The China Thread

[jimmy olsen]

So what do you think will happen?

[The Minsky Moment]

So what do you think will happen?

Don't know.
History suggests the odds are against the CP retaining monopoly power if China is to continue to develop.  Either there will be a guided transition to more pluralistic forms of politics, popular uprising that forces democratization, or China's development will stall.

However.
The CP in China is an unusual organization.  It is highly meritocratic, (internally) competitive, open to outside talent, and pragmatic.  Internally and sometimes publicly, it engages in deep reflection and self-criticism.  The fact that it has been able to achieve such extraordinary developmental results in such a short time while maintaining political stability is an impressive achievement and testament to the Party's adaptability and resoucefulness.  It is true, of course, that the Party in nonetheless prone -- as all one-party collegial structures -- to corruption, cliquism, and over-emphasis on consensus (or the appearance over consensus).  And it is also true that the challenge of suppressing the natural middle class desire for greater political participation and voice will only increase as that middle class grows in number, in affluence and in education.

It looks like the CP's goal is to move to Singapore-like soft authoritarianism where there is some room for popular political expression but one party rule is not seriously challenged.  But that is an unusual institutional arrangement that has arisen in a very particular and peculiar context.  It will be an incredible challenge for a vast, continent spanning nation of over a billion diverse people to follow in the footsteps of a tiny entrepot city-state.

Only time will tell.

[Razgovory]

Do you understand what stakeholder means Timmy?

Oh, I know this one.  It's a person who kills vampires.

Well, I thought it was funny.

[Queequeg]

The CP in China is an unusual organization.

I was thinking about this.  Isn't it somewhat similar at least to other successful, meritocratic autocracies?  There's a lot of overly enthusiastic comparisons between Prussia and modern China, but I think it's true historically that some autocracies are more efficient than others.  I just read Acemoglu's Why Nations Fail and was ultimately disappointed that he failed to talk about the development of Germany or Meiji Japan.  Also, I'm pissed that he seems to allow people to pronounce his name As-em-og-lu when it should be Aj-em-oogh-lu.

[garbon]

Also, I'm pissed that he seems to allow people to pronounce his name As-em-og-lu when it should be Aj-em-oogh-lu.

Even for you, this is a silly one.

[The Minsky Moment]

I just read Acemoglu's Why Nations Fail and was ultimately disappointed that he failed to talk about the development of Germany or Meiji Japan.  Also, I'm pissed that he seems to allow people to pronounce his name As-em-og-lu when it should be Aj-em-oogh-lu.

The Prussian regime democratized, and to the extent it held tight to its autocratic elements, that didn't work out so well.  Same can be said for Japan, and for Japan the real developmental breakthrough came after WW2. 

[crazy canuck]

I just read Acemoglu's Why Nations Fail and was ultimately disappointed that he failed to talk about the development of Germany or Meiji Japan.  Also, I'm pissed that he seems to allow people to pronounce his name As-em-og-lu when it should be Aj-em-oogh-lu.

The Prussian regime democratized, and to the extent it held tight to its autocratic elements, that didn't work out so well.  Same can be said for Japan, and for Japan the real developmental breakthrough came after WW2.

It could also be said that the real developmental breakthrough for Germany came after the combination of the world wars.  It democratized after WWI but that was quickly swept away by the Nazis.  Prior to WWI the monarchy in Germany still had signficant power.

[CountDeMoney]

Third Plenary Session Calls for PLA Reform and Restructuring
Publication: China Brief Volume: 13 Issue: 23
November 20, 2013 10:11 AM Age: 2 days
By: Kevin McCauley

The reforms announced by the recent Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee were headlined by economic pronouncements, but also contained ambitious language on the reform and restructuring of the Chinese military. The details remain sketchy, but according to the communiqué and subsequent press articles areas include adjusting the force mix according to the security requirements of various directions, reducing non-combat institutions and personnel, greater innovation in military theory, strengthening military leadership, building a system to generate greater warfighting capability, reform of military colleges and unit joint training, non-commissioned officer (NCO) system, strengthening military-civilian integration, improving weapons development and procurement, and improving the joint operation command system (Xinhua, November 16; on NCO reform, see China Brief, Volume XI, Issues 18 and 20).

Most of these proposals are not new. Rather, they are extensions of previous rounds of reform aimed at streamlining and modernizing the Chinese military, and political endorsements of reform ideas that have already circulated among military research institutions. Of all the proposals, institutional and cultural changes within the Chinese military could be the most important. A National Defense University (NDU) publication argued that the parochial interests of the services and institutional conflicts within the People's Liberation Army (PLA) are the main constraints to transformational efforts (SOSS, p. 244; 100 Questions,  pp. 196–197 * ).  Overcoming them would require a bold initiative to alter the PLA's command and institutional structure , which currently give the Army a dominant role. Since many of the newly announced reforms have been modernization areas for the past decade, the proposal could indicate that previous efforts have fallen short of the mark, and require adjustments and reinforcements.

The 2003–2005 PLA reductions included non-combat personnel and institutions, streamlining staffs, and some consolidation of military educational institutes. Since then, the PLA has conducted additional adjustments of force structure and reform of professional military education, the NCO corps, as well as researching new operational theories and methods such as integrated joint and system of systems operations. Recent PLA publications have stressed force structure, command, educational, unit training, and institutional changes required to support these emerging theoretical concepts (see China Brief, Volume XII, Issue 8, "System of Systems Operational Capability: Impact on PLA Transformation").

Many of the reform areas announced by the Third Plenary Session have been a focus of discussion in PLA publications during the past few years to support the implementation of joint and system of systems operations capabilities that could significantly increase PLA warfighting capabilities. The development of an integrated command information system and creation of a joint command structure are required to support these theoretical developments. The PLA is slowing developing a modern command information system for joint command (C4ISR), and there have been calls to create theater joint operational commands to replace the current Military Region headquarters, which are dominated by the ground forces. Several different command structures have been proposed, including functional-based and organization-based systems (China Military Online, July 1, November 25; SOSS, pp. 244–254).

PLA publications have also anticipated the Third Plenary Session's call for the need to streamline the force structure, optimize force composition and combined arms capabilities, and reduce non-combat units. However, forces that the PLA views as key to evolving operational theories will continue to expand and modernize, including Army Aviation, special operations, PLA Air Force (PLAAF) offensive forces, psychological warfare, cyber operations, and space operations forces (SOSS, p. 341; 100 Questions,  pp. 177–183).

System of systems and joint operations theory are already changing operational patterns and methods, leading to new educational and training requirements to address the lack of personnel with high-tech and joint operations experience, and train units on integrated information systems. Cultivating skilled personnel, especially joint commanders and staff, is viewed as critical to this effort (SOSS, pp. 342–344). Personnel training recommendations include: reforming academic training program content; increasing job rotation and cross-training efforts; expanding opportunities for joint command personnel to study abroad; and integrating academic institutes with exercises (SOSS, pp. 347–351; 100 Questions, p. 236).

Some of the reform areas coming from the Third Plenary Session are already the focus of improvements and change within the PLA. Equipment modernization, unit training, professional military education, and adjustments to force structure have been ongoing to some degree over the past decade or more, although the quality of the reforms is difficult to gauge. Developing a joint operations command structure, particularly at the theater level might be the most important recommendation, and would be a start to changing institutional and cultural impediments to transformation.

Since details of the renewed efforts have not been announced, it is too soon to say whether inclusion in a political document will lend impetus to reform and restructuring. A South China Morning Post article quoted current and retired PLA officers suggesting that any reform and restructuring efforts will be limited in scope, with small adjustments and improvements, but no sweeping changes (November 16). This assessment accords with this analyst's observations of change within the PLA, which is generally slow, incremental, and steady towards the overall goals, with adjustments through the process as necessary. Ongoing educational reforms within the PLA will only slowly change the culture and promote greater jointness within the PLA. Implementing theater joint operations commands would be a bold gesture that could indicate a serious move to reform the PLA at a more rapid pace.

* Information System-Based System of Systems Operations Study, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2012), referenced as SSOS.

Information System-based System of Systems Operational Capability Building in 100 Questions (Beijing: National Defense University Press, Jun 2011), referenced as 100 Questions.

[Camerus]

It could also be said that the real developmental breakthrough for Germany came after the combination of the world wars.

I doubt it.  Germany's relative global economic, cultural and scientific standing in 1914 was far greater than anything post-1945.

[crazy canuck]

It could also be said that the real developmental breakthrough for Germany came after the combination of the world wars.

I doubt it.  Germany's relative global economic, cultural and scientific standing in 1914 was far greater than anything post-1945.

Thats nice.  We were talking about the democratization process.

[CountDeMoney]

Hagel: U.S. 'deeply concerned' with China air defense map

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said Saturday the United States is "deeply concerned" over China's move to establish an air defense zone over a string of disputed islands in the East China Sea.

"We view this development as a destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo in the region," Hagel said in a statement. "This unilateral action increases the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculations."

The Associated Press reports that the Chinese Defense Ministry issued a map showing the new East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, which encompasses what the Chinese call the Diaoyu islands. The move is seen as an aggressive step against Japan, which bought what it calls the Senkaku islands from private owners in 2012. The islands are uninhabited, but are believed to rest near large underwater oil reserves. Taiwan also claims possession of the islands.

Hagel said the map will have no effect on how the United States conducts military operations in the area, and that concerns are being conveyed to China "through diplomatic and military channels." Hagel also said the United States believes that the Senkaku islands are included as part of Japan in the U.S. Japan Mutual Defense Treaty.

In a separate statement, Secretary of State John Kerry urged China to exercise restraint with foreign aircraft that don't identify themelves inside the air defense zone.

"Escalatory action will only increase tensions in the region and create risks of an incident," Kerry said. "Freedom of overflight and other internationally lawful uses of sea and airspace are essential to prosperity, stability, and security in the Pacific."

[Ed Anger]

Shove a couple of carriers in there. No lube.

[CountDeMoney]

From the Home Office in Beijing, British Columbia--

Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the P.R.C.
( Source: Xinhua  )         2013-November-23 10:00

BEIJING, Nov. 23 (Xinhua) -- China's Ministry of National Defense issued an announcement of the aircraft identification rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the People's Republic of China. Following is the full text:

Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the People's Republic of China

Issued by the Ministry of National Defense on November 23

The Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, in accordance with the Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, now announces the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone as follows:

First, aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must abide by these rules.

Second, aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must provide the following means of identification:

1. Flight plan identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone should report the flight plans to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China or the Civil Aviation Administration of China.

2. Radio identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must maintain the two-way radio communications, and respond in a timely and accurate manner to the identification inquiries from the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone or the unit authorized by the organ.

3. Transponder identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, if equipped with the secondary radar transponder, should keep the transponder working throughout the entire course.

4. Logo identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must clearly mark their nationalities and the logo of their registration identification in accordance with related international treaties.

Third, aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone should follow the instructions of the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone or the unit authorized by the organ. China's armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions.

Fourth, the Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China is the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.

Fifth, the Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China is responsible for the explanation of these rules.

Sixth, these rules will come into force at 10 a.m. November 23, 2013.

The PRC loves to orchestrate their use of force demonstrations down to the minutae--but it only works if the intended audience plays along. 
And they specifically do it at identified times of opportunity when, say, the USS George Washington just happens to be busy assisting in drying off a shitload of wet Filipinos.  SMELLS LIKE WET FLIP FLOPS

But by all means, send up some hot shot pilots in your shiny new SU-27s to play Maverick and Goose games with the JASDF, and see what the fuck happens.

[CountDeMoney]

BEIJING, Nov. 23 (Xinhua) -- The People's Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force conducted its first air patrol after the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.

　　Shen Jinke, spokesman for the PLA Air Force, said that two large scouts carried out the patrol mission, with early warning aircraft and fighters providing support and cover.

　　"The patrol is in line with international common practices, and the normal flight of international flights will not be affected," Shen said.

　　Shen said that the Chinese armed forces are capable of effective control over the zone, and will take measures to deal with air threats to protect the security of the country's airspace.

[Josquius]

Aka china decides to act like a dick and fly into Japanese airspace