When Did the ME Go Wrong?

[The Minsky Moment]

How about 300 years of constant warfare with the Parthians and continued problems with the Sarmatians?  This works almost exactly; the Romans didn't have a clue how to deal with horse-archers until they adopted some eastern styles of warfare (Syrian archers) and eventually the whole Persian shebang (grivpanvar=clibanarii, cataphracts).

That's not Malthus' argument and for good reason - endemic conflict with other settled peoples characterized early modern European states as well.  The conflict with the Parthians was not over Roman control of the Med, which was unquestioned - it was over control of northern Mesopotamia, and by and large the Romans had the better of it.  There were costs of course - but even taking into account the massive defense costs, the eastern provinces were still a net gain economically.

It's worth remembering that the real death of "Classical Civilization" was the continued Sassanid-Byzantine wars combined with the plague and the continued militarization of the steppe lifestyle. 

But classical civilization in the central Med collapsed long before than, in significant part due to Justinians military adventures.

[Queequeg]

That's not Malthus' argument and for good reason - endemic conflict with other settled peoples characterized early modern European states as well.  The conflict with the Parthians was not over Roman control of the Med, which was unquestioned - it was over control of northern Mesopotamia, and by and large the Romans had the better of it.  There were costs of course - but even taking into account the massive defense costs, the eastern provinces were still a net gain economically.

True, but then again the Steppe was still developing; the stirrup was not in useage, and the Turkic division between close bow-regular bow was not developed, the classic steppe division into multiples of ten was just invented, and the nomad way of life was less explicitly militaristic and (essentially) parasitic.  Even in this period the cavalry archer was effective enough to stave off the greatest military machine in the world, and with time was so effective that it adopted and ended up replacing (as the dominant element) the Roman style of combat.   

Also worth noting that that edge of Mesopatamia is, for whatever reason, about the place nomadic warfare starts to loose some of its luster; the Mongols had similar difficulty there, as did the Seljuks. 

[Malthus]

Well now wait a second.  Poland, and Eastern Europe in general, were closer to and associated with Easterners all the time.   They also were close by and associated with Westerners.  So my question woud be if bringing forth all this Eastern knowledge through Islam, Mongols and so forth was so instrumental wouldn't it have had a larger impact in places that associated with those cultures on a regular basis than those that interacted less?  Why didn't the renaissance start in Spain or Poland if it was all about Westerners being influenced by the East?

I am always a bit leery of the whole idea of the East facilitating the rise of the West.  it just makes no sense culturally or geographically.  Great ideas were taking off from Western Europe...not from Greece, Spain, Poland, and Russia which is where one would expect it to originate from if Eastern ideas were really as central as they were often presented.

That is not to say that Asian ideas did not have an influence (or that the Italians were not involved in the Eastern Mediterranean because they were) but the whole 'The Renaissance would never have happened with <insert pet Eastern culture here>' thing is a bit overstated IMO.

You are exaggerating what I'm saying to refute it.

If the preconditions for the rise of modernity is A + B + C + D and someone says that D (in this case, certain technological advances) only got to Europe through Mongol facilitated spread of ideas and cultures (which is what I'm saying) it does not mean that D is the only important factor (which is what you say you have a problem with).  A and B and C are equally important, and where absent modernity would not develop.  However, without D it won't either.  Perhaps D will eventually reach Western Europe or perhaps it'll be developed independently, however as it happened it got there as a result of the Mongol policy if cultural, philosophical, merchantile and technological exchange throughout their territory.

As for why Russia and Poland didn't make the leap even though they were closer to the source of D, I don't know.  Perhaps it was because they were missing B and C (whatever exactly those were) which were present further West.  This in no way invalidates the suggestion that D was critical to the rise of the modern world and that Europe got those through the Mongols.

That's not a bad way of conceptualizing my argument with Minsky.

What I'm saying is that most of the civilizations of Eurasia had about the same amount of A+B+C ... being the various technological, cultural and social abilities which are the preconditions for creating modernity. When one looks at the differences between them, there appears one vital factor - call it [- X], using a minus sign to indicate that it is a negative or retarding factor - that afflicted certain civilizations, and not others.

Now, as in the theme of this thread, some see this [-X] factor as being ideological - namely, that the cultures of the ME had Islam and the cultures of China etc. had Buddhism and Confucianism, and that *this* was the retarding factor. I do not agree. To my mind, the Minsky/Oex theory is close to this more traditional or ideological explaination.   

As stated, I see the retarding factor as historical - the invasion by barbarians at the "right time".

Minsky challenges this by stating that, if such were the case, modernity would surely have happened at some previous time - say under the Romans. My response to him is more or less what you have said - that modernity appears to require some threshold, some concatination of factors A+B+C ... etc., and the Romans did not as of yet possess.

Minsky's response to this was to assert that nothing of signicicance had really changed since Sumerian times until the modern era. If that is the case, then the transmission of technology via Mongols is surely a meaningless event.  If that is not the case, if the Mongols transmitted some tech vital to reaching that threshold - that supports my theory, and simply adds an element of irony to it: the very Mongols that suppressed China also aided Europe by acting as a conduit for those techs (the last 'letter' in the A+B+C ... sequence) necessary fpr Europe to reach the threshold for the take-off to modernity.

[Malthus]

Sorry to play Brutus here Malthus, but you seem to be overplaying your hand.  There were nomads who gave up their ways to live a settled lifestyle by choice rather than by necessity or by assimilation.  The nomadic Parni and Dahae in modern day Turkmenistan were famously adequate agriculturalists and superior  architectsbefore they moved into Parthia and became the Parthians.  As you would expect, there is something of a scale of civilization, with pure central Mongol nomadism on one hand, mixed pastoralism in the middle and settling down/becoming landed aristocracy on the other. 

In general though I agree, obviously.  I think one of the best examples of Malthus' case is the difference between the Parthians and the Sassanids; the Parthians were, in general, great warriors and had their own unique culture that contributed to the Persian tradition, but they ruled like the head of a conspiracy; if one tribe got too strong (say the Suren, who famously fucked up the Romans a lot) they'd kill everyone in it, or if one settled people started getting uppity they'd send in some of their more nomadic kin from the ancestral lands of the Parni.  On the other hand the Sassanids self consciously thought of themselves as a united Iranian monarchy and helped reconquer lands from the Nomads, Romans and really everyone else, and ushered in a new Golden Age.

Well, yes; in fact on the border of China there was a constant process of cultural assimilation going both ways: some nomads settled and became "civilized" and some Chinese took up nomadism.

This is a mere bagatelle, though.

[jimmy olsen]

This is a mere bagatelle, though.

What?

I looked this term up on wikipedia and still don't get what you mean by that.

[Malthus]

This is a mere bagatelle, though.

What?

I looked this term up on wikipedia and still don't get what you mean by that.

It means something of small importance.

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/bagatelle

[Oexmelin]

trifle.

[jimmy olsen]

This is a mere bagatelle, though.

What?

I looked this term up on wikipedia and still don't get what you mean by that.

It means something of small importance.

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/bagatelle

Ah, wiki had an in depth description of a billiard game by that name.

[Malthus]

Ah, wiki had an in depth description of a billiard game by that name.

In context that would be a bit odd. 

[The Minsky Moment]

Now, as in the theme of this thread, some see this [-X] factor as being ideological - namely, that the cultures of the ME had Islam and the cultures of China etc. had Buddhism and Confucianism, and that *this* was the retarding factor. I do not agree. To my mind, the Minsky/Oex theory is close to this more traditional or ideological explaination.   

Early on, I specifically rejected cultural determinism as explantory.  It is plainly false, as "confucian" or buddhist societies have made very successful transitions to industrial and post-industrial development.  And as Oex explained a few posts ago, the argument isn't that "protestantism" or "western culture" per se was the triggering factor.  Rather, the triggering set of ideas can substantiate themselves within the context of any number of broader cultural groupings.  It just so happens that historically it first happened in the context of a few societies in northwestern Europe that were predominantly (but not entirely) Protestant.  This may or may not be coincidental - to be honest I am not sure.  But I am pretty sure it isn't necessary - ie it is possible that it could have started first somewhere else.  Although I do think that the odds of it happening *anywhere* (or in any particularly place) were fairly long a priori.  Given enough time, it was probably bound to happen sometime, but it could have easily been another 1000, 2000, 3000 years.

Minsky challenges this by stating that, if such were the case, modernity would surely have happened at some previous time - say under the Romans. My response to him is more or less what you have said - that modernity appears to require some threshold, some concatination of factors A+B+C ... etc., and the Romans did not as of yet possess.

The Romans inherited the entire corpus of Greek science and philosophy.  They were brilliant practical engineers.  If they had had the appropriate animating ideologies, they could have harnessed steam power for productive applications, developed joint-stock companies, etc.  They just didn't.  What is the "C" they were missing?

Minsky's response to this was to assert that nothing of signicicance had really changed since Sumerian times until the modern era.

That is starting to veer towards strawman territory.  My point is that the gap between pre-modern workers and 20th century workers in a fully industrialized society is greater than the gap between any two sets of pre-modern workers.  That is testament to the sheer chasm involved in the former gap as opposed to a claim that there is no gap in the latter case.  I also contended that from the POV of the mass of farmers, the basic patterns of life and material conditions changed relatively little from ancient times to the immediate pre-modern era, as compared to what came after.  This is different from a claim that *nothing* of significance changed.

[Malthus]

Early on, I specifically rejected cultural determinism as explantory.  It is plainly false, as "confucian" or buddhist societies have made very successful transitions to industrial and post-industrial development.  And as Oex explained a few posts ago, the argument isn't that "protestantism" or "western culture" per se was the triggering factor.  Rather, the triggering set of ideas can substantiate themselves within the context of any number of broader cultural groupings.  It just so happens that historically it first happened in the context of a few societies in northwestern Europe that were predominantly (but not entirely) Protestant.  This may or may not be coincidental - to be honest I am not sure.  But I am pretty sure it isn't necessary - ie it is possible that it could have started first somewhere else.  Although I do think that the odds of it happening *anywhere* (or in any particularly place) were fairly long a priori.  Given enough time, it was probably bound to happen sometime, but it could have easily been another 1000, 2000, 3000 years.

Oex identifies himself as a Weberian, albeit his understanding of Weber is not crudely deterministic ... but nonetheless the underly assumption throughout this thread at least *appears* to favour some sort of ideological or cultural determinism. Why else all that stuff about how it is necessary for there to be a theory of progress for there to be progress?

The Romans inherited the entire corpus of Greek science and philosophy.  They were brilliant practical engineers.  If they had had the appropriate animating ideologies, they could have harnessed steam power for productive applications, developed joint-stock companies, etc.  They just didn't.  What is the "C" they were missing?

And this is the point where I re-state Jacob's point - you can't take one thing from isolation and say "this thing was necessary". Rather, there seems to be some critical mass required.

That is starting to veer towards strawman territory.  My point is that the gap between pre-modern workers and 20th century workers in a fully industrialized society is greater than the gap between any two sets of pre-modern workers.  That is testament to the sheer chasm involved in the former gap as opposed to a claim that there is no gap in the latter case.  I also contended that from the POV of the mass of farmers, the basic patterns of life and material conditions changed relatively little from ancient times to the immediate pre-modern era, as compared to what came after.  This is different from a claim that *nothing* of significance changed.

But you undermine this position in your very response above, where you state that maybe it could have taken another 3,000 years to reach modernity. My point is that you seem to hold that there has been no change significant in terms of progress - that modernity has, as it were, no anticedents and comes mysteriously out of the blue.

My point is that there is clearly a slow but cumulative development going on - the transition of metals technology from bronze to iron; the development of printing and other common mechanical contrivances; the stirrup and the plough; chemistry and gunpowder; increasing population densities; all diffused througout Eurasia - gradually reaching a critical mass. Barring significant disaster on the lines of an extinction event, there is simply no way that Eurasia would have taken another 3,000 years to reach modernity.

[Queequeg]

Minsky/Oex, I'm curious what you two would make of the following hypothetical.

It is 1000 AD, and a dedicated, slightly vicious explorer in the Cordoban Caliphate of mixed Sicilian Arab/Jewish extraction from Lisbon proposes to the Caliph that he sail to the Indies to compete with the growing Ghaznavid/Turkic influence there exceptionally well made, large baghlah. 

Do the Andalusians take advantage of this as well as their Spanish descendants/opponents?  Does this change the entire tide of human 'progress'?  Or does this much earlier Europe still colonize much of the Americas?

[The Brain]

Minsky/Oex, I'm curious what you two would make of the following hypothetical.

It is 1000 AD, and a dedicated, slightly vicious explorer in the Cordoban Caliphate of mixed Sicilian Arab/Jewish extraction from Lisbon proposes to the Caliph that he sail to the Indies to compete with the growing Ghaznavid/Turkic influence there exceptionally well made, large baghlah. 

Do the Andalusians take advantage of this as well as their Spanish descendants/opponents?  Does this change the entire tide of human 'progress'?  Or does this much earlier Europe still colonize much of the Americas?

The South will end up using dino cavalry in the Third War of Northern Aggression 1941-45, in which they are allied to the Congo Free State and Byzantium.

[The Minsky Moment]

Oex identifies himself as a Weberian, albeit his understanding of Weber is not crudely deterministic ... but nonetheless the underly assumption throughout this thread at least *appears* to favour some sort of ideological or cultural determinism. Why else all that stuff about how it is necessary for there to be a theory of progress for there to be progress?

Culture is a dangerously imprecise word that comes with a lot of baggage.  Disparate cultures are capable of mobilizing similar sets of ideas - they may come about it in different ways but the basic results are similar. 

And this is the point where I re-state Jacob's point - you can't take one thing from isolation and say "this thing was necessary". Rather, there seems to be some critical mass required.

I like the metaphor.  But mechanically, is there any way to determine when the critical mass is assembled or what the components are?