European views on American involvement in the Vietnam war.

[garbon]

Now all you need to do is to make this new term gain some traction

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Containment ?

[Eddie Teach]

I offered one. What's wrong with "containment"?

Not bad.

I mean, it should probably be turned into an adjective, but that's just semantic quibbling on my part

More substantially, using "containmentist" (to coin a clumsy adjectiviztion) seems to shift the focus of the analysis towards the motivation of the great powers and away from the power dynamics between great powers and their clients, and away from the experience of the populations in the theatres of containment.

Still, it's more neutral sounding. Now all you need to do is to make this new term gain some traction

That said, I expect that should "containmentist" or something similar gain wide currency it would quickly attract a similarly negative connotation as "imperialist" because it's still pretty hard to cast the things it covers (client elites oppressing the populace, proxy wars, etc) as positive from the perspective of the people in theatre.

Containment already has widespread currency in being used to describe American anti-communist policy and interventions such as Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, etc.

[Jacob]

But that was a means to an end, not an end in and of itself.

It's not like the US would have been mucking about in South Vietnam absent the threat of Communism in North Vietnam.

We sure as hell were not interested in setting up client states in the US "sphere of influence" in other Southeast Asian countries that were not under Communist threat, which suggests (IMO) that the driving factor was in fact Communism (misgruided as it was in hindsight), rather than some desire to expand the US sphere of influence into SE Asia in general.

... to respond to this post a second time...

That's part of why I find this subject so interesting.

There's no doubt in my mind that post WWII saw a new approach to international relations and power dynamics, and that the US was (and is) a very different hegemon from those that came before it. The US' ideals of liberty and democracy make a huge difference, as does its rejection of colonialism. How things turned out in West Germany, Japan, and South Korea are testaments to this difference, and I think greatly to the credit of the US. I don't feel I'm well versed enough in history to say that this is unique in history, but I don't know of anything comparable, and it's something I think is incredibly positive.

Still, I think it's interesting to examine where and how messy reality intersects with ideals and intentions. Maybe if the US had won in Vietnam, that country would have been a peer of South Korea and Japan and Taiwan today because the US' intentions were not imperialist in nature. On the other hand maybe that was simply not possible, and as more and more things were checked on the "imperialist list" the more impossible that outcome became.

Certainly, I think the US has become more leery of employing the various tools that I'd call imperialist (and which I don't think "containtmentist" or "cold war proxy war" can replace) since the Vietnam War.

Perhaps one of the tragedies of the Vietnam War was the the US used what were essentially imperialist methods in pursuit of non-imperialist goals, and that contributed to how badly the whole thing turned out?

[MadImmortalMan]

Perhaps one of the tragedies of the Vietnam War was the the US used what were essentially imperialist methods in pursuit of non-imperialist goals, and that contributed to how badly the whole thing turned out?

Maybe. How would they have known at the time that it would be different from Taiwan and Korea? How do we know in hindsight that Korea would not have been just like Vietnam if the West had just pulled out?

[Jacob]

. Do we prioritize intent or effect? Do we prioritize the perspective of the actor or the acted upon?

I'll answer your question with a question.
Assuming your definition, is there any way for a Great Power to come to the defense of a smaller nation threatened by another Great Power without the defending Great Power thereby itself waging an imperialist war?  Because the defending power, by virtue of coming to the weaker nation's defense, thereby creates reliance of the weaker nation on itself for basic security, and also creates a powerful sphere of influence in the weaker nation.  Moreoever, it will be in the defending Great Power's interest to maintain and bolster that influence throughout the duration of the conflict in order to make the joint resistance more effective. 

As an example: under a broad view of your definition, can't France and Britain be accused of fighting an imperialist war against Germany in 1939 in order to maintain their sphere of influence in Poland?

Should we prioritize the view of the actor or the acted upon?

Perhaps, for the sake of argument, France and Britain entered the war for imperialistic purposes in this case, but it's my understanding that the Poles did not find the war against Germany on their behalf imperialistic.

I'd expect that even the Soviets weren't initially perceived as imperialist by the Poles, but that that perception shifted after the war.

[Jacob]

Maybe. How would they have known at the time that it would be different from Taiwan and Korea? How do we know in hindsight that Korea would not have been just like Vietnam if the West had just pulled out?

Obviously we don't know.

[crazy canuck]

Its simply a misnomer. "Imperialism" already has a perfectly good meaning, and torturing the language, or as CC seems to want to do, applying ever more attenuated meanings of "imperial" like "economic imperialism", seem like desperately clinging to a term for no good reason. Why is it so important to use that term in the first place?

Wait a minute, first you say to me that you think there is such a thing as economic imperialism then you slag me for applying an ever more attenutative meaning to imperial like economic imperialism for no good reason.

[Malthus]

Its simply a misnomer. "Imperialism" already has a perfectly good meaning, and torturing the language, or as CC seems to want to do, applying ever more attenuated meanings of "imperial" like "economic imperialism", seem like desperately clinging to a term for no good reason. Why is it so important to use that term in the first place?

Wait a minute, first you say to me that you think there is such a thing as economic imperialism then you slag me for applying an ever more attenutative meaning to imperial like economic imperialism for no good reason.

I'm not "slagging". I'm merely pointing out that there is no compelling reason to use the term in this context.

I agreed that "economic Imperialism" exists, but I pointed out it had very little to do with the war in Vietnam. Vietnam lacked economic justification. Neither the supporters of the war, nor its opponents, believed that it was fought to achieve economic goals.

Economic Imperialism may be a perfectly cromulent term, but it doesn't apply here.

[Malthus]

I offered one. What's wrong with "containment"?

Not bad.

I mean, it should probably be turned into an adjective, but that's just semantic quibbling on my part

More substantially, using "containmentist" (to coin a clumsy adjectiviztion) seems to shift the focus of the analysis towards the motivation of the great powers and away from the power dynamics between great powers and their clients, and away from the experience of the populations in the theatres of containment.

Still, it's more neutral sounding. Now all you need to do is to make this new term gain some traction

That said, I expect that should "containmentist" or something similar gain wide currency it would quickly attract a similarly negative connotation as "imperialist" because it's still pretty hard to cast the things it covers (client elites oppressing the populace, proxy wars, etc) as positive from the perspective of the people in theatre.

Well, as others pointed out, it isn't a new term. "Containment" was widely used by US policymakers themselves at the time to describe what they were up to. Thus, it is a term that can be used to describe various US wars - such as Korea and Vietnam.

[Berkut]

But that was a means to an end, not an end in and of itself.

It's not like the US would have been mucking about in South Vietnam absent the threat of Communism in North Vietnam.

We sure as hell were not interested in setting up client states in the US "sphere of influence" in other Southeast Asian countries that were not under Communist threat, which suggests (IMO) that the driving factor was in fact Communism (misgruided as it was in hindsight), rather than some desire to expand the US sphere of influence into SE Asia in general.

... to respond to this post a second time...

That's part of why I find this subject so interesting.

There's no doubt in my mind that post WWII saw a new approach to international relations and power dynamics, and that the US was (and is) a very different hegemon from those that came before it. The US' ideals of liberty and democracy make a huge difference, as does its rejection of colonialism. How things turned out in West Germany, Japan, and South Korea are testaments to this difference, and I think greatly to the credit of the US. I don't feel I'm well versed enough in history to say that this is unique in history, but I don't know of anything comparable, and it's something I think is incredibly positive.

Still, I think it's interesting to examine where and how messy reality intersects with ideals and intentions. Maybe if the US had won in Vietnam, that country would have been a peer of South Korea and Japan and Taiwan today because the US' intentions were not imperialist in nature. On the other hand maybe that was simply not possible, and as more and more things were checked on the "imperialist list" the more impossible that outcome became.

Certainly, I think the US has become more leery of employing the various tools that I'd call imperialist (and which I don't think "containtmentist" or "cold war proxy war" can replace) since the Vietnam War.

Perhaps one of the tragedies of the Vietnam War was the the US used what were essentially imperialist methods in pursuit of non-imperialist goals, and that contributed to how badly the whole thing turned out?

I would love to respond, but in total sincerity, I have no interest in a debate about whether or not the US intervention in Vietnam was more or less "Imperialist" than its intervention in, say, Korea.

It is an argument that to even engage in pre-supposes (to some degree) it's conclusion.

There was not "imperialist" in any meaningful sense of the word in the US intervention in Vietnam, Korea, Greece, etc., etc., etc. They are all much better catergorized as cold war proxy conflicts, not "wars of imperium".

[Jacob]

Let's put it this way.
The US wasn't trying to maintain a sphere of influence by intervening because it didn't have one there in the first place.
And if staying out would not have resulted in the USSR acquiring a sphere of influence, the US wouldn't have bothered.
So I don't think it is right that the US intent in getting involved was to acquire of sphere of influence.
In fact, of course, the US did acquire such influence, at least as long as South Vietnam existed, but that was a side effect of the decision to intervene rather than the motivation for it (the same holds for ROK and the Korean War).

Yeah, that's fair enough. This seems to come back to increasingly imperialist methods being used in pursuit of non-imperialist aims.

Perhaps the case of Korea (I'm not familiar enough to say, but I'll take your word) is evidence that imperialist methods in pursuit of non-imperialist aims are defensible.

[Malthus]

Let's put it this way.
The US wasn't trying to maintain a sphere of influence by intervening because it didn't have one there in the first place.
And if staying out would not have resulted in the USSR acquiring a sphere of influence, the US wouldn't have bothered.
So I don't think it is right that the US intent in getting involved was to acquire of sphere of influence.
In fact, of course, the US did acquire such influence, at least as long as South Vietnam existed, but that was a side effect of the decision to intervene rather than the motivation for it (the same holds for ROK and the Korean War).

Yeah, that's fair enough. This seems to come back to increasingly imperialist methods being used in pursuit of non-imperialist aims.

Perhaps the case of Korea (I'm not familiar enough to say, but I'll take your word) is evidence that imperialist methods in pursuit of non-imperialist aims are defensible.

I dunno. What are "imperialist methods"?

[Berkut]

Let's put it this way.
The US wasn't trying to maintain a sphere of influence by intervening because it didn't have one there in the first place.
And if staying out would not have resulted in the USSR acquiring a sphere of influence, the US wouldn't have bothered.
So I don't think it is right that the US intent in getting involved was to acquire of sphere of influence.
In fact, of course, the US did acquire such influence, at least as long as South Vietnam existed, but that was a side effect of the decision to intervene rather than the motivation for it (the same holds for ROK and the Korean War).

Yeah, that's fair enough. This seems to come back to increasingly imperialist methods being used in pursuit of non-imperialist aims.

Perhaps the case of Korea (I'm not familiar enough to say, but I'll take your word) is evidence that imperialist methods in pursuit of non-imperialist aims are defensible.

I dunno. What are "imperialist methods"?

[Viking]

Let's put it this way.
The US wasn't trying to maintain a sphere of influence by intervening because it didn't have one there in the first place.
And if staying out would not have resulted in the USSR acquiring a sphere of influence, the US wouldn't have bothered.
So I don't think it is right that the US intent in getting involved was to acquire of sphere of influence.
In fact, of course, the US did acquire such influence, at least as long as South Vietnam existed, but that was a side effect of the decision to intervene rather than the motivation for it (the same holds for ROK and the Korean War).

Yeah, that's fair enough. This seems to come back to increasingly imperialist methods being used in pursuit of non-imperialist aims.

Perhaps the case of Korea (I'm not familiar enough to say, but I'll take your word) is evidence that imperialist methods in pursuit of non-imperialist aims are defensible.

I dunno. What are "imperialist methods"?

Methods I do not approve of.

[Malthus]

Just asking ...