The China Thread

[Sheilbh]

Like a fiddle

Good to see leaders learning their lessons from the invasion of Ukraine. Bit one step forward two steps back following France's revised strategy document which notes that Europe and the Pacific's security is "indivisible" and now these comments. As ever with Macron I'm not entirely sure his analysis is wrong but I feel like the way he's going about and his own comments get in the way:

Europe must resist pressure to become 'America's followers,' says Macron
The 'great risk' Europe faces is getting 'caught up in crises that are not ours,' French president says in interview.
By Jamil Anderlini and Clea Caulcutt   
April 9, 2023 12:39 pm CET

ABOARD COTAM UNITÉ (FRANCE'S AIR FORCE ONE) — Europe must reduce its dependency on the United States and avoid getting dragged into a confrontation between China and the U.S. over Taiwan, French President Emmanuel Macron said in an interview on his plane back from a three-day state visit to China.

Speaking with POLITICO and two French journalists after spending around six hours with Chinese President Xi Jinping during his trip, Macron emphasized his pet theory of "strategic autonomy" for Europe, presumably led by France, to become a "third superpower."

He said "the great risk" Europe faces is that it "gets caught up in crises that are not ours, which prevents it from building its strategic autonomy," while flying from Beijing to Guangzhou, in southern China, aboard COTAM Unité, France's Air Force One.

Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party have enthusiastically endorsed Macron's concept of strategic autonomy and Chinese officials constantly refer to it in their dealings with European countries. Party leaders and theorists in Beijing are convinced the West is in decline and China is on the ascendant and that weakening the transatlantic relationship will help accelerate this trend.

"The paradox would be that, overcome with panic, we believe we are just America's followers," Macron said in the interview. "The question Europeans need to answer ... is it in our interest to accelerate [a crisis] on Taiwan? No. The worse thing would be to think that we Europeans must become followers on this topic and take our cue from the U.S. agenda and a Chinese overreaction," he said.

Just hours after his flight left Guangzhou headed back to Paris, China launched large military exercises around the self-ruled island of Taiwan, which China claims as its territory but the U.S. has promised to arm and defend.

Those exercises were a response to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen's 10-day diplomatic tour of Central American countries that included a meeting with Republican U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy while she transited in California. People familiar with Macron's thinking said he was happy Beijing had at least waited until he was out of Chinese airspace before launching the simulated "Taiwan encirclement" exercise.

Beijing has repeatedly threatened to invade in recent years and has a policy of isolating the democratic island by forcing other countries to recognize it as part of "one China."

Taiwan talks

Macron and Xi discussed Taiwan "intensely," according to French officials accompanying the president, who appears to have taken a more conciliatory approach than the U.S. or even the European Union.

"Stability in the Taiwan Strait is of paramount importance," European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who accompanied Macron for part of his visit, said she told Xi during their meeting in Beijing last Thursday. "The threat [of] the use of force to change the status quo is unacceptable."

Xi responded by saying anyone who thought they could influence Beijing on Taiwan was deluded.

Macron appears to agree with that assessment.

"Europeans cannot resolve the crisis in Ukraine; how can we credibly say on Taiwan, 'watch out, if you do something wrong we will be there'? If you really want to increase tensions that's the way to do it," he said.

"Europe is more willing to accept a world in which China becomes a regional hegemon," said Yanmei Xie, a geopolitics analyst at Gavekal Dragonomics. "Some of its leaders even believe such a world order may be more advantageous to Europe."

In his trilateral meeting with Macron and von der Leyen last Thursday in Beijing, Xi Jinping went off script on only two topics — Ukraine and Taiwan — according to someone who was present in the room.

"Xi was visibly annoyed for being held responsible for the Ukraine conflict and he downplayed his recent visit to Moscow," this person said. "He was clearly enraged by the U.S. and very upset over Taiwan, by the Taiwanese president's transit through the U.S. and [the fact that] foreign policy issues were being raised by Europeans."

In this meeting, Macron and von der Leyen took similar lines on Taiwan, this person said. But Macron subsequently spent more than four hours with the Chinese leader, much of it with only translators present, and his tone was far more conciliatory than von der Leyen's when speaking with journalists.

'Vassals' warning

Macron also argued that Europe had increased its dependency on the U.S. for weapons and energy and must now focus on boosting European defense industries.

He also suggested Europe should reduce its dependence on the "extraterritoriality of the U.S. dollar," a key policy objective of both Moscow and Beijing.

"If the tensions between the two superpowers heat up ... we won't have the time nor the resources to finance our strategic autonomy and we will become vassals," he said.

Russia, China, Iran and other countries have been hit by U.S. sanctions in recent years that are based on denying access to the dominant dollar-denominated global financial system. Some in Europe have complained about "weaponization" of the dollar by Washington, which forces European companies to give up business and cut ties with third countries or face crippling secondary sanctions.

While sitting in the stateroom of his A330 aircraft in a hoodie with the words "French Tech" emblazoned on the chest, Macron claimed to have already "won the ideological battle on strategic autonomy" for Europe.

He did not address the question of ongoing U.S. security guarantees for the Continent, which relies heavily on American defense assistance amid the first major land war in Europe since World War II.

As one of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and the only nuclear power in the EU, France is in a unique position militarily. However, the country has contributed far less to the defense of Ukraine against Russia's invasion than many other countries.

As is common in France and many other European countries, the French President's office, known as the Elysée Palace, insisted on checking and "proofreading" all the president's quotes to be published in this article as a condition of granting the interview. This violates POLITICO's editorial standards and policy, but we agreed to the terms in order to speak directly with the French president. POLITICO insisted that it cannot deceive its readers and would not publish anything the president did not say. The quotes in this article were all actually said by the president, but some parts of the interview in which the president spoke even more frankly about Taiwan and Europe's strategic autonomy were cut out by the Elysée.

Imagine there'll be plenty of Americans looking at Russia building pipelines and increasing dependency in Europe, supporting the European led Minsk solution to the 2014 invasion, and Macron still talking about a Europe from the Atlanttic to the Urals - and noting that they've been more than happy to help out in Europe's crisis.

I'd also add the Euro was on its way to becoming a global alternative in a way that RMB hasn't - that ended in the self-harming response to the Eurozone crisis.

Edit: Incidentally, ,good on Politico for adding that editorial note. It is standard practice in much of continental Europe but should be transparently described - slightly mad that those are the comments the Elysee were happy with

Edit: Also "Europeans cannot resolve the crisis in Ukraine; how can we credibly say on Taiwan, 'watch out, if you do something wrong we will be there'" - could we try harder on Ukraine? I'm not convinced we're doing the absolute utmost...

[Josquius]

Love how it's a conflict between the US and China over taiwan.
Taiwan itself is irrelevant.

[Sheilbh]

Just like Ukraine until last year.

[Tamas]

I am getting tired of Macron.

[Duque de Bragança]

Burning the golden calf, again? 

[PJL]

Well if Europe doesn't want to be entangled in a dispute between China and the US over Taiwan, I wouldn't blame the US to get too involved in the continuing dispute between Europe and Russia over Ukraine. No wonder the Chinese government has reason to believe the West is in decline, they may have a point after Macrons visit to China.

[grumbler]

Love how it's a conflict between the US and China over taiwan.
Taiwan itself is irrelevant.

And that Macron can speak for Europe.  France /= Europe.

[Jacob]

Burning the golden calf, again? 

I think you overestimate how much folks outside of France are invested in French politics.

[Duque de Bragança]

Burning the golden calf, again? 

I think you overestimate how much folks outside of France are invested in French politics.

I think you overestimate  the number of people over here I was alluding to.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

Love how it's a conflict between the US and China over taiwan.
Taiwan itself is irrelevant.

And that Macron can speak for Europe.  France /= Europe.

The French still haven't accepted that they don't rule Europe (and that their last attempt was a disaster)

[HVC]

Every time I think that the french are right about England they remind that France is worse.

[Sheilbh]

The French still haven't accepted that they don't rule Europe (and that their last attempt was a disaster)

No but they're one of the only countries in Europe that have taken foreign and defence policy seriously for more than the last year - so they matter.

Thing that annoys me most - with that line about Ukraine - is that Ukraine and the response within Europe (again VdL has been excellent) could, I think, prompt serious European strategic autonomy. But it would require France to give up delusions of European strategic autonomy meaning France leading Europe and France (and Germany to a large extent) sharing the risk perception, fears, concerns of Eastern European partners as if they were their own. Without that happening a huge chunk of Europe will look at comments like this and think their best bet is to keep doubling down with the US - undermining the goal of autonomy and creating a risk for Europe depending on the course of US politics.

With France, in particular, I almost feel like part of it is that the alternative is too naive/not cynical enough. The West isn't perfect on this - but in general democracies are better than autocracies. That's entirely absent from Macron's comments - it's just US and Chinese power as if they're interchangeable, which feels admirably cynical in a way that would be admired in Paris but is nonsense. Similarly I feel like Polish, Baltic etc fears and commitment on Ukraine and Russia are just seen as a bit naive or overemotional, which they're not.

Edit: Basically I feel like there's a strong French instinct to be too cool for school

[The Minsky Moment]

Sheilbh - I think you hit the nail on the head.  The idea of "European strategic autonomy" is not consistent with French strategic autonomy.  For the former to become a reality, the latter would have to be compromised. And that is not going to happen, certainly not while President Jupiter is in charge.

A broader point is that very concept of strategic autonomy is incoherent. Meaningful strategic choice is powerful constrained by the strategic environment. European states are free to take whatever decisions they wish and enter or leave whatever alliances they wish. But the reality of Russian power and aggression is there on the continent and can't be ignored. Finland didn't switch policy to joining NATO because of being compelled for lack of strategic autonomy; it did so as the rational exercise of such autonomy.

The situation with China is a little more subtle but only little more. Under Xi, China is proposing to overturn the existing international economic and security order, but it is proposing any clear alternative.  And the alternative it does present - surrendering national technological advantage for market access - is not (should not) be palatable.

I'll add one other point - I was among those who thought that the US and Britain handled the AUKUS situation poorly vis-a-vis France. However, this kind of diplomatic stunt underscores why there are reservations about including France in such security arrangements.  Playing both sides may be an exercise in "strategic autonomy" but strategic consequences follow from those choices.

[frunk]

Perun's video from this week addresses this quite well.

[Sheilbh]

A broader point is that very concept of strategic autonomy is incoherent. Meaningful strategic choice is powerful constrained by the strategic environment. European states are free to take whatever decisions they wish and enter or leave whatever alliances they wish. But the reality of Russian power and aggression is there on the continent and can't be ignored. Finland didn't switch policy to joining NATO because of being compelled for lack of strategic autonomy; it did so as the rational exercise of such autonomy.

The situation with China is a little more subtle but only little more. Under Xi, China is proposing to overturn the existing international economic and security order, but it is proposing any clear alternative.  And the alternative it does present - surrendering national technological advantage for market access - is not (should not) be palatable.

And I think these are linked. It is not coincidental that the most hawkish European nations on China are (broadly) in Central and Eastern Europe - they are doing that because by identifying with America's security concerns they hope to induce America to continue to identify with Europe's. It's the basis of alliance.

I feel that imaginative step is missing with France (at least under Macron). The route to European strategic autonomy runs through Warsaw and is based on a powerful identification of Western Europe with the security interests of Europe's eastern fringe which is incredibly real. Then you can see the Poles and Balts maybe identifying France's concerns in the Sahel's or Eastern Med as their own. But until then it looks, I think, from Eastern Europe like an opportunity for "Old Europe" to tell "New Europe" what's really in their best interests.

I'll add one other point - I was among those who thought that the US and Britain handled the AUKUS situation poorly vis-a-vis France. However, this kind of diplomatic stunt underscores why there are reservations about including France in such security arrangements.  Playing both sides may be an exercise in "strategic autonomy" but strategic consequences follow from those choices.

I totally understand French anger at AUKUS and the way it came out.

But my view is it was based on a profound shift in Australia's perception of the risks in the Pacific and its environment. Whatever else, I think the Australian decision is pretty vindicated by these types of comments.

Edit: And incidentally I view European strategic autonomy as Europe's ability to defend itself and its interests even if America is no longer interested, I think Macron's positioning is that strategic autonomy is just equidistance between power blocs, which I think is delusional.