Egypt news

[Queequeg]

The Pipes family is worthless.

[Sheilbh]

It looks like the protests were far more than was expected and they've kept the momentum - crucially they've spread way out of Cairo and even the FJP (the MB's party) headquarters in a stronghold like Alexandria were burned last night. 

The problem for Morsi is that he's going to face ongoing, violent protests, or he gracelessly backs down and becomes a lame duck President.  Or he could try and become the full tyrant and eliminate the protests, but I don't think he has the institutional support to do that, if the army wouldn't crush a revolt for Mubarak it seems unlikely that they would for the MB.  Indeed according to some sources some 'leaders' of the protests (made up of left-liberals, Mubarakist ultras, angry revolutionaries and Salafists) have been in touch with army officers and the officers are supporting the protest movement.

This isn't Mubarak's Egypt though, so the courts are apparently going on strike over this and newspaper editorials have condemned him as a 'dictator' - apparently his new nickname is Morsolini. 

I think he has to try and reach out to other groups to build more of a coalition of support - the MB aren't popular enough to do this sort of thing alone.  So there probably has to be at least some sort of climbdown.  One other possible wrinkle in it all is working out quite what Morsi's roles and powers are.  He wasn't the first choice of the MB (that was Shater, ruled ineligible by the courts because his mother's an American citizen) and the power within the MB still lies elsewhere.

On conspiracy theories the anti-MB in Egypt point out that this move and when he sacked Tantawi both came the day after meeting Clinton.  My suspicion is that rather than a conspiracy he got broad US assurances of support and acted.  More generally there is a problem with conspiracy thinking in the Middle East but I think as much as anything that's a symptom of their government systems.  I'd add that febrile revolutionary atmospheres often produce absurd conspiracies too.  It wouldn't surprise me if we start hearing about Queen Noor's diamond necklaces soon.

[CountDeMoney]

apparently his new nickname is Morsolini.

  See, Muddled Easterners do have a flair for humor when it doesn't involve the Zionist Entity.

On conspiracy theories the anti-MB in Egypt point out that this move and when he sacked Tantawi both came the day after meeting Clinton.  My suspicion is that rather than a conspiracy he got broad US assurances of support and acted.

I'm sure Senators Graham and McCain will do their part as well.

More generally there is a problem with conspiracy thinking in the Middle East but I think as much as anything that's a symptom of their government systems.  I'd add that febrile revolutionary atmospheres often produce absurd conspiracies too.  It wouldn't surprise me if we start hearing about Queen Noor's diamond necklaces soon.

Yes, it's a symptom of their government systems, but it's as much as the lack of education, knowledge of the outside world and the cocoonism of their own culture;  granted, those issues were always molded and massaged by the government, but let's face it:  Mooselimbs are a very silly people.  The masses are still blissfully content 3rd Worlders wrapped in the ignorance of their moon god religion and Jew hate.  You give them too much credit.

[Tamas]

It cannot be a symptom of their government, because, in my opinion, any government reflects the culture of the people it reigns upon. Governments that manage to stay long term, that is.
Local political culture is reflected in the government, not the other way around

[Queequeg]

Tamas just made baby Imre Nagy cry.

[Viking]

apparently his new nickname is Morsolini. 

A case of damning by faint praise if I ever saw one. Faro Morsis the Great or Ptorsi Soter would be more respectful.. as well as better political criticsm, especially when done within quote marks.

[Sheilbh]

Latest rumour is that Morsi's planning to close down the Constitutional Court. Which would be an escalation.

[Viking]

Latest rumour is that Morsi's planning to close down the Constitutional Court. Which would be an escalation.

btw, shelf, I told you so. Muslim Brotherhood = Bad just like I said.

[CountDeMoney]

Latest rumour is that Morsi's planning to close down the Constitutional Court. Which would be an escalation.

btw, shelf, I told you so. Muslim Brotherhood = Bad just like I said.

But he's popular, and the Tahrir Squares, the moderates and other intelligent people are in the minority.   Yay for democracy in moon god countries.

[Sheilbh]

It cannot be a symptom of their government, because, in my opinion, any government reflects the culture of the people it reigns upon. Governments that manage to stay long term, that is.
Local political culture is reflected in the government, not the other way around

I think it's more complex.  The Arab world is mainly ruled by some form of monarchic state or other - whether republican or actually a monarchy seems to make little difference.  With the exception of the biased satellite news channels (al-Jazeera is Qatari so backs the MB, al-Arabiya is Saudi and tends to back 'stable' monarchies and Salafis, and so on) there's little free press - though there is the internet.  The ruling elite is made up of various, often kleptocratic, courtiers whose influence is based on their access and intimacy with the ruler or their ability to build internal states that make them indispensable.  On top of that there's often an element of tribalism and, in certain states, sectarianism.

Now bits of that are cultural obviously - for example I think the idea of using the state to get money and patronage goes quite nicely with a tribal or sectarian society.  But what it all means taken together is that very often rumour, conspiracy theory and gossip will be more accurate than reported 'truth'.  This is true of Western reporting of the Middle East as much as it is of their own state press.  I think people tend to universalise from their own experience.  I remember reading that the Kremlin simply didn't believe that the British government couldn't lean on newspapers to stop talking about Litvinenko and so the persistence of the British press hurt British-Russian relations as much as the British government's policies did.

So I think in some ways that Western reporting isn't informed or in depth enough (and can't be, because there's not enough people who are interested in inter-tribal struggles within the Syrian government) or necessarily cynical enough.  So even the free press I think often presents something closer to the 'official story' when discussing these governments.  Often, I think, the theories inspired by rumour and gossip and potentially unlinked facts are as useful because of the system.  From a Western perspective I think the best thing is to read the best Arab, English-language sources who tend to be very cynical and the Western Arabist professor who's started a blog.

It's nonsense to say that all conspiracy theories boil down to the US and Israel - there's lots of suspicions on Iran, Saudi, Qatar, the MB, the Army and all the rest too.  I think, reading the China thread, that there's something similar there though their system is different.  So I think that example of the Shah being convinced that the US was behind his ouster was a bit like the Kremlin: to him a popular revolt would probably be unimaginable, it was almost unprecedented, he had SAVAK and, as the CIA famously reported, Iran seemed amazingly calm in the mid to late seventies.  Add to that the circumstances of 1953 and his own personality, which was rather paranoid, his own habit of often brutally betraying subordinates and the conspiracy theory is reasonable but wrong.  (On the Iranian revolution I recommend 'The Crown for the Turban' which I've since given to a charity shop but has a lot on the Shah's paranoia and suspicions of US betrayal which is fascinating.)

btw, shelf, I told you so. Muslim Brotherhood = Bad just like I said.

Democracy is good.  I still think the fundamental problem is that the army and Constitutional Court disbanded the elected Parliament and are trying to disband the constitutional assembly which will leave Morsi the only democratic figure in post-revolutionary Egypt.  Morsi's powergrab is wrong but so was the army's in April.  A lot of this is trying to deal with that.

Personally I'm still unsure.  A couple of days ago I thought it was too soon to tell but I was pessimistic, now I think it's too soon to tell and I'm optimistic again.  The protests and the response have been far stronger than I expected which I think is a good sign.

The reports now are that Morsi is going to be meeting with some senior judges including the head of the Constitutional Court - so we could be back to him trying to broaden his coalition and possibly climbing down.

But he's popular, and the Tahrir Squares, the moderates and other intelligent people are in the minority.

Actually he's not.  That's precisely his problem with moving so fast.  He got around 25% in the first round and around 52% in the second round run-off.

I thought this piece by a Belgian liberal who's been in Cairo since the revolution began was interesting:

Egypt and the psychology of dictatorship. An outsider's perspective.

What was Morsi thinking on the evening of November 22? Everyone expected him to take some measures to appease the clashes that commemorated the many killed revolutionaries one year ago in Mohamed Mahmud Street. Instead he made a Constitutional Declaration of seven articles, giving himself unlimited powers. Article 2 says: "All constitutional declarations, laws and decrees made since Morsi assumed power on 30 June 2012 cannot be appealed or canceled by any individual, or political or governmental body until a new constitution has been ratified and a new parliament has been elected. All lawsuits against them are declared void." Article 6 says that "The president is authorized to take any measures he sees fit in order to preserve the revolution, to preserve national unity or to safeguard national security."

Not only the world was stunned, Mohamed Morsi himself was also surprised, by the overall negative reaction. Didn't he take these powers to give blinded revolutionaries pensions, to reopen the trials that let those responsible for the killings unpunished, to give the liberals more time to finish the constitution? And above all, didn't he fire one of the most hated remnants of the old regime, the public prosecutor, who refused to investigate so many cases filed by revolutionaries? So, what was Morsi thinking when he issued his declaration? Was it amateurism or bad will? A lot of people on Tahrir said: "Told you so. The Muslim Brotherhood is a Masonic-like organization who wants to take power in order to turn Egypt into a second Iran." I believe the problem lies somewhere else.

I asked sources, close to the president and the government, in private what was going on. What they told me struck the historian in me. They unfolded to me that the government had proof that the judges, the administration and the media were conspiring against the president and the government. Not to overthrow them but to block whatever they wanted to do to make progress. The media, they said, did not bring the good news. They only criticize. No wonder, because they were paid by foreign funds. There was even proof that some liberals were in the same kind of conspiracy.

Sure there is some truth to it. The media hasn't been very kind. The Constitutional Court had dissolved the People's Assembly and was poised to dissolve the Constitutional Assembly as well. The public prosecutor has indeed not been very cooperative. The judges seemed to have used legal grounds to motivate political rulings. The bureaucracy is dragging decisions into the administrative mud. And the liberals walked out of the Constitutional Assembly. But labeling al this as a conspiracy is more then one bridge too far. I have worked in opposition and government in Belgium. Every politician gets that feeling at least once in his career. The 'they-are-all-against-us-motif' is an all time classic. It happens in all countries in the entire world. The question is how do you react to it?

The biggest danger is going into the bunker-mentality, closing your self up in retreat, waiting for the right moment for a counter-attack. In a fully fledged democracy this counter-attack is always pretty harmless, because the bunker-mentality makes you misread the situation and loose the next election. Nicolas Sarkozy is a good example. In a post-revolutionary situation, the counter-attack is mostly very dangerous. Because whatever you decide, your bunker-mentality will make you only more suspicious and will encourage you to go down the path of dictatorship, step by step.

Egypt has seen this evolution before. When Nasser took power in 1952 he didn't shut down democracy immediately. I even think his initial intentions were good. He wanted to liberate Egypt from its foreign occupiers and their puppets. But then he was drawn into the bunker-mentality. He didn't trust his former friends anymore and surely not the political parties that wanted to block his plans. Gradually, Nasser turned into a brutal dictator himself, sacking president Naguib, abolishing political parties and imprisoning all 'anti-revolutionary forces'.

This is the psychology of post-revolutionary dictatorship: fighting the enemy of the revolution from an ever smaller becoming bunker. Many revolutionary leaders went down the same path. After the French revolution some leaders wanted to fight against the counterrevolutionary forces. They weren't butchers by nature. On the contrary, they were mainly intellectuals who were suddenly overwhelmed by the fear that the revolution might fail. Lenin made the same mistake. Initially, he wanted to install a government out of representatives of the Soviets. The Soviets were the councils set up by soldiers, farmers and workers against the reign of the Tsar. But when the councils – without which no revolution would have been possible – criticized the plans of Lenin, he labelled them as enemies of the people and sent them to Siberia.

I am not saying that Morsi is a dictator or that the Muslim Brothers are the same ruthless people as the Bolsheviks. But they should realize that there is no such thing as a big conspiracy against them. There simply is no human brain big enough to master media, judges, politicians and the street. That only exists in films of James Bond. Most people just fight for their ideas or for their own position. Of course, there are many opponents who would like to see them fail, but that is the case in every democracy. The Central-European countries needed two decades to become well-functioning democracies after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Transition is not easy and it takes an awful amount of time.

The problem is that once you go down the path to dictatorship, there is hardly a way back. So Morsi has the choice: either he sticks with his declaration and has to start a crackdown in order to maintain it. Or he leaves his bunker, cancels his declaration and faces the difficulties every post-revolutionary transition has to deal with. There is always a way out. The president and the opposition should start a dialogue instead of setting ultimatums. Deleting articles 2 and 6 and agreeing on a way to move forward with the Constituent Assembly might be the only solution to avoid a major political deadlock. It is not easy and often very frustrating. But thinking that a short period of dictatorship will set everything right is wrong. History proves that the path to democracy never leads through dictatorship.

One thing that struck me is that I almost automatically capitalised 'revolution' (in part this is because I loathe the phrase 'Arab Spring', so I try not to use it).  Thinking about it I'm not sure if this is because I think the Egyptian revolt is important and historically very significant (though I think it is) or if it's because the way it's talked about by some Egyptian writers I read and by Morsi himself reminds me of the French.  The 'revolution' is a thing which is sacred and needs to protected from her enemies - it seems to be discussed with a capital.  If it's the latter then that in itself seems a worrying development.

[Viking]

btw, shelf, I told you so. Muslim Brotherhood = Bad just like I said.

Democracy is good.  I still think the fundamental problem is that the army and Constitutional Court disbanded the elected Parliament and are trying to disband the constitutional assembly which will leave Morsi the only democratic figure in post-revolutionary Egypt.  Morsi's powergrab is wrong but so was the army's in April.  A lot of this is trying to deal with that.

Personally I'm still unsure.  A couple of days ago I thought it was too soon to tell but I was pessimistic, now I think it's too soon to tell and I'm optimistic again.  The protests and the response have been far stronger than I expected which I think is a good sign.

The reports now are that Morsi is going to be meeting with some senior judges including the head of the Constitutional Court - so we could be back to him trying to broaden his coalition and possibly climbing down.

Democracy is good. That is the point. The other point is that you can't have democracy without democrats. That's what happened in Germany in the 1930's. The Republic only had the Social Democrats, everybody else was hoping to replace it with something else. The Muslim Brotherhood is not democratic it has never been democratic. It doesn't see democracy as a value or even as an end goal. They think that law comes from god, nobody who thinks that will ever be democratic.

In general I agreed with his move against the army, though now it seems merely a first step to rending the greatest threat to him impotent. I was as uneasy then as you profess to be now. The army was the only institution influenced by a solid democratic force acting for rule of law and democracy in Egypt, the US State Department. I was worried that he neutered the army to prevent it from coup'ing him when he went and usurped some other branch of government, like, say (checking yesterdays newspaper), the judiciary.

The activists of Tahrir (who, to my surprise turn out to be much more liberal than I thought at the time, just badly organized) have stood up again. That is good. What the army couldn't do thugs using violence against sin and vice in the streets can do perfectly well without government support, merely acquiescence, Green Revolution style.

Morsi moved to remove any input from what seems more and more like a put up job on the constitution from outside the convention which is dominated by the Brothers.

As I said at the start, you cannot have democracy without democrats. The brothers are not democrats. They are willing to play by democracy's rules, they can do that without supporting them. As with any religious party or movement the problem remains that you don't vote for which god is true and which theology predominates, god and theology tell you how to vote. 

[Razgovory]

 

[Tamas]

Viking is right.

And a lot of you people are overanalyzing this. That region has no history of any kind of semi-advanced political culture. Of course their democracy will be shortlived (eg. about 6 months like in Egypt).

The Arab Spring was about a bunch of desperate, poor people going into unrest. It was not a mass of facebook-generation western liberal arabs as the clueless journalists claimed.

The best Egypt can hope for I think is a Putin-esque (or  Hungary-esque) pretend-democracy. I seriously doubt there is real mass demand for anything more. If there is, it will be eliminated by the democratic regime's guaranteed inability to lift up the country in a couple of years.

[jimmy olsen]

That region has no history of any kind of semi-advanced political culture.

Turkey?

[Tamas]

That region has no history of any kind of semi-advanced political culture.

Turkey?

Right. Introduced and maintained by no-compromise military ruthlessness. MAYBE it will survive after the military spent 80 years forcing secularism down the throat of everyone. Maybe.