Midway: Reality and Myth

[Agelastus]

I'll ask here what I asked in the other thread: I heard there that current thinking is that the Aleutians Campaign was not a diversionary operation for Operation MI. What was the Japanese strategic motive for these landings?

Protect their northern flank? But the islands had such rough and difficult terrain it is hard to know how the Americans owning those islands put much stress on the Japanese northern areas. Trying to put an airbase on one of those islands would have been a military campaign all by itself.

Protect the northern flank ... from Innuit commandos?   

If that was the motive, I can only imagine it was the creation of some ignorant staff officer pushing pins into a map, without any knowledge of (say) just how difficult the actual conditions in the Aleutian islands actually were, how remote and isolated they were, etc.

But then, these same jokers though New Guinea was a good strategic springboard to Australia ...

https://history.army.mil/brochures/aleut/aleut.htm suggests the following -

Japanese concern for the defense of the northern Pacific increased when sixteen U.S. B-25 bombers, led by Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle, took off from the carrier Hornet and bombed Tokyo on 18 April 1942. Unsure of where the American raid originated, but suspicious that it could have been from a secret base in the western Aleutians, the Imperial High Command began to take an active interest in capturing the island chain.

Strategic Setting

The Aleutians first appeared as a Japanese objective in a plan prepared under the direction of one of Japan's most able commanders, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. With help from the Japanese Army, Yamamoto intended to "invade and occupy strategic points in the Western Aleutians" as well as Midway Island on the western tip of the Hawaiian chain. He envisioned these two sites as anchors for a defensive perimeter in the north and central Pacific. His plan also included the final destruction of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. By using the Aleutians and then Midway as bait, he intended to lure the already weakened American fleet from Pearl Harbor and annihilate it before new construction could replace the losses it had sustained on 7 December.

An attack on the Aleutians in early June 1942, Yamamoto believed, would draw the U.S. fleet north to challenge his forces. With the departure of the U.S. warships from Pearl Harbor, he would then move his main fleet to seize Midway. Because of Midway's importance-the island was within bomber range of Pearl Harbor-he concluded that Nimitz would redirect his fleet from the Aleutians to Midway to prevent the loss of the island. Waiting off Midway to intercept that force would be the largest concentration of naval power ever assembled by Japan. After overwhelming the American fleet, Yamamoto would have undisputed control of the central and western Pacific.

I always understood the Aleutians operation to be a distraction the Japanese intended to use to discomfort and place out of position the US Pacific Fleet that instead became a distraction to themselves as it left significant naval forces in the wrong place to assist the fighting at Midway (the Japanese being fond of overcomplicated plans with multiple objectives.)

A more interesting question regarding Midway is how the outcome would have been had the Japanese not had such an inefficient system for bringing damaged carrier air-groups up to strength - they could have put together an air-group for Zuikaku from the remains of her airgroup and two other damaged ones but there system did not allow this. Five carriers to three are much better odds than four to three given the reduced aircraft numbers all the Japanese carriers had compared to their full strength.

Of course, the inefficiencies of the Japanese scouting system aren't fixed by the presence of Zuikaku - but if Hiryu survived alongside Zuikaku and the Americans lost Hornet, Enterprise or both as well as their historical loss of Yorktown this could significantly affect the Solomons campaign.

Of course, the Americans are only months from getting the first tranche of Essex class carriers into service so the Japanese are still on a hiding to nothing long term, but losing at Guadalcanal because the Japanese have Hiryu, Zuikaku and Shokaku to compete against Wasp and maybe Saratoga (if she doesn't get torpedoed again) could delay the American campaign by a few months.

[Syt]

Didn't the Americans also decrypt messages that strongly suggested Midway to be the main target (shortly before Japanese changed encryption, no less)?

[Berkut]

Didn't the Americans also decrypt messages that strongly suggested Midway to be the main target (shortly before Japanese changed encryption, no less)?

Yes, that is what allowed the USN to ambush the ambushers.

[Berkut]

Because of Midway's importance-the island was within bomber range of Pearl Harbor-

That is really not true in any meaningful sense.

[Malthus]

I just find it difficult to understand how bases in the Aleutian islands would have offered any real protection to Japan at the time. Capturing Midway at least makes some sort of sense.

[Valmy]

I just find it difficult to understand how bases in the Aleutian islands would have offered any real protection to Japan at the time. Capturing Midway at least makes some sort of sense.

It mostly strikes me as incredible ignorance of what kind of geography they were dealing with. The United States had a base there, Dutch Harbor, but it was hardly worth all the Japanese did to take it out. (which they didn't...)

[Habbaku]

We let the DUTCH have a base in the USA?! 

[grumbler]

I just find it difficult to understand how bases in the Aleutian islands would have offered any real protection to Japan at the time. Capturing Midway at least makes some sort of sense.

They were mostly interested in using them as a seaplane base to patrol for US carriers in the North Pacific.  Kiska Harbor was big enough to support a couple of tenders and a dozen or so patrol planes, plus some float fighters.

[grumbler]

I always understood the Aleutians operation to be a distraction the Japanese intended to use to discomfort and place out of position the US Pacific Fleet that instead became a distraction to themselves as it left significant naval forces in the wrong place to assist the fighting at Midway (the Japanese being fond of overcomplicated plans with multiple objectives.)

A more interesting question regarding Midway is how the outcome would have been had the Japanese not had such an inefficient system for bringing damaged carrier air-groups up to strength - they could have put together an air-group for Zuikaku from the remains of her airgroup and two other damaged ones but there system did not allow this. Five carriers to three are much better odds than four to three given the reduced aircraft numbers all the Japanese carriers had compared to their full strength.

Of course, the inefficiencies of the Japanese scouting system aren't fixed by the presence of Zuikaku - but if Hiryu survived alongside Zuikaku and the Americans lost Hornet, Enterprise or both as well as their historical loss of Yorktown this could significantly affect the Solomons campaign.

Of course, the Americans are only months from getting the first tranche of Essex class carriers into service so the Japanese are still on a hiding to nothing long term, but losing at Guadalcanal because the Japanese have Hiryu, Zuikaku and Shokaku to compete against Wasp and maybe Saratoga (if she doesn't get torpedoed again) could delay the American campaign by a few months.

The Aleutians campaign would have had to start at least a week before the Midway campaign if they wanted to draw US ships out of position.  The fact that the Japanese started the Aleutians campaign the day before the battle of Midway tells us that it was not a diversion, but a concurrent operation.

[Agelastus]

The Aleutians campaign would have had to start at least a week before the Midway campaign if they wanted to draw US ships out of position.  The fact that the Japanese started the Aleutians campaign the day before the battle of Midway tells us that it was not a diversion, but a concurrent operation.

Yes, I was interrupted when writing that and finished it in a hurry; I meant to include a bit about how while that may have been the concept it seems to have got a little lost during the planning. There's not much point in having a submarine patrol line between Midway and Pearl Harbor if you are expecting the US ships to already be heading north to the Aleutians by the time you reach Midway.

[Maladict]

We let the DUTCH have a base in the USA?! 

We were there before you 

[PDH]

All I know about Midway is the Charlton Heston died when he crashed his plane at the end.

[crazy canuck]

Moses fought at Midway? I thought he traveled to the Planet of the Apes after leading his people out of bondage.

[PDH]

Moses fought at Midway? I thought he traveled to the Planet of the Apes after leading his people out of bondage.

He had to die at Midway, his son was in love with a Nisei girl.

[The Brain]

I am not terribly familiar with American Midway myths.