Bad court thingy in gay teen homicide.

[Razgovory]

Terrible crime, but he should not be tried as an adult for an offense committed at age 14.  Perhaps that is driving the jury nullification here.  At least I hope it is that and not some homophobic animus toward the victim.

There a local case going to trial soon (hopefully) where a 15 year old kid killed her 9 year old neighbor so she could "Know what it feels like".  Our prosecutor is trying her as an adult (he's postponed the trial for over two years though, I think he's waiting till she gets a little older so the jury will be more inclined to see her as adult).  It's really disgraceful in my opinion.  It hasn't helped that the prosecutor has refused to share evidence with the defense.

[Razgovory]

Let's not forget that we don't know all facts of the case, and the jury does.  All we know is that the defendant shot the guy in the back of the head in front of 20 people.

This is why I was curious what Barrister had to say.  It sounds open and shut to me.  Perhaps the prosecution overreached, but it sounds like murder to me.
I don't care for trying a minor as an adult.  I know that's popular with prosecutors but it strikes me as wrong.  Also noticed that the step-father of the victim seemed to sympathize with the shooter over his own son, which is kind of sickening.

The article isn't clear, but it sounds like the jury was deadlocked between murder and manslaughter, not guilty versus not guilty.

Having gone through a youth homicide trial myself - they're tough.  You don't want to think of kids being capable of this kind of stuff.  Minsky's suggestion of "jury nullification" sounds logical.

I posted the Wiki thing which gives a bit more info.  It sounded like the defense was arguing that the victim was sexually harassing the shooter.

[Barrister]

Beeb: been meaning to ask you--I've been watching Law & Order reruns late at one (one was so old schoole it had Paul Sorvino and Captain Philly Fade).

Are there any legal penalties for breaking a verbal plea agreement?  What standing does a plea deal have in law?

Very good question.  It was so good a recent case from Alberta went all the way up to the SCC just this year.

Rather than type out a long summary, I'll just post the SCC headnote:

The accused drove her motor home through an intersection and struck another vehicle, killing a husband and wife and injuring their young son.  She was charged with several Criminal Code offences, including dangerous driving causing death, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, and parallel charges for impaired driving.  Counsel initially entered into a plea agreement according to which the accused would plead guilty to a charge of careless driving under the provincial Traffic Safety Act with a joint sentence recommendation for an $1,800 fine in return for which the Crown agreed to withdraw the Criminal Code charges.  When the Acting Assistant Deputy Minister of the Criminal Justice Division of the Office of the Attorney General saw the proposed resolution, he initiated an inquiry which led him to conclude that Crown counsel's assessment of the strength of the case was flawed. In his view, a plea to careless driving in the circumstances was contrary to the interests of justice and would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.  Crown counsel was thus instructed to withdraw the plea agreement and to proceed to trial.  In response, the accused brought a s. 7 Charter application alleging abuse of process and seeking a court direction requiring the Crown to complete the plea agreement.  The application judge held that negotiations between counsel after charges are laid are matters of tactics or conduct which are subject to review by the court, and that the repudiation of the plea agreement, in this case, was not justified.  He concluded that the accused's s. 7 Charter right to security of the person had been breached and he directed the Crown to proceed with the agreement.  The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the repudiation of a plea agreement is a matter of prosecutorial discretion not reviewable by the courts, subject to the doctrine of abuse of process.

                    Held:  The appeal should be dismissed.

                    The crucial importance of the distinction between prosecutorial discretion reviewable only for abuse of process and matters of tactics or conduct before the court governed by the inherent jurisdiction of the criminal trial court to control its own process was fully canvassed and explained in Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, 2002 SCC 65 (CanLII), 2002 SCC 65, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372.  Subject to the abuse of process doctrine, supervising one litigant's decision-making process — rather than the conduct of litigants before the court — is beyond the legitimate reach of the court.  The Crown's decision in this case to resile from the plea agreement and to continue the prosecution clearly constituted an act of prosecutorial discretion subject to the principles set out in Krieger:  it is only reviewable for abuse of process.  Prosecutorial discretion is not spent with the decision to initiate the proceedings, nor does it terminate with a plea agreement.  So long as the proceedings are ongoing, the Crown may be required to make further decisions about whether the prosecution should be continued, and if so, in respect of what charges.

                    There are two categories of abuse of process under s. 7 of the Charter:  (1) prosecutorial conduct affecting the fairness of the trial; and (2) prosecutorial conduct that contravenes fundamental notions of justice and thus undermines the integrity of the judicial process.  While s. 24(1) of the Charter allows for a wide range of remedies, this does not mean that abuse of process can be made out by demonstrating a lesser degree of harm, either to the accused's fair trial interests or to the integrity of the justice system.  Achieving the appropriate balance between societal and individual concerns defines the essential character of abuse of process.

                    The repudiation of a plea agreement may well constitute an abuse of process, either because it results in trial unfairness or meets the narrow residual category of abuse that undermines the integrity of the judicial process.  The more difficult question in this appeal is how the initial exercise of prosecutorial discretion — Crown counsel's offer to resolve the matter on the basis of a plea to a lesser charge — should figure in the analysis regarding abuse of process.  A plea agreement should not be regarded as a contractual undertaking.  Vitiating factors, such as mistake, misrepresentation or fraud, which usually inform a private party's right to resile from a bargain, do not fully capture the public interest considerations which are at play.  However, the analogy can usefully underscore the utmost importance of honouring the agreement.  The situations in which the Crown can properly repudiate a plea agreement are, and must remain, very rare.  Moreover, the reasonably defensible test applied by the application judge to Crown counsel's decision to enter into a plea agreement is not the appropriate measure to determine whether there is an abuse of process.  Indeed, it is the circumstances surrounding the repudiation of a plea agreement which should be reviewed to determine whether that decision amounts to an abuse of process.  Reviewing for "reasonableness" a decision made in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion runs contrary to the constitutionally separate role of the Attorney General in the initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecutions as well as the principles set out in Krieger.

                    Given that acts of prosecutorial discretion are generally beyond the reach of the court, there is good reason to impose a threshold burden on the applicant who alleges abuse of process.  A court should not embark on an inquiry into the reasons behind the exercise of prosecutorial discretion without a proper evidentiary foundation.  However, evidence that a plea agreement has been entered into and subsequently reneged by the Crown meets the requisite threshold.  Further, to the extent that the Crown is the only party who is privy to the information, the evidentiary burden shifts to the Crown to enlighten the court on the circumstances and reasons behind its decision to resile from the agreement.  The ultimate burden of proving abuse of process, however, remains on the applicant.

                    In this case, the Crown's repudiation conduct cannot be considered so unfair or oppressive to the accused, or so tainted by bad faith or improper motive, that to allow the Crown to now proceed on the dangerous driving Criminal Code charges would tarnish the integrity of the judicial system and thus constitute an abuse of process.  Indeed, the Acting Assistant Deputy Minister, in good faith, determined that Crown counsel's assessment of the strength of the evidence was erroneous and, on that basis, having regard to the seriousness of the offences, concluded that it would not be in the public interest to terminate the prosecution on the criminal charges.  This can hardly be regarded as evidence of misconduct.  Finally, the accused was returned to the position she was in at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing before the plea agreement was entered into and thus suffered no prejudice as a result of the repudiation.

http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2011/2011scc34/2011scc34.html

So - a plea deal doesn't have a great deal of 'legal standing' - until it is acted upon.  Once it is acted upon - say, by entering a guilty plea, then it would be far more enforceable.

And that all focuses on the Crown.  From the accused - I always assume a plea deal is worthless up until the moment the accused actually says the word "guilty", or puts their signature to an agreed statement of facts.

[Barrister]

Terrible crime, but he should not be tried as an adult for an offense committed at age 14.  Perhaps that is driving the jury nullification here.  At least I hope it is that and not some homophobic animus toward the victim.

There a local case going to trial soon (hopefully) where a 15 year old kid killed her 9 year old neighbor so she could "Know what it feels like".  Our prosecutor is trying her as an adult (he's postponed the trial for over two years though, I think he's waiting till she gets a little older so the jury will be more inclined to see her as adult).  It's really disgraceful in my opinion.  It hasn't helped that the prosecutor has refused to share evidence with the defense.

How is pursuing a legally available sentence "disgraceful"?

[The Brain]

How is pursuing a legally available sentence "disgraceful"?

BB in one sentence.

[jimmy olsen]

Delaying the trail is. All defendants are entitled  to a swift trial.

[Razgovory]

Terrible crime, but he should not be tried as an adult for an offense committed at age 14.  Perhaps that is driving the jury nullification here.  At least I hope it is that and not some homophobic animus toward the victim.

There a local case going to trial soon (hopefully) where a 15 year old kid killed her 9 year old neighbor so she could "Know what it feels like".  Our prosecutor is trying her as an adult (he's postponed the trial for over two years though, I think he's waiting till she gets a little older so the jury will be more inclined to see her as adult).  It's really disgraceful in my opinion.  It hasn't helped that the prosecutor has refused to share evidence with the defense.

How is pursuing a legally available sentence "disgraceful"?

I don't like trying kids as adults.  We don't grant adult rights to children.  There is an assumption that they aren't old enough fully understand their actions.  So we don't let them vote or run for office etc.  Trying a kid as adult but refusal to grant adult rights feels like trying to have it both ways.

[Barrister]

Terrible crime, but he should not be tried as an adult for an offense committed at age 14.  Perhaps that is driving the jury nullification here.  At least I hope it is that and not some homophobic animus toward the victim.

There a local case going to trial soon (hopefully) where a 15 year old kid killed her 9 year old neighbor so she could "Know what it feels like".  Our prosecutor is trying her as an adult (he's postponed the trial for over two years though, I think he's waiting till she gets a little older so the jury will be more inclined to see her as adult).  It's really disgraceful in my opinion.  It hasn't helped that the prosecutor has refused to share evidence with the defense.

How is pursuing a legally available sentence "disgraceful"?

I don't like trying kids as adults.  We don't grant adult rights to children.  There is an assumption that they aren't old enough fully understand their actions.  So we don't let them vote or run for office etc.  Trying a kid as adult but refusal to grant adult rights feels like trying to have it both ways.

So it's disgraceful to do things you don't like.  Gotcha.

If it makes you feel any better, we don't try kids as adults.  Instead, once they've been convicted (and if we've given notice), we can apply to have them sentenced as an adult.

[Valmy]

So it's disgraceful to do things you don't like.  Gotcha.

Um yeah.  He thinks it is disgraceful to do things that he finds disgraceful.  Don't we all?

[PDH]

So it's disgraceful to do things you don't like.  Gotcha.

Um yeah.  He thinks it is disgraceful to do things that he finds disgraceful.  Don't we all?

Your reasonableness is a disgrace.

[The Brain]

Delaying the trail is. All defendants are entitled  to a swift trial.

No Trial of Tears?

[jimmy olsen]

Delaying the trail is. All defendants are entitled  to a swift trial.

No Trial of Tears?

Doh!

[dps]

So it's disgraceful to do things you don't like.  Gotcha.

Um yeah.  He thinks it is disgraceful to do things that he finds disgraceful.  Don't we all?

I have enough common sense to make a distinction between things that I merely don't like, and things that I find disgraceful.  For example, I don't like mustard on my hamburgers.  But if you put it on your hamburger, I don't find that disgraceful.

I wouldn't be at all surprised to find that Raz lacks that enough common sense to make the distinction.  I would have expected a bit more out of you, though.

[Razgovory]

So it's disgraceful to do things you don't like.  Gotcha.

Um yeah.  He thinks it is disgraceful to do things that he finds disgraceful.  Don't we all?

I have enough common sense to make a distinction between things that I merely don't like, and things that I find disgraceful.  For example, I don't like mustard on my hamburgers.  But if you put it on your hamburger, I don't find that disgraceful.

I wouldn't be at all surprised to find that Raz lacks that enough common sense to make the distinction.  I would have expected a bit more out of you, though.

I have enough common sense to make a distinction between matters justice and matters of condiments.

[Faeelin]

Who cares?

I can't wait til the Saracens drive you to the sea and take your women. Again.