Jutland, Jellico, Beatty and Castles of Steel

[The Minsky Moment]

Both sides went into the battle in order to inflict losses on the other side, so saying "focusing on "sinkings" is a bit misleading" seems... a bit misleading.  The British never made up for the loses of the battlecruisers (they added two more during the war, but not a third).  Given that both sides went into the battle of Jutland with the intention of sinking enemy ships, focusing on success in sinking enemy ships seems perfectly leading.

The focus on force ratios and attrition reminds me of McNamara and the Vietnam War.  To be clear - I am not saying the two situations are properly analogous - they aren't.  But it does illustrate why focusing on the particular objectives of the respective commanders at the time is analytically incomplete.  The US military did a pretty decent job of achieving the desired  attrition levels and ratios and still lost the war.

The British had the ability to construct more capital ships if they felt the need; they didn't and so put those resources elsewhere.  I suppose that goes more to point out the problems with the entire strategic conception and the waste of resources involved in constructing the High Seas Fleet in the first place, as opposed to the conduct or outcome of any specific battle.  But the point is that the strategic purpose of the Grand Fleet was  to contain the High Seas Fleet and prevent it from threatening either the blockade or Britain's own sea lines of communication.  From that perspective, the outcome of Jutland looks good for Britain and bad for Germany,

[grumbler]

The Brits most certainly DID come out to play - the Grand Fleet sailed when the HSF came out again, and when Scheer found out it was out, he, again, turned around and went back home - and pretty much stopped trying.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Action_of_19_August_1916

Do you mean they would not come out to play in that they would not agree to fight the entire HSF with just part of the GF?

The HSF came out once more, and the GF raised steam to intercept if needed, but the Germans went home after being attacked by submarines.

From 18 to 19 October, Scheer led a brief sortie into the North Sea which British intelligence gave advance warning; the Grand Fleet declined to prepare an ambush, staying in port with steam raised, ready to sail. The German sortie was abandoned after a few hours when SMS München was hit by a torpedo fired by E38 (Lieutenant-Commander J. de B. Jessop) and it was feared other submarines might be in the area. Scheer suffered further difficulties when in November he sailed with Moltke and a division of dreadnoughts to rescue U-20 and U-30, which had become stranded on the Danish coast. British submarine J1 (Commander Noel Laurence) managed to hit the battleships Grosser Kurfürst and Kronprinz. The failure of these operations reinforced the belief, created at Jutland, that the risks were too great for such tactics, because of the danger from submarines and mines.[12]

The Brits after Jutland were perfectly happy to have a repeat engagement, as long as they could do so on the terms they wanted all along - a fleet on fleet engagement that would be very, very likely to win. The Germans wanted the same thing THEY wanted all along - to bait some significant portion into a fight where they could use their entire fleet against some fraction of the British fleet, and wipe it out such that the overall balance would allow them to fight that battle that the Brits wanted on more even terms, and potentially break the British blockade.

We probably agree that neither side was really going to get what they wanted. The Brits were too careful to let the HSF engage a portion of their fleet without backup from the rest, and the Germans knew doing anything else would be suicide.

The British stopped sending their ships into the southern North Sea for fear of submarines (and the Germans eventually did the same).

The claim that the Germans didn't seek a fleet action after Jutland is false.  That was my only point.  They didn't want to fight the entire GF at once, but that was as true before the battle as after.

[Berkut]

I didn't make the claim that the Germans did not seek a fleet action, just disputed the implication that the Brits were "unwilling to play". They were certainly very willing to play.

[grumbler]

You said it was not an argument "either side" used. That is wrong - it is most certainly an argument that one of the sides used.

And nobody claims that the Japanese ran away after Pearl harbour, and THAT is an argument that neither side used, because it was a raid.

And plenty of people have in fact pointed out that the Japanese victory at PH was considerably less complete then it could have been  had they stuck around and hit again, targeting the repair and fueling facilities, for example.

But I think the damage disparity at PH was rather different then Jutland, the goals of the Japanese were different, and the goals of the Americans were different. And again, I've never heard anyone characterize the Japanese retreat back to Japan as "running away", so I am not sure how that is relevant.

The Germans, most certainly, ran away. Their actions the night of the battle were entirely about trying to make sure that the battle was not rejoined the next morning, because they knew the outcomes would be very, very bad for them.

Balfour claimed that the British won because the Germans didn't break the British blockade https://www.newspapers.com/clip/35367740/british-first-lord-of-the-admiralty/.  He doesn't mention a belief that the British won because the Germans retreated (as planned).

You have here created a new distinction that isn't logically very clear: the Japanese didn't "run away" because their operation was "a raid" and so planned to retreat, but the Germans did "run away" because their operation was not called a raid but still planned to retreat.  What is the distinction you are drawing between the two hit-and-run plans?

The repetition of the argument that the Germans retreated so they couldn't have won (in fact, it is an argument that they never planned to win) seems to me a mere attempt at argument by assertion.  Did the Japanese lose at Savo Island because they "ran away" after the battle?  Did the fact that Taffy 3 was trying to "run away" at the battle of Samar mean that the Japanese won that battle?  The Germans "ran away" after sinking the carrier HMS Glorious and 2 destroyers.  Did they lose that engagement, in your opinion?

The Germans retreated on the night of Jutland because they'd always planned to withdraw when the whole GF showed up.   Any other plan would have been foolish.  It is pretty clear, though, that they didn't think that they could never succeed in fighting the GF under any circumstances, even though they would have to 'run away" under all circumstances.  Which side "runs away" is not a good measure of victory at sea.

[Threviel]

The German objective was to catch a small part of the Grand Fleet and destroy it in detail. They failed to achieve that objective.

The British objective was to maintain the blockade, they succeeded with that objective.

That the Germans caused more casualties is neither here nor there, they failed in their objective and the Brits did not.

[Threviel]

And a minor quibble. It's Jellicoe, not Jellico. And if you start to discuss carriers they have hangars, the sailors onboard have hangers.

Edit: And I'm on a phone, any misspellings is caused by that. 

[Berkut]

You said it was not an argument "either side" used. That is wrong - it is most certainly an argument that one of the sides used.

And nobody claims that the Japanese ran away after Pearl harbour, and THAT is an argument that neither side used, because it was a raid.

And plenty of people have in fact pointed out that the Japanese victory at PH was considerably less complete then it could have been  had they stuck around and hit again, targeting the repair and fueling facilities, for example.

But I think the damage disparity at PH was rather different then Jutland, the goals of the Japanese were different, and the goals of the Americans were different. And again, I've never heard anyone characterize the Japanese retreat back to Japan as "running away", so I am not sure how that is relevant.

The Germans, most certainly, ran away. Their actions the night of the battle were entirely about trying to make sure that the battle was not rejoined the next morning, because they knew the outcomes would be very, very bad for them.

Balfour claimed that the British won because the Germans didn't break the British blockade https://www.newspapers.com/clip/35367740/british-first-lord-of-the-admiralty/.  He doesn't mention a belief that the British won because the Germans retreated (as planned).

You claimed that neither side made that argument. That is not true.

It may not be a good argument (I don't agree that it isn't, under the circumstances of THIS battle), but the claim was that neither side made the argument, which, again, is not true. The allies did in fact make that argument.

[Berkut]

You said it was not an argument "either side" used. That is wrong - it is most certainly an argument that one of the sides used.

And nobody claims that the Japanese ran away after Pearl harbour, and THAT is an argument that neither side used, because it was a raid.

And plenty of people have in fact pointed out that the Japanese victory at PH was considerably less complete then it could have been  had they stuck around and hit again, targeting the repair and fueling facilities, for example.

But I think the damage disparity at PH was rather different then Jutland, the goals of the Japanese were different, and the goals of the Americans were different. And again, I've never heard anyone characterize the Japanese retreat back to Japan as "running away", so I am not sure how that is relevant.

The Germans, most certainly, ran away. Their actions the night of the battle were entirely about trying to make sure that the battle was not rejoined the next morning, because they knew the outcomes would be very, very bad for them.

You have here created a new distinction that isn't logically very clear: the Japanese didn't "run away" because their operation was "a raid" and so planned to retreat, but the Germans did "run away" because their operation was not called a raid but still planned to retreat.  What is the distinction you are drawing between the two hit-and-run plans?

In the one case, the Japanese came, they achieved what they set out to do, then they left because there was no reason to stick around. Same with Savo Island.

The Germans came, they failed to achieve what they set out to do, then they ran away when they realized that they had failed and could not succeed. They did not leave because they had done what they came to do.

Hence the very basic observation that their leaving *before they achieved what they set out to do* is a reasonable argument to be made that they in fact lost.

It isn't an iron clad argument, but it isn't ridiculous.

It is also reasonable to note that naval combat is NOT land combat, and siezing ground is not the point, and hence who is left in control of the battlefield isn't really nearly as important as it might sound.

Hell, a better example if you want to go to the extreme is noting that the Americans probably won the battle of Hiroshima, even though the Enola Gay left the battlefield.

[grumbler]

The German objective was to catch a small part of the Grand Fleet and destroy it in detail. They failed to achieve that objective.

The British objective was to maintain the blockade, they succeeded with that objective.

That the Germans caused more casualties is neither here nor there, they failed in their objective and the Brits did not.

If the only British objective was to maintain the blockade, the Grand Fleet would have stayed in port.  The British went to sea to decisively defeat the HSF and free up British naval resources for other uses.

So, the British failed in their objective, and the Germans in theirs.

[grumbler]

You claimed that neither side made that argument. That is not true.

It may not be a good argument (I don't agree that it isn't, under the circumstances of THIS battle), but the claim was that neither side made the argument, which, again, is not true. The allies did in fact make that argument.

My claim is that no one (of any significance to historians, anyway) made the claim that the RN won Jutland just because the Germans withdrew first.  The Germans were always going to withdraw first, and everyone knew it.

[grumbler]

In the one case, the Japanese came, they achieved what they set out to do, then they left because there was no reason to stick around. Same with Savo Island.

The Germans came, they failed to achieve what they set out to do, then they ran away when they realized that they had failed and could not succeed. They did not leave because they had done what they came to do.

Hence the very basic observation that their leaving *before they achieved what they set out to do* is a reasonable argument to be made that they in fact lost.

It isn't an iron clad argument, but it isn't ridiculous.

It is also reasonable to note that naval combat is NOT land combat, and siezing ground is not the point, and hence who is left in control of the battlefield isn't really nearly as important as it might sound.

Hell, a better example if you want to go to the extreme is noting that the Americans probably won the battle of Hiroshima, even though the Enola Gay left the battlefield.

The Japanese at Savo actually failed to accomplish what they set out to do; they sank none of the transports or assault cargo ships off Guadalcanal, which were their target.  So, "the very basic observation that their leaving *before they achieved what they set out to do* is a reasonable argument to be made that they in fact lost" applies, if it is, in fact, true.  I don't think that anyone would agree in the case of Savo Island, though.

Which side left first isn't a signifier in naval combat, any more than it is in aerial combat.

[Valmy]

The German objective was to catch a small part of the Grand Fleet and destroy it in detail. They failed to achieve that objective.

The British objective was to maintain the blockade, they succeeded with that objective.

That the Germans caused more casualties is neither here nor there, they failed in their objective and the Brits did not.

If the only British objective was to maintain the blockade, the Grand Fleet would have stayed in port.  The British went to sea to decisively defeat the HSF and free up British naval resources for other uses.

So, the British failed in their objective, and the Germans in theirs.

The British strike me as delusional then. Did they really think they could blow away the entire HSF in one engagement? Surely at the distances that ship combat occurred in this era as soon as the Germans started taking losses everybody knew they would steam away.

The British were supposed to be these great seaman, did they really think such an unlikely thing was a realistic possibility?

[The Brain]

The German objective was to catch a small part of the Grand Fleet and destroy it in detail. They failed to achieve that objective.

The British objective was to maintain the blockade, they succeeded with that objective.

That the Germans caused more casualties is neither here nor there, they failed in their objective and the Brits did not.

If the only British objective was to maintain the blockade, the Grand Fleet would have stayed in port.  The British went to sea to decisively defeat the HSF and free up British naval resources for other uses.

So, the British failed in their objective, and the Germans in theirs.

The British strike me as delusional then. Did they really think they could blow away the entire HSF in one engagement? Surely at the distances that ship combat occurred in this era as soon as the Germans started taking losses everybody knew they would steam away.

The British were supposed to be these great seaman, did they really think such an unlikely thing was a realistic possibility?

The Nelson of the Pacific pulled off a battle of annihilation just a few years before. Granted, circumstances were hardly identical...

[grumbler]

The British strike me as delusional then. Did they really think they could blow away the entire HSF in one engagement? Surely at the distances that ship combat occurred in this era as soon as the Germans started taking losses everybody knew they would steam away.

The British were supposed to be these great seaman, did they really think such an unlikely thing was a realistic possibility?

Well, yes, they did expect such a thing to be possible.  Tsushima had only been eleven years in the past, and it was just such a decisive victory.

Of course, the GF didn't need to "blow away the entire HSF in one engagement" to win a decisive victory, just smash enough of it that the rest could be contained by a fraction of the Grand Fleet, allowing the rest of the GF to be used in the Med, against submarines, and in trade protection. 

The Germans would steam away from any encounter with the entire GF, but steaming away isn't the same as getting away.  If the Germans steamed away at each squadron's best speed, the slower 2/3 of the HSF would be gobbled up piecemeal.  And if the HSF stayed together, it could only retreat at the speed of its slowest ship, which would mean its destruction.

I don't think that it was unreasonable to suppose that it might be possible to achieve such a decisive victory, but the fleet commanders knew very well that it was extremely unlikely, given visibility in the North Sea and the virtual requirement that an engagement take place in the late afternoon, after the fleets steamed and maneuvered all day.

[Threviel]

The German objective was to catch a small part of the Grand Fleet and destroy it in detail. They failed to achieve that objective.

The British objective was to maintain the blockade, they succeeded with that objective.

That the Germans caused more casualties is neither here nor there, they failed in their objective and the Brits did not.

If the only British objective was to maintain the blockade, the Grand Fleet would have stayed in port.  The British went to sea to decisively defeat the HSF and free up British naval resources for other uses.

So, the British failed in their objective, and the Germans in theirs.

For neither was it the only objective. The British primary objective was to maintain the blockade. Secondary to that was the destruction of the HSF. The secondary objective was obviously not worth it to risk the primary.

If Jellicoe had been ordered to destroy the HSF at all costs he would not have turned away from the destroyer attack. But he was not ordered to do that.

It was also not the habit of the RN to hide in harbour.