When Did the ME Go Wrong?

[garbon]

You clearly don't know much about Indian history.  Steppe invaders of India in Chronological order:
Indo-Aryan tribes (celebrated in the Rigveda)
Indo-Iranian invaders
Scythians (Shaka)
Kushan-Yuezhi
Hepthalites
various other Turkic groups
Pashtuns
Mughals.

If anything the Steppe influence on India is far more obvious than in China.  Hinduism a is a clear offshoot of the steppe Indo-Aryan religion, and various kshatriya groups (most clearly khatris) are clearly descended from the original Steppe conquerors of the region. 

So it is any place that ever was invaded by any type of steppe nomad?

[Queequeg]

You clearly don't know much about Indian history.  Steppe invaders of India in Chronological order:
Indo-Aryan tribes (celebrated in the Rigveda)
Indo-Iranian invaders
Scythians (Shaka)
Kushan-Yuezhi
Hepthalites
various other Turkic groups
Pashtuns
Mughals.

If anything the Steppe influence on India is far more obvious than in China.  Hinduism a is a clear offshoot of the steppe Indo-Aryan religion, and various kshatriya groups (most clearly khatris) are clearly descended from the original Steppe conquerors of the region. 

So it is any place that ever was invaded by any type of steppe nomad?

Not really.  The thing is, for most of Indian history native dynasties have been the exception.  This isn't true of China, but even when there was a native dynasty they spent most of their time trying to beat the nomads back.

[garbon]

Not really.  The thing is, for most of Indian history native dynasties have been the exception.  This isn't true of China, but even when there was a native dynasty they spent most of their time trying to beat the nomads back.

So progress (in the way that it leads to modernity) happens in places where a native culture sits by unperturbed?

[Caliga]

I was under the impression that, while India has been conquered repeatedly by foreign invaders, those invaders almost always assimilated rapidly... which I think is what happens most everywhere unless disease/genocide does away with most of the locals.... the point being that it sounds weird to me to class the Mughals as a non-native dynasty, even though that might technically be true.

[garbon]

I was under the impression that, while India has been conquered repeatedly by foreign invaders, those invaders almost always assimilated rapidly... which I think is what happens most everywhere unless disease/genocide does away with most of the locals.... the point being that it sounds weird to me to class the Mughals as a non-native dynasty, even though that might technically be true.

Well as much as anyone could get assimilated into the complex ethnocultural map that is India.

[The Minsky Moment]

(who inconveniently for this argument cease to be a major problem for all Eurasian societies about 200 years before the transition occurs)

Not really; the Mughals, Ottomans and Manchus all clearly had nomadic roots and had far more in common with the horse archer empires before them than native dynasties or European nation-states.

I already responded to this re Malthus.  The answer is: so what?  The roots of the English ruling class was a pack of violent, unruly, plundering barons -- the Tudors arose from a particularly cunning and ruthless member of one of the turbulent baronial factions.  The House of Orange arose from an imperial feudal magnate turned religious fundamentalist.  The Bourbons arose from a backward mountain principality.  Ancestry is not destiny.  Suleiman the Magnificent was pretty far removed from the dynastic roots of wild Ghazi warriors; he certainly seems a more "modern" man than his contemporary Henri III.

If the argument is that the threat of nomadic incursion is what holds societies back, the argument doesn't work.  If the argument is that having a ruling dynasty that traces its ancestry to nomads is what holds society back, that doesn't work either because historically the "native" dynasties weren't more innovative than the nomadic ones.  Your own argument about the Arabs (desert nomads) supports this.

[Malthus]

So is your position that the Ming, if left alone, would have "progressed" inevitably into a modern-style society?  I seriously doubt it.  I also question your characterization of the Manchus as being unusually backward or conservative.  The Manchus could be quite flexible and adaptive.  It's not that they were unsually conservative, it is more that they were not unusually radically.

Not at all - you will recall that I originally made the argument that the Sung would have.

The Ming were a product of reaction to the trauma of the Mongol invasion - and the fear of a repetition of the same (not an unnatural fear - after all, the Manchu did it!). This is symbolized perfectly in the reasons given for the ending of the Chung Ho Expeditions - which cleared the Indian ocean 50 years before Europeans visited the place: that the resources were needed to shore up the anti-barbarian barrier. Which they were. 

The Ming were tio the Sung what Muscovy was to the Kievian 'Rus - a suspicious, conservative, and comparatively authoritarian place. The Mongol invasion is what made the difference and diverted who civilizations into new channels - ones less conducive to future modernity (and of course in the case of China, a double whammy in actually being invaded *yet again* by Manchus).

To claim that these repeated invasions have had *no effect* on the capability of China to achieve modernity defies reality. 

For most of human history, northern Europeans were also "comprehensively backwards" compared to other civilizations.  This did not prevent them from ultimately being the first societies to transition to the modern.  To the extent that your point is that it is very difficult for a "backward" society to make such a transition, you are making my argument.  Modernity is the aberration, not what came before.

Heh, "Northern Eurpopeans" made the transition to modernity not by relying on their own internal civilization, but by absorbing that of the Mediteranian world. Your point is as valid as claiming that, if in the future Mexico was to become a world power, it is equivalent to the aztecs doing so. 

The one point where I would agree with you (and Diamond) is that the non-Eurasian civilizations were comparatively disadvantaged because there was less opportunity for diffusion of ideas and knowledge.  Thus, I would agree that assuming that some civilization would make a transition to modernity, it is more likely that civilization would be a Eurasian one, than a non-Eurasian one.  But I would not grant the assumption that such a transition was inevitable a priori absent some kind of adverse outside agency like malevolent steppe nomads (who inconveniently for this argument cease to be a major problem for all Eurasian societies about 200 years before the transition occurs).  The entire course of history prior to the point suggests otherwise - stable and innovative pre-modern civilizations often lasted for centuries without serious barbarian threats to the core, but also without any indication of making the ideological and social shift to a modern world-view and modern means of production.

Heh when discussing an event that can, by its nature, only happen once - such as the transistion to modernity - naturally the "whole course of human history" is going to suggest it is unique.

My point is not that a lack of barbarian invasions = modernity at any time (which would indeed be silly), but rather that the civilizations of Eurasia were approaching, collectively, that accumulation of technological and intellectual capacity which would, inevitably, lead to modernity sooner or later; it could only happen once because anywhere it happened would gain such an advantage over the others as to be insurmountable and tend to spam itself; and that it could have happened in any one of the major centres - but the other contenders were knocked out of the game at the critical time by disaster (namely, steppe invasions). Europe escaped this particular disaster and this, more than any other factor, explains why modernity happened in Europe and not elsewhere.

[The Minsky Moment]

Not at all - you will recall that I originally made the argument that the Sung would have.

Then stop picking on the poor Manchus.   

The Sung had 300 years - they didn't do it.  Much the advances you tout - paper money, iron smelting, gunpowder, printing - were well established by the mid-11th century and some well predated the Song.  The dynasty had another two centuries to run.  I just don't see it - if they "would have", they would have.

Meanwhile, it appears you look down on the Yuan as mere steppe barbarians, but they conserved the Song achievements, while accomplishing very impressive engineering projects and fostering long-distance trade. 

To claim that these repeated invasions have had *no effect* on the capability of China to achieve modernity defies reality. 

One would think that fundamentalist religious revival, a long period of devastating warfare that had direct demographic impact on the population, and climatic change bringing endemically recurring famines would have a serious adverse impact as well.  That would describe western Europe in the first half of the 17th century.  Hindsight bias is powerful, but it is still bias.

Heh, "Northern Eurpopeans" made the transition to modernity not by relying on their own internal civilization, but by absorbing that of the Mediteranian world.

I don't know what you mean by "internal civilization".  But I do know that the Mediterranean world itself had many opportunities to make the transition to modernity at a number of historical junctures.  It didn't happen.  And steppe barbarians had little to do with it.

[garbon]

One would think that fundamentalist religious revival, a long period of devastating warfare that had direct demographic impact on the population, and climatic change bringing endemically recurring famines would have a serious adverse impact as well.  That would describe western Europe in the first half of the 17th century.  Hindsight bias is powerful, but it is still bias.

Yeah, that's the one thought that popped into my head.  If you look at the beginning of the 17th century Europe, you don't really see the seeds of modernity.

[Malthus]

Not at all - you will recall that I originally made the argument that the Sung would have.

Then stop picking on the poor Manchus.   

The Mongols were worse. 

The Sung had 300 years - they didn't do it.  Much the advances you tout - paper money, iron smelting, gunpowder, printing - were well established by the mid-11th century and some well predated the Song.  The dynasty had another two centuries to run.  I just don't see it - if they "would have", they would have.

That's not an argument. Europe had many centuries before they achieved modernity. What has that got to do with anything?

Meanwhile, it appears you look down on the Yuan as mere steppe barbarians, but they conserved the Song achievements, while accomplishing very impressive engineering projects and fostering long-distance trade.

The Mongols - even the non-Yuan ones - "fostered long-distance trade" (that is after all how the Polos got there), but the imposition of the Pax Mongolica was hardly a triumph for civilization.

One would think that fundamentalist religious revival, a long period of devastating warfare that had direct demographic impact on the population, and climatic change bringing endemically recurring famines would have a serious adverse impact as well.  That would describe western Europe in the first half of the 17th century.  Hindsight bias is powerful, but it is still bias.

Certain types of disasters have a different effect than others. They are not apples and apples.

To give just one example, the most horrific disaster in European history - the Black Death - is thought by many to have had a positive effect on social progress - essentially helping to break the back of serfdom in some places.

In contrast, other disasters have a different effect.

The problem with steppe nomads as a disaster is not so much the pyramids of skulls they leave behind - you are correct in that Europe has its share of skull-pilers, figurative if not literal. It is in the effect of creating governments which are intensely conservative and autocratic.

This is not "hindsight", it is simply the case - almost universally, the effect of being subject to nomad invasion was to create reactionary governments - whether staffed by the nomads (now aristocrats) like the Turks or Manchus or in reaction to them (Ming, Muscovy).

It is then not a huge leap of imagination to see that "inward looking, intensely conservative, reactionary and despotic governments" tend to do less well in terms of progress than ones lacking these characteristics. 

I don't know what you mean by "internal civilization".  But I do know that the Mediterranean world itself had many opportunities to make the transition to modernity at a number of historical junctures.  It didn't happen.  And steppe barbarians had little to do with it.

Heh never heard of the Huns? 

Or for that matter Vandals, Visigoths, etc.?

Barbarians (both steppe and otherwise) had lots to do with the fall of Roman civilization, which was the culmination of Mediteranian civilization. The main difference between steppe and non-steppe barbarians being, of course, that the non-steppe variety was capable of absorbing much of that civilization even as it destroyed it - by its nature, nomads cannot do so and remain nomads.

Again, I think Rome etc. was simply not advanced enough to accumulate sufficient social, technological and cultural traits to make the transition to modernity - barbarians or not. They may have done so, were they not ended by (you guessed it) barbarians.

[Oexmelin]

I will not pick upon points Keynes Robinsky has answered - it seems we share much of the same outlook, including due appreciation for caveats à la Diamond - but simply point out that:

There is a radical ideological shift - I will say that.  Such a shift is in itself a historical contingency so I am not sure about the distinction being made here.  It seems that (like Diamond) you are wary of an explanation (like Weber's classical formulation) 

Weber's formulation of the Protestant Work Ethic is usually poorly summed up as being one of the causes of capitalist development, while Weber (not so clearly, due to Weber's own style) actually insists upon said work ethic working to reinforce, reorient, foster previous cultural and technical developments that existed. In other words, the Protestant Work Ethic emerged out of a particular historical situation in a way that made it suited to foster, in relation to its own doctrine, development in contingent fields. It was not the only way, and Weber takes pains to point them out as well: Catholic countries also found ways to justify or to lift the barrier of traditional Christian doctrines re: credit, loans and interests (see the very interesting recentm work on antidora and the Moral Economy).

This is why I am not ashamed of finding Weber convincing against Predigested Weber, or Misunderstood Weber: because there is no inevitability nor simplistic causal connections in it. (Which I am not accusing anyone here to engage in).

[Malthus]

I will not pick upon points Keynes Robinsky has answered - it seems we share much of the same outlook, including due appreciation for caveats à la Diamond - but simply point out that:

There is a radical ideological shift - I will say that.  Such a shift is in itself a historical contingency so I am not sure about the distinction being made here.  It seems that (like Diamond) you are wary of an explanation (like Weber's classical formulation) 

Weber's formulation of the Protestant Work Ethic is usually poorly summed up as being one of the causes of capitalist development, while Weber (not so clearly, due to Weber's own style) actually insists upon said work ethic working to reinforce, reorient, foster previous cultural and technical developments that existed. In other words, the Protestant Work Ethic emerged out of a particular historical situation in a way that made it suited to foster, in relation to its own doctrine, development in contingent fields. It was not the only way, and Weber takes pains to point them out as well: Catholic countries also found ways to justify or to lift the barrier of traditional Christian doctrines re: credit, loans and interests (see the very interesting recentm work on antidora and the Moral Economy).

This is why I am not ashamed of finding Weber convincing against Predigested Weber, or Misunderstood Weber: because there is no inevitability nor simplistic causal connections in it. (Which I am not accusing anyone here to engage in).

I have no problems with this sort of Weber, but I'll simply point out that, as an explaination, it does not in fact attempt to explain; it does not in itself attempt to have predictive power. The emphasis has to be then on analysis of the "particular historical situation" which "fostered" it; that is exactly what I'm attempting to do ... 

[Jacob]

Barbarians (both steppe and otherwise) had lots to do with the fall of Roman civilization, which was the culmination of Mediteranian civilization. The main difference between steppe and non-steppe barbarians being, of course, that the non-steppe variety was capable of absorbing much of that civilization even as it destroyed it - by its nature, nomads cannot do so and remain nomads.

I think that is basically false.

The various Jurchen, Manchu and Mongol conquerors of China certainly "absorbed" much of the civilization they conquered, ditto the various steppe conquerors of India.

The Mongols in particular absorbed and adapted to the cultures they conquered - witness the Il-khanate and Yuan China.  Nor would I say that culture such as it was in the Golden Horde suffered particularly.  Nor did the Mughals seem particularly incapable of absorbing civilization.

[Jacob]

The Mongols - even the non-Yuan ones - "fostered long-distance trade" (that is after all how the Polos got there), but the imposition of the Pax Mongolica was hardly a triumph for civilization.

I recently read a book that argued that it was exactly that.  The administration of the Pax Mongolica facilitated the exchange of ideas and scholarship that sowed the seeds of modernity.  Without the Mongols introducing a variety of administrative practices and technologies to Europe, Europe would not be in the position to develop as it did.

[Valmy]

I recently read a book that argued that it was exactly that.  The administration of the Pax Mongolica facilitated the exchange of ideas and scholarship that sowed the seeds of modernity.  Without the Mongols introducing a variety of administrative practices and technologies to Europe, Europe would not be in the position to develop as it did.

Careful now everybody tries to take credit for Europe.  If that was true wouldn't Poland and Russia then have led the developement and not lagged behind the Western Europeans?  After all they were living right beside the Mongols.