Aukus

[Zanza]

The EU does not even have a strategy for Europe - neither within the EU, nor with third countries like Britain, Switzerland or the West Balkans. Or Russia. Of course the EU has no viable Indo-Pacific strategy. In the end, EU foreign policy is ineffective because it is only in addition to national foreign policy and interests. Where all countries agree - and that's rare - it can amplify the power of the member states. Elsewhere it is fairly toothless.

The EU is fairly strong in some areas - trade, regulation, development,  international institutions etc. - but not at all in others. Because its members want it that way or else they would pool their sovereignty.

Edit: I am also not convinced that putting much focus on the Indo-Pacific makes sense for the EU. I feel we should concentrate on our own neighborhood. There are plenty of things to solve with West Balkans, Maghreb/Sahel, Middle East/Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Ukraine/Russia, Switzerland, United Kingdom. And of course "domestic" issues like rule of law in Hungary and Poland.

[Richard Hakluyt]

What would be the advantage of nuclear subs for Canada?
Surely the range of conventional ones is good enough for patrolling the Arctic?

It is not just range, as i understand it diesel-powered subs are still reliant on batteries when underwater, which limits them a lot. Meanwhile nuclear-powered subs can stay underwater indefinitely and also move very fast while underwater.

[OttoVonBismarck]

https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/peter-dutton/statements/inaugural-australia-france-22-ministerial-consultations

The French and Australian foreign and defence ministers met on August 30th and even specifically discussed the submarine topic, but it looks like the Australians did not say a word about this.
Sounds like big, but seemingly deliberate failure of Australian diplomacy. They reinforced their alliance with the US, but extremely pissed off France. The US can to a degree ignore the feelings of its allies as they are indispensable. Not sure if Australia is well served with pissing off their neighbour France. I guess their desired FTA with the EU is no longer on the agenda.

I don't really agree it was a failure, to be honest. If the decision has been made to go with American nuclear subs, there is actually not a good reason for giving France any real advance notice--it allows France to make threats for example, and to position it as "Australia had better not do this or else", which makes everything more difficult. What has France pissed is the decision which costs their defense industry $40bn and lots of ancillary work in downstream manufacturing etc, and undermines France's attempts at building its own Indo-Pacific sphere of influence. None of that is better because Australia gives France advanced notice--and based on France's overreaction towards the United States I'm not sure France wouldn't behave stupidly if given advance notice, threaten Australia in various ways and then be boxed into a corner where it has to follow through on those threats.

France is mad they lost the contracts, it's a red herring that somehow the notification timing is what has them angry.

[Sheilbh]

So there currently is no EU strategy?

I think describing it as "in response to" is wrong. This was in the diary from the EU for a while - one criticism I've seen is that the AUKUS announcement should have been more sensitive to the EU about to announce its strategy and moved to avoid sort of clashing/overshadowing it.

The EU does not even have a strategy for Europe - neither within the EU, nor with third countries like Britain, Switzerland or the West Balkans. Or Russia. Of course the EU has no viable Indo-Pacific strategy. In the end, EU foreign policy is ineffective because it is only in addition to national foreign policy and interests. Where all countries agree - and that's rare - it can amplify the power of the member states. Elsewhere it is fairly toothless.

I totally agree with your post - I'd add that I also think the Commission has taken, in my view, the wrong approach in building EU foreign policy credibility which I think actually just exposes their weakness in that area. I think since the High Representative role was created the approach has been that the way to show the EU's role is to get involved in the biggest issues (Iran is the biggest example) - in my view that probably just exposes the EU's weakness for all the other participants to see, because those are precisely the issues where the member states (especially the bigger ones) are most likely to be doing their own thing.

I think the EU's approach should be to start with its neighbourhood and become a credible actor by doing, then as its credibility grows it will become more involved in the big issues like the Iran deal or whatever. It wouldn't be easy - there are clearly splits between member states over policy with Turkey, Ukraine/Belarus/Russia and North Africa which might take a while to resolve - but if the EU could get common positions and strategy for, say the West Balkans and the Caucas first, so they are the main interlocutor with local bodies I think that would be a huge step forward in terms of building actual foreign policy capacity.

Edit: I am also not convinced that putting much focus on the Indo-Pacific makes sense for the EU. I feel we should concentrate on our own neighborhood. There are plenty of things to solve with West Balkans, Maghreb/Sahel, Middle East/Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Ukraine/Russia, Switzerland, United Kingdom. And of course "domestic" issues like rule of law in Hungary and Poland.

France has been pushing for more engagement by European allies in the Indo-Pacific, so I think that was probably a big driver. France was the first European country to start talking and thinking about an Indo-Pacific tilt which I think is probably part of the reason they are so angered by this.

Sounds like big, but seemingly deliberate failure of Australian diplomacy. They reinforced their alliance with the US, but extremely pissed off France. The US can to a degree ignore the feelings of its allies as they are indispensable. Not sure if Australia is well served with pissing off their neighbour France. I guess their desired FTA with the EU is no longer on the agenda.

I agree and I've got a lot of sympathy for the French position - the other side which I have a lot of sympathy for is the Australian and why they lacked/lost confidence in their deal with France because I don't think they took that step lightly.

The Australians were talking publicly about looking for contingency plans, Morrison says he told Macron in June that they had very big concerns about the subs and might need to move in Australia's national security interests. So I think the other failure is that France was interpreting Australian dissatisfaction as basically being standard big defence contract haggling, while Australia felt it was raising issues that were sort of existential to the program (basically they'd end up with subs that were later, less capable and more expensive than nuclear subs that, in their view, might not have a useful life beyond the 2030s).

And looking at French foreign policy figures, like Gerard Araud, talking about re-calibrating their policy to China and emphasising cooperation in response to losing a submarine contract and not being invited to a defence agreement might go some way to explaining why the Australians decided to make that change and why the French weren't included in the agreement. Obviously it's unlikely to happen because France has focused on building relations with India, Japan and, until now, Australia.

France is mad they lost the contracts, it's a red herring that somehow the notification timing is what has them angry.

I think it's bigger and deeper than that. I think there's probably personal stuff - from Macron being very warm at the G7 with Biden and doing a press conference on the Indo-Pacific where he talked about the importance of Franco-Australian meetings, when that was the summit where this was being hammered in trilaterals.

But also one point made by a French commentator is that there's been a generation of French foreign policy thinkers and policy makers who have basicaly spent their entire career trying to get France to work more and better with London and Washington and to move away from the Gaullist tradition (across all Presidencies in the last 15-20 years), who may now feel this as a sort of betrayal/failure of their professional life's work.

[Josquius]

But surely they must recognise (though they won't admit it) that it was France's error in not letting Australia have nuclear subs?
If that's what Australia was after it should be expected the British or a sane American government could be open to negotiations there.

[Sheilbh]

But surely they must recognise (though they won't admit it) that it was France's error in not letting Australia have nuclear subs?
If that's what Australia was after it should be expected the British or a sane American government could be open to negotiations there.

It isn't what Australia was after in 2016 when the French won their contract - my understanding is the French as a policy will not share nuclear propulsion technology with anyone, but they weren't asked.

This is what I find most important and striking about this. Either the proposed submarines were really sub-par, or the Australian asessment of the threat from China's naval build up has really shifted in the last five years to the point where they now feel they need nuclear subs. If it's the former - then that's really on the French and Australians not working together and it doesn't mean much - and my understanding is issues with this contract have been leading the nightly news in Australia for years because it's their biggest ever defence contract with lots of issues. But I think it's the latter because this deal is supported by Labor and going for nuclear subs in 2016 was a big issue - and that's concerning.

[OttoVonBismarck]

So there currently is no EU strategy?

I think describing it as "in response to" is wrong. This was in the diary from the EU for a while - one criticism I've seen is that the AUKUS announcement should have been more sensitive to the EU about to announce its strategy and moved to avoid sort of clashing/overshadowing it.

This is silly. Unlike the EU, the United States actually has security and defense policies and powers, that have meaningful real impacts. EU activities along these lines are largely little more than symbolic. The EU has no military and no strategic force projection capability. Its strategy in the Indo-Pacific isn't front page news, the United States is--and that's because the United States matters in matters military in the Pacific and frankly the EU does not. The EU's policies in the Pacific along diplomatic lines, are such minimal news compared to American strategic positioning that suggesting the US should have "made room" for the EU announcement is like the owner of the Brooklyn Cyclones Minor League team complaining that a press release he had planned about the introduction of a new polish sausage at his concessions was overshadowed by the New York Yankees announcing they'd signed a new pitcher to a $150m contract.

I think the EU's approach should be to start with its neighbourhood and become a credible actor by doing, then as its credibility grows it will become more involved in the big issues like the Iran deal or whatever. It wouldn't be easy - there are clearly splits between member states over policy with Turkey, Ukraine/Belarus/Russia and North Africa which might take a while to resolve - but if the EU could get common positions and strategy for, say the West Balkans and the Caucas first, so they are the main interlocutor with local bodies I think that would be a huge step forward in terms of building actual foreign policy capacity.

The U.S. is credible because it has hard power. The EU is not credible because it doesn't. Dealing with issues in Ukraine, North Africa, etc--ultimately will require more hard power than the EU has. The idea you can have anywhere comparable to U.S. influence by running a "Diplomatic Victory" strategy ala Civ 5, isn't reality in the real world. Mixtures of trade deals / arms deals / the occasional economic sanction etc don't translate to very much power.

France is arguably the only EU country that realizes this and maintains credible hard power of its own, but France isn't the EU.

France has been pushing for more engagement by European allies in the Indo-Pacific, so I think that was probably a big driver. France was the first European country to start talking and thinking about an Indo-Pacific tilt which I think is probably part of the reason they are so angered by this.

The U.S. has been significantly active, strategically, economically and diplomatically in the Pacific for over 100 years. The idea that France should be "angry" because of our strategic moves in the Pacific is kind of insane. We're an actual Pacific country, France is not in any serious sense. France is not entitled to American "deference" to its plans in the Pacific. Frankly if France wants to work with us in the Pacific they should hitch their wagon to our train--they will never seriously be an alternative to American power in the Pacific, nor should they want to be. Frankly their separate efforts are likely not a good use of resources compared to better synergies that could be attained with them working in concert with the U.S. in the region.

I think it's bigger and deeper than that. I think there's probably personal stuff - from Macron being very warm at the G7 with Biden and doing a press conference on the Indo-Pacific where he talked about the importance of Franco-Australian meetings, when that was the summit where this was being hammered in trilaterals.

But also one point made by a French commentator is that there's been a generation of French foreign policy thinkers and policy makers who have basicaly spent their entire career trying to get France to work more and better with London and Washington and to move away from the Gaullist tradition (across all Presidencies in the last 15-20 years), who may now feel this as a sort of betrayal/failure of their professional life's work.

I think it should generally be understood by the EU and its member states:

1. The United States operates in its own interests. Trumpism is the abandoning of alliances and multilateral institutions. Biden has reversed that. But Trump was not the first American President to act in American self-interest, nor will he be the last. The EU have made themselves less valuable allies over time, so they should expect less active consideration when America is pursuing strategies in its own interest. This is no different from the EU continuing to enmesh itself economically with Russia, sign trade deals with China etc. You can't expect a country like the United States to be less interested in its own affairs than EU countries are.

2. The United States power is largely based on a serious and long term project to build and maintain a powerful military. The EU seems to do a lot of talking these days about how to "replace" American influence or stand up without American. There is no answer to replacing what America does that doesn't include significant militarization. I'm not saying that's the path the EU should follow, but if it doesn't, it shouldn't expect to walk where we walk or how we walk. And it should be unsurprising when countries with more serious and immediate security concerns will consistently choose security relationships with us in preference to those with the EU and EU member states.

[Sheilbh]

The U.S. is credible because it has hard power. The EU is not credible because it doesn't. Dealing with issues in Ukraine, North Africa, etc--ultimately will require more hard power than the EU has. The idea you can have anywhere comparable to U.S. influence by running a "Diplomatic Victory" strategy ala Civ 5, isn't reality in the real world. Mixtures of trade deals / arms deals / the occasional economic sanction etc don't translate to very much power.

France is arguably the only EU country that realizes this and maintains credible hard power of its own, but France isn't the EU.

Yes but only to an extent I think - Italy and Greece play a role in the Med, similarly I think Poland and the Baltics in different ways and adjusted for their size are credible actors in Eastern Europe. I think one of the biggest mistakes in the French push for European strategic autonomy is the focus on Germany. I think Germany is always going to be reluctant on that and during the Merkel era Germany's foreign policy has basically been about creating coalitions for the status quo. If France wants European strategic autonomy - then I'd start with meetings in Rome, Athens, Warsaw and probably London if they're willing to go out of the EU framework - rather than Berlin.

Of course I think there's an open question of how much the French really want that. In the same as the US wants the EU to do more and have stronger defence capabilities - I don't know if it would trade that for an EU that acted independently and possibly not in line with what the US wants. I think France wants strategic autonomy, I query if they're willing to accept decisions made in Rome overriding France in what the French consider "their" regions/areas where they have interests.

But I think my point is actually that even before that stage the EU is not particularly credible in foreign policy within its neighbourhood that isn't framed around accession or trade negotiations - and I do think the EU has soft power in the region and could build credibility by using that and coordinating member states. But I think High Representatives have decided that, given the EU's economic and regulatory power - which is real - they should be involved in the Iran negotiations and having summits in Moscow, rather than slumming it and problem solving in Baku and Kyiv and Tunis. So I think there's a huge gap between goals and means - I think by focusing on where they can deliver results they'd increase their capacity and member state trust in the EU in this are would increase and it would become more involved in the bigger issues because it would have a proven track record.

The U.S. has been significantly active, strategically, economically and diplomatically in the Pacific for over 100 years. The idea that France should be "angry" because of our strategic moves in the Pacific is kind of insane. We're an actual Pacific country, France is not in any serious sense. France is not entitled to American "deference" to its plans in the Pacific. Frankly if France wants to work with us in the Pacific they should hitch their wagon to our train--they will never seriously be an alternative to American power in the Pacific, nor should they want to be. Frankly their separate efforts are likely not a good use of resources compared to better synergies that could be attained with them working in concert with the U.S. in the region.

But France has been doing that. There is the often cited stats that France has around 1.5 million citizens (as does the EU) in the Pacific and 3/4s of France's maritime territory is in the Pacific. They have been working with the US, Australia, Japan, India and others. This has been something France has been working on for ten years.

The reason for the anger I think is that two of those partners France has been working with have done a deal that, in their view, cuts France out despite the last ten years of working with the Aussies and in concert with the US. This, in their view, undermines the last ten years of policy - and is by two allies. They weren't really acting separately from the US (except to the extent that we all were during the Trump years).

I think it should generally be understood by the EU and its member states:

1. The United States operates in its own interests. Trumpism is the abandoning of alliances and multilateral institutions. Biden has reversed that. But Trump was not the first American President to act in American self-interest, nor will he be the last. The EU have made themselves less valuable allies over time, so they should expect less active consideration when America is pursuing strategies in its own interest. This is no different from the EU continuing to enmesh itself economically with Russia, sign trade deals with China etc. You can't expect a country like the United States to be less interested in its own affairs than EU countries are.

2. The United States power is largely based on a serious and long term project to build and maintain a powerful military. The EU seems to do a lot of talking these days about how to "replace" American influence or stand up without American. There is no answer to replacing what America does that doesn't include significant militarization. I'm not saying that's the path the EU should follow, but if it doesn't, it shouldn't expect to walk where we walk or how we walk. And it should be unsurprising when countries with more serious and immediate security concerns will consistently choose security relationships with us in preference to those with the EU and EU member states.

I've not seen any talk about the EU "replacing" the US. There's been talk about "strategic autonomy" but that's slightly different.

I don't disagree - I think the key is actually that I think Biden's Afghanistan speech is really important. He said that the US would be focusing on great power competition, it would not be committing forces or resources except for the US's "vital interests" and I think we now see what the pivot to Asia means. From a European perspective I think that means reccognising that the interests of the EU/Western allies in Europe may be vital to them but we can no longer assume they are vital to the US. I also don't think the regions around Europe are anywhere near as important to Biden as has historically been the case, because it's clear the great power competition is in the Pacific.

I think that should raise serious questions across Europe of how to respond to that strategic re-alignment and shift of assessment of interests by the US, because I think the US is less reliable for Europe not because it's Trump but because it's re-assessed its strategy. I don't expect much, however.

[Zanza]

The U.S. is credible because it has hard power. The EU is not credible because it doesn't. Dealing with issues in Ukraine, North Africa, etc--ultimately will require more hard power than the EU has. The idea you can have anywhere comparable to U.S. influence by running a "Diplomatic Victory" strategy ala Civ 5, isn't reality in the real world. Mixtures of trade deals / arms deals / the occasional economic sanction etc don't translate to very much power.

France is arguably the only EU country that realizes this and maintains credible hard power of its own, but France isn't the EU.

The main weakness of the EU is not their lack of hard power. China for example does not use its hard power anywhere except arguably in the South China Sea and is yet supremely influential around the world these days.

The EU is weak because of its inherent internal divisons. As I mentioned, the members are sovereign with their own foreign policy and jealously guard that. Then you have very different foreign policy goals among the members: France is actually looking at hard power projection, but Germany is completely mercantilist and will rarely act against its economic interests, some countries consider themselves neutral and obviously Russia is seen rather differently in the Baltics and in Malta or Portugal...

I would go so far and argue that the main strength of the US is also not its hard power as Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the very real limits that hard power has even against third rate nations. US power comes from its control of the world financial system, being the biggest market in the world, having a broad network of alliances with similar minded countries etc. Hard power helps, but it's the soft power that makes the US so strong.

[Zanza]

1. The United States operates in its own interests. Trumpism is the abandoning of alliances and multilateral institutions. Biden has reversed that.

Biden is not sucking up to dictators like Trump and his tone is much nicer, but other than that, what meaningful difference has he made regarding international institutions and the rules-based order?

[Zanza]

France is mad they lost the contracts, it's a red herring that somehow the notification timing is what has them angry.

Not at all from what I read. The commercial-industrial side is not what annoys them greatly, it's the strategic/diplomacy side where they feel betrayed.

[Sheilbh]

The main weakness of the EU is not their lack of hard power. China for example does not use its hard power anywhere except arguably in the South China Sea and is yet supremely influential around the world these days.

I'm not sure if China is yet supremely influential and I can't think of an area where it's policy has shaped things - possibly the Chinese response to the financial crisis.

I think it probably will in climate - I think that may be the first space we see true Chinese influence on a global level. Because we all have to do important things in our own countries to reduce emissions, but we are ultimately a sideshow compared to China. Even the US is far less significant - I think the "West" could have devised a climate strategy and helped roll it out around the world 10-15 years ago. Obviously we'd need China to be on-board with that. But now I think climate politics will at least run through, if not be designed by Beijing.

I would go so far and argue that the main strength of the US is also not its hard power as Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the very real limits that hard power has even against third rate nations. US power comes from its control of the world financial system, being the biggest market in the world, having a broad network of alliances with similar minded countries etc. Hard power helps, but it's the soft power that makes the US so strong.

I agree on the financial and monetary system being key to US power - to an extent that I think you could almost consider it a hard power. If the US decides to freeze you out, then that makes it very difficult to act within international monetary system which is still not solely, but relatively unipolar. And I think the moment that things started to shift in relation to China was the financial crisis in part because of Chinese, European and US actions in response to that. I think that is more key to where we are and emerging competition with China than Trump or the pivot to Asia or Biden or Xi.

But on alliances - the basis of those is US hard power and their military guarantee. NATO and Japan and Korea are not all in alliances with the US because we share the same values but because of the military power of the US. Those alliances are then a sort of multiplier of American power into other areas - so America assumes leadership (because of hard power) but it then has the soft power backing and strategic depth of the alliance network.

Biden is not sucking up to dictators like Trump and his tone is much nicer, but other than that, what meaningful difference has he made regarding international institutions and the rules-based order?

I don't think American leaders/elites view international institutions and the "rules-based order" as something external to American leadership. I think this is probably an issue of perspective - from London or Berlin - the international order is something we participate in and benefit from. From DC or New York it is something America created and runs (through financial/monetary power, alliance networks etc).

There's those Larry Summmers questions from 2018:
"Can the US imagine a viable global economic system" in which it is no longer the dominant player? Could an American "political leader acknowledge that reality in a way that permits negotiation over what such a world would look like?... Can China be held down without inviting conflict?"

Based on the Biden administration I'm not convinced American leaders can envision a pluralist order in which America is not dominant - I'm not even sure they can even imagine that in the Pacific.

Edit: And of course this is an institutional framework - that's part of the purpose I imagine is to try and Trump-proof it a little bit. Interesting Rana Mitter piece in the Guardian which sort of mentions that actually there is a proliferation of new "minilateral" institutions being created - this, the Quad etc. But I think it is insane to think the Atlantic framework is going to necessarily be a model for another bit of the world, or central to the Indo-Pacific which is the more important region now.

[crazy canuck]

I don't get how it's screwing over Canada.

If you subscribe to the Globe there is are is an article and an opinion piece answering that question.  They are behind a paywall which is why I reproduced just a small bit above.  I will also reproduce that same portion below in response to Grumbler's post.

[crazy canuck]

Unless the French were lied to or cheated in some I don't see how the butthurt is warranted.

We are all supposed to be allies.  It was reported today that Canada was not even told this was happening.  France was not either.  France had a deal in the works.

Either someone in the US State Department (or whatever department is supposed to be in charge of talking to allies) dropped the ball or the decision not to keep allies in the loop was a deliberate decision.  The first is excusable - concerning but excusable.  The second signals that the US is continuing down the path of basically saying fuck you to its allies.

The United States had no deal with France, and no obligation to inform France about every diplomatic or military initiative it is undertaking.

France can be mad at Australia for pulling out of the deal the two countries had, but hat probably doesn't have the same political rewards as blaming the US for the failure of the French themselves to maintain the contract.  Of course, the nation at fault is as likely to be France as it is Australia, but in no way is the failure of the French to keep their contract the fault of the US. Being allies doesn't mean that contracts cannot be cancelled.

Thanks for confirming its a big Fuck You to US allies.

Thanks for confirming that your reaction is just emo.

From the Globe article mentioned above and edited to respond to Grumber.

He said he was I am surprised to hear Mr. Trudeau Grumbles play down the pact as merely a submarine purchase deal. "I think it's misleading and concerning ... I would like to believe he was poorly briefed by his staff informed," Mr. Norman said.

The retired naval flag officer said that, if Mr. Trudeau was fully briefed Grumbles does know the content of the deal "he doesn't understand what is going on internationally and he doesn't understand what the significance of an arrangement like this is as it relates to international security."

He said the agreement goes far beyond access to U.S. submarine technology.

"This is about accessing both current and emerging technologies, from cyber and artificial intelligence, to acoustics and underwater warfare – a whole range of very important strategic capabilities."

[crazy canuck]

The U.S. is credible because it has hard power. The EU is not credible because it doesn't. Dealing with issues in Ukraine, North Africa, etc--ultimately will require more hard power than the EU has. The idea you can have anywhere comparable to U.S. influence by running a "Diplomatic Victory" strategy ala Civ 5, isn't reality in the real world. Mixtures of trade deals / arms deals / the occasional economic sanction etc don't translate to very much power.

France is arguably the only EU country that realizes this and maintains credible hard power of its own, but France isn't the EU.

The main weakness of the EU is not their lack of hard power. China for example does not use its hard power anywhere except arguably in the South China Sea and is yet supremely influential around the world these days.

The EU is weak because of its inherent internal divisons. As I mentioned, the members are sovereign with their own foreign policy and jealously guard that. Then you have very different foreign policy goals among the members: France is actually looking at hard power projection, but Germany is completely mercantilist and will rarely act against its economic interests, some countries consider themselves neutral and obviously Russia is seen rather differently in the Baltics and in Malta or Portugal...

I would go so far and argue that the main strength of the US is also not its hard power as Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the very real limits that hard power has even against third rate nations. US power comes from its control of the world financial system, being the biggest market in the world, having a broad network of alliances with similar minded countries etc. Hard power helps, but it's the soft power that makes the US so strong.

Agreed.  The main risk the US faces is that it is behaving as if Otto's view of the world is accurate.