Aukus

[Berkut]

I think this is about 90% Australia asking itself "Who is more important to have on our side, I mean REALLY on our side, when it comes to our primary future threat (China) and threat area (the Pacific).

The answer is obvious. AFAICT, Europe has not and will not lift a single finger to do anything to oppose China at all.

(Not that plenty in the US have not been bending over with enthusiasm to Xi)

[celedhring]

So the obvious question from this part of the world is why wasn't Canada involved.  I mean - we're a pacific nation, we have conflicts with China, we have long-standing ties to all three countries...

Three options come to mind:

1. This is largely about nuclear subs.  Canada does not have nuclear subs, and no plans to build new subs.
2. We have an election going on, so they don't want to interfere
3. They just don't trust us.

4. They forgot.

5. They didn't care.

[Zanza]

The US is the real guarantor of Australian security. Everybody knows that. France or the UK are just friends, but not indispensable. Under Trump it was openly communicated policy that US security guarantees come with the expectation to buy US military equipment. Might be that Biden is just more tacit about it. As Australia was unhappy with the French submarine deal, this was an area where the US could offer an alternative and they took it.

[Sheilbh]

The US is the real guarantor of Australian security. Everybody knows that. France or the UK are just friends, but not indispensable. Under Trump it was openly communicated policy that US security guarantees come with the expectation to buy US military equipment. Might be that Biden is just more tacit about it. As Australia was unhappy with the French submarine deal, this was an area where the US could offer an alternative and they took it.

The other side of that is that until Trump the US was planning to amend their law to include the UK and Australia in "NTIB" which is the "national technology and industrial base". Trump stopped that. I think Canada is already covered.

So in some ways it might be reverting to policies that were planned/in place before Trump.

[Tamas]

I think they should have done this in a way that France could save face and not make it clear that they just ignored them.

Then again, maybe that was the initial plan but France insisted the deal stays as it was, who knows.

[The Brain]

Looks like Freedom Fries is back on the menu, boys!!

[Duque de Bragança]

I am still a bit mystified:  why are the French cancelling events in Washington DC to protest actions taken by the Australian government?  Do the French really feel that the Australians will be more hurt by cancelled events in DC than Canberra?

I understand that the French are unhappy, and especially that the US didn't take on the responsibility of the Australians to notify the French about  change in Franco-Australian relations, but, seriously, fuck France if it thinks that the US owes it any special advance tips in regards to its relations with Australia.

Because playing that they're mad at Australia won't do anything for them domestically.

Still won't do much for Jupin domestically, as the Atlantist he is. I don't see much fuss in French media, it's covered, with titles speaking of a crisis but far from Freedom Fries level.
I don't think it will be that important for the presidential election campaign next year. Some candidates already declared themselves and Jupin uses every visit or opportunity now to prepare for it.

[The Minsky Moment]

1. I think France is perfectly within in rights to be furious as they thought they had a valuable deal in place that was critical to them in maintaining the viability of their national military-industrial base.  And is is totally understandable they would view this as a betrayal by trusted allies.
2.  At the same time, it is perfectly within Australia's rights to reconsider its naval defense posture in light of events and for the US to encourage that reconsideration. For the first time since before WW2 we have a old-style naval arms race in the making and the US-NATO bloc now faces the prospect of the first potentially legit blue-water naval competitor since 1943.  Given Australia's geographic position, did it make sense to replace their existing diesel fleet with an upgrade that would add another 10 days of endurance, or make the leap to nuclear? Perhaps a debatable question but from the limited standpoint of countering the growth of Chinese power, there's a pretty good argument for the latter.
3.  Once the decision was made, it made little sense to tip off France in advance because France would still be really angry but given enough time might have been have sought to exert undesired political pressure to get it reversed.  Better to present a fait accompli.
4.  On the other hand, it is understandable that pissed of France even more.
5.  Given that France remains a Pacific power of sorts, it would have been nice if this could have been handled better, but I'm at loss to figure out how.

[Sheilbh]

The other two angles of this are if Australia had made the decision that they need to move to nuclear because their perception of risks in the Pacific has change, that rules out France as a supplier. Lots of people are pointing out that the subs the French were providing were adapted at Australia's request to diesel, which is true. But in addition, my understanding (from Bruno Tertrais of the Institut Montaigne) is that France as a policy will not share nuclear propulsion technology. It's possible there'd be an exception for Australia but that can't be assumed.

The other point is this didn't leak which is very surprising and I imagine the talks were sensitive to the very end. Ultimately if you notify the French then, as an understandably aggrieved party, it would leak.

Separately - interesting piece from an Aussie. In particular that the Labor Party are supportive which, again, I think indicates the Australian assessment of the threat they're facing in the region:

What does the new AUKUS alliance mean for global relations?
The new pact between the UK, US and Australia could lead to nothing less than a merger of military, industrial and scientific capabilities.
By Rory Medcalf

Britain has just become part of something momentous in the Indo-Pacific, the super-region centred on maritime Asia and Australasia where China has been fast-expanding its coercive military power.

Not only has the UK's Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier "strike group" recently completed warlike exercises with Japanese, American and other navies in the Pacific, but Prime Minister Boris Johnson has now joined the leaders of Australia and the United States to launch a powerful new security triangle.

This augments the longstanding Australia-US and UK-US alliances with a new tripartite grouping called AUKUS, launched in a virtual meeting last night (15 September) between Johnson, Australian PM Scott Morrison and US president Joe Biden.

AUKUS's initial priority will be to pool US and British expertise and technology to develop a nuclear-powered submarine fleet for Australia over the decades ahead. This has cascading significance for Australia and the Indo-Pacific; for China – the power this is largely about keeping at bay; and for Britain, the United States and Europe.

For Australia, it's a huge deal, and in a military sense almost existential. Anxieties about Chinese power have intensified with Beijing's totalitarian turn, aggression in the South China Sea and political interference campaigns.

This low point has also come with economic bullying, following Canberra's bluntness in being the first to call for an inquiry into the origins of Covid-19.

As an island continent, reliant on seaborne trade, Australia needs a strong navy. But in the undersea domain – which is vital for naval deterrence and intelligence collection – it has increasingly made do with six Swedish-designed submarines of 1990s vintage. Their conventional (diesel-electric) propulsion limits their ability to stay stealthily deployed around one of the largest maritime zones in the world.

Meanwhile, the waters of the Indo-Pacific have become starkly contested, as the modernisation of China's navy has overtaken those of Japan, India, Australia and all others, except America's, with which it now contends for dominance.

Since 2009, when the then Labor prime minister Kevin Rudd promised Australia would fix this vulnerability with a regionally superior fleet of 12 submarines, the question has been "how"?

That seemed answered in 2016, when the conservative government of Malcolm Turnbull agreed to a huge deal for the "future submarines" to be designed and built in Australia by French state contractor Naval Group. Japan had expected to win the bid, but moved on.

The Australia-France arrangement soon struggled, however, with shifting understandings on price, timelines and capability. Canberra wanted a diesel-electric submarine with the performance of a nuclear one. All the while, China's assertiveness and Australia's angst were rising.

At the same time, then US president Donald Trump's abusive attitude to allies reinforced Canberra's interest in diversifying its security partners, whether with Asian powers such as its "Quad" friends India and Japan, or with France – or, it turns out, a Britain seeking its own post-Brexit way in the world.

Biden's America and Johnson's Britain have become focused on the risks to their interests and values from China's assertive power, including in the far-flung Indo-Pacific – the global centre of gravity for economic growth and strategic tensions alike.

This has dovetailed with Australia's quest for security. Thus, on the sidelines of the Cornwall G7 summit in June – the elements of a new plan were struck.

Nuclear submarine cooperation is the headline, because the sudden American and British willingness to share their technology was what persuaded Australia to take the difficult decision to drop the French connection.

But there is much more in play. This new triple near-alliance is based on capability, convergent interest and, above all, trust. It will be easy enough to caricature as an outmoded Anglosphere. Yet these are three of the world's most multicultural democracies, now defining their identity more by shared liberal ideals than heritage.

The trio have hinted at a larger commitment to one another: nothing less than a merger of military, industrial and scientific capabilities (a point applauded publicly by Tom Tugendhat, the chair of the British parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee) in the new commanding heights of cyber, artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

But the hard work begins now, as do the hard questions. Australia can't afford to get this one wrong, so all three countries need to be serious, and committed for the long haul. The three governments have set an 18-month deadline to map out the specifics of the nuclear submarine plan. This involves the enormous task of sharing advanced nuclear technology with a country that has no civilian nuclear sector. One surprise is that Australia's Labor opposition seems largely on board, now assenting to the need for a technology it had long regarded as taboo.

Difficult diplomacy lies ahead. Relations with France are going to go through a tough period. Paris is understandably aggrieved at all three powers over the cancellation of its contract. Whatever the commercial imperatives, this deal was emblematic of President Macron's wider play for an influential French role in the Indo-Pacific – where France has been welcomed and encouraged by Australia as a resident power and diplomatic partner.

Australia and France – indeed the whole EU –  have a real convergence of interests in a rules-based Indo-Pacific region dominated by no single power. It would be a tragedy if, in strengthening their own ability to balance China, the AUKUS trio have discouraged the admittedly more cautious solidarity that other democracies have begun to show.

On the other hand, there will likely be little rush to allay China's professed alarm, given that this is about Australia's friends helping it acquire its own share of the kind of naval power that China has been building up for years.

Professor Rory Medcalf is head of the National Security College at the Australian National University and author of "Indo-Pacific Empire: China, America and the Contest for the World's Pivotal Region" (Manchester University Press).

[Tonitrus]

Should have invited in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan as well. 

[Syt]

https://twitter.com/BBCJonSopel/status/1438957622145830933

Jon Sopel
@BBCJonSopel

Can't quite believe I'm writing this, but:
France is recalling its ambassador to the US and to Australia over submarine deal and  #AUKUS agreement.
For such close allies, this is an extraordinary step

10:06 PM · Sep 17, 2021·Twitter for iPhone

[HVC]

They're a lot more butt hurt then i'd thought they'd be. also, what's the end game? the contract won't come back. so unless france plans to keep the ambassadors away eventually they'll have to slink back. which is a way worse look.

[garbon]

The art of the gesture

[Duque de Bragança]

https://twitter.com/BBCJonSopel/status/1438957622145830933

Jon Sopel
@BBCJonSopel

Can't quite believe I'm writing this, but:
France is recalling its ambassador to the US and to Australia over submarine deal and  #AUKUS agreement.
For such close allies, this is an extraordinary step

10:06 PM · Sep 17, 2021·Twitter for iPhone

Confirmed by French media:

https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/crise-des-sous-marins-paris-rappelle-ses-ambassadeurs-aux-etats-unis-et-en-australie-20210917

Right on the same site, another link saying how Americans torpedoed (pun intended) a contract that was not going well. 

https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/sous-marins-australiens-comment-les-americains-ont-torpille-un-contrat-deja-mal-en-point-20210916

[Sheilbh]

https://twitter.com/BBCJonSopel/status/1438957622145830933

Jon Sopel
@BBCJonSopel

Can't quite believe I'm writing this, but:
France is recalling its ambassador to the US and to Australia over submarine deal and  #AUKUS agreement.
For such close allies, this is an extraordinary step

10:06 PM · Sep 17, 2021·Twitter for iPhone

They didn't withdraw their ambassador from Moscow despite Russia trying to interfere with their election. The silence from other European capitals is also pretty striking.

I think this is heading into overreaction territory now.