Do You Support John Brown's Revolutionary Violence

[jimmy olsen]

That is a pretty strong natural law position to take.

The problem that John Brown faces it seems to me is that he is a citizen of a republic whose basic law recognizes the right to enslave human beings, so that he cannot with any consistency claim the rights and protections of citizenship while at the same time rejecting the legitimacy of some of its basic laws.  Moreover, I don't think the problem can be solved by placing the slaveholders alone in the position of "hostis humani generis" while characterizing the government as a purely passive actor.  This was the age of the Fugitive Slave Act and Dred Scott - the general government is an active enforcer of slavery, and thus the entire political community is complicit. So as I see it, Brown has one of two choices -- either (1) accept the basic legitimacy of the political community in which he lives and limit himself to those avenues of the protest that the community permits, or (2) reject the legitimacy of the polity and become literally an "outlaw".  In choosing the latter, he justifiably could seek recourse to violence to counter violence, but at the same time could not be heard to complain if the political community then exacted the penalty for outlawry.  Put simply, Brown had justification to foment an armed slave rebellion and the state had justification to hang him for it.

All the more reason for violence. Given that John Brown was plotting a nation wide slave revolt, I hardly think it credible to argue that he did not "reject the legitimacy of the polity".

[The Minsky Moment]

The problem with a pure natural rights view is that it presumes the moral reasoning can be conducted with scientific precision and certitude.  If it cannot (as I would maintain) then not only is a theoretical polity based on natural right doomed to endless strife due to disagreement over the right, but it is all so true that there is way even in theory for such strife to be resolved.

The dual virtue of democracy is that not only can be be justified as a matter of right in itself (based on an appeal to autonomy and a priori equality) but it can separately and additionally be justified as a procedural mechanism to respond to the limitations of moral reasoning.  Ie recognizings that moral reasoning cannot universally yield determinate answers to all critical political questions, democracy provides a fair procedural mechanism for resolving such disagreements.  But such a mechanism requires not only recognition not only the fundamental rights that are a condition for democracy to function but also that all members of the democracy agree to renounce violence as a means of resolving political disputes, and instead to agree to abide bybthe procedures of democracy itself.

In this simple schema therefore a member of a nondemocratic polity retains the right to follow their own moral reasoning, and the state cannot legitimately punish him other than as an exercise o raw power.  In a true democracy, matters stand quite to the contrary and the right of the individual to pursue moral ends is subject to the rules of democratic political engagement.

The problem of course is that life rarely accords with the simple schema and true democracies are few and far between.   Specifically the situation in 1850s america is a hybrid form where only property holding males have full rights, and certain persons (slaves) have none.  In such a system the right of the slave to rebel and use violence follows from the fundamental right of self defense and the state cannot legitimately punish the exercise of that right as the state has no justifiable claim to the slaves obedience and adherence to it's laws.  But the situation for a property holding white male like Brown is different.  He fully enjoys all political rights, including the manifold opportunity to redress wrongs.  His enjoyment of those rights does not make slavery any less an evil and thus if one accepts slavery to be a basic moral wrong (as I do) his taking violent action in aid of the oppressed is morally justified.  But in taking that action, he also violates his duty as citizen enjoying full rights in a democracy to abide by the rules of political engagement, and the state may therefore legitimately punish him for that.

[Ideologue]

The dual virtue of democracy is that not only can be be justified as a matter of right in itself (based on an appeal to autonomy and a priori equality) but it can separately and additionally be justified as a procedural mechanism to respond to the limitations of moral reasoning.  Ie recognizings that moral reasoning cannot universally yield determinate answers to all critical political questions, democracy provides a fair procedural mechanism for resolving such disagreements.  But such a mechanism requires not only recognition not only the fundamental rights that are a condition for democracy to function but also that all members of the democracy agree to renounce violence as a means of resolving political disputes, and instead to agree to abide bybthe procedures of democracy itself.

In this simple schema therefore a member of a nondemocratic polity retains the right to follow their own moral reasoning, and the state cannot legitimately punish him other than as an exercise o raw power.  In a true democracy, matters stand quite to the contrary and the right of the individual to pursue moral ends is subject to the rules of democratic political engagement.

The problem of course is that life rarely accords with the simple schema and true democracies are few and far between.   Specifically the situation in 1850s america is a hybrid form where only property holding males have full rights, and certain persons (slaves) have none.  In such a system the right of the slave to rebel and use violence follows from the fundamental right of self defense and the state cannot legitimately punish the exercise of that right as the state has no justifiable claim to the slaves obedience and adherence to it's laws.  But the situation for a property holding white male like Brown is different.  He fully enjoys all political rights, including the manifold opportunity to redress wrongs.  His enjoyment of those rights does not make slavery any less an evil and thus if one accepts slavery to be a basic moral wrong (as I do) his taking violent action in aid of the oppressed is morally justified.  But in taking that action, he also violates his duty as citizen enjoying full rights in a democracy to abide by the rules of political engagement, and the state may therefore legitimately punish him for that.

Ok, I think I understand the logic, though I don't agree that he violated his duty, because I don't believe the existence of a duty has been established.  The ongoing, instant violence of slavery defeats any purpose democratic process would have.  Basically, when you see a woman being raped, you don't write your congressman.

I like to think that engaging in that process is still morally worthwhile (if violent opposition to any oppression, any where, is morally obligatory, then all of us are damned), but in the case of slavery democracy had demonstrably failed.  Slavery wasn't new in 1858; the United States, with all its democratic process, had existed for almost a century, and done little to curb the institution.

At what point is it acceptable to accept the failure of democracy, and move on to other means?  At what point is it necessary?

[dps]

Slavery wasn't new in 1858; the United States, with all its democratic process, had existed for almost a century, and done little to curb the institution.

In 1780, slavery was legal everywhere in the U.S.;  by 1860, it was only legal in half the states, and there wasn't much room in the reamaining territories for it to expand into.  Also, the U.S. had banned the African slave trade almost as soon as the Constitution allowed it, and the Buchanan administration was starting to actually enforce the ban.

[Zoupa]

But then, slavery is used to beg the question: what do you do when law and order support an unjust regime, even if a democracy? You wait?

You reason, you persuade.

While your fellow man is in shackles?

[Slargos]

The dual virtue of democracy is that not only can be be justified as a matter of right in itself (based on an appeal to autonomy and a priori equality) but it can separately and additionally be justified as a procedural mechanism to respond to the limitations of moral reasoning.  Ie recognizings that moral reasoning cannot universally yield determinate answers to all critical political questions, democracy provides a fair procedural mechanism for resolving such disagreements.  But such a mechanism requires not only recognition not only the fundamental rights that are a condition for democracy to function but also that all members of the democracy agree to renounce violence as a means of resolving political disputes, and instead to agree to abide bybthe procedures of democracy itself.

In this simple schema therefore a member of a nondemocratic polity retains the right to follow their own moral reasoning, and the state cannot legitimately punish him other than as an exercise o raw power.  In a true democracy, matters stand quite to the contrary and the right of the individual to pursue moral ends is subject to the rules of democratic political engagement.

The problem of course is that life rarely accords with the simple schema and true democracies are few and far between.   Specifically the situation in 1850s america is a hybrid form where only property holding males have full rights, and certain persons (slaves) have none.  In such a system the right of the slave to rebel and use violence follows from the fundamental right of self defense and the state cannot legitimately punish the exercise of that right as the state has no justifiable claim to the slaves obedience and adherence to it's laws.  But the situation for a property holding white male like Brown is different.  He fully enjoys all political rights, including the manifold opportunity to redress wrongs.  His enjoyment of those rights does not make slavery any less an evil and thus if one accepts slavery to be a basic moral wrong (as I do) his taking violent action in aid of the oppressed is morally justified.  But in taking that action, he also violates his duty as citizen enjoying full rights in a democracy to abide by the rules of political engagement, and the state may therefore legitimately punish him for that.

Ok, I think I understand the logic, though I don't agree that he violated his duty, because I don't believe the existence of a duty has been established.  The ongoing, instant violence of slavery defeats any purpose democratic process would have.  Basically, when you see a woman being raped, you don't write your congressman.

I like to think that engaging in that process is still morally worthwhile (if violent opposition to any oppression, any where, is morally obligatory, then all of us are damned), but in the case of slavery democracy had demonstrably failed.  Slavery wasn't new in 1858; the United States, with all its democratic process, had existed for almost a century, and done little to curb the institution.

At what point is it acceptable to accept the failure of democracy, and move on to other means?  At what point is it necessary?

Maybe you can ask Breivik.

[Ideologue]

Shut up, Slargos.

[Slargos]

why? youre essentially saying that one only needs to believe strongly enough that a crime is being committed in order to justify murder.

[Neil]

Maybe you can ask Breivik.

Well-played.

[alfred russel]

That is a pretty strong natural law position to take.

The problem that John Brown faces it seems to me is that he is a citizen of a republic whose basic law recognizes the right to enslave human beings, so that he cannot with any consistency claim the rights and protections of citizenship while at the same time rejecting the legitimacy of some of its basic laws.  Moreover, I don't think the problem can be solved by placing the slaveholders alone in the position of "hostis humani generis" while characterizing the government as a purely passive actor.  This was the age of the Fugitive Slave Act and Dred Scott - the general government is an active enforcer of slavery, and thus the entire political community is complicit.  So as I see it, Brown has one of two choices -- either (1) accept the basic legitimacy of the political community in which he lives and limit himself to those avenues of the protest that the community permits, or (2) reject the legitimacy of the polity and become literally an "outlaw".  In choosing the latter, he justifiably could seek recourse to violence to counter violence, but at the same time could not be heard to complain if the political community then exacted the penalty for outlawry.  Put simply, Brown had justification to foment an armed slave rebellion and the state had justification to hang him for it.

I think that the justification of violence requires several conditions to be met: a) a moral cause, b) a reasonable expectation of success, and c) a reasonable expectation that the ends will justify the means after success is achieved.

John Brown met a), he didn't meet b) or c). I'd say he didn't have justification.

[jimmy olsen]

That is a pretty strong natural law position to take.

The problem that John Brown faces it seems to me is that he is a citizen of a republic whose basic law recognizes the right to enslave human beings, so that he cannot with any consistency claim the rights and protections of citizenship while at the same time rejecting the legitimacy of some of its basic laws.  Moreover, I don't think the problem can be solved by placing the slaveholders alone in the position of "hostis humani generis" while characterizing the government as a purely passive actor.  This was the age of the Fugitive Slave Act and Dred Scott - the general government is an active enforcer of slavery, and thus the entire political community is complicit.  So as I see it, Brown has one of two choices -- either (1) accept the basic legitimacy of the political community in which he lives and limit himself to those avenues of the protest that the community permits, or (2) reject the legitimacy of the polity and become literally an "outlaw".  In choosing the latter, he justifiably could seek recourse to violence to counter violence, but at the same time could not be heard to complain if the political community then exacted the penalty for outlawry.  Put simply, Brown had justification to foment an armed slave rebellion and the state had justification to hang him for it.

I think that the justification of violence requires several conditions to be met: a) a moral cause, b) a reasonable expectation of success, and c) a reasonable expectation that the ends will justify the means after success is achieved.

John Brown met a), he didn't meet b) or c). I'd say he didn't have justification.

I don't think that a reasonable expectation is necessary, if the anticipated fallout will favor your cause. Unlike Viking I see very little hope that there could have been peaceful abolition in the US after the 1830s when the issue was last discussed in a southern legislature. From that point on the South grew ever more radical and fanatical in the institution's defense.

To abolish slavery, a war was needed and John Brown helped provoke that war with his actions. John Brown's raid lead to an explosion in tension between the sections, and the fallout of this is in part to blame for the Civil War. The war ended with 4 million slaves freed.

If John Brown knew how his action would be received in the North by abolitionists, and how the South would react in turn to that reaction I'd say that justifies his actions. Given the way he played the martyr during his trail, I think that he knew what he was doing.

[dps]

To abolish slavery, a war was needed and John Brown helped provoke that war with his actions. John Brown's raid lead to an explosion in tension between the sections, and the fallout of this is in part to blame for the Civil War. The war ended with 4 million slaves freed.

See, I think this is the only way that you can justify what Brown did, and I don't buy it.  There's no way to know for sure, of course, but I figure without Brown, Lincoln would still have won the 1860 election, and the South would have still seceded, and there would still have been a war that the Union won.

[The Brain]

I like how starting a devastating civil war with hundreds of thousands killed is seen as something positive that may justify acts of terrorism.

[Martinus]

The problem with a pure natural rights view is that it presumes the moral reasoning can be conducted with scientific precision and certitude.  If it cannot (as I would maintain) then not only is a theoretical polity based on natural right doomed to endless strife due to disagreement over the right, but it is all so true that there is way even in theory for such strife to be resolved.

The dual virtue of democracy is that not only can be be justified as a matter of right in itself (based on an appeal to autonomy and a priori equality) but it can separately and additionally be justified as a procedural mechanism to respond to the limitations of moral reasoning.  Ie recognizings that moral reasoning cannot universally yield determinate answers to all critical political questions, democracy provides a fair procedural mechanism for resolving such disagreements.  But such a mechanism requires not only recognition not only the fundamental rights that are a condition for democracy to function but also that all members of the democracy agree to renounce violence as a means of resolving political disputes, and instead to agree to abide bybthe procedures of democracy itself.

In this simple schema therefore a member of a nondemocratic polity retains the right to follow their own moral reasoning, and the state cannot legitimately punish him other than as an exercise o raw power.  In a true democracy, matters stand quite to the contrary and the right of the individual to pursue moral ends is subject to the rules of democratic political engagement.

The problem of course is that life rarely accords with the simple schema and true democracies are few and far between.   Specifically the situation in 1850s america is a hybrid form where only property holding males have full rights, and certain persons (slaves) have none.  In such a system the right of the slave to rebel and use violence follows from the fundamental right of self defense and the state cannot legitimately punish the exercise of that right as the state has no justifiable claim to the slaves obedience and adherence to it's laws.  But the situation for a property holding white male like Brown is different.  He fully enjoys all political rights, including the manifold opportunity to redress wrongs.  His enjoyment of those rights does not make slavery any less an evil and thus if one accepts slavery to be a basic moral wrong (as I do) his taking violent action in aid of the oppressed is morally justified.  But in taking that action, he also violates his duty as citizen enjoying full rights in a democracy to abide by the rules of political engagement, and the state may therefore legitimately punish him for that.

I disagree with the last part of your analysis. If you accept that it is permissible to use violence in defense of liberty and life of those unlawfully deprived of it (in this case slaves), the violence is permitted both by those who are directly oppressed and those who stand up in their defense.

If a criminal is pointing a gun at you with an intention to kill you, you have a right to kill him in self-defense, but so do I have such a right in defense of your life.

John Brown would not be authorized to use violence to defend, say, against a tax imposed on him by the polity he is a member of, however he was in hisright to use violence in defense of those who were deprived of their fundamental rights by the polity.

[Slargos]

I like how starting a devastating civil war with hundreds of thousands killed is seen as something positive that may justify acts of terrorism.

where would we be today without all the acw games? net good.