Did Truman know Hiroshima was a city?

[The Brain]

Japanese WW2 leaders were many things, for instance their values and agendas were anathema to what would conventionally be called good governance, but one thing they were not is low-IQ morans. The idea that the Japanese leaders were stupid enough to believe that the Soviet Union was the biggest threat to them in August 1945 is bizarre.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Right, I mean grumbler outlined the actual history of Japan's decision to surrender, which is the well known and understood history that has been known for many decades. Nothing said here about fanciful Communist revolutions springing up in Japan or the USSR easily conquering Hokkaido changes any of that. I'll also note that while Soviet war planners had grown skeptical they could invade Hokkaido, Truman outright told Stalin he would not tolerate a Soviet occupation of any of the home islands. It's possible Stalin would've called that bluff, but I'll note Truman had played a card that aggressively during the fall of eastern Europe, and Stalin was now well aware of the power of the atomic bomb. I'm skeptical the USSR was realistically going to do much more against Japan than it had already done in terms of the home islands.

[Neil]

Its lack of density is a point against its defensibility.

Yes, but the inability of the Soviets to effectively attack it is a point against. 

It'd be like people in 2002 worried about Saddam attacking some small town in Nebraska.  Sure, a Republican Guard division with tanks and air support could wreak havoc against the unprepared farmers of the Bible Belt.  But how are they going to get there, and even if they could manage to teleport their troops and war machines there, how are they going to keep them supplied? 

When you're considering military history, and especially military history in the industrial age, the most important questions that you have to ask are how are your troops going to get where you want them to fight and how are you going to keep them supplied.  When it came to an invasion of the Home Islands, the Soviets didn't have an answer to those questions, at least not in 1945, and probably not even in 1946.  The most profound effect of the Soviet declaration of war wasn't military, but diplomatic.  It forced the moderate faction, who had maybe been willing to consider some sort of negotiated peace, to realize that there would be no peace negotiated through a third party as there had been in 1905.  The choice was between either unconditional surrender or the annihilation of the kokutai by devastating bombardment and invasion. 

[Sheilbh]

There is a reason the Soviet High Command realized that they couldn't invade Hokkaido, and sent the small amphib fleet against the Kuriles instead.

And I think the very early cold war context matters there as well of their only being so many fronts the Soviets could be aggressive on - especially when they didn't have a nuke - and the Americans were comfortable and the Kurils but not Hokkaido. I think it's similar to the motivation to cut a deal on Korea (while also handing Manchuria to Mao - after stripping lots of industry in the traditional Soviet way). And I don't think the Soviets had any illusion about working with the allies any more - unlike some Americans and Brits.

I think that bit of North-East Asia had the potential to be the first real cold war flashpoint but it wasn't.

[grumbler]

There is a reason the Soviet High Command realized that they couldn't invade Hokkaido, and sent the small amphib fleet against the Kuriles instead.

And I think the very early cold war context matters there as well of their only being so many fronts the Soviets could be aggressive on - especially when they didn't have a nuke - and the Americans were comfortable and the Kurils but not Hokkaido. I think it's similar to the motivation to cut a deal on Korea (while also handing Manchuria to Mao - after stripping lots of industry in the traditional Soviet way). And I don't think the Soviets had any illusion about working with the allies any more - unlike some Americans and Brits.

I think that bit of North-East Asia had the potential to be the first real cold war flashpoint but it wasn't.

  Sorry, I have no idea what you are arguing here nor why you quoted me in your post.  I don't believe that the evidence supports the Soviets not invading Hokkaido because of early cold war context, I believe that the evidence shows that they knew that they couldn't.  Their total amphibious lift capacity was about 6,000 men (provided all of their landing craft were operational) and very little equipment.  They would be utterly open to kamikaze attacks on the transit with none of the assets needed to establish anything like the Big Blue Blanket. 

I agree that there was the potential for conflict between the allies in the Northwest Pacific given the many competing factions trying to become the government of Korea (and the fact that the US head of the occupation forces was a rather hasty individual). 

[Sheilbh]

  Sorry, I have no idea what you are arguing here nor why you quoted me in your post.  I don't believe that the evidence supports the Soviets not invading Hokkaido because of early cold war context, I believe that the evidence shows that they knew that they couldn't.  Their total amphibious lift capacity was about 6,000 men (provided all of their landing craft were operational) and very little equipment.  They would be utterly open to kamikaze attacks on the transit with none of the assets needed to establish anything like the Big Blue Blanket. 

Sorry - maybe wrong message - I meant the message from Truman to Stalin on Hokkaido.

Evidence and records are interesting when they are brought forward to be studied in honest context with OTHER records and evidence. Not when they are brought forward in specific isolation of contrasting information in order to feed an agenda. Indeed, when THAT happens, it is downright dangerous, and is generally used to promote some kind of propaganda or dishonest narrative.

So I've just chosen this bit - I just disagree. I don't think that's what most historians are doing. I think they have an agenda in terms of their own theory or ideology of how they study the past - and that's fine as long as they're transparent about it - but I don't think they're generally bad faith operators drive by politics.

All historians are making a case and have an argument, I think as long as they are up-front with that or engage with the opposing position then it's for you as a reader. I don't think they're doing propaganda or being dishonest - and you can tell the ones that are (the David Irving approach).

And I think part of it is even less propagandistic - I think the bigger risk for historians is that they are faddish and glom onto the latest theory or approach. So I think "global histories" are having a bit of a moment at the minute which has benefits and downsides. But at its best, like any other new approach or theory, I think it can really change your perspective.

Edit: And I think this goes to your point on the Sovietisation of WW2 and also my view that China is a more important bit of the war than I think is generally covered. I think in the immediate aftermath most people were very aware of the importance of the USSR and China. I think both dwindle for a few decades partly, no doubt, as other national narratives are settled and in part because of the cold war (and, frankly, war films) but crucially I also think part of it is that Western academics don't have access to the Soviet archives, a lot of the Nazi archives are in East Berlin and probably the single biggest source for understanding China are the records of people like Stilwell.

In the last 30 years a lot more Soviet and Nazi records have become available and both Taipei and Beijng have started to release (more limited) documents. I think it's impossible for that new information to not transform the perspective on the war. It might well go too far and over-correct, and then there'll be a revision to that approach as well. But all the time through that process our understanding will become more complete.

[Berkut]

Except what you just talked about and described is not at all what is happening here.

What IS happening here is exactly that David Irving approach, and you can in fact tell the ones that are - I can tell.

This is not about "all historians are doing". It is about what some non-historians are doing while most actual historians role their eyes and try to get actual evidence and facts across. But as we can tell, a juicy bit of "controversial" bullshit is ever so much "sexier" and "interesting" then the plain old obvious truth.

And yes, I did notice that you "just chosen this bit". You interrogative scalpel is impressive.

[Berkut]

Lastly, please don't trot out the tired idea that the poor Soviets never got their due amongst historians. That is just simply not true.

It might be true among amateur or the general public, but actual historians of WW2 have long noted and taken as a matter of course the incredible amount of blood and treasure and pain the Soviets invested into protecting themselves from the Nazis. Frankly, war films aren't really part of what historians are actually doing.

New information in the last thirty years has certainly been very interesting. It has not, except among those cherry picking those records, suggested that it was really the USSR that drove Japan to surrender.

[Admiral Yi]

I don't get your logic here.
They wanted to continue to fight even after the bombs had been dropped.... yet Japan surrendered.
This sounds like an argument against the bombs single handedly winning the war  rather than in defence of it.

Japan surrendered because the emperor overrode his cabinet.  The emperor overrode his cabinet because of the A bombs.

[Sheilbh]

Except what you just talked about and described is not at all what is happening here.

What IS happening here is exactly that David Irving approach, and you can in fact tell the ones that are - I can tell.

But that's just crazy.

I got most of this from Herbert Bix's biography of Hirohito, he did tip the hat to Hasegawa as transforming the studies on this point. Both are respectable academic historians (Hasegawa is a Soviet-Japanese specialist so comfortable with both records).

Hasegawa also edited and contributed to a collection of essays on this the end of the Pacific War - including with contributions from other prominent historians who totally disagree with him like Richard Frank, as well as an essay on the historiography by Barton Bernstein, an essay on the cold war context by David Holloway and a contribution from Sumio Hatano that the bomb and the Soviet DOW were of equal importance (but more important to different factions which is what moved things). These are all academic historians engaging in debate with this perspective and I just don't understand how you can dismiss it all as David Irving-like propagandists (other professional historians who were experts on the Thrid Reich or the Holocaust didn't contribute to a book edited by Irving).

I just find it really weird that there is clearly discussion around this in academic circles and people are saying actually they're only partisan propagandists and, in reality, the debate is settled.

And yes, I did notice that you "just chosen this bit". You interrogative scalpel is impressive.

Law school was costly but did have some benefits

Lastly, please don't trot out the tired idea that the poor Soviets never got their due amongst historians. That is just simply not true.

It might be true among amateur or the general public, but actual historians of WW2 have long noted and taken as a matter of course the incredible amount of blood and treasure and pain the Soviets invested into protecting themselves from the Nazis. Frankly, war films aren't really part of what historians are actually doing.

I that's probably fair among academic historians - although I wonder if even then while understanding the eastern front they perhaps underestimated how awful it really just because it was difficult to access the people involved or the records in those state.

But if I'm reading a book then it's chances basically a popular history which helps form the view of the general public - and that is the context you are writing against if you're trying to topple a commonly held perception (like, I imagine in both our countries the central quality of our war struggle ). That's why I think war films matter - the example that comes to mind for me is the lions led by donkeys view of WW1 in this country.

Initially a lot of the generals from WW1 and especially Haig were incredibly popular with their veterans and perceived as having really done their best for their soldier especially around their welfare and then treatment after the war. From about the 60s onwards there's a trend of really questioning (justifiably) what the point of WW1 was - there's the start of popular culture that basically depicts it as pointless and futile (Oh, What A Lovely War! etc) and there's an incredibly influential history book by a non-professional historian (and future Tory MP) Alan Clark: Lions Led By Donkeys. And that is basically what it argues, that the generals were old-fashioned unwilling to innovate and instead expended huge numbers of British (and imperial) lives with outdated tactics to push forward the frontline by one inch.

From my understanding - and it's not an area that I'm interested in so haven't read much on this - that view is entirely discredited among academic military historians. They write books including some aimed at the general public (e.g. by Hew Strachan) to displace that perception, but it's just become the accepted wisdom for the general public. That's why I think the wider culture matters in terms of when historians are writing.

New information in the last thirty years has certainly been very interesting. It has not, except among those cherry picking those records, suggested that it was really the USSR that drove Japan to surrender.

Aren't both sides just cherry-picking the same records to construct their argument though? That's why my own guess is it was probably both - it was the dual shock that's why the records talk about both events so much.

[Berkut]

No, I think if you do NOT cherry pick your records, the narrative is pretty straightforward here- I made this point rather specifically in the portion of the argument you decided did not warrant a response.

This is not a case of each side cherry picking - it is a case where one side wants to cherry pick, and the other is referencing the total source. Again - your argument is *identical* in kind to the argument of the Lost Causers, or Holocaust Deniers, or The Election Was Stolen theorists. It is not "both sides".


But hey, if you just find this narrative too delicious to pass on, knock yourself out. I am sure 4 years of constant war in the pacific were all just window dressing to the USSR saving the world from the Japanese who were ready to throw the Americans back, and at the exact same time, totally ready to surrender without the bombs, but only if the Soviets entered the war because absent the Soviets entering the war, they were definitely going to use the Soviets to negotiate a peace....which we know the Americans would reject, making the bombs necessary again.


The entire thing doesn't even make sense. It's starting with a conclusion, then searching for reasons to support it.

[Neil]

The reason that the 'Lions Led By Donkeys' craze caught on when it did was mainly political.  It's not like it was a new sentiment.  Lloyd George had been going on about how every one of Britain's war leaders who wasn't him was mentally defective pretty much since 1915, and he absolutely despised Haig and Robertson for having the strategic clarity to realize that the Western Front was critical.  However, the reason that it became so popular when it did was that British politics was shifting away from the 'English gentleman'.  People lapped up tales about how stupid the gentleman generals were because it was exactly what they wanted to hear.

[The Brain]

Are we discussing history or the public's perception of history? The public's perception of history is about as correct as the public's perception of nuclear physics.

[grumbler]

The reason that the 'Lions Led By Donkeys' craze caught on when it did was mainly political.  It's not like it was a new sentiment.  Lloyd George had been going on about how every one of Britain's war leaders who wasn't him was mentally defective pretty much since 1915, and he absolutely despised Haig and Robertson for having the strategic clarity to realize that the Western Front was critical.  However, the reason that it became so popular when it did was that British politics was shifting away from the 'English gentleman'.  People lapped up tales about how stupid the gentleman generals were because it was exactly what they wanted to hear.

That wasn't a WW1 phenomenon.  That goes back to the Boer War, at least.  Raglan and Cardigan were earlier examples, but not seen as representative.

[Sheilbh]

The reason that the 'Lions Led By Donkeys' craze caught on when it did was mainly political.  It's not like it was a new sentiment.  Lloyd George had been going on about how every one of Britain's war leaders who wasn't him was mentally defective pretty much since 1915, and he absolutely despised Haig and Robertson for having the strategic clarity to realize that the Western Front was critical.  However, the reason that it became so popular when it did was that British politics was shifting away from the 'English gentleman'.  People lapped up tales about how stupid the gentleman generals were because it was exactly what they wanted to hear.

Interesting - although there is an irony that the guy who really propagated in his book was in many ways the archetype of an English gentleman: son of Kenneth Clark (of Civilisation fame), prep school, public school, Household Cavalry, Oxford, the Bar, then to the House of Commons as a Tory MP

And of course that it's lingered so long - Blackadder Goes Forth probably didn't help on that front. But historians have been debunking it for decades to no effect on public perception which is why what is conventional among professional historians always appears as revisionist when it's in a popular history book.

No, I think if you do NOT cherry pick your records, the narrative is pretty straightforward here- I made this point rather specifically in the portion of the argument you decided did not warrant a response.

This is not a case of each side cherry picking - it is a case where one side wants to cherry pick, and the other is referencing the total source. Again - your argument is *identical* in kind to the argument of the Lost Causers, or Holocaust Deniers, or The Election Was Stolen theorists. It is not "both sides".

I'm just baffled by this. I don't understand why any of those academic historians with different perspectives with this would engage if they thought that Hasegawa's point was basically the equivalent of Holocaust denial, or how you can see me talking about a debate in the scholarship as like that as well. I don't understand how you can just know that all of those historians - who other historians of the Pacific War engage with in good faith - are actually just bad faith historians and propagandist. Surely that would be something that the other historians like Frank (who vigorously disagrees with Hasegawa. Despite disputing the conclusions and really disagreeing on the points on the Potsdam Declaration and Truman, which grumbler flagged, as not rising above the level of a weak inference - this is Frank on Hasegawa's book:

The end of the Pacific War looms as one of the leading controversies in American history.  For more than fifty years—an astonishing achievement--Robert Butow's exemplary Japan's Decision to Surrender reigned as the essential work on political decision making in Japan and the United States.[1]  Other works supplemented Butow, but never entirely displaced him. Racing the Enemy now stands as an absolutely critical work on political dimensions of this passage and I believe it is the first work with a legitimate claim to have eclipsed Butow.  Not only does Dr. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa profit from an enormous body of evidence shielded from Butow's view, Hasegawa stretches the political canvas to include a Soviet Union in vivid hues.  All of this is a sterling achievement that amply justifies this roundtable. [...]
Racing the Enemy will mark a turning point in the U.S. historiography of the end of the Pacific War.  It is the coup de grace to the fundamental premises of the first wave of what has been called "revisionism."  Following a number of prior works and based on such thorough and sound research from Japanese sources, it demolishes the narrative that Japan was near surrender before Hiroshima or that her surrender could have been easily procured with a guarantee about the imperial institution untenable.  At the same time, this work will open new fronts for critical challenges to Japanese and American decision making.  As this roundtable is designed to bring out disagreements and perhaps areas where further scholarship is warranted, I will now turn to those areas.

As I say he totally disagrees with Hasegawa - but that's not how a critic describes a book by a historian who's doing the equivalent of Lost Causing or Holocaust denial. It's why I just don't understand how the conclusion this is settled, undoubted and very clear history.

But hey, if you just find this narrative too delicious to pass on, knock yourself out. I am sure 4 years of constant war in the pacific were all just window dressing to the USSR saving the world from the Japanese who were ready to throw the Americans back, and at the exact same time, totally ready to surrender without the bombs, but only if the Soviets entered the war because absent the Soviets entering the war, they were definitely going to use the Soviets to negotiate a peace....which we know the Americans would reject, making the bombs necessary again.

No in terms of my opinion it would be that after 4 years of constant war in the Pacific the Japanese leadership were unable or unwilling to confront their position. This is demonstrated by factions, with the backing of the imperial household, trying to open negotiations without clarifying what Japan's terms would be and imagining in relation to the mediator, terms that were absurdly disconnected from that position (i.e. Japan keeping South Manchuria and a neutral buffer Korea).

The Japanese leadership was driven to face reality by the dual shocks of nukes and Soviet invasion that the only route to peace was through unconditional surrender. This maybe did present a - to quote Yonai's comment - "gift from Heaven" in presenting a justification to move for peace that would got around the dilema of a widespread army revolt for ending the war too soon, or the growing public hostility and opposition to the emperor and the imperial system from not ending the war quickly enough.

I just don't think my "narrative" is what you think it is. And it is just an opinion from very little reading (as I say, mainly Bix) and I can definitely sway back and forth on weighing up those factors. As I've said before I don't particularly have an opinion on the bombs - I struggle to see them as particularly different from the carpet bombing/firebombing that were routinely used in WW2. I could be wrong but I feel like the terror at them was primarily based on their potential and the knowledge that, as humans, we would improve it to the weapons we have now which I think are different from anything else.