Did Truman know Hiroshima was a city?

[alfred russel]

A more interesting question: does Trump know that Hiroshima is a city?

[Neil]

The reason that the 'Lions Led By Donkeys' craze caught on when it did was mainly political.  It's not like it was a new sentiment.  Lloyd George had been going on about how every one of Britain's war leaders who wasn't him was mentally defective pretty much since 1915, and he absolutely despised Haig and Robertson for having the strategic clarity to realize that the Western Front was critical.  However, the reason that it became so popular when it did was that British politics was shifting away from the 'English gentleman'.  People lapped up tales about how stupid the gentleman generals were because it was exactly what they wanted to hear.

That wasn't a WW1 phenomenon.  That goes back to the Boer War, at least.  Raglan and Cardigan were earlier examples, but not seen as representative.

I'd argue there were important differences.  For one thing, World War One was a more universal experience, and thus more important.  it resonated better with the public.  The other is, as you point out, the contempt wasn't generalized across the entire officer corps or senior officer corps. 

[grumbler]

The reason that the 'Lions Led By Donkeys' craze caught on when it did was mainly political.  It's not like it was a new sentiment.  Lloyd George had been going on about how every one of Britain's war leaders who wasn't him was mentally defective pretty much since 1915, and he absolutely despised Haig and Robertson for having the strategic clarity to realize that the Western Front was critical.  However, the reason that it became so popular when it did was that British politics was shifting away from the 'English gentleman'.  People lapped up tales about how stupid the gentleman generals were because it was exactly what they wanted to hear.

That wasn't a WW1 phenomenon.  That goes back to the Boer War, at least.  Raglan and Cardigan were earlier examples, but not seen as representative.

I'd argue there were important differences.  For one thing, World War One was a more universal experience, and thus more important.  it resonated better with the public.  The other is, as you point out, the contempt wasn't generalized across the entire officer corps or senior officer corps.

No question that the WW1 mythos was more significant.  I was just noting that it didn't start with WW1.  In fact, the colonial exploits of the British Army in the second half of the Nineteenth Century was largely seen as a struggle of the geniuses to overcome the bureaucracy and spit-and-polish-worship of the mediocre. 

[Sheilbh]

I wonder if that's also linked to Alan Bennett's observation that the Boer war is the first (in the U.K.) that has war memorials with named individual private soldiers. And possibly a shift from Victorian statuary which was of the generals, often paid for by subscription by their soldiers after the conflict to more public memorials to the soldiers.

Haig is, interestingly, an exception to that because his statue on Whitehall was paid for by subscription of his troops. But it has been the target of people wanting to pull it down for years and years, not for more current controversies but because of his (popular) reputation as "Butcher Haig".

[Josquius]

Oh yeah, it would definitely be totally easy to overrun Hokkaido. "Quite easily" in fact.

Everyone who knows anything about the Pacific War knows how easy it is to overrun Japanese islands. Piece of cake. All it takes are a few troops and some like rafts to shuttle them on over, because we know how quickly the Japanese just roll right over when they are in "indefensible" positions.

And you can see how much of a threat the Japanese thought this was as well, after all Tyr just told us that "most of Japan's defences were facing the south of the country, even in Hokkaido they were facing an American invasion on the east."

So obviously their overriding strategic fear was that Soviet invasion, which we know would be trivial to pull off, which is why the Japanese aligned all their defenses away from that axis of threat, even though it was their primary strategic concern for the entire war.

You miss the facts that they had been at war with the US for 4 years whilst the Soviets had until very recently been a neutral nation that was otherwise engaged and the south of Sakhalin had been Japanese territory.

Yes, but the inability of the Soviets to effectively attack it is a point against.

It'd be like people in 2002 worried about Saddam attacking some small town in Nebraska.  Sure, a Republican Guard division with tanks and air support could wreak havoc against the unprepared farmers of the Bible Belt.  But how are they going to get there, and even if they could manage to teleport their troops and war machines there, how are they going to keep them supplied?

When you're considering military history, and especially military history in the industrial age, the most important questions that you have to ask are how are your troops going to get where you want them to fight and how are you going to keep them supplied.  When it came to an invasion of the Home Islands, the Soviets didn't have an answer to those questions, at least not in 1945, and probably not even in 1946.  The most profound effect of the Soviet declaration of war wasn't military, but diplomatic.  It forced the moderate faction, who had maybe been willing to consider some sort of negotiated peace, to realize that there would be no peace negotiated through a third party as there had been in 1905.  The choice was between either unconditional surrender or the annihilation of the kokutai by devastating bombardment and invasion.

When looking at reasons for Japan's surrender however the reality doesn't really matter. As Sheilbh says at the time Soviet strength was massively over-estimated. That Soviet tanks would be rolling down the streets of Tokyo anytime soon we know with the full knowledge of hindsight just wasn't going to happen. But that's not how things looked to the Japanese leaders. This seemed a very real and terrifying threat, especially combined with the belief in simmering unrest (not unfounded) and paranoia of communism.
See also operation sea lion and how seriously it was taken by the UK....

Its besides the point, but to address the tangent, I do think a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido was possible. Many in the Soviet leadership felt it was possible (though yes, others disagreed) and it was mostly diplomatic considerations that led to it being cancelled.
They were hitting Japan in the rear, they would be going up against virtually no defenders. I'm somewhat more questionable the plan would succeed in its entirety, but that they could seize and hold the Soya peninsula is very possible.
This wouldn't be a comparable operation to Pacific island hopping. We're looking at a significantly larger island and very different terrain that would be much more amenable to the Soviets than any Japanese forces that would be redirected that way.
The analogy of Iraq invading the middle of the US doesn't work. We're talking about a major power invading an island 20km from territory they hold, at the sparsely inhabited northern fringe of a pretty linear country.

I don't get your logic here.
They wanted to continue to fight even after the bombs had been dropped.... yet Japan surrendered.
This sounds like an argument against the bombs single handedly winning the war  rather than in defence of it.

Japan surrendered because the emperor overrode his cabinet.  The emperor overrode his cabinet because of the A bombs.

Again don't confuse how convenient this was for both sides with the actual reasons. He couldn't very well say in his radio speech to the nation "We've decided to surrender because we're afraid y'all are going to rise up and put my head on a spike". That's really not the time or the place for full honestly.
The process of deciding to surrender was already well under way but since it happened the bomb provided an excellent propaganda excuse; it wasn't any failure on Japan's part to blame, it was that there's this new magic bomb that can destroy the nation.

I'd also question the narrative that the emperor finally emerged from the shadows and overrode the cabinet. This is the way history was written in the aftermath of the war in order to protect the emperor, but it is increasingly thought he was a far more active participant in wartime government than is commonly believed. For instance when Konoe was first given a chance to make his case about the coming revolution in early 1945 it was the emperor who turned down his calls to surrender on the basis that Japan needed just one big victory (and he believed this was definitely possible) so it could make a more favourable peace. A belief that he had lost by summer which led to Japan starting to put out peace feelers.

[The Minsky Moment]

When looking at reasons for Japan's surrender however the reality doesn't really matter.

Hmm...

[Josquius]

When looking at reasons for Japan's surrender however the reality doesn't really matter.

Hmm...

What?
If you're afraid I'm going to beat you up then it doesn't really matter whether I'm actually capable or not. All that matters is you think I can so you hand over your wallet.

[The Brain]

Of all the books I've read on Japan in WW2 no one has mentioned this big Soviet monster under the bed of Japanese leaders. But even if one were to accept that such a monster existed, what would be so special about Hokkaido that the thought of its potential future loss would trigger a surrender?

[Josquius]

Of all the books I've read on Japan in WW2 no one has mentioned this big Soviet monster under the bed of Japanese leaders.

I have no idea what books you've been reading but it sounds very strange they wouldn't mention this. Its one of the basic facts in understanding the mindset of the Japanese leadership. Its pretty standard to the far right no matter where you find them.

But even if one were to accept that such a monster existed, what would be so special about Hokkaido that the thought of its potential future loss would trigger a surrender?

It is one of the home islands and its just a short distance from Honshu. its loss would be a pretty major blow.
But I never said the thought of its loss would trigger a surrender.
What did in actual history trigger a surrender was the thought of the Soviets invading Japan and the threat of workers revolution against the imperial system.

[Tamas]

How were the Soviets expected to land a massive invasion force?

It is inconceivable that instead of the 100% real American destruction of Japan that had been ongoing (for which the atomic bombs were just icing on the cake) what made the Emperor give up was the 100% fictional ability of the Soviets to threaten the Japanese homeland.

[grumbler]

Of all the books I've read on Japan in WW2 no one has mentioned this big Soviet monster under the bed of Japanese leaders. But even if one were to accept that such a monster existed, what would be so special about Hokkaido that the thought of its potential future loss would trigger a surrender?

Hokkaido was symbolic only (the US had sunk the train ferries that shipped Hokkaido coal to Honshu), but symbolically important enough that the Japanese dedicated the Fifth Area Army to its defense. The army wasn't huge like the Third Area Army on Honshu because there were few landing spots and no enemy nearby with the capability to invade.

The Soviet Pacific Fleet commander thought he could take Hokkaido with six regiments, landed two at a time, with three days between landings.  Presumably, he was making up shit like that to sound good to Stalin.  The fleet commander's superiors patted him on the head, told him to keep making his mud pies but to take no action unless told to do so, and used his forces elsewhere.

[grumbler]

How were the Soviets expected to land a massive invasion force?

It is inconceivable that instead of the 100% real American destruction of Japan that had been ongoing (for which the atomic bombs were just icing on the cake) what made the Emperor give up was the 100% fictional ability of the Soviets to threaten the Japanese homeland.

Remember that to the Tyrs of the world, the fact that there s no evidence whatsoever for their conclusions, and that no analysis of any of the existing evidence can make it fit their conclusions, just means that history was re-written after the fact the hide the truth, and only the Tyrs of the world know it.

That's how wartime estimates of up to half a million US combat deaths mean that it "is proven" that the actual claimed estimates were a million deaths, and therefor untrue.  That's how the Emperor's documented intervention in the Big Six deliberations must be a lie concocted after the fact, because maybe he intervened in prior decision-making.

It's hard to get your mind twisty enough to believe that kind of crap, but for some people it seems that the sacrifice is worth it.

[Razgovory]

Tyr, this is getting stupid.  If the fear is that the Soviets could land on Hokkaido unopposed and trigger a revolution then the logical response is to send soldiers to Hokkaido. You are making an enormous leap from "fear of communism" to a speculative motivation for surrender.  Too make this leap you need statements by the main actors or people very close to the main actors that this was what they had on their minds.  Instead you have the opposite: examples of the major players claiming that something else was the deciding factor.


Japan's own actions severely undermine your claim.  They were in the midst of arming civilians to fight the Americans.  That's not something you would do if you believed the the civilians would use those weapons against you.  The blockade around Japan is much more likely to trigger an uprising than an communist invasion.

[Josquius]

Tyr, this is getting stupid.  If the fear is that the Soviets could land on Hokkaido unopposed and trigger a revolution then the logical response is to send soldiers to Hokkaido. You are making an enormous leap from "fear of communism" to a speculative motivation for surrender.  Too make this leap you need statements by the main actors or people very close to the main actors that this was what they had on their minds.  Instead you have the opposite: examples of the major players claiming that something else was the deciding factor.

The Soviets declared war on the 9th of August catching the Japanese by surprise.
They did already have significant forces watching the Soviet border- however these were defeated very quickly indeed.
Hokkaido was some way beyond the border. Given the war its common sense that there wouldn't be many Japanese forces in position to defend against an invasion from Japanese Karafuto prefecture.
Had things dragged on then undoubtedly forces would have been redirected against the coming Soviet invasion. However there's so many unknowns and things to consider in this alternate history scenario.

There's no leap or speculation at all. I've already provided a prominent quote that sums up this strain of thought on the Japanese side. From Fumimaro Konoe, who took these concerns to the emperor in early 1945:

Regrettably, I think that defeat is inevitable. What I shall say is based on this assumption. Defeat will be a blemish upon our imperial system, but public opinion in Great Britain and the United States up to now has not gone so far as change in this imperial system(of course there are extremist opinions among some, and it is difficult to gauge what sort of change may take place in the future). Thus, if it were only a matter of defeat, I think it would not be necessary to be concerned about the imperial system. More than defeat itself, what we must be most concerned about from the standpoint of preserving the imperial system is the communist revolution which may accompany defeat.

Japan's own actions severely undermine your claim.  They were in the midst of arming civilians to fight the Americans.  That's not something you would do if you believed the the civilians would use those weapons against you. 

With bamboo spears.
It was a propaganda exercise rather than anything of actual military utility.

The blockade around Japan is much more likely to trigger an uprising than an communist invasion.

Yes.

[Berkut]

Of all the books I've read on Japan in WW2 no one has mentioned this big Soviet monster under the bed of Japanese leaders. But even if one were to accept that such a monster existed, what would be so special about Hokkaido that the thought of its potential future loss would trigger a surrender?

I brought that up over an dover again, but the "IT WAS THE SOVIETS!!!" faction doesn't want to address anything like that.

US troops physically occupying Tokyo and the Imperial Palace? That's a concern for sure!

Soviet troops teleporting to Hokkaido? OMG SURRENDER NOW!!!!!

And the argument that the Japanese, of all people, were simply unaware of how difficult it is to mount and supply a naval invasion is...I am not sure how to even respond to that.

It is, again, this willfull attempt to simply ignore the effort and sacrifice made by the USA and her allies over four years of war. If you just create this story that the Soviet could and would just stroll into Hokkaido, why, you also then get to ignore the incredible amount of effort the US expended to create the largest navy the world has ever known with a *massive* logistics tail to allow them to land divisions of men and marines on enemy shores. Apparnetly all of that, like the A-Bombs, were simply not necessary. Yet another example of how it was really all just the USSR.

It's just...ugggh.