From the movies thread.
So, to start, here is what I think the Japanese hoped would play out with Midway.
Midway itself was never really that important. It is a tiny atoll with enough room for one airstrip. It was not large enough to support enough airpower to actually threaten Hawaii, even if it wasn't too far anyway.
What it was was far enough forward to maybe entice the Americans to come out and fight for it, or at least fight to get it back.
So here is how I would imagine a best case scenario plays out for Japan, from their perspective:
They attack Midway and achieve complete surprise. The island is lightly defended, and they take it without much opposition, given that the US fleet was not expecting that attack.
However, the US does respond after the island falls, and the US fleet sorties to attack the invasion force. The Kudo Butai ambushes the hapless Americans, and force a decisive engagement on IJN terms. Say they get a reversal of the historical result, and lose 1 CV and sink all 3 American CVs.
The US has experienced yet another decisive defeat, and is sick of the entire thing, and without any real Navy left, decides to negotiate a end to the Pacific War on terms acceptable to Japan. Yeah!
Now, the thing is, this is all a pipe dream, at least the actual outcome. But that isn't the point.
The point is that there is this myth of Midway that it was just the next logical step in a chain of Japanese conquests and victories, and a desperate US Navy went out and took on the IJN and had some kind of miracle, crushing the over-confident IJN that had no idea it could possibly lose.
The reality is that it was the Japanese that were desperate by that point, not the Americans. The Americans did not engage because they had no choice, they engaged because they successfully suckered the IJN high command into a blunder, and THEY sprung the ambush on the ambusher. They engaged with basically equal air forces (actually an advantage if you count the air on Midway itself, although this proved to be ineffective at attacking the KB, but did distract them rather nicely) and with a considerable tactical advantage of knowing when and where their opponent would be, while be reasonably confident that the IJN would NOT know they were there until it was too late.
Midway was something of a gamble for the US, but it was a very carefully constructed gamble where the potential payoff was incredible against a risk that was rather manageable. The Japanese walked into a trap laid out for them rather carefully. Note: We are talking about carrier combat of course - so it is very much a roll of the dice, high stakes game even when you do your best to stack the odds. So not entirely risk free.
The IJN took an incredible gamble on a shot that even they knew was very high risk. Why? Because other than giving up, what else could they do? They were turned back at Port Moresby, and turned back in the Solomons, both at significant cost in resources they could not easily replace. The USN was just getting stronger every day, while the IJN strength was static at best, waning in reality. The balance of power at that moment in the war was probably still in the IJN favor in the Pacific, bit only just, and that was dripping away fast, and would never, EVER get better. They had to do SOMETHING, and there were not any particularly good options, especially for a organization predicated on the supremacy of the offense.
It is fair to say that Midway was the turning point in the war, but it was a turning point that absent the US giving up, was going to come eventually regardless of the outcome of that battle. So I don't think it was particularly decisive, in that it change the outcome of the war, because it did not. The outcome of the Pacific War was determined the moment the first bomb dropped off a Japanese plane on December 7th, IMO. The only question was the details and the timing.
I have read that one of the Japanese motivations for the Midway campaign was preventing another Doolittle raid
A broadly similar argument could be made for a French victory at Waterloo.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on October 24, 2019, 06:47:31 PM
I have read that one of the Japanese motivations for the Midway campaign was preventing another Doolittle raid
The Doolittle raid demonstrated that the US carriers were a lot more dangerous than the Japanese had believed (they knew the planes launched off a carrier because they captured and tortured some of the aircrew before murdering them) and so the Midway attack was designed to draw out the US carriers and force them to fight at a disadvantage. So, yeah, that particular mission was motivated at least in part by the desire to prevent another Doolittle raid.
The bigger problem was that the IJN High Command couldn't imagine following the prewar strategy and reverting to the defense once they had achieved their initial goals. They themselves had demonstrated the power of the offensive: concentrated air power overwhelms dispersed air power, and the side on the offensive gets to decide when and where the concentration is needed. So, the Japanese changed strategies mid-stream, and decided to maintain the offensive beyond any prewar plans. And, thus, we had Midway.
Had the US not taken the bait at Midway, the Japanese planned to take New Caledonia, the Fiji islands, and Samoa. In other words, they were going to court a Midway-style disaster until they got one.
They didn't have a lot of choice, though. There were far more carriers on US building slips than the Japanese could manage even without suffering wartime losses. They could only hope that the US gave up before the Japanese could bite off more than they could chew. that was a long shot, but the Japanese accept gambling more than most.
FUN FACT:
Last week I was on the USS Midway, and also was at Chicago Midway airport. :)
Quote from: mongers on October 24, 2019, 07:24:59 PM
A broadly similar argument could be made for a French victory at Waterloo.
There was no "Davout sitting in Paris' for the Japanese.
Interesting tidbit for those of us who think guys with glasses can still be cool: from the time he was promoted to General de Brigade, Davout was never present at a French defeat.
The butterfly effects from a decisive French victory at Waterloo are far more significant than those of a Japanese victory at Midway. The negotiations at Vienna had already revealed a massive split between the nominal allies in the Sixth Coalition. Austria, for instance, was far from convinced that Napoleon was the greatest of her enemies.
Quote from: Caliga on October 24, 2019, 07:40:24 PM
FUN FACT:
Last week I was on the USS Midway, and also was at Chicago Midway airport. :)
And also at some stage midway through a gas station 'meal'. :P
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bd8_vO5zrjo
Not sure if this has been posted before, but I love this guy's videos. This is the best presentation on the first half of the battle I have ever seen in any format. Can't wait for the second half.
Quote from: grumbler on October 24, 2019, 07:30:47 PM
They didn't have a lot of choice, though. There were far more carriers on US building slips than the Japanese could manage even without suffering wartime losses. They could only hope that the US gave up before the Japanese could bite off more than they could chew. that was a long shot, but the Japanese accept gambling more than most.
Yeah, that's why I said in the other thread that Japan wouldn't have won the war even if they'd managed to win at Midway. Even if they had sunk all 3 American carriers with no ship losses themselves, in a few months the USN would still have had more fleet carriers than the IJN.
Quote from: grumbler on October 24, 2019, 07:44:32 PM
Austria, for instance, was far from convinced that Napoleon was the greatest of her enemies.
Hell I think Austria was even cool with leaving Napoleon in power originally...but granted they had that dynastic tie going on.
Quote from: Monoriu on October 24, 2019, 10:53:24 PM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bd8_vO5zrjo
Not sure if this has been posted before, but I love this guy's videos. This is the best presentation on the first half of the battle I have ever seen in any format. Can't wait for the second half.
Yeah I posted this in the other thread. Great video.
I have nothing to add. Just want to comment on the fact that this is a interesting topic.
I'll ask here what I asked in the other thread: I heard there that current thinking is that the Aleutians Campaign was not a diversionary operation for Operation MI. What was the Japanese strategic motive for these landings?
Quote from: Malthus on October 25, 2019, 07:59:33 AM
I'll ask here what I asked in the other thread: I heard there that current thinking is that the Aleutians Campaign was not a diversionary operation for Operation MI. What was the Japanese strategic motive for these landings?
Protect their northern flank? But the islands had such rough and difficult terrain it is hard to know how the Americans owning those islands put much stress on the Japanese northern areas. Trying to put an airbase on one of those islands would have been a military campaign all by itself.
Quote from: Valmy on October 25, 2019, 08:05:30 AM
Quote from: Malthus on October 25, 2019, 07:59:33 AM
I'll ask here what I asked in the other thread: I heard there that current thinking is that the Aleutians Campaign was not a diversionary operation for Operation MI. What was the Japanese strategic motive for these landings?
Protect their northern flank? But the islands had such rough and difficult terrain it is hard to know how the Americans owning those islands put much stress on the Japanese northern areas. Trying to put an airbase on one of those islands would have been a military campaign all by itself.
Protect the northern flank ... from Innuit commandos? ;)
If that was the motive, I can only imagine it was the creation of some ignorant staff officer pushing pins into a map, without any knowledge of (say) just how difficult the actual conditions in the Aleutian islands actually were, how remote and isolated they were, etc.
But then, these same jokers though New Guinea was a good strategic springboard to Australia ...
Quote from: Malthus on October 25, 2019, 08:28:46 AM
Quote from: Valmy on October 25, 2019, 08:05:30 AM
Quote from: Malthus on October 25, 2019, 07:59:33 AM
I'll ask here what I asked in the other thread: I heard there that current thinking is that the Aleutians Campaign was not a diversionary operation for Operation MI. What was the Japanese strategic motive for these landings?
Protect their northern flank? But the islands had such rough and difficult terrain it is hard to know how the Americans owning those islands put much stress on the Japanese northern areas. Trying to put an airbase on one of those islands would have been a military campaign all by itself.
Protect the northern flank ... from Innuit commandos? ;)
If that was the motive, I can only imagine it was the creation of some ignorant staff officer pushing pins into a map, without any knowledge of (say) just how difficult the actual conditions in the Aleutian islands actually were, how remote and isolated they were, etc.
But then, these same jokers though New Guinea was a good strategic springboard to Australia ...
https://history.army.mil/brochures/aleut/aleut.htm suggests the following -
QuoteJapanese concern for the defense of the northern Pacific increased when sixteen U.S. B-25 bombers, led by Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle, took off from the carrier Hornet and bombed Tokyo on 18 April 1942. Unsure of where the American raid originated, but suspicious that it could have been from a secret base in the western Aleutians, the Imperial High Command began to take an active interest in capturing the island chain.
Strategic Setting
The Aleutians first appeared as a Japanese objective in a plan prepared under the direction of one of Japan's most able commanders, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. With help from the Japanese Army, Yamamoto intended to "invade and occupy strategic points in the Western Aleutians" as well as Midway Island on the western tip of the Hawaiian chain. He envisioned these two sites as anchors for a defensive perimeter in the north and central Pacific. His plan also included the final destruction of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. By using the Aleutians and then Midway as bait, he intended to lure the already weakened American fleet from Pearl Harbor and annihilate it before new construction could replace the losses it had sustained on 7 December.
An attack on the Aleutians in early June 1942, Yamamoto believed, would draw the U.S. fleet north to challenge his forces. With the departure of the U.S. warships from Pearl Harbor, he would then move his main fleet to seize Midway. Because of Midway's importance-the island was within bomber range of Pearl Harbor-he concluded that Nimitz would redirect his fleet from the Aleutians to Midway to prevent the loss of the island. Waiting off Midway to intercept that force would be the largest concentration of naval power ever assembled by Japan. After overwhelming the American fleet, Yamamoto would have undisputed control of the central and western Pacific.
I always understood the Aleutians operation to be a distraction the Japanese intended to use to discomfort and place out of position the US Pacific Fleet that instead became a distraction to themselves as it left significant naval forces in the wrong place to assist the fighting at Midway (the Japanese being fond of overcomplicated plans with multiple objectives.)
A more interesting question regarding Midway is how the outcome would have been had the Japanese not had such an inefficient system for bringing damaged carrier air-groups up to strength - they could have put together an air-group for Zuikaku from the remains of her airgroup and two other damaged ones but there system did not allow this. Five carriers to three are much better odds than four to three given the reduced aircraft numbers all the Japanese carriers had compared to their full strength.
Of course, the inefficiencies of the Japanese scouting system aren't fixed by the presence of Zuikaku - but if Hiryu survived alongside Zuikaku and the Americans lost Hornet, Enterprise or both as well as their historical loss of Yorktown this could significantly affect the Solomons campaign.
Of course, the Americans are only months from getting the first tranche of Essex class carriers into service so the Japanese are still on a hiding to nothing long term, but losing at Guadalcanal because the Japanese have Hiryu, Zuikaku and Shokaku to compete against Wasp and maybe Saratoga (if she doesn't get torpedoed again) could delay the American campaign by a few months.
Didn't the Americans also decrypt messages that strongly suggested Midway to be the main target (shortly before Japanese changed encryption, no less)?
Quote from: Syt on October 25, 2019, 10:31:01 AM
Didn't the Americans also decrypt messages that strongly suggested Midway to be the main target (shortly before Japanese changed encryption, no less)?
Yes, that is what allowed the USN to ambush the ambushers.
QuoteBecause of Midway's importance-the island was within bomber range of Pearl Harbor-
That is really not true in any meaningful sense.
I just find it difficult to understand how bases in the Aleutian islands would have offered any real protection to Japan at the time. Capturing Midway at least makes some sort of sense.
Quote from: Malthus on October 25, 2019, 10:47:52 AM
I just find it difficult to understand how bases in the Aleutian islands would have offered any real protection to Japan at the time. Capturing Midway at least makes some sort of sense.
It mostly strikes me as incredible ignorance of what kind of geography they were dealing with. The United States had a base there, Dutch Harbor, but it was hardly worth all the Japanese did to take it out. (which they didn't...)
We let the DUTCH have a base in the USA?! :mad:
Quote from: Malthus on October 25, 2019, 10:47:52 AM
I just find it difficult to understand how bases in the Aleutian islands would have offered any real protection to Japan at the time. Capturing Midway at least makes some sort of sense.
They were mostly interested in using them as a seaplane base to patrol for US carriers in the North Pacific. Kiska Harbor was big enough to support a couple of tenders and a dozen or so patrol planes, plus some float fighters.
Quote from: Agelastus on October 25, 2019, 09:24:13 AM
I always understood the Aleutians operation to be a distraction the Japanese intended to use to discomfort and place out of position the US Pacific Fleet that instead became a distraction to themselves as it left significant naval forces in the wrong place to assist the fighting at Midway (the Japanese being fond of overcomplicated plans with multiple objectives.)
A more interesting question regarding Midway is how the outcome would have been had the Japanese not had such an inefficient system for bringing damaged carrier air-groups up to strength - they could have put together an air-group for Zuikaku from the remains of her airgroup and two other damaged ones but there system did not allow this. Five carriers to three are much better odds than four to three given the reduced aircraft numbers all the Japanese carriers had compared to their full strength.
Of course, the inefficiencies of the Japanese scouting system aren't fixed by the presence of Zuikaku - but if Hiryu survived alongside Zuikaku and the Americans lost Hornet, Enterprise or both as well as their historical loss of Yorktown this could significantly affect the Solomons campaign.
Of course, the Americans are only months from getting the first tranche of Essex class carriers into service so the Japanese are still on a hiding to nothing long term, but losing at Guadalcanal because the Japanese have Hiryu, Zuikaku and Shokaku to compete against Wasp and maybe Saratoga (if she doesn't get torpedoed again) could delay the American campaign by a few months.
The Aleutians campaign would have had to start at least a week before the Midway campaign if they wanted to draw US ships out of position. The fact that the Japanese started the Aleutians campaign the day before the battle of Midway tells us that it was not a diversion, but a concurrent operation.
Quote from: grumbler on October 25, 2019, 11:23:12 AM
The Aleutians campaign would have had to start at least a week before the Midway campaign if they wanted to draw US ships out of position. The fact that the Japanese started the Aleutians campaign the day before the battle of Midway tells us that it was not a diversion, but a concurrent operation.
Yes, I was interrupted when writing that and finished it in a hurry; I meant to include a bit about how while that may have been the concept it seems to have got a little lost during the planning. There's not much point in having a submarine patrol line between Midway and Pearl Harbor if you are expecting the US ships to already be heading north to the Aleutians by the time you reach Midway.
Quote from: Habbaku on October 25, 2019, 10:58:37 AM
We let the DUTCH have a base in the USA?! :mad:
We were there before you :P
All I know about Midway is the Charlton Heston died when he crashed his plane at the end.
Moses fought at Midway? I thought he traveled to the Planet of the Apes after leading his people out of bondage.
Quote from: crazy canuck on October 25, 2019, 05:19:39 PM
Moses fought at Midway? I thought he traveled to the Planet of the Apes after leading his people out of bondage.
He had to die at Midway, his son was in love with a Nisei girl.
I am not terribly familiar with American Midway myths.
Quote from: Berkut on October 25, 2019, 10:40:08 AM
QuoteBecause of Midway's importance-the island was within bomber range of Pearl Harbor-
That is really not true in any meaningful sense.
It is in one meaningful sense. It was within range of US bombers. It was not within range of Japanese bombers, who never really had anything like an equivalent long range bomber capability.
If Japan had taken Midway, Japan wouldn't have been useful to launch air raids on Pearl Harbor, but it would have been neutralized by US bombers.
The Pacific War in WWII is unfortunate to study from the perspective that there is no winning play for Japan. They were badly outnumbered and outclassed in terms of quality. Their brief advantage at the beginning of the war had no hope of being converted into a win - the territory to conquer was impossibly large.
You're thinking of katmai.
Quote from: alfred russel on October 25, 2019, 06:13:50 PM
Quote from: Berkut on October 25, 2019, 10:40:08 AM
QuoteBecause of Midway's importance-the island was within bomber range of Pearl Harbor-
That is really not true in any meaningful sense.
It is in one meaningful sense. It was within range of US bombers. It was not within range of Japanese bombers, who never really had anything like an equivalent long range bomber capability.
If Japan had taken Midway, Japan wouldn't have been useful to launch air raids on Pearl Harbor, but it would have been neutralized by US bombers.
The Pacific War in WWII is unfortunate to study from the perspective that there is no winning play for Japan. They were badly outnumbered and outclassed in terms of quality. Their brief advantage at the beginning of the war had no hope of being converted into a win - the territory to conquer was impossibly large.
It was *technically* in range of Japanese bombers, in that they could take off and fly to Hawaii, and drop their (reduced) bomb load and return, as long as they didn't maneuver, or go above the most efficient cruising speed.
I was involved in a discussion with someone about this, and they said "Well, Midway was in range of Hawaii from Betty bombers, which were one of the most successful bombers designs of the war, so once they get an airfield there, Hawaii was compromised".
There is so much wrong with this statement, mixed with a tiny bit of truth. But it SOUNDS reasonable, right? At least to anyone who doesn't know much about the war and air power in the Pacific.
Hell, even if the Japanese had B-17s, having Midway would not be useful to neutralize Hawaii. What could Midway support? 1 airstrip, and the US built another by expanding the second atoll. So for Japan, 1 airbase.
Hawaii at that time probably had what - 20? You could basically station an infinite number of planes on Hawaii, and maybe, at best, Midway could support 20-30 medium/heavy bombers. I think at the time of the battle the US crammed about 100 planes there (which included IIRC a dozen or twenty B-17s, the rest being single engined bombers, fighters, or seaplanes).
It just doesn't make any sense, even if you ignore that Japan could never have gotten the bombers there, or maintained an airfield, or supplied it. Even if they magically did all of those things....it would allow them to barely harass Hawaii, while the American could just plaster the island at will.
And beyond all that, level bombers aren't really a very good anti-ship weapon, though that wasn't apparent at the time.
Even if bettys could theoretically hit ph they would be outside the range of fighter escort, which is just another fatal flaw in the plan. B17s could fend for themselves, bettys not so much.
Quote from: dps on October 25, 2019, 11:52:34 PM
And beyond all that, level bombers aren't really a very good anti-ship weapon, though that wasn't apparent at the time.
Uhhh, well, actually the Betty was a damn fine anti-ship weapon, as the Prince of Wales and Warspite found out.
Quote from: alfred russel on October 26, 2019, 07:09:10 AM
Even if bettys could theoretically hit ph they would be outside the range of fighter escort, which is just another fatal flaw in the plan. B17s could fend for themselves, bettys not so much.
Yeah, the entire idea of Midway as a stepping stone to Hawaii is ludicrous on about 30 different levels.
Quote from: Berkut on October 26, 2019, 09:05:02 AM
Quote from: dps on October 25, 2019, 11:52:34 PM
And beyond all that, level bombers aren't really a very good anti-ship weapon, though that wasn't apparent at the time.
Uhhh, well, actually the Betty was a damn fine anti-ship weapon, as the Prince of Wales and Warspite found out.
I assume that you mean the Repulse; the Warspite served in the Atlantic. And yes, the PoW and the Repulse were sunk by Bettys (and Nells) but the planes were torpedo bombing, not level bombing. Pearl Harbor wasn't really suited for torpedo bombers--the Kates that dropped torpedoes on 7 Dec 41 were carrying specially modified torpedoes.
It is 1300 miles from Midway to Pearl Harbor. Not even the B-17 could carry a useful load over that range. A Betty would have to have a torpedo with a range of 500 nm to torpedo ships in Pearl from Midway.
By comparison, London to Berlin is 579 air miles.
Quote from: dps on October 26, 2019, 08:36:09 PM
Quote from: Berkut on October 26, 2019, 09:05:02 AM
Quote from: dps on October 25, 2019, 11:52:34 PM
And beyond all that, level bombers aren't really a very good anti-ship weapon, though that wasn't apparent at the time.
Uhhh, well, actually the Betty was a damn fine anti-ship weapon, as the Prince of Wales and Warspite found out.
I assume that you mean the Repulse; the Warspite served in the Atlantic. And yes, the PoW and the Repulse were sunk by Bettys (and Nells) but the planes were torpedo bombing, not level bombing. Pearl Harbor wasn't really suited for torpedo bombers--the Kates that dropped torpedoes on 7 Dec 41 were carrying specially modified torpedoes.
I thought you were saying they would not be good anti-ship weapons patrolling around Midway, rather than attacking PH itself.
They would probably be fine doing that - not that they would GET to do that, since and Japanese base at Midway would be pulverized.
It's not widely know but the full local name of the island translated mean 'Midway To Nowhere' :smarty: