Dutch Mad Scientist Creates Bio-Weapon That Could Kill Billions.

[Drakken]

It is a nightmare scenario

What needless editorializing.

A artificially-mutated deadly flu superstrain which can be transmitted via ambient air qualifies as a nightmare scenario to me.

[Ideologue]

It is a nightmare scenario

What needless editorializing.

You're a needless editorializing.

Your mom goes to college.

[garbon]

It is a nightmare scenario

What needless editorializing.

You're a needless editorializing.

Your mom goes to college.

Your face goes to college.

[Martinus]

Time to stock up on ferrets.

Isn't this your answer to everything? 

[Martinus]

Anyway, it's winter and tamiflu manufacturers need a profit boost. Since we did not come up with a new "deadly" flu virus this year (remember the billions who died from swine flu or avian flu?) we needed to invent one. 

[Drakken]

Anyway, it's winter and tamiflu manufacturers need a profit boost. Since we did not come up with a new "deadly" flu virus this year (remember the billions who died from swine flu or avian flu?) we needed to invent one. 

It won't get out anytime soon. The current discussion is to transfer the research on these mutated strains from biohazard level-3 to level-4 security to make it even less likely to get out through accidentally-infected researchers, or through a terrorist attack.

As for "censuring" Nature and those kinds of peer-review papers, I'm torn on this issue. It infringes on the inherent need to circulate information and research results in the scientific community, but the potential hazards if these are known for terrorists or rogue states that DO have the facilities to manipulate and mutate the strain might make it "acceptable" to severely limit this circulation, at least among a very tightly-knit circle of researchers and facilities. After all, the American and immigrant scientists in the Manhattan Project certainly did not publicize all their research work on how they build the A-Bomb and made it work, for obvious security reasons, so there are precedents.

As for the swine flu, it's not because it was a hoisted petard in hindsight that it wasn't potentially dangerous, and Tamiflu was quite effective on those mild-to-moderately severe cases of infection. We got VERY lucky this time that the random mutations didn't make it more dangerous that it was, but it certainly was the pandemic that was long overdue for this generation.

[lustindarkness]

Should we revisist this thread a year from today? December 21, 2012? 

[Darth Wagtaros]

I'll tell you what though, I'm gonna be playin more Pandemic 2 as a result of this thread. Good on you Timmay.

[Ed Anger]

I'll tell you what though, I'm gonna be playin more Pandemic 2 as a result of this thread. Good on you Timmay.

close the port.

[Capetan Mihali]

Where's Richard Widmark when you need him, goddamit?   

[grumbler]

It won't get out anytime soon. The current discussion is to transfer the research on these mutated strains from biohazard level-3 to level-4 security to make it even less likely to get out through accidentally-infected researchers, or through a terrorist attack.

As for "censuring" Nature and those kinds of peer-review papers, I'm torn on this issue. It infringes on the inherent need to circulate information and research results in the scientific community, but the potential hazards if these are known for terrorists or rogue states that DO have the facilities to manipulate and mutate the strain might make it "acceptable" to severely limit this circulation, at least among a very tightly-knit circle of researchers and facilities. After all, the American and immigrant scientists in the Manhattan Project certainly did not publicize all their research work on how they build the A-Bomb and made it work, for obvious security reasons, so there are precedents.

Listened to some eggheads (including the head of the NSABB) discussing the virus mutation research on the Diane Rehm show yesterday.  They were pretty confident that the problem wasn't the accidental spread of the virus, as the security at the facilities was plenty good enough.  The issue was how to get the relevant data (what the resulting virus looks like) out to virus strain, and that any competent biologist with an appropriately equipped lab can duplicate it in 3-5 years even without knowing any of the steps in the two successful projects (and could, indeed, have done so before this particular research was carried out).  The issue, as they saw it, was really whether a virus could be developed before some sinister types could create the virus.  Of course, the sinister types have much more incentive to do the research now that they know the virus can be produced (if, indeed, this virus actually does transmit from human to human), but all agreed that this was research that needed to be done, and that it was done responsibly.