Languish.org

Apparently the EU delegates in Geneva are briefing that a deal's been reached :o

Given that the French were the ones with objections last time...

If the French are objecting, we should band with our Frenchy brothers.

I am profoundly skeptical anything good will come of this.

Sure hope Lurch didn't give them too much free stuff they can welch on later.

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 23, 2013, 09:56:06 PM
I am profoundly skeptical anything good will come of this.

Sure hope Lurch didn't give them too much free stuff they can welch on later.

Lurch....... :D


YOU RANG

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xCc-RWIp7XU

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 23, 2013, 09:56:06 PM
I am profoundly skeptical anything good will come of this.

I'll wait till the details of the deal come out. I agree about the one the French scotched last time. We'll see.

BBC story:

QuoteIran nuclear: Geneva talks 'reach deal'

Iran and six world powers meeting in Geneva have reached a deal on Tehran's nuclear programme, foreign ministers say.

No details have been released about the agreement, which has been reached after five days of negotiations.

Negotiators from the UK, US, Russia, China, France and Germany want Iran to stop enriching uranium in return for a loosening of sanctions.

Iran had earlier said it insisted on a "right to enrichment" in any deal.

This deal may be the most significant agreement between the world powers and Iran for a decade, says the BBC's Iran correspondent, James Reynolds, who is at the talks in Geneva.

Iranian and western negotiators are expected to speak at a news conference shortly.

US President Barack Obama will give a statement at 03:15 GMT.

QuoteNegotiating positions for interim deal

P5+1 want Iran to:
Halt uranium enrichment at medium level of purity
Reduce concentration of existing stockpile of medium-enriched uranium or convert it to oxide form
Not allow Arak heavy-water reactor to go into operation
Commit to permitting more inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Iran wants the P5+1 to:
Recognise its "right" to enrich uranium
End international and unilateral sanctions

Tehran denies repeated claims by Western governments that it is seeking to develop nuclear weapons, and insists it must be allowed to enrich uranium for power stations.

"We have reached an agreement," the Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif announced on his Twitter feed.

French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius also confirmed the deal.

Minutes earlier, Michael Mann, spokesman for the EU foreign policy chief Baroness Catherine Ashton, who is leading the conference, quoted her as saying: "We have reached agreement between E3+3 and Iran."

No details have been released. The White House says the US president, Barack Obama - who is in Washington - is preparing to make a statement about the deal.

Earlier, on Saturday evening, the deputy Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araqchi, said "98% of the draft" had been agreed but that Tehran wanted a "right to enrichment" to be clearly stated in any deal.

"We are insisting on our right to enrichment, which should be clearly recognised in the draft agreement," Mr Araqchi was quoted as telling Iranian reporters late on Saturday - the fourth day of the negotiations.

Negotiators have been working since Wednesday to reach an agreement that is acceptable to both sides.

The talks had been scheduled to finish on Friday but were extended. Foreign ministers from the so-called P5+1 group of nations joined on Saturday, amid hopes of a breakthrough.

US officials said Secretary of State John Kerry, who arrived in Geneva early on Saturday, had the goal of "continuing to help narrow the differences and move closer to an agreement".

'Vigorous inspections'
British Foreign Secretary William Hague said on Saturday that a deal would be done only if it was a "truly worthwhile agreement".

Some US politicians had said they would push for more sanctions if the talks failed.

The Geneva meeting follows a previous round of talks earlier this month.

On that occasion, foreign ministers flew to Geneva to conclude the negotiations, but they went home empty-handed.

Analysts say a major sticking point has been Iran's insistence on its right to enrich uranium - a process that yields material used to manufacture fuel for power stations, but can also be used in weapons.

Western diplomats are also concerned about a reactor Iran is building at Arak - an issue which disrupted the first round of talks.

President Obama has said any interim agreement would see the bulk of international and US sanctions remain, but that Iran would get sanctions relief worth between $6bn and $7bn.

The essence of the deal would involve Iran making no more advances in its nuclear programme and agreeing to "more vigorous inspections", he said.

It's all foot-dragging bullshit, designed to complicate and impede verification and enforcement.

Meanwhile, as the fake Iranian leadership tries to ink a worthless deal, back at the villain's hideout where the real power is...

Quote(CNSNews.com) – A defiant speech by Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei – coming as high-stakes nuclear talks resumed in Geneva on Wednesday -- contrasted starkly with the message posted online by Iran's chief delegate to those talks.

President Hasan Rouhani used his Twitter account to highlight some of the few less incendiary points in the speech Khamenei delivered to tens of thousands of members of the Basij, a militia affiliated to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and notorious for its role in the violent crackdown following the disputed presidential election in 2009.

Rouhani retweeted (forwarded to his Twitter followers) two comments from Khamenei's speech, one in which the supreme leader voiced support for his government and emphasized the need to ensure Iran's nuclear "right," and a second in which Khamenei said Iran was "not an enemy of the American people."

On its own official Twitter feed, by contrast, Khamenei's office carried well over a dozen tweets in English (and more in Farsi) linked to his speech, underlining far more provocative comments, including:

-- "Israel is the sinister, unclean rabid dog of the region."

--"It came from the mouth of the rabid dog of the region – Israel – that Iran is a threat to the world! No, fake Israeli regime & allies are a threat."

--"All U.S. presidents have the same form of hostility; provoking ethnicities, coups, provoking Saddam to attack Iran, sanctions etc."

--"Supporting miserable Zionist regime will be a great dishonor to the Europeans."

--"Arrogance [Tehran's label for the U.S. and its Western allies] has no regard for the lives of nations; the crimes against the indigenous & killing of 100,000 Japanese people with atomic bomb etc."

--"They shoot the Iranian airliner & its 300 innocent passengers, don't apologize & give a medal to the one who has done this crime." (This was a reference to the accidental shooting down of an Iranian aircraft over the Persian Gulf in 1988. The captain of the cruiser USS Vincennes said the plane had been mistaken for a hostile military aircraft.)

--"Wherever there is a struggle against the enemy, you should resist while your will & determination should overcome that of the enemy."

Khamenei also accused the U.S. of giving Saddam Hussein 500 tons of chemical gas, said Israel was "doomed to decline," and accused the French of humiliating themselves by paying "lip service" to "Zionists."

Elsewhere in his speech, although not referenced on his Twitter feed, Khamenei advised the U.S. government, "Instead of threatening other countries, go and deal with your wretched economic conditions and think of your debts."

"The response of the Iranian nation to any foreign aggression will be regrettable for the enemy," the Fars news agency quoted him as telling the militiamen, who responded with "Death to America" chants.

Rouhani's chief nuclear negotiator, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, also turned to social media Wednesday, posting a five-minute message in English on YouTube with diplomatic appeals for "mutual respect" and "dignity for all." He called it "Iran's message" ahead of the talks in Geneva.

"For us Iranians, nuclear energy is not about joining a club or threatening others," he said in English. "For us, nuclear energy is about securing the future of our children, about diversifying our economy, about stopping the burning of our oil, and about generating clean power."

"This summer, our people chose constructive engagement through the ballot box, and through this, they gave the world a historic opportunity to change course," Zarif said.

"To seize this unique opportunity, we need to accept equal footing, and choose a path based on mutual respect, and recognition of the dignity of all people, and more so, on the recognition that no power, however strong, can determine the fate of others. This is no longer an option."

Foundation for Defense of Democracies senior fellow Ali Alfoneh, an Iran expert, said in a policy brief it will be Khamenei, along with Basij and IRGC commanders, who will ultimately dictate what negotiators can cede in the nuclear talks.

"Khamenei's speech bodes poorly for the deal Western governments may strike in Geneva. If they remain focused on the softer words of Rouhani and foreign minister Javad Zarif, they do so to their own detriment," Alfoneh said.

"Ignoring Khamenei's jarring display of defiance will haunt the West when it is Tehran's turn to deliver on its promises and implement the Geneva agreement."

The talks in Geneva are between Iran and the P5+1 – the U.S., Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany – and are being convened by European Union foreign policy chief Cathy Ashton.

A spokesman for French President Francois Hollande said Hollande viewed Khamenei's remarks on Israel as "absolutely unacceptable" and warned they would "complicate" the negotiations.

"Nevertheless, the best thing is for the negotiations to continue and succeed, but you might say that the ball is in Iran's court now," he quoted Hollande as saying. "We are waiting for responses to the proposals that were put forward" at the last round of talks earlier this month.

Asked about Khamenei's remarks – specifically the "rabid dog" comment directed at Israel – State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki replied, "Obviously, comments like these are not helpful, but we still believe that both sides are negotiating in good faith."

In reply to a question about Zarif's YouTube message, Psaki said she had seen it but made no observations about its content.

"Obviously, just as we communicate and the president communicates and Secretary Kerry communicates in terms of why we feel this is the appropriate path forward, they certainly are doing that on their end. So beyond that, I don't know that I have more analysis other than to convey it seems that they're using many forms of media to do just that."

I want my goddamned air strikes, goddammit.

Seconded

The ones about Israel being the mad-dog of the region were apparently mistranslated. He said Netanyahu was. It would be odd for Khamenei's official twitter feed to mention 'Israel' at all.

Personally I suspect Obama's focused more of his energy and effort on dealing with Iran than any other issue in his Presidency. Though we won't know till this era's declassified. I also think he wouldn't hesitate to bomb Iran if he viewed it necessary. But that's about your judgement on another person's judgement.

Sarkozy wouldn't have put up with this bullshit, either.

Quote from: CountDeMoney on November 23, 2013, 10:36:51 PM
Sarkozy wouldn't have put up with this bullshit, either.

It did make me think of him, given that France agreed to a deal just days after Francois Hollande had to spend a lot of time with Bibi on his state visit :lol:

Fuck yeah, let's deal with Iran!

Oh. -_-

So, any bets on IAF strikes?????

Quote from: 11B4V on November 23, 2013, 10:57:26 PM
So, any bets on IAF strikes?????

Not going to happen.

 :lol:

@JohnCornyn
Amazing what WH will do to distract attention from O-care
10:15 PM - 23 Nov 2013 from Austin, TX, United States

 :lol: :lol:

@AriFleischer
The Iran deal and our allies: You can't spell abandonment without OBAMA.
9:08 PM - 23 Nov 13

OMG, it's true! :o

But you can't spell Obama with abandonment. :hmm:

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 23, 2013, 11:00:35 PM

Quote from: 11B4V on November 23, 2013, 10:57:26 PM
So, any bets on IAF strikes?????

Not going to happen.

a 20 spot says they will in the next 12 mos.

That's a bit unfair. This deal only lasts six months.

Quote from: Sheilbh on November 23, 2013, 11:21:02 PM
That's a bit unfair. This deal only lasts six months.

Bets to Yi

Quote from: 11B4V on November 23, 2013, 11:18:08 PM
a 20 spot says they will in the next 12 mos.

Let's make it 50.

1. It has to be an overt strike; if a facility mysteriously explodes and Israel does  :whistle: then it doesn't count.

2.  Shit has to blow up.  Offing a few more scientists doesn't count.

If there's a judgement call, I'll let you pick a binding arbitrator from among Beeb, Tricky Dick, and Joan.

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 23, 2013, 11:37:30 PM

Quote from: 11B4V on November 23, 2013, 11:18:08 PM
a 20 spot says they will in the next 12 mos.

Let's make it 50.

1. It has to be an overt strike; if a facility mysteriously explodes and Israel does  :whistle: then it doesn't count.

2.  Shit has to blow up.  Offing a few more scientists doesn't count.

If there's a judgement call, I'll let you pick a binding arbitrator from among Beeb, Tricky Dick, and Joan.

Done and I'll take the Queens Prosecutor as the arbitrator.

Can I get in on this action?

Oh, btw, Yi, it's the next TWO presidential elections now. :P

Quote from: Ideologue on November 24, 2013, 01:10:44 AM
Oh, btw, Yi, it's the next TWO presidential elections now. :P

My recollection is it was 4 in a row, Obama's 2nd was the 1st of 4.

Iirc the wording was "a Democratic presidency through 2024," thus 3 elections--although I suppose if you really wanted hardball me you could wait to payout until it was clear that Hillary Clinton wasn't going to be successfully impeached and convicted during her term.

Any clue what thread that was in?  My memory is different than yours.

Quote from: Ideologue on November 24, 2013, 01:09:49 AM
Can I get in on this action?

Which side of the bet did you want?

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 24, 2013, 01:34:09 AM
Any clue what thread that was in?  My memory is different than yours.

Hard to say.  May search later.

Quote from: YiWhich side of the bet did you want?

Yours.  I think you're right and Infantry's wrong.  I can separate fantasy from reality.

Quote from: 11B4V on November 23, 2013, 11:52:05 PM

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 23, 2013, 11:37:30 PM

Quote from: 11B4V on November 23, 2013, 11:18:08 PM
a 20 spot says they will in the next 12 mos.

Let's make it 50.

1. It has to be an overt strike; if a facility mysteriously explodes and Israel does  :whistle: then it doesn't count.

2.  Shit has to blow up.  Offing a few more scientists doesn't count.

If there's a judgement call, I'll let you pick a binding arbitrator from among Beeb, Tricky Dick, and Joan.

Done and I'll take the Queens Prosecutor as the arbitrator.

-_-

I'm honoured I'd be selected amongst a white shoe New York City lawyer and a British house husband.

And just to be crystal clear - 11B says shit will blow up in the next 12 months in Iran, and Yi says it won't?

Quote from: CountDeMoney on November 23, 2013, 11:08:49 PM
:lol: :lol:

@AriFleischer
The Iran deal and our allies: You can't spell abandonment without OBAMA.
9:08 PM - 23 Nov 13

Isn't this what the Bush administration wanted?

Quote from: Barrister on November 24, 2013, 02:14:43 AM
And just to be crystal clear - 11B says shit will blow up in the next 12 months in Iran, and Yi says it won't?

Before says the Israel Air Force will blow shit up in Iran in the next 12 months.

Surprising that Kerry's accomplished more in his first year than Clinton did in her entire time as Secretary of State. Even if everything falls through on Iran, Syria and the Israel-PA talks.

It's also surprising that Baroness Ashton turned into quite a good appointment given the reaction at the time and since :mellow:

Ide, I've been thinking about our bet and I'm now even more certain that it was for 4 elections, not 3.

You proposed the bet during the Magic Negro-Magic Underpants campaign.  Anyone could see Underpants was going to get skunked.  Most people could also that the Republican party was in the throes of a long, painful bout of electoral suicide.  So betting that the president after Obama is a another Democrat was pretty low risk.  Betting that this future Democratic president wins a second term was also relatively low risk.  If the bet had been for 3 elections including Negro/Underpants, I wouldn't have taken the bet.  It was the inclusion of the 4th election that raised the possibility in my mind to something approaching even money.

As for your "through 2024" recollection, I am quite certain that the bet was formulated in terms of the number of elections and never in terms of an end date.

I get the feeling that people here are unhappy with this new deal.  Could someone explain why?  I thought this was the point of the sanctions.

Nukes want to be free.

Quote from: Sheilbh on November 24, 2013, 11:37:18 AM
Surprising that Kerry's accomplished more in his first year than Clinton did in her entire time as Secretary of State. Even if everything falls through on Iran, Syria and the Israel-PA talks.

How can you possibly assign credit for Syria to Kerry?

I'm pretty outspoken in my belief Obama fumbled/fumbles much of his foreign policy for about five years now, but even I don't see how Kerry doesn't deserve significant credit for the Syria deal. What is your take on the situation that leads you to a different conclusion?

I thought he had gaffed into giving Syria a "get out of airstrikes free" card...and making the Russians look like foreign policy stars at the same time.

Quote from: Tonitrus on November 24, 2013, 07:35:34 PM
I thought he had gaffed into giving Syria a "get out of airstrikes free" card...and making the Russians look like foreign policy stars at the same time.

How was it free and what did the Russians really accomplish?

I think that was the DC version of the story. But I think, as it often is, it was wrong.

 :w00t: Peace for our time.  :cheers:

Quote from: Sheilbh on November 24, 2013, 09:04:14 PM

Quote from: Tonitrus on November 24, 2013, 07:35:34 PM
I thought he had gaffed into giving Syria a "get out of airstrikes free" card...and making the Russians look like foreign policy stars at the same time.

How was it free and what did the Russians really accomplish?

World Prestige: +5

Quote from: CountDeMoney on November 23, 2013, 10:20:48 PM

Quote
Elsewhere in his speech, although not referenced on his Twitter feed, Khamenei advised the U.S. government, "Instead of threatening other countries, go and deal with your wretched economic conditions and think of your debts."

Worrying about the prosperity of your people instead of waging a suicidal foreign policy? :hmm:

Might not be a bad idea Iran.  Why don't you demonstrate this virtue first?  Maybe everybody will follow suit.

I misread the title as "Duel With Iran" and thought "sounds OSSUM".

Jaw Jaw > War War

Quote from: fhdz on November 24, 2013, 10:05:31 PM
I misread the title as "Duel With Iran" and thought "sounds OSSUM".

You did not.

Reading the draft, what I see is:

-Iran makes a promise to not make nucular weapons, while they are allowed to openly keep the means to make nucular weapons, its only they need to try and keep it a secret
-Iran gets sanctions lifted

How does this accomplish anything other than potentially saving the weakening islamist regime in Iran? What is the rest of the world gaining from this?

Quote from: Tamas on November 25, 2013, 06:52:52 AM
Reading the draft, what I see is:

-Iran makes a promise to not make nucular weapons, while they are allowed to openly keep the means to make nucular weapons, its only they need to try and keep it a secret
-Iran gets sanctions lifted

How does this accomplish anything other than potentially saving the weakening islamist regime in Iran? What is the rest of the world gaining from this?

In reading the draft, you missed the facts that Iran will have to allow unprecedented levels of monitoring, and that sanctions are not, in fact, lifted at all; they are merely eased in a few ways.  Before you ask what the interim agreement accomplishes, you probably will want to read an interpretation of the agreement that mentions all of the actual terms.  If you just make up the terms, the deal will either seem better or worse than it is, based on what you make up.

Quote from: Tamas on November 25, 2013, 06:52:52 AMReading the draft, what I see is:

-Iran makes a promise to not make nucular weapons, while they are allowed to openly keep the means to make nucular weapons, its only they need to try and keep it a secret
-Iran gets sanctions lifted

How does this accomplish anything other than potentially saving the weakening islamist regime in Iran? What is the rest of the world gaining from this?

As grumbler says you should re-read.

Iran's not promised not to make nuclear weapons and sanctions haven't been lifted. They aren't allowed to keep all the means. But, you're right, everything should be happening openly.

What it does is cap Iran's nuclear work. They go back a couple of steps and stop. All work at the Arak reactor stops. They provide unprecedented access to the IAEA, including daily monitoring visits to the sites involved and far more details about the design of the Arak reactor.

In return $6-7 billions of Iranian assets are unfrozen and there is some lifting of sanctions. Apparently all the sanctions that will be lifted aren't important to the overall sanctions regime and can quickly be reintroduced.

All of this is limited to six months while the two sides try to negotiate a permanent deal. More accurately six months for Iran to decide if they want a permanent deal. If the interim measures are seen as successful within Iran then that increases the chances that Rouhani and Zarif will be empowered to make a real deal.

It's not a complete deal yet. It's nowhere near. But right now this seems like the least-bad option. Trust, but verify.

As it is for six months there's no attack by Israel. There's no progress on an Iranian nuclear weapon. If it all falls through, because of the Syria deal, Western countries aren't involved in a Mid-East civil war so have maximum flexibility if they feel there's a need to attack Iran.

Edit: Incidentally that's why I'm not sure Yi's made a great bet. If Khamenei isn't willing to make a deal then I think the chances of an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities in 6-12 months increase hugely. I especially think that Bibi may see it as a narrow window of opportunity. Also I'd expect Israel to attack Hezbollah soon, in some way or other.

Quote from: Tamas on November 25, 2013, 06:52:52 AM
Reading the draft, what I see is:

-Iran makes a promise to not make nucular weapons, while they are allowed to openly keep the means to make nucular weapons, its only they need to try and keep it a secret
-Iran gets sanctions lifted

How does this accomplish anything other than potentially saving the weakening islamist regime in Iran? What is the rest of the world gaining from this?

The problem with this deal isn't the deal itself or even the temporary nature of the deal; the problem is that it is with people who are fundamentally untrustworthy. The Islamic Republic has made a habit of lying and getting caught and has made a habit of breaking promises. The fact that they are giving up enriched uranium and dismantling substantial portions of the plutonium track suggests to me that they have abandoned the Fat Man approach to bomb building (proton gun activation of a plutonium core).

The fact remains that with 40 billion dollars (mossad estimate), 60 years of scientific progress and all the details except the Manhattan Project Blueprints they haven't manged to do in 20 years what a group of refugees did in 18 months with 20 billion (year 2000 dollars) in 1945 from scratch.

The Israelis are right and this will not end the problem. The problem will end when the Islamic Republic convinces us (or the israelis) that if they had a bomb they wouldn't use it offensively. 

Is the consensus that the inspection regime will be robust enough to prevent Iran from making any progress during the next six months?

Quote from: Kleves on November 25, 2013, 10:07:17 AM
Is the consensus that the inspection regime will be robust enough to prevent Iran from making any progress during the next six months?

The key points on monitoring seem to me to be that the IAEA are allowed to conduct daily inspections of the nuclear sites and the Iranians will be giving the IAEA information on precisely what they're building in Arak which is something the IAEA have always said the Iranians have obfuscated on.

I don't know about consensus. Generally most of the response to it is very predictable.

As normal I agree with Goldberg:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-24/in-iran-obama-achieves-50-percent-of-his-goals.html

It's all going to be determined as dual-purpose technology thanks to muddled and watered-down NPT and IAEA definitions, anyway.  The Iranians learned all the lessons of WMD-dodgers before them, and have designed their weapons program accordingly:  horizontal and flattened, with systems and facilities purposefully designed to be as clouded and circumstantial as possible.

I'm almost with Lindsay Graham on this one:  unless they're going to get out of the uranium business altogether, it's going to be useless.  The IRG will eventually get their bomb, regardless of all the useless NPT and IAEA bullshit you throw at them.  And it's all useless, because everybody and their grandmother designed them that way.

Rohani. Yeah, the former chief nuclear negotiator that had been bullshitting the IAEA Board of Governors ten years ago, and now he's President.  And he's the softie of the bunch with no power, since it's the HMIC and the IRG that run the nuclear shop over there.

Fuck these guys.  All it is is a PR stunt and stalling tactic, and there's nothing the international community's going to do about non-compliance anyway.

I mean what more can we do?  Even tighter sanctions?

If we are ok with Syria using nerve gas on their people to put down a rebellion, then why aren't we ok with Iran getting a nuke anyway?

Non-proliferation has no cred anymore.

Quote from: Berkut on November 25, 2013, 10:45:04 AM
If we are ok with Syria using nerve gas on their people to put down a rebellion, then why aren't we ok with Iran getting a nuke anyway?

But the Syrians are cooperating with the dismantling of their chemical weapons :mellow:

Usually I am inclined to agree with my Scoop Jackson Democrat brother from Baltimore.  But not this time.  Barry is not going to war with Iran, and neither are the GOP chicken hawks.  The whole point of the sanctions regime is to get a good diplomatic resolution.   This is a very good interim deal, the Iranians already went farther than I would have expected at this stage.  If it all goes to hell then we really have lost very little.  But the upside is a mini-diplomatic revolution.  The Islamic Republic has already crossed a big ideological Rubicon just by putting pen to paper: the population -- which by all reports is very supportive -- is not going to easily accept the US back in the role of Satan Incarnate now that the Supreme Leader's government has signed a deal with his authorization.  And there is real practical, realpolitik reasons why the Iranian regime elements would want this to work.  The bombing in Lebanon is a symptom of an intensification of vicious sectarian conflict in the region, and Iran finds itself dangerously isolated.  The regime is now over 30 years old, its insurgent pretensions are frayed, and the writ of its influence no longer extends much past a the rag tag bands and beleagured governments of Shi'a sectarties spread across the Fertile Crescent.  Normalization may be Iran's only escape from isolation.

+1 JR, who is more evil the Devil or the traitor that makes a deal with him?

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on November 25, 2013, 10:58:13 AMBut the upside is a mini-diplomatic revolution.  The Islamic Republic has already crossed a big ideological Rubicon just by putting pen to paper: the population -- which by all reports is very supportive -- is not going to easily accept the US back in the role of Satan Incarnate now that the Supreme Leader's government has signed a deal with his authorization.

Especially if there's an economic upside from even this relaxation of sanctions. There's a danger that it would be difficult the sanctions regime back, though it's one the P5+1 have tried to avoid.

But there's also a danger in the relaxation for Iran, depending on where it's felt. It could shift the internal politics of the regime if enough of the power-brokers don't want to return to total economic isolation. It could also make it very difficult to do so if the Iranian public see the benefit of conceding this much for economic relief.

Unfortunately like so many Languishites, Minsky's buying into the revisionist hype.  Iran may not be as big on promoting the Revolution as it was 30 years ago, but it is most definitely in the Aspiring Regional Hegemon business as both a conventional power and a proxy daddy, and that is not going to go away anytime soon.

Of course this agreement is a great deal for Iran:  it gets to buy positive international PR by signing, it gets to buy shampoo with the loosening of sanctions, it gets to buy time for its weapons program.  IAEA inspections and verification processes are time-consuming, easily challenged, blocked and obfuscated and the enforcement and appeals process is an international bureaucratic paper pile heaven if you want to drag your feet.  It's designed to be useless.

The HMIC and the IRG don't give a shit about sanctions anyway.  Just like the North Korean elite they're immune to them, and Iran's sanctions are much more porous.

You're right on the first point.

But on the IAEA, I think you're wrong. What you describe is how it would work if there was a perfectly functioning ideal international system. But there isn't, so their opinions don't matter except in how they influence other countries. It could be that the US and the rest are willing to let Iran drag their feet, challenge, block and obfuscate. I think it's more likely they'd say that any of that is evidence that Iran's not acting in good faith, so there'll be an ultimatum or the deal's off.

Islamist Nutplace Iran signed the deal because they think it's better for them than not signing it. It is not obvious that we should celebrate things that benefit Iran.

If you cannot accept even the possibility that diplomacy could be a more than zero sum game, there really isn't any reason to engage in it at all, is there?

See how this works?

I think it's a good deal with a possibility of an even better one some months down the road. Very well worth a shot.

Netanyahu might need to have his leash yanked meanwhile.

Quote from: CountDeMoney on November 25, 2013, 11:19:56 AM
Unfortunately like so many Languishites, Minsky's buying into the revisionist hype.  Iran may not be as big on promoting the Revolution as it was 30 years ago, but it is most definitely in the Aspiring Regional Hegemon business as both a conventional power and a proxy daddy, and that is not going to go away anytime soon.

Of course this agreement is a great deal for Iran:  it gets to buy positive international PR by signing, it gets to buy shampoo with the loosening of sanctions, it gets to buy time for its weapons program.  IAEA inspections and verification processes are time-consuming, easily challenged, blocked and obfuscated and the enforcement and appeals process is an international bureaucratic paper pile heaven if you want to drag your feet.  It's designed to be useless.

The HMIC and the IRG don't give a shit about sanctions anyway.  Just like the North Korean elite they're immune to them, and Iran's sanctions are much more porous.

I agree that they wish to be a power in the region, but that's nothing special.  Most countries in the region want to be the big dog.  I think the Elite are very conscious of the sanctions.  First off, they can't be a big dog with the sanctions hobbling growth and secondly, unlike North Korea they aren't a Stalinist dictatorship.  While not a free democracy, they elites lack the control over the country that that the North Korean Government has.

I also think that Iran is a natural ally of the US.  The Islamic Revolution is sort of an aberration, I think we have an opportunity to shift Iran back our way.

Quote from: Razgovory on November 25, 2013, 04:48:01 PM

Quote from: CountDeMoney on November 25, 2013, 11:19:56 AM
Unfortunately like so many Languishites, Minsky's buying into the revisionist hype.  Iran may not be as big on promoting the Revolution as it was 30 years ago, but it is most definitely in the Aspiring Regional Hegemon business as both a conventional power and a proxy daddy, and that is not going to go away anytime soon.

Of course this agreement is a great deal for Iran:  it gets to buy positive international PR by signing, it gets to buy shampoo with the loosening of sanctions, it gets to buy time for its weapons program.  IAEA inspections and verification processes are time-consuming, easily challenged, blocked and obfuscated and the enforcement and appeals process is an international bureaucratic paper pile heaven if you want to drag your feet.  It's designed to be useless.

The HMIC and the IRG don't give a shit about sanctions anyway.  Just like the North Korean elite they're immune to them, and Iran's sanctions are much more porous.

I agree that they wish to be a power in the region, but that's nothing special.  Most countries in the region want to be the big dog.  I think the Elite are very conscious of the sanctions.  First off, they can't be a big dog with the sanctions hobbling growth and secondly, unlike North Korea they aren't a Stalinist dictatorship.  While not a free democracy, they elites lack the control over the country that that the North Korean Government has.

I also think that Iran is a natural ally of the US.  The Islamic Revolution is sort of an aberration, I think we have an opportunity to shift Iran back our way.

I was with you till the last sentence.  Iran might be a natural US ally (and of course they were an ally pre '79), but the Islamic Republic is never going to be remotely pro-US without "regime change" of one sort or another.

What Beeb said.  We have no common enemies with Iran.  I think we tend to overstate the relative importance of educated, urban, long haired booze guzzling Iranians and their hot sisters.

The world has lived with Saudi Arabia being "most definitely in the Aspiring Regional Hegemon business as both a conventional power and a proxy daddy, and that is not going to go away anytime soon," and with Russia being "most definitely in the Aspiring Regional Hegemon business as both a conventional power and a proxy daddy, and that is not going to go away anytime soon," and with China being "most definitely in the Aspiring Regional Hegemon business as both a conventional power and a proxy daddy, and that is not going to go away anytime soon," and with pakistan being "most definitely in the Aspiring Regional Hegemon business as both a conventional power and a proxy daddy, and that is not going to go away anytime soon." I can see Turkey going down that road, as well. We can live with Iran in that state as well, so long as it has something to lose by pushing that line too far and/or allowing the extremists too much influence, like the others.

I think the way you defang extremists is by giving the non-extremists a stake in an upright apple cart.  The deal has the potential to do that with Iran.  If it doesn't work, little is lost.  Israel isn't going to defang the extremists, nor is it going to do much more than inconvenience the nuclear by bombing.  Hell, the Iranian extremists probably pray daily for Israel to attack Iran.  It's funny to imagine the look on Binky's face when he gets prayers from CdM that are identical to those of Mohammad Ali Jafari.

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 25, 2013, 05:18:49 PM
What Beeb said.  We have no common enemies with Iran. 

Saudi Arabia? :hmm:

Who is Binky? :unsure:

Quote from: grumbler on November 25, 2013, 05:20:52 PM
Saudi Arabia? :hmm:

No.

Quote from: grumbler on November 25, 2013, 05:20:52 PM

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 25, 2013, 05:18:49 PM
What Beeb said.  We have no common enemies with Iran. 

Saudi Arabia? :hmm:

More precisely: radical Sunni extremists, often Saudi-funded.

Iran cares about jihadists killing Alawites in Syria.  We're indifferent. 

We care about jihadists blowing up Americans.  Iran is indifferent.

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 25, 2013, 05:30:49 PM
Iran cares about jihadists killing Alawites in Syria.  We're indifferent. 

We care about jihadists blowing up Americans.  Iran is indifferent.

But since they're the same jihadists doing both, there is a common enemy.

Iran was surprisingly co-operative with the US in Afghanistan for precisely that reason - both wanted the taliban out of power.

Quote from: Barrister on November 25, 2013, 05:32:54 PM

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 25, 2013, 05:30:49 PM
Iran cares about jihadists killing Alawites in Syria.  We're indifferent. 

We care about jihadists blowing up Americans.  Iran is indifferent.

But since they're the same jihadists doing both, there is a common enemy.

Iran was surprisingly co-operative with the US in Afghanistan for precisely that reason - both wanted the taliban out of power.

In fact an impartial observer might be rather confused that we are enemies, considering we've attacked Afghanistan (Taliban, Iranian enemy), Iraq (Hussein, Iranian enemy) and refrained from attacking Syria (Assad, Iranian friend).

Quote from: Barrister on November 25, 2013, 05:32:54 PM
But since they're the same jihadists doing both, there is a common enemy.

Iran was surprisingly co-operative with the US in Afghanistan for precisely that reason - both wanted the taliban out of power.

Fair enough, but where is the room for common policy, or a quid pro quo?  Iran has no leverage over Gulf funding or recruitment of terrorists.

Quote from: grumbler on November 25, 2013, 05:20:03 PMI think the way you defang extremists is by giving the non-extremists a stake in an upright apple cart.  The deal has the potential to do that with Iran.  If it doesn't work, little is lost.  Israel isn't going to defang the extremists, nor is it going to do much more than inconvenience the nuclear by bombing.

Concur.

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 23, 2013, 09:56:06 PM
Sure hope Lurch didn't give them too much free stuff they can welch on later.

He gave them $7 billion in unfrozen assets.

We're getting hustled again.

As skeptical as I am of this deal, what's the alternative if not some kind of an agreement?  War isn't really the answer, is it?

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 25, 2013, 07:17:45 PMHe gave them $7 billion in unfrozen assets.

We're getting hustled again.

You think so? Is $7 billion in unfrozen assets really that big a deal?

At least they'll never see those 4 Spruance destroyers they ordered. :)

Quote from: Jacob on November 25, 2013, 07:25:22 PM
You think so? Is $7 billion in unfrozen assets really that big a deal?

A big enough deal to Iran so they go through the motions of making a deal and halt enrichment for a bit?  I would think so.

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 25, 2013, 07:46:19 PMA big enough deal to Iran so they go through the motions of making a deal and halt enrichment for a bit?  I would think so.

... and the Iranians for whom these $7B are a big deal, how will they feel when that money's done and there's a choice between getting even more assets unfrozen and trade normalized in return for proper de-escalation of their nuclear program on one hand, and going back to being deep frozen out of the international economy for a tenuous attempt to keep building the bomb?

It seems to me that you are analyzing the Iranians' motivations and actions as if they're North Korea; going for a hustle here and a shell-game there to keep a trickle of hard currency going. Personally, I don't think that's the Iranians are after.

What it should seem like is another front-loaded deal that the US has made with a country that has a track record of lying and cheating.

Everything Iran has promised to do is reversible.  They can switch back on their centrifuges at any time.  The unfrozen assets are not reversible.

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 25, 2013, 08:01:08 PM
What it should seem like is another front-loaded deal that the US has made with a country that has a track record of lying and cheating.

Everything Iran has promised to do is reversible.  They can switch back on their centrifuges at any time.  The unfrozen assets are not reversible.

I was under the impression that there was some unprecedented inspection and decommissioning involved.

Though you do bring up a good point: what possible steps could Iran take that are not reversible, and thus acceptable (and specifically acceptable to you)? In particular, I'm interested in the kind of confidence-building part-way steps that are on the table right now.

They could send all their nuclear scientists on a vacation to Israel.  :hmm:

Quote from: Jacob on November 25, 2013, 08:04:16 PM
what possible steps could Iran take that are not reversible, and thus acceptable (and specifically acceptable to you)?

Take a sledgehammer to their centrifuges and their heavy water reactor.

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 25, 2013, 05:18:49 PM
I think we tend to overstate the relative importance of educated, urban, long haired booze guzzling Iranians and their hot sisters.

They've been overstated for years now.  Iran's not going to change from within.  Iranians worth a shit go abroad and don't come back, and the established elites at home are too busy enjoying the comfortable and unspoken agreement they have with the HMIC to know enough not to rock the boat. 

But no, we get the same argument from the same suckers every couple years, 155% of Iranians are under the age of 23, the information highway will free the youth of the clutches of the clerics, blah, blah, blah. Been hearing that bullshit for 20 years now.

Quote from: Ed Anger on November 25, 2013, 07:28:51 PM
At least they'll never see those 4 Spruance destroyers they ordered. :)

Which were turned into Kidd class destroyers, served in the US Navy for their lifespans, decommissioned, and then refurbished for the Taiwanese Navy. 

Poor Generalissimo Chiang is long dead, and they're still getting shitty hand-me-downs.   :(

Quote from: CountDeMoney on November 25, 2013, 08:46:00 PM

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 25, 2013, 05:18:49 PM
I think we tend to overstate the relative importance of educated, urban, long haired booze guzzling Iranians and their hot sisters.

They've been overstated for years now.  Iran's not going to change from within.  Iranians worth a shit go abroad and don't come back, and the established elites at home are too busy enjoying the comfortable and unspoken agreement they have with the HMIC to know enough not to rock the boat. 

But no, we get the same argument from the same suckers every couple years, 155% of Iranians are under the age of 23, the information highway will free the youth of the clutches of the clerics, blah, blah, blah. Been hearing that bullshit for 20 years now.

Maybe this time, we'll be lucky. :)

Quote from: grumbler on November 25, 2013, 05:20:03 PM
We can live with Iran in that state as well, so long as it has something to lose by pushing that line too far and/or allowing the extremists too much influence, like the others.

Considering extremists have been running the country for 30 years now, I don't really see what influence is left that they don't already have. 

QuoteIt's funny to imagine the look on Binky's face when he gets prayers from CdM that are identical to those of Mohammad Ali Jafari.

I would never, ever want the Israelis to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities.  I want the United States and the Best of the Rest of the West(tm) to do it instead.

Quote from: garbon on November 25, 2013, 08:53:01 PM

Quote from: CountDeMoney on November 25, 2013, 08:46:00 PM
But no, we get the same argument from the same suckers every couple years, 155% of Iranians are under the age of 23, the information highway will free the youth of the clutches of the clerics, blah, blah, blah. Been hearing that bullshit for 20 years now.

Maybe this time, we'll be lucky. :)

Who knows, maybe we should trade them arms for centrifuges this time around.

This is the best piece I've seen on the deal:

QuoteThe Iran Agreement in Geneva: a Limited but Valuable Breakthrough
RUSI Analysis, 25 Nov 2013
By Shashank Joshi, Research Fellow

The Geneva Agreement is an inventive, astute piece of diplomacy that puts Iran further from nuclear weapons at low cost. But the road to a final settlement is long and rocky.

(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rusi.org%2Fimages%2Flibrary%2FLI5293B96A89EE6.jpg&hash=3f24b1791053b4ff555f869d186c4719674b402f)
(L to R) British Foreign Secretary William Hague, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, US Secretary of State John Kerry,  24 November 2013 (EU photo)

After a decade of on-off nuclear diplomacy and just over a hundred days of the presidency of Iran's Hassan Rouhani, a deal has been done between Iran and the E3+3 (the UK, France, Germany plus the US, Russia, and China; in short, the Six) in Geneva. Although the deal appears to have come rapidly, it is clear that the groundwork was laid by a US-Iran backchannel going back to at least Rouhani's inauguration in August, and perhaps further.

The deal itself is a modest achievement that does not completely freeze Iran's nuclear programme, defers some of the most challenging issues to subsequent diplomacy to occur over the next six months, and relies on artful language to bridge differences over the biggest point of contention, Iran's claimed 'right to enrich' uranium on its own soil. But it is an astute and inventive piece of diplomacy, putting Iran objectively and verifiably further away from any nuclear weapon, imposing curbs that go beyond those that were anticipated by most observers, and all the while leaving the most punitive sanctions entirely in place. 

The Geneva Agreement

The deal (whose reported text is available here) has a few important aspects worth picking out.

All but a freeze

First, it freezes the most important parts of Iran's nuclear programme, while rolling back those elements which were doing most to shorten Iran's breakout time (the time it would take to produce fissile material for a single nuclear weapon).

Enrichment of uranium to 20 per cent, nine-tenths of the way to weapons-grade, is frozen (including by dismantling 'technical connections' between cascades) and stockpiles of uranium enriched to that higher level are to be converted into reactor fuel or diluted to lower levels.

Iran will continue enrichment up to 5 per cent, but, importantly, has agreed that its stockpile of this lower enriched uranium will not grow over the six month period of the deal: it will convert the surplus into oxide form, which makes it less readily usable for weapons use. Iran may not install additional centrifuges, must leave a large proportion of installed centrifuges inactive, and may not even manufacture new centrifuges other than to replace damaged ones. This is  something that is to be verified through 'IAEA access to centrifuge assembly facilities' and 'centrifuge rotor component production and storage facilities', measures that go well beyond Iran's formal obligations to the Agency.

Iran's heavy water reactor at Arak was never going to go operational during the period of this interim deal anyway, but the agreement forbids Iran from transferring fuel or heavy water to the site – from testing or producing fuel, or installing 'remaining components' – easing the understandable concerns over how Iran might have used the deal to make progress towards activation of the reactor.

The implications of this are threefold: first, Iran's breakout time has nearly doubled (from 'at least 1-1.6 months to at least 1.9-2.2 months', according to ISIS' David Albright); second, even the deal's collapse will leave the West in a better position than the pre-deal status quo; third, the deal guards against Iran 'buying time' for six months and then, at the end of the negotiating period, installing enrichment capacity that it had built up and held in reserve. This increase in breakout time is significant, and it should be interpreted in conjunction with further provisions for 'enhanced monitoring' of Iran's programme and daily access for inspectors (greater than today). These upgraded monitoring rights are just a start – as part of a final deal, Iran will have to ratify an Additional Protocol, which gives the IAEA wider powers – but it is a crucial element, and one that, as Jeffrey Lewis explains, also modestly decreases the likelihood that Iran could conceal any secret nuclear facilities in addition to its declared, safeguarded ones.

In sum: not only would it take Iran longer to produce the fissile material for a nuclear weapon, but its likelihood of getting caught has also increased. The possibility of undetected or unstoppable breakout has therefore diminished greatly. Depending on how the IAEA employed its new powers, the US and Israel would have around two months after detecting any Iranian attempt at breakout to respond, more than sufficient time for whatever response they deemed appropriate, including a military one (of course, for those who believe that the US would never use force against Iran, breakout times are irrelevant). Had a deal not been done, Iran's breakout time would have shrunk over this same period to a few weeks, long before sanctions compelled it to dismantle its programme.

Sanctions Relief

Second, the deal comes cheaply. Iran is being granted less than $7 billion of sanctions relief focused on releasing frozen Iranian funds and relief on gold, petrochemical, and automobile sector sanctions. This is a small fraction of the cost being imposed monthly by the punishing oil and banking sanctions that stay firmly in place, including all EU-mandated sanctions. The deal also permits 'Iran's current customers to purchase their current average amounts of crude oil', which removes the threat of further export cuts and protects Iranian revenue. But Iran will still be forfeiting over three times as much in foregone oil revenue as it will gain in relief.

There is no logical reason why these measures should subsequently weaken the remaining sanctions over time, because the costs of noncompliance remain as high as ever. There is no sanctions slippery slope. Moreover, if Iran is unwilling to agree to the further curbs and transparency measures of a final deal, new sanctions could more than offset any gain it made in the six-month interim period. 

Compromise on enrichment

Third, the agreement is exceptionally carefully balanced on the issue of whether Iran is to be granted a 'right to enrich', something that Iranian officials had made a deal-breaker. US Secretary of State John Kerry insisted after the deal that 'we do not recognise a right to enrich', whereas his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif, declared the opposite.  This disagreement is a function of the language employed in the text:

This comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment program with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the program. This comprehensive solution would constitute an integrated whole where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.

Various UN Security Council resolutions have called on Iran to halt enrichment activity, and many have taken the view that Iran should therefore only be granted sanctions relief upon perfect compliance – the so-called 'zero enrichment' position. P5+1 officials recognised that this was unrealistic, given the domestic prominence of the issue within Iran, but they were wary of agreeing that Iran had what it called an 'inalienable' right to enrichment, not least because this would set troubling precedents for civil nuclear cooperation and other cases of potential nuclear proliferation.

The language in this agreement is an intelligent compromise. The US can argue that a 'mutually defined' programme is one that exists by consent, not by right, and that no such precedent is being sent; Iran can argue that any sort of enrichment activity presupposes a right to enrichment, and that its right has been implicit recognised.

Moreover, the US can claim that Iranian enrichment is only sanctioned under heavy curbs – without which the 'integrated whole' is incomplete and no enrichment programme will be 'defined' i.e., granted. Iran on the other hand will point to the clause specifying that 'following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear program will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT', suggesting that all limits on enrichment capacity and suchlike will disappear if and when Iran can demonstrate its alleged nuclear weapons work no longer continues. This is likely to become a point of greater contention in final status discussion.

Loopholes

It is understandable that each side will interpret the agreement to suit its own interests, particularly when the issue has domestic political resonance. It was crucial for Iran's negotiating team they had been seen to successfully defend Iran's nuclear rights, not least because the Supreme Leader had emphasised this issue. But this matter can become a source of tension if either side is seen to be exploiting loopholes.

When the US concluded a deal with North Korea last year, it assumed that missile tests were banned. But Pyongyang then conducted a satellite launch, which amounts to the same thing; although it had been verbally agreed that this would be forbidden, it was never formalised. The diplomacy in Geneva was protracted and painstaking precisely to tie such loopholes up, but in an agreement of such complexity, dealing with highly complex nuclear issues, more points of friction may emerge over time. Critics will soon complain that Iran's missile programme, which was bound up with its alleged pre-2003 weapons programme, has gone unaddressed.

The agreement does specify that 'a Joint Commission of E3/EU+3 [the Six powers] and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of the near-term measures and address issues that may arise', but the key test of this commission will be its ability to resolve any disputes before they rise, as they would quickly, to the political level. It will be more important than ever that the international community holds Iran to these commitments, on pain of further sanctions, but also that the US upholds its own promises, particularly those pertaining to its own pause in the imposition of new sanctions.

Final status

Defining an acceptable end state for Iran's nuclear programme and the sequence of steps to get there is now the principal task for negotiators. The domestic obstacles to this are severe. Although Iran's parliament will also have a role to play in a final agreement – notably in ratifying the Additional Protocol, but perhaps also in approving other curbs on Iran's nuclear programme – the most serious hurdles are likely to lie in Congress, where there is bipartisan scepticism over this agreement.

Iran will not come to a final agreement and begin further limiting its nuclear programme without a credible roadmap to the complete lifting of all 'nuclear-related sanctions' (the agreement permits the US and others to keep other, e.g., human rights-related, sanctions to remain), and such a roadmap will not be credible unless the Obama administration is able to show that Congress will acquiesce to any deal – Iran will not accept presidential waivers in perpetuity. As such, a successor deal may also be 'staged', so that the administration can persuade Congress at each step that Iran is in compliance. This is far from guaranteed, and will necessitate that Iran allows its overall enrichment capacity to shrink greatly at least until the IAEA finished looking into so-called Possible Military Dimensions (PMDs) to Iran's nuclear programme. 

It is also worth noting that, although the deal's measures last for six months, it also states that 'the parties aim to conclude negotiating and commence implementing' the final deal 'no more than one year after the adoption of this document', which suggests a gap between the conclusion of the interim agreement and the adoption of a new one: how will that be bridged?

The Aftermath

The regional response

The response to this agreement from Iran's regional rivals has not been universally hostile. Many Arab and particularly Gulf analysts expressed cautious optimism. The UAE, which has a major territorial dispute with Iran and is closely aligned to Saudi Arabia, said the agreement could support 'the stability of the region'; Bahrain's foreign minister said it 'removes fears from us, whether from Iran or any other state'. Turkey, Kuwait, and Oman have also expressed support. But Saudi Arabia and Israel have been less positive, with Israeli Prime Minster Benjamin Netanyahu insisting that the deal was a  'historic mistake' that 'turns the world into a much scarier place'. As Israel's former army intelligence chief Amos Yadlin put it: 'in the coming six months the legitimacy of an [Israeli] attack will diminish'. But the moment of maximum danger would come if, once the agreement expires, no successor deal is in place. In that scenario, the US Congress would push back much harder against any effort to initiate a second interim agreement and would instead push ahead with further sanctions, regardless of whether Iran expanded its nuclear programme or not.

Israel's focus is now likely to shift to watching for any Iranian breaches of the agreement, encouraging US legislators and the international community to prepare for an intensification of sanctions pressure in case the deal collapses or lapses, and demanding 'offsetting' concessions from the US, such as advanced weaponry of the sort that would useful in airstrikes e.g., bunker-buster bombs that the US has previously withheld. Israeli covert actions against Iran are possible, but they would risk a more serious US-Israel breach.

Iran-US rapprochement?

More broadly, we should also be realistic about the scope of this agreement. Enthusiasts and cynics seem united in their belief that a historic US-Iran rapprochement is on the cards. Some welcome this; others – Israel and the Arab monarchies – fear it. But the Geneva agreement is a narrow, technical nuclear agreement. Contrary to the hopes or fear of many, there are no secret protocols on the future of the Middle East.

The bombing of Iran's embassy in Beirut last week will have hardened Tehran's view that a Syrian rebel victory would be catastrophic for their interests. There is no evidence that Iran's support for the Assad regime is softening, or that the US will permit Iran to attend a peace conference until it formally concedes the principle of political transition. It would be a mistake to conflate the US' hesitance to bomb Syria with an eagerness to accommodate Iran, although the next few months will give us a better indication of the degree to which Iran will be brought into the fold. Elsewhere in the region, even where US-Iran interests are most convergent, cooperation is hard to find: Iran was the only state to oppose last week's US-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement on the future of US troops in the country.

On the Iranian side, their government has sought a deal to ease sanctions and so repair an ailing economy. Nuclear diplomacy is a means to a limited and practical end, not a vehicle for unconstrained US-Iran friendship. Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, does not necessarily want to see this deal become the thin end of a wedge to normalisation. Khamenei has written to Rouhani encouraging him to take 'the next wise steps', but this likely refers to the next stage of nuclear diplomacy rather than regional cooperation.

This is a modest, imperfect, but valuable agreement that affords us the best opportunity we have had in years to put reasonably solid barriers between Iran's civil nuclear programme and any attempt to manufacture nuclear weaponry. Achieving a more lasting deal will require a judicious mixture of vigilance, patience, and creative diplomacy from the US and Iran over the coming months.

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 25, 2013, 08:20:15 PM
Take a sledgehammer to their centrifuges and their heavy water reactor.

So anything short of total capitulation isn't okay?

Quote from: Sheilbh on November 25, 2013, 10:08:22 PM
So anything short of total capitulation isn't okay?

Jacob asked the question of what Iran could do that's non-reversible.  I answered.  You're asking a different question.

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 25, 2013, 10:15:37 PM

Quote from: Sheilbh on November 25, 2013, 10:08:22 PM
So anything short of total capitulation isn't okay?

Jacob asked the question of what Iran could do that's non-reversible.  I answered.  You're asking a different question.

Jacob said that 'in particular, I'm interested in the kind of confidence-building part-way steps that are on the table right now.' How is destroying their centrifuges and heavy water reactor a confidence-building part-way step? :P

Quote from: Sheilbh on November 25, 2013, 10:07:27 PM
This is the best piece I've seen on the deal:

Yeah, this whole agreement is designed to appeal to the most discerning of Euroweenie diplomatic palates: it avoids confrontation and conflict, puts off the hard choices, and offers no endgame alternatives in the event of failure--as we all know how these NPT/IAEA issues play out at the Security Council when it comes to the authorization of the use of force regarding non-compliance.

Quote from: Sheilbh on November 25, 2013, 10:18:20 PM
Jacob said that 'in particular, I'm interested in the kind of confidence-building part-way steps that are on the table right now.' How is destroying their centrifuges and heavy water reactor a confidence-building part-way step? :P

Which is still different than the question you asked.

Let me ask you a question: if the ostensible end game is a non-nuclear Iran, what's the reasoning behind them keeping centrifuges and the Arak?

To get them to the table, so the dynamic perpetuates, right?  Well we just handed them $7 billion to sit at the table.  It will be cheap at the price (it is after all their money) if there is a true breakthrough, but if they pocket the 7 billion and get up from the table, then our Nobel whoring long faced Secretary of State just got badly suckered.

Why does the US never cut deals with these peckerheads where *they* are they ones front-loading deals?

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 25, 2013, 10:29:04 PMWhich is still different than the question you asked.

But it's the question you answered.

QuoteLet me ask you a question: if the ostensible end game is a non-nuclear Iran, what's the reasoning behind them keeping centrifuges and the Arak?

As Jacob said confidence building interim measures that stop Iran's program developing during full negotiations. We're nowhere near the end game yet.

To use an internal analogy, we're at the ceasefire stage of negotiations not the decommissioning stage.

QuoteTo get them to the table, so the dynamic perpetuates, right? 

What dynamic?

QuoteWell we just handed them $7 billion to sit at the table.  It will be cheap at the price (it is after all their money) if there is a true breakthrough, but if they pocket the 7 billion and get up from the table, then our Nobel whoring long faced Secretary of State just got badly suckered.

If there's a true breakthrough it'll be a lot more than $7 billion involved. But I think this matters too:

QuoteThe implications of this are threefold: first, Iran's breakout time has nearly doubled (from 'at least 1-1.6 months to at least 1.9-2.2 months', according to ISIS' David Albright); second, even the deal's collapse will leave the West in a better position than the pre-deal status quo; third, the deal guards against Iran 'buying time' for six months and then, at the end of the negotiating period, installing enrichment capacity that it had built up and held in reserve. This increase in breakout time is significant, and it should be interpreted in conjunction with further provisions for 'enhanced monitoring' of Iran's programme and daily access for inspectors (greater than today). These upgraded monitoring rights are just a start – as part of a final deal, Iran will have to ratify an Additional Protocol, which gives the IAEA wider powers – but it is a crucial element, and one that, as Jeffrey Lewis explains, also modestly decreases the likelihood that Iran could conceal any secret nuclear facilities in addition to its declared, safeguarded ones.

In sum: not only would it take Iran longer to produce the fissile material for a nuclear weapon, but its likelihood of getting caught has also increased. The possibility of undetected or unstoppable breakout has therefore diminished greatly. Depending on how the IAEA employed its new powers, the US and Israel would have around two months after detecting any Iranian attempt at breakout to respond, more than sufficient time for whatever response they deemed appropriate, including a military one (of course, for those who believe that the US would never use force against Iran, breakout times are irrelevant). Had a deal not been done, Iran's breakout time would have shrunk over this same period to a few weeks, long before sanctions compelled it to dismantle its programme.

QuoteWhy does the US never cut deals with these peckerheads where *they* are they ones front-loading deals?

They are rolling back elements of their progress. For example diluting or making reactor grade all of the uranium they've enriched to over 20%. So it's not a freeze so much as a step back (front-loaded) and a cap on their progress for the next six months.

Quote from: CountDeMoney on November 25, 2013, 10:27:48 PMYeah, this whole agreement is designed to appeal to the most discerning of Euroweenie diplomatic palates: it avoids confrontation and conflict, puts off the hard choices, and offers no endgame alternatives in the event of failure--as we all know how these NPT/IAEA issues play out at the Security Council when it comes to the authorization of the use of force regarding non-compliance.

What are the alternatives to attempting negotiations? I agree with Jeffrey Goldberg:

QuoteTo echo my Bloomberg View colleague Al Hunt, the temporary deal struck in Geneva seems, in many ways, like the least-worst option at the moment. There are four ways to neutralize the Iranian regime's nuclear program. The first is the military option, executed either by Israel or by the U.S. (The Arab states, which want a military solution very much, have never shown the desire to actually carry it out.) A bombing campaign is a bad idea: It could very well destroy many of Iran's nuclear facilities, but it also could kill innocent people and legitimize the program. The sanctions regime would collapse following a strike, which still would not wipe out Iran's nuclear knowledge base and could rally the country around the cause of full nuclearization.

Crushing sanctions, the second option, have been effective at forcing Iran to the negotiating table, but years of sanctions have not placed the Iranian regime's survival in jeopardy. The regime is willing to let its citizens absorb a great deal of pain on its behalf, and when those citizens get ornery, it hasn't been shy about killing them. It seems unlikely that sanctions, which are already hard enough to enforce, will bring about Iran's total nuclear capitulation.
Iran's Uranium Enrichment

The third path is a campaign for a complete regime change, but the American experience in Iraq has removed this option from the table. The U.S. has neither the stomach nor the competence to bring about the collapse of the regime.

The fourth path is diplomacy, and this interim deal may be the best the U.S. was going to get. The deal has many dubious features. It comes perilously close to recognizing Iran's so-called right-to-enrich. It makes it even less probable that the West will confront Iran for its nefarious behavior in Syria. It frees up billions of dollars for the regime to use in exchange for nuclear concessions that are reversible. It does not require a single centrifuge to be dismantled. Iran could still make a rush for nuclear breakout in eight weeks.

To me it seems of those only diplomacy and regime change could get to an end game of a nuclear free Iran.

Quote from: Sheilbh on November 25, 2013, 10:41:16 PM
But it's the question you answered.

Look again at what i quoted

QuoteWhat dynamic?

The virtuous heightened confidence spiral dynamic.

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 25, 2013, 10:50:11 PM
Look again at what i quoted

Okay, but I think you're missing the important bit of Jake's question. It's not what irrevocable steps can Iran take, but which of those steps could be taken now.

QuoteThe virtuous heightened confidence spiral dynamic.

Is that some hippy band? I've no idea what that means, I'm afraid :P

Yo, Infantry, did you want to expand your ledger, or what?

Quote from: Sheilbh on November 25, 2013, 10:55:08 PM
Okay, but I think you're missing the important bit of Jake's question. It's not what irrevocable steps can Iran take, but which of those steps could be taken now.

The steps I mentioned could be taken now.  They're not locked in a time vault.

QuoteIs that some hippy band? I've no idea what that means, I'm afraid :P

One takes "confidence building steps" in order to build confidence that will lead to a more fundamental deal in the future.

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 25, 2013, 11:00:02 PMThe steps I mentioned could be taken now.  They're not locked in a time vault.

Yeah. We could also unfreeze all their assets now. As I said earlier, it's total capitulation.

QuoteOne takes "confidence building steps" in order to build confidence that will lead to a more fundamental deal in the future.

What do you understand by confidence here?

FWIW, Foreign Policy's Rothkopf says let's not start sucking each other's dicks quite yet--

QuoteWhy Hawks Should Love the Iran Deal
...and doves should worry.
BY DAVID ROTHKOPF | NOVEMBER 25, 2013

The reflexive reaction of Iran hawks to condemn the interim accord struck in Geneva this weekend is as wrongheaded as the triumphal assessments of those suggesting it ushers in a new, more hopeful era in the region's history. This deal, hard-won as it has been, is just a tentative if hopeful step down a long and twisting road fraught with dangers.

For the hawks to suggest that the deal freezing Iranian uranium-enrichment efforts above the 5 percent level, halting work on the heavy-water reactor near Arak, and granting daily inspections to Iran's centrifuge-laden facilities at Natanz and Fordow makes matters more dangerous in the short term is just indefensible on its face. Absent such a deal, all enrichment and technological advancement efforts would continue unabated and without inspections. Iran would almost certainly move more quickly toward having a bomb without this deal than with it.

Moreover, were Iran to cross a perceived red line on its path to having a bomb, taking military action against that country without having exhausted every possible diplomatic channel would be extremely unpopular in the United States and worldwide. The political resistance to taking action would make a slower response or lower level of support than ideal more likely. This would thereby make the success of such an effort less likely.

The existence of this six-month deal gives a very clear deadline by which Iran must commit to steps that will enduringly and demonstrably end its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. The Iranians will also have to commit to an inspection program that ensures they are following through on their commitments. Whether you believe the Iranian promises or not, having a deadline will not only focus the attention of negotiators on the more important work of a permanent deal, but also put at imminent risk what is now the signature achievement of Iran's new Rouhani administration (and by extension an initiative associated with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who must have given it his OK). While hawks in the United States have seized upon and denounced Iran's "victory dance" following the deal, they have to recognize that a failure of this initiative -- which would result in worse sanctions and possible military action -- would be seen as a serious setback for Iran's leadership. While the country's most important leaders don't answer to the people, Rouhani does and for him, and even for Iran's Supreme Leader, the damage to their credibility would take a huge toll on their international standing and weaken them at home.

A failure to successfully translate this interim deal into an end to Iran's suspected nuclear weapons program would also be damaging for President Barack Obama. But he knows that he will not be able to win congressional support for a long-term deal unless it is very specific and buttoned-down regarding eliminating the threat of Iran's rollout of a bomb in the near term. At this moment, the president, the secretary of state, and their teams are seen as having taken a risky tack, and if it fails, history will forever mark them as appeasers, naifs who were played by Tehran. The only way to avoid a damaging outcome is a long-term deal that works in the eyes of its critics.

It should also be noted that the Iran negotiations, coming as they do at the same time as the Syria negotiations, contain other risks that cut both ways for the United States, Iran, and the other parties to both sets of negotiations. If Iran appears to be acting in bad faith or if this deal goes sour, the international community will have the option of punishing Iran's leaders by withdrawing support for their desired outcome in the Syria talks -- either keeping their long-term ally, President Bashar al-Assad, in place or accepting a successor regime that preserves their interests and influence in that country. On the other hand, if Iran actually makes real progress on the nuclear deal, the country may be rewarded at the Syria negotiating table. Of course, none of this will be explicit or even discussed. But it is the nature of diplomacy to link such things if they are proceeding in parallel.

It is within such linkages -- intersections with the region's other fault-line issues -- that we also see precisely the reasons why those who are hailing the deal as a breakthrough should be cautious. Even were a long-term deal to be struck verifiably ending Iran's program to develop a nuclear weapons capability, which would eliminate one major threat to the region, it would not only not necessarily reduce other major threats associated with Iran's other foreign-policy initiatives, ambitions, and tactics, but it could make those threats worse.

If Iran were to verifiably forswear the bomb but gain more legitimacy, a blessing for it having protracted influence in Syria, for example, its destabilizing role as a would-be regional hegemon will only be strengthened. Iran has been a threat for decades without having nuclear weapons. It can continue to be one for decades to come without having those weapons.

Of further concern is that by warming to Iran, the United States is incurring the ire of the allies upon which its entire Middle East policy has relied since essentially the Iranian revolution. Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have been pillars of that often uneasy but surprisingly stable three-decade long partnership. But right now, U.S. relations with all of these countries are in the worst shape they have been during the last 30 years. That is due in part to muddled and misguided U.S. policy toward the current regime in Egypt. But it is also exacerbated by Obama's steady and (as the White House has been clear to communicate via leaks and other means) long-term effort to open a new channel with Iran -- the one enemy that unites the Israelis and the Sunni Arab states.

Any hint of support for Iranian goals in Syria would only exacerbate this (the Saudis and Gulf states have been supporting the more "moderate" opposition in that country in its battle with the Assad regime). Further, it is easy to see America's withdrawal from Iraq as having opened up an opportunity for growing Iranian influence there (because it has done just that without our real opposition). And our withdrawal from Afghanistan could do the same in the western part of that country.

Therefore, one possible outcome of this deal is an Iran that has a ratified right to a civilian nuclear program, including some kind of enrichment programs, and thereby has an ever greater capability regarding nuclear technology -- but that also becomes stronger throughout the Middle East. Those important long-term allies of the United States that have been dealing with the Iranians since time immemorial fear this outcome is not something to be taken lightly.

There are other geopolitical consequences of such a shift in the region's balance of power. Longtime U.S. allies might grow considerably less cooperative with the United States, thereby creating a partnership vacuum, and seek other major-power partners. And should they view a post-deal Iran as a greater threat, they might embark on military programs to counter the threat that in themselves increase danger in the region.

Part of the way to avoid such an outcome is for the United States to work very closely with the Saudis, the Gulf states, and the Israelis in defining the terms of an Iran deal they can live with. Clearly, they cannot be allowed to dictate all the terms of such an arrangement, but we will need and want these countries on its side for the long term precisely because they form the counterbalance to Iranian regional ambitions that we should view as aligned with its interests for the region.

The truth is, the first phase of this deal was not well pre-sold. This is no doubt in part because some of the negotiations were taking place in secret (though reports suggest they were well known to the Saudis and the Israelis as many so-called "secrets" are). As the deal continues to move forward over the next six months, the next phase will require as much in the way of diplomacy among our allies that are not part of the P5 + 1 process as those that are.

It will also be important to send a clear message to the Iranians that we will continue to oppose their efforts at regional hegemony. One way to do that will be a tough stand in Syria talks that adamantly opposes any place for the Assad regime or its hand-chosen successors in the fate of that fractured country. Another will be to publicly restore our ties with our unhappy allies via other means -- having a coherent Egypt policy would help. Secretary of State John Kerry seems to be hewing closer to one than the White House has recently. Let's hope he can seize the lead on this.

Finally, of course, we must recognize that the solution to this problem lies not with hawks or with doves. It relies on having those who would pose a threat to us and our allies know that we possess the resolve and the will to act as a hawk even as we are guided by the aspirations of a dove. While listening to the shrill debate in Washington between the two groups is disturbing, if we are interested in advancing U.S. interests worldwide as we have in the past, we should do everything we can to remind friends and enemies alike that both are part of our national character, both drive our foreign policy -- the doves when possible, the hawks when necessary.

Where is the bolded text on my article? :angry:

How will I know what are the important parts?

Quote from: garbon on November 25, 2013, 11:11:53 PM
Where is the bolded text on my article? :angry:

How will I know what are the important parts?

I want to facilitate reeding and comprahenshun skillz

Quote from: CountDeMoney on November 25, 2013, 11:13:22 PM

Quote from: garbon on November 25, 2013, 11:11:53 PM
Where is the bolded text on my article? :angry:

How will I know what are the important parts?

I want to facilitate reeding and comprahenshun skillz

I've been writing everyday so eventually other people can handle that nonsense for me.

Quote from: garbon on November 25, 2013, 11:11:53 PM
Where is the bolded text on my article? :angry:

How will I know what are the important parts?

I know. I had to read the whole thing :bleeding:

I understand the concern.

Who wouldn't fear the spectre of a significant regional power, whose pseudo-democratic trappings poorly conceal a regime dominated by radical Islamic ideology and militarism, whose leaders and people constantly express hatred of the US, and who over the years has harbored, sponsored and protected some of the worlds' worst terrorists - organizations and individuals responsible for the murders of thousands of Americans - who wouldn't be horrified by the prospect of such a state acquiring a nuclear weapon.

But enough about our ally, Pakistan.

I don't have illusions about what we are dealing with in Iran.  But Yi and CDM - while making some good points in this thread - are less forthcoming about viable alternatives.  The US is not going to attack Iran.  It is not going to happen, at least not without exhausting all alternatives and building a broad coalition for action.  The options are a diplomatic deal or some kind of containment/proxy war option.  But since the former doesn't exclude the latter, there really isn't any reason at all not to try it.  And there are reasons to think it could work.  Not because the Iranians are trustworthy.  But for the simple reason that the regime's own interests may well coincide with making and (mostly) keeping to such a diplomatic solution.

This looks like a good first step on the way to stopping Iran's progress towards nukes, but is just a first step. More negotiations will be needed in six months to a year and it will take a real change of mind by the Iranian Mullahs to truly stop their desire of getting nukes. After all their rhetoric and actions over the years I'm still very skeptical that Iran wants to give up their nukes.

One thing that really worries me is the angst by Mid East nations on this proposed deal. I feel they know more about what's really going on than we in the West really know. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and especially Israel. I think even the Turks. Pakistan is supposedly willing to help the Saudis obtain nukes to counter Iran. Egypt and Saudi Arabia seem pretty miffed at the US and are talking about pulling back from working with the US. And I tend to trust Israel's instincts when it comes to intel issues in the Mid East.

Then again I don't fully understand why these nations are so angry since the other options seem to be business as usual and Iran getting a nuke, as I don't feel that military strikes would be able to end Iran's quest for nukes. Their nuke program seems too widespread for that.

You're mischaracterizing my position Joan.  I didn't say that *no* deal is worth doing, I'm saying we're paying too much for a two month setback in their nuclear program.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on November 26, 2013, 11:29:16 AM
But enough about our ally, Pakistan.

(https://lh3.ggpht.com/-QyEyA-k67BU/UauDDoQ9hlI/AAAAAAAAAro/GndF6Jyd4fg/s1600/rolleyes.gif)

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 25, 2013, 10:15:37 PM

Quote from: Sheilbh on November 25, 2013, 10:08:22 PM
So anything short of total capitulation isn't okay?

Jacob asked the question of what Iran could do that's non-reversible.  I answered.  You're asking a different question.

You missed the key part of my question:

Quote from: JacobIn particular, I'm interested in the kind of confidence-building part-way steps that are on the table right now.

Obviously you'd be happy with Iran conceding everything. That's not what I asked. What's an incremental step Iran can take to show good faith, as part of confidence building negotiations?

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 26, 2013, 11:40:11 AM
You're mischaracterizing my position Joan.  I didn't say that *no* deal is worth doing, I'm saying we're paying too much for a two month setback in their nuclear program.

OK but the deal you would have preferred isn't available.
What's your next best option?

Quote from: Jacob on November 26, 2013, 12:02:20 PM
Obviously you'd be happy with Iran conceding everything. That's not what I asked. What's an incremental step Iran can take to show good faith, as part of confidence building negotiations?

I'd be very happy if Iran were to chuck their religious state, institute full democracy and freedom of the press and conscience, stop their support for Hezbollah, stop sending troops and arms to the Syrian rebels, and let us fuck their women.  But that's not part of the discussion.  So I'm not asking them to concede everything.

Your question is a paradox Jake.  Basically anything that is non-reversible you will see as not "incremental." 

For the deal to be symmetrical and fair we should have traded something reversible for something reversible. 

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on November 26, 2013, 12:16:38 PM
OK but the deal you would have preferred isn't available.
What's your next best option?

Something reversible for something reversible.  We can only unfreeze those assets once.

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 25, 2013, 07:17:45 PM
He gave them $7 billion in unfrozen assets.

For perspective, that is about 1.3 % of annual GDP.
Not exactly immaterial, but hardly make or break either.

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 26, 2013, 12:20:10 PM

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on November 26, 2013, 12:16:38 PM
OK but the deal you would have preferred isn't available.
What's your next best option?

Something reversible for something reversible.  We can only unfreeze those assets once.

Strict reversability x for x is irrelevant.
For example, we could easily cause that level of damage to Iran's economy by tightening back down on the oil sanctions. 
Of course that would require cooperation from countries like India that would not look favorably on rejecting diplo overtures.
The unfortunate reality is that our leverage over Iran, short of sending in the bombers, is proportional to the level of economic damage we can credibly cause, but that turns on our ability to convince the rest of the world to go along.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on November 26, 2013, 12:20:59 PM
For perspective, that is about 1.3 % of annual GDP.
Not exactly immaterial, but hardly make or break either.

Make or break what?

I thought one of the problems for Western negotiators was how difficult it was to find easily reversible sanctions. I know it was a major EU concern.

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 25, 2013, 07:17:45 PM

Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 23, 2013, 09:56:06 PM
Sure hope Lurch didn't give them too much free stuff they can welch on later.

He gave them $7 billion in unfrozen assets.

We're getting hustled again.

Who's frozen assets?  Did we give them North Korea's assets or did we allow them access to their own assets we had previous frozen?  If it's the second that's hardly giving away free stuff.

I was under the impression that phyical destruction of the machinery is quite reversible.  They can always build more centrifuges and more and different facilities.

Kerry's really overselling the significance of this

http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/12/10/21850703-kerry-tries-to-allay-congressional-fears-over-nuclear-deal-with-iran?lite

QuoteSecretary of State John Kerry on Tuesday sought to reassure nervous members of Congress about the interim agreement with Iran that's designed to stop its progress toward building nuclear weapons.

"Iran's nuclear programs will not move forward," Kerry said in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee

Once implemented, "this agreement halts the progress of Iran's nuclear program and rolls its back in certain places," he told the committee. Kerry argued that the national security of both the United States and Israel will be stronger under the deal than it was before.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry tells a House committee Tuesday that an agreement to ease Iranian sanctions "halts the progress" of the country's nuclear program as transparency increases.

And he pointed to the Arak reactor in Iran which is designed to use plutonium, which in turn could be used to construct a bomb. Under the interim accord with Iran, that reactor is "frozen stone cold, where it is," Kerry said, and "we're actually going to have the plans for the site delivered to us."

He said the $7 billion in sanctions relief for Iran under the interim deal "pales in comparison with the amount of pressure we're leaving in place."

The pressure of previously enacted economic sanctions is what brought Iran to the negotiating table, he said.

But "we now have the best chance we've ever had" to get a permanent accord with Iran and he urged Congress to hold off imposing new sanctions. "I'm just saying 'not right now,'" he said, adding that "this is a very delicate diplomatic moment." He said he did want to threaten the unity of UN Security Council members or give the Iranians an excuse to violate the interim agreement.

But in his opening statement, committee chairman Rep. Ed Royce, R-Calif., said "we may have bargained away our fundamental position, which is enshrined in six U.N. Security Council Resolution...that Iran should not be enriching and reprocessing (uranium). We may bargain that away in exchange for a false confidence that we can effectively check Iran's misuse of these key nuclear bomb-making technologies."

He also wondered "why we'd be letting up sanctions pressure at the very time its economy is on the ropes without getting an agreement which stops its centrifuges (used to enrich uranium) from spinning."

The committee's senior Democrat, Rep. Eliot Engel of New York, voiced similar fears saying "I have serious reservations about the agreement." Engel said the deal should have in effect said to Iran "while we're talking, you stop enriching" uranium that might be used to build nuclear weapons.

Members of the committee in both parties seemed to be unconvinced by Kerry's assurances about the interim accord. Rep. Ileana Ros Lehtinen, R-Fla., told Kerry the concessions to Iran will be "the death knell of sanctions." Kerry replied, "In six months, the world will know whether I'm right or you're right."

Kerry also told a skeptical Rep. Brad Sherman, D-Calif., that "the president is committed – if this fails – he is going to want to ratchet up" sanctions. "We are committed to asking you for additional sanctions" if Iran reneges on the interim deal. 

And Kerry said if the Iranian regime were to say "the hell with you" and expands its uranium enrichment, "we have the absolute capacity deployed now to deal with that" militarily and the United States could "terminate those (Iranian) facilities" and "set back their program for some time." But he warned that military option "comes with whole different set of costs." 

Kerry spoke to the panel the day before he heads to Jerusalem to confer with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a harsh critic of the deal between Iran and the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, plus Germany.

It's not yet clear whether Kerry and President Barack Obama can persuade members of Congress to hold off on passing new sanctions legislation.

The House last July passed the Royce-Engel bill to impose more stringent sanctions on Iran by a vote of 400 to 20.

Earlier Tuesday Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Sen. Robert Menendez, D- N.J. said that "At some point soon there probably would be bipartisan (sanctions) legislation that would be offered and then we have to think about what the way forward is." He said sanctions legislation would be introduced before the Senate adjourned for the Christmas-New Year's holiday.

Menendez rejected the Obama administration's argument that passing more sanctions against Iran now would risk unraveling the accord with the Tehran regime. "I respectfully disagree with the administration," he said, adding that he and other sanctions supporters have in the past "been told that sanctions was not an appropriate vehicle or time and we found that it was, and we believe that it is again."

Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif was quoted in Time Magazine saying that if Congress were to pass new sanctions, "The entire deal is dead. We do not like to negotiate under duress."

Menendez has proposed "prospective" sanctions that would be set to begin six months from the date of congressional enactment, but would give Obama some waiver powers. He has said such sanctions would "send a message to Iran, as it has throughout this process, that there is a consequence if you don`t strike a successful deal...."

State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said Monday that "putting new sanctions in place during the course of negotiations, even those that are delayed, would be counterproductive." She argued that it could "put the negotiations that we have all worked so hard on that we believe is the best chance we've had in a decade to achieve a peaceful outcome at risk."

On Monday, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid said that in the two weeks remaining before adjournment, the Senate must complete work on a defense authorization bill and "address the issue of additional sanctions against Iran....." But he did not say there would be a vote on a sanctions bill.

Quote from: jimmy olsen on December 11, 2013, 09:26:30 PM
Kerry's really overselling the significance of this

I can't oversell how much I fucking hate you.

The Arak reactor uses plutonium? :yeahright: