.  I am laughing out loud at your ignorance of this issue.  The British were aware of developmental problems but were not aware of the impending cuts until McNamara told them in November.  Please see this link to read the floor statements in the House of Commons between the Defense Minister Thorneycraft and the opposition Conservatives.  http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1962/dec/17/skybolt-missile-talks

From the British defense minister himself:

Quote
The Minister of Defence (Mr. Peter Thorneycroft)

With permission, I should like to make a statement on my recent talks with Mr. McNamara in London on 11th December.

The principal subject discussed was, as the House knows, the future of the Skybolt missile. We have, of course, known from the outset of our association with the United States Government on 894 this weapon that it constituted a formidable development problem. We knew of various difficulties that had arisen, and of the steps that were being taken to surmount them. Such difficulties, of course, were not unexpected, nor are they unusual even in simpler missiles.

However, when I visited the United States in September of this year, the situation was that while the increase in costs was causing concern, I was assured that American plans assumed delivery of Skybolt. It was not until the beginning of November that Mr. McNamara, while assuring me that no decision would be taken without the fullest consultation, informed me that the future of the weapon was under review. This consultation was carried a further stage last week, and will be continued between the Prime Minister and the President in the Bahamas.

QuoteThe problem was caused by the fact that the British had decided to stake their entire deterrent program on the Skybolt, which was the sort of penny-wise and pound-foolish thing we are seeing with their carriers today (though entirely in keeping with both British and US defense procurement "strategies").  When Skybolt was cancelled, for good and sufficient reasons, they were stuck.

Yes.  I agree fully.  As an aside, this debate reinforces our mutual agreement that British defense procurement policy has been schizophrenic at best and over-reliant on American defense procurement.

QuoteThe claim that Macnamara was "unaware of the political stock the British placed in having their own independent deterrent" is laughable; of course he knew what stock they placed in an independent deterrent; he just wanted to scotch the independence of that deterrent because he (and Kennedy) didn't want the Soviets to be tempted into an attack only on the British deterrent, as part of some independent British venture (something like the Suez fiasco) taken under the umbrella of that deterrent.

You are mistaken, or you are a interpreting source documents vastly different from contemporary historians.  Please see Chapter 3 of Richard E. Neustadt's Alliance Politics [1970]  for a discussion on this issue.  Better yet, read his updated Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective [1999] which unquestionably reveals McNamara's (and Kennedy's) ignorance of Eisenhower's promise of an independent nuclear deterrent to the British in 1958.

Quote" Of course, the very arguments Macnamara was using were undermined by the fact that Polaris wouldn't be subject to such a Soviet attack, and so, in the end, the british got Polaris and the independent deterrent, in what was a real steal price-wise.  There is no question that Polaris, though obviously more expensive than the el cheapo Skybolt route, was a much more credible deterrent, and that the Brits would have had to buy into Polaris or Poseidon at some point anyway, but without the leverage to get the deal they actually got.

Yes, the British got a better system.  We agree.  However, the costs were, in my estimation, too great.  The system itself cost much more money, and the Skybolt issue was used by DeGaulle as an excuse veto Britain's desired entry into the European Common market.  (See page 50-55 of Alliance Politics)  Given the state of the euro today, perhaps that was a good thing after all.  This statement is in line with our original hypothesis that British defense spending is historically conducted without proper analysis of the costs involved and the feasibility of those programs.  This results in a backtrack further down the road and a subsequent dramatic increase in defense spending.  I believe that this point is supported by this analogy.

Quote
There were no development costs for the F-14E.  There were significant development costs for the F-18 E/F.  Remember, we are talking about decisions being made in 1991.  The E/F was just a concept (Hornet 2000) at that point.

Source documents from that period refer to a F-18 E/F platform.  I do not believe your statement that it was still Hornet 2000 at the decision point.  Earlier you had stated yourself that they planned on a 2-seater F-model with two pilots attached to each air wing.  Your statements are contradictory and confusing.  Please provide references.  There were significant costs relative to converting the F-14.  These were judged to be too much by the Navy and the Armed Services Committee.  Please see the 1992 Congressional Report at:

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/docs/920630-cr.htm

And I quote from it:

Quote
Figure 7: CVW Cost Comparisons

[Billions of FY90$; 20 years; 13 CVWs; Basis for Estimates: F/A-18E/F Is Budget Quality; F-14D(QS) & STC-21 are Rough Order of Magnitude]

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                    CVW A                       CVW B                                      CVW D
                                40 F/A-18E/F    20 F/A-18E/F 20 F-14D(QS)             40 F-14D(QS)                                   

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

E&MD                            $4.88                 $4.88        $0.33                          $0.33         

Total procurement         43.48                 24.96        29.10                         47.15           

Operations and support 23.54                11.77        15.92                         31.84           

Total                               71.90                41.61        45.35                         79.32     

or you can look at the [1994] GAO report at:

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1994-06-22/html/CREC-1994-06-22-pt1-PgS26.htm

Incidentally, this conflicts with your earlier cost estimate of $80 billion versus $20 billion.  I believe you pulled this number out of thin air or this number applies only to a limited selected upgrade of aircraft and not to a new production run of F-14's.  Please provide some sort of qualification or reference to your statistic.


My original statement was that I believed the reasons for cutting the F-14 to be: 1. Loss of mission relevance with the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the Tu-22M bomber, 2.  Increased obsolescence of its aviation electronics relative to the FLIR and AMRAAM capabilities of the F-18, and 3. High maintenance and labor costs relative to the F-18.

Your original statement, was that you believe it was due to "airdale" admirals wanting to remove the two-seater airplane, backed up by an implied statement that because you were involved in the creation of the performance comparison report you had insider knowledge of the personalities making such a decision.  We have established that the transition to the F-18's did not significantly affect the Naval Flight Officer community.  You countered with a statement that the original plan was for single-seaters with "pilot-only" two seaters.  However, to take your argument, if the original secret intention of the admirals was to perform a clandestine reduction in NFO personnel costs, this begs the question: Why would they have changed their mind and shifted back to a two-seater plan in the end?  With the F-18 versus F-14 battle won, the battle to keep single-seaters would have been a mere skirmish compared to the first.  It makes no sense that they would suddenly change tack if their original intention was to establish a single-seater air fleet.  The only plausible explanation is that there was a change in brass at the top, but there is no reference or data to support this.  You have proved nothing and made a wild accusation with no facts.  I believe that there is an emotional factor to this associated with the fact that your personal recommendation was not heeded.  Rather, I should say, it was heeded, noted, and considered to be insufficient to support continued deployment of the F-14.  I challenge your statement and I demand references, facts, and personalities involved.  I am willing to listen and change my views, provided I receive facts.

To support my arguments, I quote from the 1992 report, which is roughly concurrent with the decision timeframe:

Quote
7. SUMMARY

Over the course of the last five years several major reviews and analyses have produced the data which substantiates the Navy's F/A-18E/F decision. The need to replace large quantities of retiring fighter and attack aircraft in the late 1990s within a constrained fiscal environment is the basis for the Navy's requirement. Less substantial modification to the F/A-18C/D was rigorously evaluated, but all postulated solutions incurred additional costs without improvements in carrier suitability, combat performance, survivability, and growth potential. New start aircraft were considered as prohibitively expensive. The A-6 AI was eliminated as not adequately survivable in the projected threat environment. All F-14 derivatives, while offering equivalent or slightly better fighter capability compared to the F/A-18E/F, proved to be too expensive compared to expected future funding for naval aviation. The data as summarized in Figure 8 confirm the Navy's F/A-18E/F decision.

FIGURE 8. SUMMARY

F-14D(QS): not as survivable in strike role, more expensive to procure, more expensive to operate and support, less capable than F/A-18C/D in strike role.

F-14 derivatives (ATC-21/STC-21): require more squadron manpower, more expensive to operate, high development cost risk (ROM estimates), not acceptable for Marine Corps, not suitable for foreign military sales.

F/A-18E/F configuration based upon 5 years COEA trade studies.

F/A-18E/F cost effective solution to meet inventory requirements.

END

I feel that this conclusively supports my characterization of the mindset that caused the cancellation of the F-14 program.

 :bleeding: :bleeding: :bleeding:

The obvious solution to this dilemma...is giant dirigible airborne fighter/bomber-carrier/fortresses.  Operated by the USAF, of course.

(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fairship-research-lab.com%2Fimages%2Fflying_aircraft_carrier_1934%255B1%255D.jpg&hash=3b61cdb8c0ee4da4d20e90ddba27628c4a75859f)

The whole floating-on-water thing is sooo 18th century.

Quote from: Tonitrus on May 10, 2012, 02:19:51 PM
We'd probably be better off just building "new" F-14s, F-16s, A-10s, F-15s, etc....

Or, one thousand new B-52s for a one thousand bomber raid. :mmm:

Quote from: Tonitrus on May 14, 2012, 02:00:21 AM
The obvious solution to this dilemma...is giant dirigible airborne fighter/bomber-carrier/fortresses.  Operated by the USAF, of course.

The LEMV, you mean? OK, they say it's only for surveillance, but just look at it:

(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Finhabitat.com%2Fwp-content%2Fblogs.dir%2F1%2Ffiles%2F2010%2F06%2FLEMV-Hybrid-Airship-3.jpg&hash=cfc7a1e5a686bed492aab8f5816e60feb0e6dc49)

http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/lemv/ (http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/lemv/)

"Unblinking stare" has to be one of my favourite military idioms.

Quote from: Ideologue on May 14, 2012, 02:13:01 AM

Quote from: Tonitrus on May 10, 2012, 02:19:51 PM
We'd probably be better off just building "new" F-14s, F-16s, A-10s, F-15s, etc....

Or, one thousand new B-52s for a one thousand bomber raid. :mmm:

One thousand B-52's doing an ARC Light strike? I think I just creamed my pants.

Quote from: Ideologue on May 14, 2012, 02:13:01 AM

Quote from: Tonitrus on May 10, 2012, 02:19:51 PM
We'd probably be better off just building "new" F-14s, F-16s, A-10s, F-15s, etc....

Or, one thousand new B-52s for a one thousand bomber raid. :mmm:

Haven't we discovered that the B-52 is a pretty ineffective weapon?

Quote from: Neil on May 14, 2012, 09:34:53 AM

Quote from: Ideologue on May 14, 2012, 02:13:01 AM

Quote from: Tonitrus on May 10, 2012, 02:19:51 PM
We'd probably be better off just building "new" F-14s, F-16s, A-10s, F-15s, etc....

Or, one thousand new B-52s for a one thousand bomber raid. :mmm:

Haven't we discovered that the B-52 is a pretty ineffective weapon?

What does that have to do with anything? Go ask an Iraqi soldier from GW1.

Quote from: Neil on May 14, 2012, 09:34:53 AM

Quote from: Ideologue on May 14, 2012, 02:13:01 AM

Quote from: Tonitrus on May 10, 2012, 02:19:51 PM
We'd probably be better off just building "new" F-14s, F-16s, A-10s, F-15s, etc....

Or, one thousand new B-52s for a one thousand bomber raid. :mmm:

Haven't we discovered that the B-52 is a pretty ineffective weapon?

I dunno...20 nuclear ALCMs under the wings still make them pretty effective.

And yeah, like 11Bravo said, ask the Vietnamese, Republican Guardsmen, Serbs and Taliban on the receiving end of a B-52 party platter.

Quote from: CountDeMoney on May 14, 2012, 10:02:04 AM

Quote from: Neil on May 14, 2012, 09:34:53 AM

Quote from: Ideologue on May 14, 2012, 02:13:01 AM

Quote from: Tonitrus on May 10, 2012, 02:19:51 PM
We'd probably be better off just building "new" F-14s, F-16s, A-10s, F-15s, etc....

Or, one thousand new B-52s for a one thousand bomber raid. :mmm:

Haven't we discovered that the B-52 is a pretty ineffective weapon?

I dunno...20 nuclear ALCMs under the wings still make them pretty effective.

And yeah, like 11Bravo said, ask the Vietnamese, Republican Guardsmen, Serbs and Taliban on the receiving end of a B-52 party platter.

He's Canadian he doesnt understand.

Quote from: 11B4V on May 14, 2012, 10:03:35 AM
He's Canadian he doesnt understand.

With a battleship fetish, no less.   Go fig.

Quote from: CountDeMoney on May 14, 2012, 10:02:04 AM
I dunno...20 nuclear ALCMs under the wings still make them pretty effective.

No, that would make them even more useless.  What good is a nuclear weapon if you can't even use it?

QuoteAnd yeah, like 11Bravo said, ask the Vietnamese, Republican Guardsmen, Serbs and Taliban on the receiving end of a B-52 party platter.

The US lost the Vietnam War, where B-52s were used.  The US won World War II, where dreadnought battleships were used.

I rest my case.

Weren't some of the Iowas used in Vietnam?

Quote from: Neil on May 14, 2012, 10:06:39 AM

Quote from: CountDeMoney on May 14, 2012, 10:02:04 AM
I dunno...20 nuclear ALCMs under the wings still make them pretty effective.

No, that would make them even more useless.  What good is a nuclear weapon if you can't even use it?

QuoteAnd yeah, like 11Bravo said, ask the Vietnamese, Republican Guardsmen, Serbs and Taliban on the receiving end of a B-52 party platter.

The US lost the Vietnam War, where B-52s were used.  The US won World War II, where dreadnought battleships were used.

I rest my case.

Battleboats and there like were obsolete by the start of WW2. Nice try.

Quote from: 11B4V on May 14, 2012, 10:49:29 AM
Battleboats and there like were obsolete by the start of WW2. Nice try.

Talking to a Canadian about defense is about as effective as talking to a gay Polish lawyer about, well, anything.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on May 14, 2012, 10:33:38 AM
Weren't some of the Iowas used in Vietnam?

In Gulf War 1 too. Sweet 16" action.

Quote from: Ed Anger on May 14, 2012, 11:27:46 AM

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on May 14, 2012, 10:33:38 AM
Weren't some of the Iowas used in Vietnam?

In Gulf War 1 too. Sweet 16" action.

A former Ranger I used to work with--who had to wait over ten years for his combat jump wings after their action on the Honduran-Nicaraguan border--got to watch a fire support mission from the Iowa walk its shells right into a shitload of mobilized student reservists into the tree line on the far side of an open field.  Said it was like watching cockroaches scatter, except in little bitty pieces.   :lol:

Quote from: CountDeMoney on May 14, 2012, 11:38:18 AM

Quote from: Ed Anger on May 14, 2012, 11:27:46 AM

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on May 14, 2012, 10:33:38 AM
Weren't some of the Iowas used in Vietnam?

In Gulf War 1 too. Sweet 16" action.

A former Ranger I used to work with--who had to wait over ten years for his combat jump wings after their action on the Honduran-Nicaraguan border--got to watch a fire support mission from the Iowa walk its shells right into a shitload of mobilized student reservists into the tree line on the far side of an open field.  Said it was like watching cockroaches scatter, except in little bitty pieces.   :lol:

:lol:

Whoops, I just creamed my pants. BRB.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on May 14, 2012, 10:33:38 AM
Weren't some of the Iowas used in Vietnam?

New Jersey was, but by itself it wasn't enough.  More dreadnoughts would have been required.

Quote from: Neil on May 14, 2012, 11:41:49 AM

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on May 14, 2012, 10:33:38 AM
Weren't some of the Iowas used in Vietnam?

New Jersey was, but by itself it wasn't enough.  More dreadnoughts would have been required.

I still have hopes that one day, particularly with the "littoral" emphasis on the current and future operational capabilities, that NGFS will once again see the last two wagons come back in some sort of capacity.
It can be done.

Quote from: Ed Anger on May 14, 2012, 11:40:17 AM

Quote from: CountDeMoney on May 14, 2012, 11:38:18 AM

Quote from: Ed Anger on May 14, 2012, 11:27:46 AM

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on May 14, 2012, 10:33:38 AM
Weren't some of the Iowas used in Vietnam?

In Gulf War 1 too. Sweet 16" action.

A former Ranger I used to work with--who had to wait over ten years for his combat jump wings after their action on the Honduran-Nicaraguan border--got to watch a fire support mission from the Iowa walk its shells right into a shitload of mobilized student reservists into the tree line on the far side of an open field.  Said it was like watching cockroaches scatter, except in little bitty pieces.   :lol:

:lol:

Whoops, I just creamed my pants. BRB.

I knew you would.  :D

Quote from: Kolytsin on May 13, 2012, 11:38:46 PM
Not true.  The proposed upgrades for the F-14 were incompatible with many of the precision-guided munitions that were being developed for the day.  To completely upgrade the F-14 would have cost substantially more money.  Please reference the GAO report at http://www.fas.org/man/gao/gao9512.htm or the 1992 Congressional Cost of Operational Effectiveness Analysis report at www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/docs/920630-cr.htm

You are confusing upgraded old F-14s with new-build F-14s.  Neither of your reports refer to new-build F-14s.  Both were written about a different issue, long after the decision at stake was made.

QuoteCongressional reports at the time mark only marginal improvement over the capabilities of the F-18.  It was likely more capable individually, but more F-18's could be carried by a carrier than F-14's.  Any strike capability over 700 miles could be dealt with either by tomahawks or by the United States Air Force.  From the 1994 GAO report:

Upgraded F-14s generally have greater range than the F/A-18C.. (snip)

Again, you are misunderstanding the issue.  The issue wasn't "should the Navy spend money to upgrade F-14s," but, rather, "should the navy use the F-14 or the F-18 as the basis for the next-generation strike fighter."

As for the shift to "From the Sea," that document was written in light of the decision to abandon the Naval strike mission and adopt the F-18.  The argument that "the Secretary of the Navy said 85 percent of the Navy's potential targets are within 200 miles of the coast" is merely a reinforcement of the bureaucratic reasoning behind the decision to adopt the short-range F-18 E and F: the Navy's "potential targets" are overwhelmingly located close tot he sea because the Navy cannot hit targets more than a stone's throw away.

QuoteF-14 upgrades considered at the time were directed towards avionics and armaments capabilities... (snip)

Since the issue I was discussion doesn't concern F-14 upgrades at all, this is moot.

QuoteEach man has his own opinion.  However, the decision to use the F-18 left us with a platform that could fully deploy the wide range of precision guided munitions, vice the limited PGM's supported by the F-14 upgrade.  Unquestionably, this was the most necessary ordnance in the tactical situations of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.  No "Top-gun" high-performance fighter was required in those conflicts.  What was needed was a platform that could deliver precision munitons on very narrow targets while minimizing civilian casualties. 

While each man may have his own opinion, an informed opinion like mine is probably going to be more persuasive than an uninformed opinion like yours.  The decision to opt for the F-18 follow-on rather than the F-14 follow-on saved a bit in training costs (no need for NFOs) and a fair chunk in operating costs (more fuel-efficient engines due to much lighter aircraft), but left the Navy with a fraction of its strike capability and an enormous R&D bill.

Quotel. o. l.  I am laughing out loud at your ignorance of this issue.

As I am at yours.

QuoteThe British were aware of developmental problems but were not aware of the impending cuts until McNamara told them in November. 

Not sure what you are arguing here.  There were no impending cuts until November. 

QuotePlease see this link to read the floor statements in the House of Commons between the Defense Minister Thorneycraft and the opposition Conservatives.  http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1962/dec/17/skybolt-missile-talks

From the British defense minister himself:

The Minister of Defence (Mr. Peter Thorneycroft)

With permission, I should like to make a statement on my recent talks with Mr. McNamara in London on 11th December.

The principal subject discussed was, as the House knows, the future of the Skybolt missile. We have, of course, known from the outset of our association with the United States Government on 894 this weapon that it constituted a formidable development problem. We knew of various difficulties that had arisen, and of the steps that were being taken to surmount them. Such difficulties, of course, were not unexpected, nor are they unusual even in simpler missiles.

However, when I visited the United States in September of this year, the situation was that while the increase in costs was causing concern, I was assured that American plans assumed delivery of Skybolt. It was not until the beginning of November that Mr. McNamara, while assuring me that no decision would be taken without the fullest consultation, informed me that the future of the weapon was under review. This consultation was carried a further stage last week, and will be continued between the Prime Minister and the President in the Bahamas.

Yes, this is correct, and in accordance with what I have said; the November notification of the possibility of cancellation was no surprise to the Brits, though it was unwelcome.

QuoteYou are mistaken, or you are a interpreting source documents vastly different from contemporary historians.  Please see Chapter 3 of Richard E. Neustadt's Alliance Politics [1970]  for a discussion on this issue.  Better yet, read his updated Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective [1999] which unquestionably reveals McNamara's (and Kennedy's) ignorance of Eisenhower's promise of an independent nuclear deterrent to the British in 1958.

I disagree.  Contemporary, and subsequent, historians are pretty much agree that McNamara and Kennedy fully understood that the British wanted an independent nuclear deterrent, and that Skybolt was going to give them that.  If you think that some historian says otherwise, you need some citations, not vague 'read this book" stuff.    McNamara and Kennedy wanted to convert the Brits to a "duel key" system that would allow the US to have a veto over British nuclear responses, under the argument that this would reduce the chances of a thermonuclear exchange.

Now, the tussle with he Brits came not alone because Skybolt was cancelled, but because McNamara and Kennedy wanted to use the subsequent forced British move to the Polaris program as leverage to get them to accept the duel key.  The Brits successfully counter-leveraged the fact that they had the capability to go it alone and got the Polaris not only without the duel key, but at a bargain price.

QuoteYes, the British got a better system.  We agree.  However, the costs were, in my estimation, too great.  The system itself cost much more money, and the Skybolt issue was used by DeGaulle as an excuse veto Britain's desired entry into the European Common market.

The SSBN system cost more money because the aircraft and their bases were already built - but the Vulcans were obsolescent even by the 1960s (and in particular proved unable to maintain a standing airborne force even though over 100 aircraft had been built), and would have to have been replaced by the early 70s had a Skybolt program been adopted.  That cost would have dwarfed that of the  the SSBN force.

QuoteSource documents from that period refer to a F-18 E/F platform.  I do not believe your statement that it was still Hornet 2000 at the decision point.

I don't believe you have a clue as to when the decision was made.

QuoteEarlier you had stated yourself that they planned on a 2-seater F-model with two pilots attached to each air wing.  Your statements are contradictory and confusing.  Please provide references.

What level of clearance do you possess?  If it is high enough, you can probably get a copy of the report (which would be something like "Naval Strike warfare Options") from 1991 via the OPNAV N88 office.

QuoteThere were significant costs relative to converting the F-14.  These were judged to be too much by the Navy and the Armed Services Committee.

Irrelevant.  The report I am referring to didn't consider any F-14 conversions.

QuoteIncidentally, this conflicts with your earlier cost estimate of $80 billion versus $20 billion.  I believe you pulled this number out of thin air or this number applies only to a limited selected upgrade of aircraft and not to a new production run of F-14's. 

I don't care what you believe.  :D

QuotePlease provide some sort of qualification or reference to your statistic.

I already referenced this; my recollections of the 1991 study I ran.  I see a typo in my statement, though; it should say the F-14D would have been $20 billion less to build in equivalent numbers, not less than $20 billion.

QuoteYour original statement, was that you believe it was due to "airdale" admirals wanting to remove the two-seater airplane, backed up by an implied statement that because you were involved in the creation of the performance comparison report you had insider knowledge of the personalities making such a decision.

Nope.  I brought up the difference between the outcome of the study (which was to build upon the F-14 airframe rather than the F-18, for cost, effectiveness, and obviously cost-effectiveness reasons) and the policy ultimately adopted a year or so later as an example of how bureaucracies function: the decision that makes the most objective sense often loses to a solution that has subjective benefits within the bureaucracy (like getting rid of the back-seaters).  I never said anything about the personalities - whoever they were - who got the decision reversed.

That the Navy, after making the decision in favor of the F-18, should find reasons why the F-18 decision was the correct one is to be expected.  That it was cheaper to fly is certainly true.  Whether it was a smart decision to forgo the strike mission to save those operating expenses (at a high anticipated development cost, I might add, though the cost numbers may have changed in the meantime, as nothing is more volatile than projected development costs!) is the question.  I still think the Navy got it wrong.  If you don't, that's perfectly fine with me.

In 1991, the Hornet option was the more expensive and less capable of the two options available.  All of the analysis demonstrated that.  The DSB accepted the analysis and recommended accordingly.  Without analysis, the DSB recommendation was rejected, and the Navy bought the option that its own study had shown to be the inferior one.  Those are facts.  This is how bureaucracies operate, though; bureaucratic priorities are not always rational to outsiders.

Quote from: grumbler on May 14, 2012, 12:00:45 PM

Quote from: Kolytsin on May 13, 2012, 11:38:46 PM
Earlier you had stated yourself that they planned on a 2-seater F-model with two pilots attached to each air wing.  Your statements are contradictory and confusing.  Please provide references.

What level of clearance do you possess?  If it is high enough, you can probably get a copy of the report (which would be something like "Naval Strike warfare Options") from 1991 via the OPNAV N88 office.

(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fcf.geekdo-images.com%2Fimages%2Fpic1313522.jpg&hash=605bf83ec9511c271a715fd1ac6d9de86434142f)

Quote from: grumbler on May 14, 2012, 12:00:45 PM
You are confusing upgraded old F-14s with new-build F-14s.  Neither of your reports refer to new-build F-14s.  Both were written about a different issue, long after the decision at stake was made.

I was unsure about the exact nature of your study.  I targeted both variations, new build and upgrades to existing aircraft.  I am proceeding based on the belief that you are referring to either new builds of the the F-14D(QS) or new builds of the proposed F-14 ATC/STC-21.  If we limit the debate to those two platforms, the 1992 congressional study remains relevant.  According to the numbers published therein, estimates at the time of a 40-platform F-14D(QS) showed the cost to total $79.32 Billion, compared with $88.31 Billion for a new production run of F-14 ATC/STC-21 platforms.  An equivalent F-18 wing cost estimate was $71.90 Billion.   The referenced figure even states that this number was based on new builds.  Please read the report and revise your statement or explain exactly what it was that you were studying for the F-14.  The ATC/STC-21 estimates I believe refers to your particular study.  To quote further from the report:

Quote
After several years of comprehensive analysis including the results of MAR-I and MAR-II, the Navy concluded that ATA and NATF were beyond the limits of affordability and judged the A-6 AI as lacking sufficient survivability to justify further consideration. This narrowed the candidate field to only the F/A-18E/F and the ATC-21/STC-21 as viable alternatives to fulfill carrier aviation's force structure, low end strike fighter requirements. The MAR studies concluded that the STC/ATC-21 were capable of achieving survivability and vulnerability comparable to the F/A-18 derivative. Fighter performance is somewhat better for the F-14 derivatives. Because of the increased gross weights, carrier suitability measures are degraded for the F-14 derivatives compared to the F/A-18 derivative. With the development of an upgraded AEGIS system for the outer air battle and reduction of the long range Soviet bomber threat the F-14 was designed to counter, the Navy concluded it is reasonable to trade better high end fighter performance for reduced cost and comparable performance for other measures.

This supports my argument that the Navy acknowledged the superior performance of the F-14 derivatives, but decided against the platform due to 1.  Lower cost of the F-18.  and 2.  Decreased carrier suitability of a modified F-14.

Quote
Again, you are misunderstanding the issue.  The issue wasn't "should the Navy spend money to upgrade F-14s," but, rather, "should the navy use the F-14 or the F-18 as the basis for the next-generation strike fighter."

The issue, as I see it, is "Is a longer range strike fighter necessary in today's threat environment?"  The Navy sought to deal with this via upgrades or new-builds.  The arguments for "not necessary" are the same no matter how you try to hold this capability.

Quote
As for the shift to "From the Sea," that document was written in light of the decision to abandon the Naval strike mission and adopt the F-18.  The argument that "the Secretary of the Navy said 85 percent of the Navy's potential targets are within 200 miles of the coast" is merely a reinforcement of the bureaucratic reasoning behind the decision to adopt the short-range F-18 E and F: the Navy's "potential targets" are overwhelmingly located close tot he sea because the Navy cannot hit targets more than a stone's throw away.

I dislike the way you are interpreting the statement.  I feel it is a logical fallacy.  You are trying to portray the Secretary as meaning "The targets that can be handled by the Navy component are within 200 miles of the coast."  Rather, he is saying that "The targets that would need to be handled by the Navy strike component are within 200 miles of the coast."  This is not a reinforcement of bureaucratic reasoning.

QuoteNot sure what you are arguing here.  There were no impending cuts until November.   

I am arguing that the British did not know the American plan to cut the program until notified in November.  Perhaps they could have had a premonition, but the Defense minister even stated that he was assured of delivery as late as September.

Quote
I disagree.  Contemporary, and subsequent, historians are pretty much agree that McNamara and Kennedy fully understood that the British wanted an independent nuclear deterrent, and that Skybolt was going to give them that.  If you think that some historian says otherwise, you need some citations, not vague 'read this book" stuff.    McNamara and Kennedy wanted to convert the Brits to a "duel key" system that would allow the US to have a veto over British nuclear responses, under the argument that this would reduce the chances of a thermonuclear exchange.

What more is a citation than "Read this book."?  You have provided no books, articles, or backup for your statements and are using the classic argumentative fallacy of "Historians pretty much agree".  Give me names of these "Historians".  In fact, you have provided no references at all for any of your points, except "Based on a 20-year-old personal memory"  I have given you my names.  I will even copy the applicable paragraph out of a book for you.

Neustatd, Richard.  May, Ernest.  Thinking in Time.  Page 108.

Quote
For instance, in a famous case at the end of 1962, Anglo-American relations reached a low point because Robert McNamara, Kennedy's Defense Secretary, did not know that two years earlier, when Eisenhower had pledged Britain a crude air-to-surface missile in development (the Skybolt) to extend the Royal Air Force's nuclear capability, the President had not required British bombers to be under NATO.

What more evidence do you need?  What possible quotes, beyond a personal recorded message from Robert McNamara to you, would cause you to give up your untenable position?  Keep in mind that Mr. Neustadt was a close associate of Mr. McNamara and Mr. McNamara even reviewed his comments on the situation and found no issues with his characterization (see page 23 of his 1999 book)

I have not seen a single basis or source for your arguments. 

Quote
Now, the tussle with he Brits came not alone because Skybolt was cancelled, but because McNamara and Kennedy wanted to use the subsequent forced British move to the Polaris program as leverage to get them to accept the duel key. 

Provide a source.  My referenced sources disagree with that statement.

Quote
The Brits successfully counter-leveraged the fact that they had the capability to go it alone and got the Polaris not only without the duel key, but at a bargain price.

The SSBN system cost more money because the aircraft and their bases were already built - but the Vulcans were obsolescent even by the 1960s (and in particular proved unable to maintain a standing airborne force even though over 100 aircraft had been built), and would have to have been replaced by the early 70s had a Skybolt program been adopted.  That cost would have dwarfed that of the  the SSBN force.

I disagree that a standing airborne force would have been less costly compared to ballistic nuclear submarines, but since you do not provide sources for your statements and since I don't want to move further into the weeds, I will let this statement drop, with my registered disagreement.

Quote
I don't believe you have a clue as to when the decision was made.

As per your statements, sometime in 1991.

QuoteWhat level of clearance do you possess?  If it is high enough, you can probably get a copy of the report (which would be something like "Naval Strike warfare Options") from 1991 via the OPNAV N88 office.

It is not available (or, rather, easily findable) on searches of such networks that handle those things.

QuoteIrrelevant.  The report I am referring to didn't consider any F-14 conversions.

Converting a F-14 base from a fighter platform to a strike platform does not count as a conversion?

QuoteI already referenced this; my recollections of the 1991 study I ran.  I see a typo in my statement, though; it should say the F-14D would have been $20 billion less to build in equivalent numbers, not less than $20 billion.

To solidify your statement.  You are basing your arguments solely off of a 20-year-old recollection of an internal report.

Quote
Nope.  I brought up the difference between the outcome of the study (which was to build upon the F-14 airframe rather than the F-18, for cost, effectiveness, and obviously cost-effectiveness reasons) and the policy ultimately adopted a year or so later as an example of how bureaucracies function: the decision that makes the most objective sense often loses to a solution that has subjective benefits within the bureaucracy (like getting rid of the back-seaters).  I never said anything about the personalities - whoever they were - who got the decision reversed.

Reducing personnel costs is hardly subjective in a cost-versus-benefit debate. 

Quote
That the Navy, after making the decision in favor of the F-18, should find reasons why the F-18 decision was the correct one is to be expected.  That it was cheaper to fly is certainly true.  Whether it was a smart decision to forgo the strike mission to save those operating expenses (at a high anticipated development cost, I might add, though the cost numbers may have changed in the meantime, as nothing is more volatile than projected development costs!) is the question.  I still think the Navy got it wrong.  If you don't, that's perfectly fine with me.

Projected cost numbers based on my resources indicate that the F-14 had a higher projected cost at the time.  I do not see how you can argue that there is no developmental cost associated with redesigning a F-14 airframe for a strike mission.  Also, I don't see how you can make the conclusion that these arguments were only created after the fact and were not considered at the time of decision unless you were personally in the debating room.  All you know is that you submitted a report that was endorsed by a subsidiary bureaucratic element.  You don't know what other information the deciding forces were referencing at the time.  I highly doubt that this report was the sole source of information. 

Quote
In 1991, the Hornet option was the more expensive and less capable of the two options available.  All of the analysis demonstrated that.  The DSB accepted the analysis and recommended accordingly.  Without analysis, the DSB recommendation was rejected, and the Navy bought the option that its own study had shown to be the inferior one.  Those are facts.  This is how bureaucracies operate, though; bureaucratic priorities are not always rational to outsiders.

How do you know it was rejected without analysis?  I have already addressed and challenged the assertion that the Hornet was the more expensive option.  At this point we are arguing about a report that only you have seen and whether the cost assertions made inside that report were true.  Other sources point to the fact that the F-18 was cheaper and that the Navy chose the cheaper option over the marginal improvement in strike capability.  A point which is borne out by history.  I would hardly say that the Navy "sacrificed the strike mission" considering the heavy use of carrier strike capabilities in the recent wars.

The point that I am trying to get to is that the decision was between a lower-cost Hornet, and a equivalent or possibly marginally more capable F-14.  Not between a higher-cost underperforming Hornet and a lower-cost, superior F-14.  Whether the final decision was right or not is somewhat irrelevant, but I feel that using this issue to support an argument of bureaucratic stupidity in defense procurement is misleading and false.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on May 14, 2012, 10:33:38 AM
Weren't some of the Iowas used in Vietnam?

Lol.  Yes.

Now I'm imagining B-52s over Dresden. TAKE THAT BILLY PILGRIM. :wub:

Quote from: Ideologue on May 14, 2012, 08:19:37 PM

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on May 14, 2012, 10:33:38 AM
Weren't some of the Iowas used in Vietnam?

Lol.  Yes.

Now I'm imagining B-52s over Dresden. TAKE THAT BILLY PILGRIM. :wub:

In WWIII, they would have been.

(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fassets0.ordienetworks.com%2Fimages%2FGifGuide%2Fclapping%2Fgolf-clap.gif&hash=3770033d6249c889ab1703927ed01bf4d958cd4a)

Quote from: Kolytsin on May 14, 2012, 07:18:36 PM
I was unsure about the exact nature of your study.  .... According to the numbers published therein, estimates at the time of a 40-platform F-14D(QS) showed the cost to total $79.32 Billion, compared with $88.31 Billion for a new production run of F-14 ATC/STC-21 platforms.  An equivalent F-18 wing cost estimate was $71.90 Billion.

The study examined options for the future navy air wing in terms of strike performance in a variety of scenarios.  The F-14 model we ended with as the final recommendation was what the congressional study refers to as the F-14D(QS), though it wasn't known as that in our study.  The cost numbers don't reflect all the R&D costs, just the 6.5 R&D, procurement and operating costs.  Given that the F-18 E/F didn't exist at the time of the study, and the F-14D did, this represents a significant cost advantage for the F-14 option, one that makes their higher unit costs moot in terms of overall costs.  Just looking at the Congressional numbers alone (ignoring the R&D), one would think that paying $7B and change over the life of the wings would be worth it to get the more capable aircraft.

QuoteThis supports my argument that the Navy acknowledged the superior performance of the F-14 derivatives, but decided against the platform due to 1.  Lower cost of the F-18.  and 2.  Decreased carrier suitability of a modified F-14.

The F-14 had a higher carrier suitability (i.e. ability to land with ordinance still aboard) than does the F-18 E/F.  I seriously doubt that unit cost was the driver, and even if it was, that was a shortsighted approach.  There were cheaper options yet than the E/F, if cost was the driver.

QuoteThe issue, as I see it, is "Is a longer range strike fighter necessary in today's threat environment?"  The Navy sought to deal with this via upgrades or new-builds.  The arguments for "not necessary" are the same no matter how you try to hold this capability.

You are the only one asking that question, though, and it cannot be answered by anyone save the military planners.  In fact, it cannot possibly be quantified because "longer' and "today's threat environment" are non-quantifiable terms.

QuoteI dislike the way you are interpreting the statement.  I feel it is a logical fallacy.  You are trying to portray the Secretary as meaning "The targets that can be handled by the Navy component are within 200 miles of the coast."  Rather, he is saying that "The targets that would need to be handled by the Navy strike component are within 200 miles of the coast."  This is not a reinforcement of bureaucratic reasoning.

it is pure bureaucratic reasoning.  The Navy doesn't need to handle any targets at all.  You are engaged in a logical fallacy; first, by assuming that the navy's targets belong to it and no other service, and second by changing the secretary's statement from the acknowledgement that 15% are further from the cost than the planes can hit to all within strike range.  The target distribution in From the Sea is meaningless bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo.

QuoteI am arguing that the British did not know the American plan to cut the program until notified in November.  Perhaps they could have had a premonition, but the Defense minister even stated that he was assured of delivery as late as September.

The Americans didn't know of plans to cut the program until November, either.

QuoteNeustatd, Richard.  May, Ernest.  Thinking in Time.  Page 108.

Quote
For instance, in a famous case at the end of 1962, Anglo-American relations reached a low point because Robert McNamara, Kennedy's Defense Secretary, did not know that two years earlier, when Eisenhower had pledged Britain a crude air-to-surface missile in development (the Skybolt) to extend the Royal Air Force's nuclear capability, the President had not required British bombers to be under NATO.

What more evidence do you need?  What possible quotes, beyond a personal recorded message from Robert McNamara to you, would cause you to give up your untenable position?  Keep in mind that Mr. Neustadt was a close associate of Mr. McNamara and Mr. McNamara even reviewed his comments on the situation and found no issues with his characterization (see page 23 of his 1999 book)

I would need evidence that
(1) "The British didn't know and were not informed of the significant difficulties encountered by the Skybolt development program."
(2)  "it was cut without informing the British"
(3)  "When McNamara went to London to inform the British...[he was], unaware of the political stock the British placed in having their own independent deterrent."

I have not seen a single basis or source for your arguments.  Neustedt doesn't support any of these assertions.

QuoteProvide a source.  My referenced sources disagree with that statement.

You can accept or not.  Your source doesn't disagree with that statement at all.

The rest of your arguments seem to me to be simply naysaying.  I have no response to that kind of argument.

QuoteThe point that I am trying to get to is that the decision was between a lower-cost Hornet, and a equivalent or possibly marginally more capable F-14.

And the point I am making is that the actual choice was between a higher (overall) cost Hornet program that was less capable, and a lower (overall) cost Tomcat program that was more capable.  that's what the analysis at the time, before the decision was made, told us, and this decision was accepted by the highest level of Navy decision-makers of which I am aware.  None of the post-hoc rationalizations have convinced me that the decision was made based on actual cost-versus-performance data, since there was no follow-on effectiveness study done by the Pentagon.

You are, of course, free to believe anything you wish.

Last time I start a thread about boats.

I only wanted to laugh at the Tories.

Actually surprised to see the difference is cost between the F-18 and F-14 was so small.  I always thought he F-18 was a lot cheaper, like 30% or more.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on May 15, 2012, 11:31:04 AM
Actually surprised to see the difference is cost between the F-18 and F-14 was so small.  I always thought he F-18 was a lot cheaper, like 30% or more.

The F-18 E/F had a lot of stealth features the F-14 lacked.  That drove up costs more than the cheaper engines drove costs down.

The ironic thing, of course, is that the F-18 carries its ordnance externally, mostly if not entirely negating its stealth features when on a strike mission.

Quote from: grumbler on May 15, 2012, 11:53:42 AM
The ironic thing, of course, is that the F-18 carries its ordnance externally, mostly if not entirely negating its stealth features when on a strike mission.

Brilliant.  While we're at it, let's bring back gun pods.

Quote from: Gups on May 15, 2012, 10:04:56 AM
Last time I start a thread about boats.

I only wanted to laugh at the Tories.

:D

Thi thread raises the semi-serious question, what happens if a single post exceeds the default page length?

Quote from: Admiral Yi on May 15, 2012, 06:41:20 PM

Quote from: Gups on May 15, 2012, 10:04:56 AM
Last time I start a thread about boats.

I only wanted to laugh at the Tories.

:D

Thi thread raises the semi-serious question, what happens if a single post exceeds the default page length?

then quote it in it's entirety. Your head would explode. :lol:

Quote
The Americans didn't know of plans to cut the program until November, either.

False.  McNamara was considering that the program's difficulties warranted a cut of the program, but wanted to wait until November to decide.  None of this was communicated to the British.

Quote
Neustatd, Richard.  Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective.  Page 6.

"Among all those I interviewed, there was but one who sought to read my report after the President's death.  That was Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, who deviled a copy out of JFK's executor, Robert Kennedy.  McNamara read it and we subsequently discussed it.  He had but one point of difference with it.  I had written that in August of 1962 he concluded Skybolt should go, but the time of the announcement was not yet.  No, McNamara told me, rather his August thought would have been, if, by November, circumstances remained unchanged from August, then he would gladly conclude that it should go.

Quote
I would need evidence that
(1) "The British didn't know and were not informed of the significant difficulties encountered by the Skybolt development program."
(2)  "it was cut without informing the British"
(3)  "When McNamara went to London to inform the British...[he was], unaware of the political stock the British placed in having their own independent deterrent."

I have not seen a single basis or source for your arguments.  Neustedt doesn't support any of these assertions.

You may also see Nigel Ashton's Kennedy, Macmillan, and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence, Chapter 8, page 152.

The single quotation that I pulled for you was not intended for these other assertions, which are too broad to supported by mere cherry-picking of a paragraph.  I would modify the first one, however, to say that they did know the difficulties, but did not know that these difficulties represented a threat to the program.  The rest of the books, and my other citation of the House of Commons deliberation, which I did not place in front of your nose, do support these arguments.  I refuse to hand deliver material to you for review.  At this point, without you providing any sources for your baseless claims, I must regard your arguments as mere naysaying and there is nothing more to discuss.  No matter how much information I may place in front of you, I now believe that your stance will not change.

Quote
And the point I am making is that the actual choice was between a higher (overall) cost Hornet program that was less capable, and a lower (overall) cost Tomcat program that was more capable.  that's what the analysis at the time, before the decision was made, told us, and this decision was accepted by the highest level of Navy decision-makers of which I am aware.  None of the post-hoc rationalizations have convinced me that the decision was made based on actual cost-versus-performance data, since there was no follow-on effectiveness study done by the Pentagon.

Then this discussion ends with whether one will believe the numbers contained in your unpublished, internal Navy study, known only to you, or an Navy-independent, publicly-available, concomitant Congressional study.  You have sourced and based none of your claims throughout this entire discussion with independent evidence or studies and your arguments reduce to mere attacks on the validity or interpretation of my sources. 

Edit: You state that your group evaluated the F-14D Quickstrike and it was not adequately considered.  I rebut this with the following excerpt from the congressional report:

Quote
While those intent on killing the F/A-18E/F program have suggested otherwise, the F-14D Quickstrike was considered in detail. A side-by-side comparison showed that the F-14D was more expensive, less reliable and less survivable than the F/A-18E/F. In fact, the Quickstrike was shown to be even less capable than the current F/A-18C/D, which the F/A-18E/F will replace. Other reasonable options also were considered and eventually rejected, including other derivatives of the F-14. Although one derivative--the STC-21--was found to offer equivalent performance to the F/A-1E/F, the studies concluded it was simply too expensive and significantly more risky.

In a head-to-head comparison of the F/A-18E/F with the F-14D Quickstrike, the Navy found that the F-14D was not as survivable in the Strike role, was more expensive to procure, and was more expensive to operate and support; and less capable than the F/A-18C/D in the strike role.

The italics are my own.

Quote
You are, of course, free to believe anything you wish.

And I will choose to believe the published conclusions of respected political scientists and an independent congressional study over the unsupported claims of an anonymous internet personality. 

My contact with the NAWC office has not resulted in a report, but if I ever manage to get ahold of this phantom publication I will post my conclusions, while respecting the classification of the report.

Quote from: Gups on May 15, 2012, 10:04:56 AM
Last time I start a thread about boats.

I only wanted to laugh at the Tories.

I like this Kolystin guy.  He's produced more in 15 posts than Raz has posted in, I don't know, how many years have we had Raz?

He is a worth opponent for grumbler-san.

I stand by my man Grumbler, who was there when Pulcher threw the chickens into the sea.

Quote from: Ed Anger on May 15, 2012, 07:34:47 PM
I stand by my man Grumbler, who was there when Pulcher threw the chickens into the sea.

Yes, but he's been lacking decent sparring partners.  I like this Kolystin Mr T type coming out of nowhere to keep the g man fresh.

I'm suspicious of n00bs.

Could be Grumbler argueing with himself.... :huh:

Quote from: Ed Anger on May 15, 2012, 08:05:42 PM
I'm suspicious of n00bs.

Indeed. They smell funny and they talk strange.

I have finally received an independent evaluation of the report you participated in.  The pages are, unfortunately, apparently classified, but the executive summary is thankfully posted.  It is available here:

http://gao.justia.com/department-of-defense/1993/9/naval-aviation-nsiad-93-287r/NSIAD-93-287R-full-report.pdf

This report is highly critical of the F/A-18 and supports several of your assertions on its shortcomings.  However the report concludes that the F-14D Quickstrike was an inferior platform compared to the F-18 E/F (page 13).  Also, the numbers that I posted earlier were challenged.  Instead of $7.4 Billion more, the GAO argues that the QS apparently would have cost $3.6 Billion more.   I still maintain my original position, based on this report's conclusion, that the F-14D (QS) was a higher cost, underperforming alternative.


Your assertion that the Navy performed an inadequate review of the F-14 Quickstrike is not correct.  However, they did not adequately compare the platform with all alternatives.  From the same source, the summary is below:

Quote
Except for the F-14 QUICKSTRIKE, the Board's deliberations appeared to be based on individuals' knowledge and judgment or on
information derived from prior analyses that were only minimally documented in the materials submitted to the Board, rather than on studies performed specifically to compare the F/A-18E/F with other alternatives.

This is further substantiated here: http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/155498.pdf   

There is an odd blip, however.  There is some unsourced noise that suggests that the Navy tried to go with the F-14 variant in 1991 but was denied by the DoD, specifically Mr. Cheney.  Their position changed in 1992 to the F-18 variant.  Also, unverifiably, the maintenance costs in the 1992 estimate were based off of F-14A data.  The true maintenance costs of the F-14D when it reached the fleet were half that. 

Based on my research on your report, my position remains in opposition to your F-14D (QS).  I have become more open to the completely reengineered F-14 Strike Tomcat.  This platform appears superior in all respects to the SH, except cost per platform.  However, it would have maintained the strike capability of the A-6 while incorporating all significant upgrades to the SH, for an increase in cost.  The disadvantages held by the F-14D(QS) would have been engineered out of this platform.  The Navy should have performed further follow-on studies and the decision on the F/A-18 E/F was definitely premature, but not necessarily wrong.

Quote from: Kolytsin on May 15, 2012, 07:24:11 PM
False.  McNamara was considering that the program's difficulties warranted a cut of the program, but wanted to wait until November to decide.  None of this was communicated to the British.

Untrue:

QuoteAs we will see when we come to discuss the Nassau meeting, the British government could hardly claim to be unaware of the possibility of the failure of Skybolt or unfamiliar with the likely US negotiating position in the event of such a failure

Nigel Ashton's Kennedy, Macmillan, and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence p. 156

The British were quite aware of the issues with the program.

QuoteYou may also see Nigel Ashton's Kennedy, Macmillan, and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence, Chapter 8, page 152.

Did that.  He agrees with me, and not with you.

QuoteThe single quotation that I pulled for you was not intended for these other assertions, which are too broad to supported by mere cherry-picking of a paragraph.  I would modify the first one, however, to say that they did know the difficulties, but did not know that these difficulties represented a threat to the program.

Ashton disagrees with this, as I have shown.

QuoteThen this discussion ends with whether one will believe the numbers contained in your unpublished, internal Navy study, known only to you, or an Navy-independent, publicly-available, concomitant Congressional study.

It began with my observations about how bureaucracies, for reasons of their own, twist the objective facts until they support the bureaucratic, as opposed to the logical, conclusions.  My observations were based on personal experience.  Your support of the bureaucratic solution is based on the post-hoc justifications put out by the bureaucracy in question.  I don't really care about what you believe.  My observation stands, and if you think I am lying, that's fine with me.

There really isn't anything more to say.

Quote from: grumbler on May 16, 2012, 06:43:10 AM
There really isn't anything more to say.

Yes there is:  whether or not Kolytsin's or your premises remain valid in Battleship.

Quote from: CountDeMoney on May 16, 2012, 10:02:49 AM

Quote from: grumbler on May 16, 2012, 06:43:10 AM
There really isn't anything more to say.

Yes there is:  whether or not Kolytsin's or your premises remain valid in Battleship.

My premises would have held true in The Final Countdown.

* Screaming Eagle one-zero-three, splash the Zeroes! *

* No can do, Nimitz. Bingo state. Heading for the barn. *

The movie would have lasted five minutes.



Edit: changed the scenario to Seedy's favorite line.

 :lol:

I like Iron Eagle.

I WANT THOSE PIGS......DESTROYED.

Quote from: Ed Anger on May 16, 2012, 11:42:31 AM
I like Iron Eagle.

I WANT THOSE PIGS......DESTROYED.

:punk:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GVHEFiLQ3GU

Quote from: Ed Anger on May 16, 2012, 11:42:31 AM
I like Iron Eagle.

I WANT THOSE PIGS......DESTROYED.

:bleeding:

Quote from: Ed Anger on May 16, 2012, 11:42:31 AM
I like Iron Eagle.

I WANT THOSE PIGS......DESTROYED.

:weep:

Quote from: The Brain on May 17, 2012, 03:22:15 AM

Quote from: Ed Anger on May 16, 2012, 11:42:31 AM
I like Iron Eagle.

I WANT THOSE PIGS......DESTROYED.

:weep:

:lol:

So yeah. Umm. Carriers.