Jutland, Jellico, Beatty and Castles of Steel

[grumbler]

Battle of Jutland: Who won?

How is this even up for debate?

The Germans came out with a very specific mission: to try to trap a portion of the Grand Fleet and destroy it, in an attempt to create parity. They failed. Really, the entire battle was an intel victory for the Brits, more then anything else. The Germans were trying to figure out how to get their entire fleet to engage just one element of the GF, that way at some point in the future they could go toe to toe with the GF with some hope of winning. They lost the battle as soon as the Brits read their radio signals and sent the entire GF out instead of just Beatty's battle cruiser and fast battleships. At that moment, the chances of the Germans managing to fight just one piece of the GF were pretty much lost, since Jellico took the entire thing out, and it turned from the Germans trying to trap the Brits to the Brits trying to trap the Germans.

And the Germans ran back home (rightfully so - they would have been eviscerated otherwise), mission failed.

I don't know how there is debate about who won. After it was over, the Brits were sailing around freely doing wahtever they like, and the Germans were sitting in port fixing all their broken ships, and would never really come back out again.

I'd argue that the Germans won, if anyone did.  They set out to force attrition on the Grand Fleet, and did so.  Which side would have preferred to have another ten Jutlands?  The problem with the German "victory" (if it was one) was that they didn't attempt to repeat it very vigorously, and the Grand Fleet soon became strong enough to make even Jutland-style attrition endurable.

One could argue that the status quo suited the British, but if that was the case, why did Jellico even seek a battle?  He could have ensured that the Germans could not bombard the British ports, and the Germans would have had to withdraw anyway.  Maybe the British were not satisfied with the status quo.

[grumbler]

Battle of Jutland: Who screwed up? Did *anyone* really screw up?

So afterwards, apparently there was a rather long running feud between Beatty and his followers and the followers of Jellico. Jellico himself mostly seemed to stay out of it.

But anyway, the argument was over who was at fault for the battle not having a much more decisive result for Britain. Beatty basically called Jellico a pussy for turning back in the face of the massed torpedo attack, and apparently later (when he was running the Admiralty) actually trying to censor the official account of the battle to block mention of the main fleet even being engaged, to suggest that the only actual fighting done was his force.

Beatty, IMO (and based on very limited reading) comes across like kind of a douchebag. A bit of a glory hound.

But more than that, I find it interesting that there is even a debate to begin with. It seems pretty clear to me that Jellico did exactly what he set out to do, and the Brits won, and why does anyone need to be blamed? Beatty (mostly) did his job as well, drawing the HSF into the British trap. I don't really even understand why there was any kind of blame game needed at all.

In fact, given what they all knew at the time they knew it, I don't think there is much to fault any of the admirals on either side on. Some tactical details to be sure, but basically both sides went out and did what they intended to do.

But if I had to pick between Beatty and Jellico, it is no contest. Jellico had a plan, he executed on that plan, and he won. If you want to fault him for turning away from the torpedo attack, then you have to honestly claim that is a bad idea BEFORE it happened - Beatty did not do that. Jellico had published his orders and battle expectations, and he knew his #1 goal was always, always, always to preserve the superiority of the Grand Fleet over the High Seas Fleet. Destroying the HSF was secondary to that. So he said before the battle that in such a situation, he would expect to turn away from such a torpedo attack, and when it happened, that is just what he did. I don't see how you can fault him for that unless you were arguing before the battle that those plans were bullshit.

One thing you can most definitely fault Beatty for, however, is his lack of communication both within his force, and more importantly, back to Jellico. He failed on multiple occasions to keep Jellico informed on what was going on, and had pretty sloppy control of his own ships. And these are things that prior to the battle WERE expected of him.

But I still don't see why there was even much of a controversy to begin with. The Brits won, and won clearly. Bitching about what might have been seems just an exercise in ego more then anything else. Maybe politics?

Assuming that the British won, which is a bit of a reach, one can still see that the two major British commanders had very different policies and styles of command, which clashed at Jutland. 

Jellico was a very methodical commander who tried to direct everything from his flagship, even though he didn't have (and knew he didn't have) the command and control necessary to centrally direct things with any efficiency.  His was what he thought was the least-bad solution, one that might prevent decisive victory but would also prevent decisive loss.

Beatty was more of an informal, "follow my lead" kind of leader.  He improvised (in the case of his improvements to firing speeds, disastrously) and tended to have his own, informal rules.  He didn't communicate those well to people outside his inner circle, though, which left poor Admiral Evans-Thomas behind twice because Beatty didn't ever talk to E-T before the battle, and tell him that the Battlecruiser Fleet didn't follow Royal navy signaling procedures.

OTOH,  the US admirals and captains who served in the Grand Fleet under Beatty thought that he was a brilliant commander and motivator, able to maintain high morale in the fleet under the most boring of conditions, and they were sure he would decisively crush the Germans if they came out.

[grumbler]

Also, not Jutland, but the entire story around Spree and his little squadron and the Brits stomping on their own dicks trying to get him was awesome.

Not so awesome for the crews of Good Hope and Monmouth.  Massie was wrong, by the way, in asserting that those ships were mostly manned by recently-activated reservists.  More recent research shows that.

[grumbler]

It comes down to expectations I think
If you come to it looking at whether Britain's strategic objectives were met, then it was one of the most decisive naval victories in history, because the consequence was to take the HSF out of the rest of war.  But if your expectation is - by jingo those rascally Krauts should have all been sent to the bottom where they belong, then it looks less satisfactory.

The idea that the German High Seas Fleet never came out again is one of those persistent myths that is incorrect.  The Germans, in fact, had two more fleet sorties in 1916 and two in 1917.  By 1918, there was only sufficient boiler-quality coal for one more operation. 

[grumbler]

But I think the Jellico's of the time very much understood the strategic objectives.

Hence to comment from Churchill that Jellico was the only man who could lose the war for his country in a single afternoon.

There would have been significant benefits to the UK had they won at Jutland, but the cost of defeat (which would only have come had Jellicoe been lured into torpedo range of the German light forces without his own light forces to defend himself) clearly outweighed any benefit that the British could gain through victory.  A minor loss was still a win for Jellicoe, once the decision to seek an action was taken.

[grumbler]

The Germans might have been too smart to bring ACs to a gunfight, but they were apparently dumb enough to bring pre-dreadnoughts, and their low speed made the fleet speed of the HSF 3-4 knots slower than it should have been....and they accomplished fuck all as well. Although, to be fair, the dreadnoughts of the HSF didn't accomplish a hell of a lot either.

Actually, the German Pre-dreads didn't slow the fleet by much (though they couldn't have kept up their maximum speeds for very long) and were useful in the night action, with their multiple intermediate-size guns.  The Germans shouldn't have brought them (and politics forced Scheer's ahnd), but at least they had a purpose once they were assigned to the mission.  The British ACs just blundered about fouling the range until they were blown up.

[Berkut]

Battle of Jutland: Who won?

How is this even up for debate?

The Germans came out with a very specific mission: to try to trap a portion of the Grand Fleet and destroy it, in an attempt to create parity. They failed. Really, the entire battle was an intel victory for the Brits, more then anything else. The Germans were trying to figure out how to get their entire fleet to engage just one element of the GF, that way at some point in the future they could go toe to toe with the GF with some hope of winning. They lost the battle as soon as the Brits read their radio signals and sent the entire GF out instead of just Beatty's battle cruiser and fast battleships. At that moment, the chances of the Germans managing to fight just one piece of the GF were pretty much lost, since Jellico took the entire thing out, and it turned from the Germans trying to trap the Brits to the Brits trying to trap the Germans.

And the Germans ran back home (rightfully so - they would have been eviscerated otherwise), mission failed.

I don't know how there is debate about who won. After it was over, the Brits were sailing around freely doing wahtever they like, and the Germans were sitting in port fixing all their broken ships, and would never really come back out again.

I'd argue that the Germans won, if anyone did.  They set out to force attrition on the Grand Fleet, and did so.  Which side would have preferred to have another ten Jutlands?  The problem with the German "victory" (if it was one) was that they didn't attempt to repeat it very vigorously, and the Grand Fleet soon became strong enough to make even Jutland-style attrition endurable.

One could argue that the status quo suited the British, but if that was the case, why did Jellico even seek a battle?  He could have ensured that the Germans could not bombard the British ports, and the Germans would have had to withdraw anyway.  Maybe the British were not satisfied with the status quo.

Jellico was happy to have a battle where he took the entire GF up against the HSF, because that was a battle he was very, very likely to win.

The Germans wanted a battle where they could peal off piece of the GF and beat just it - they failed to get that battle.

I think Jellico would have LOVED to have another fleet on fleet battle, because even after Jutland, he still had a significant advantage in number of ships.

It's true that Britain could not win the war by destroying the HSF, and Germany could have won (in theory) by some kind of amazing outcome where they take on and destroy the GF while not having the HSF destroyed. But that outcome was incredibly unlikely unless they managed to win a preliminary fight more on their terms, which is what they were trying to do - and they failed.

[Berkut]

Battle of Jutland: Who screwed up? Did *anyone* really screw up?

So afterwards, apparently there was a rather long running feud between Beatty and his followers and the followers of Jellico. Jellico himself mostly seemed to stay out of it.

But anyway, the argument was over who was at fault for the battle not having a much more decisive result for Britain. Beatty basically called Jellico a pussy for turning back in the face of the massed torpedo attack, and apparently later (when he was running the Admiralty) actually trying to censor the official account of the battle to block mention of the main fleet even being engaged, to suggest that the only actual fighting done was his force.

Beatty, IMO (and based on very limited reading) comes across like kind of a douchebag. A bit of a glory hound.

But more than that, I find it interesting that there is even a debate to begin with. It seems pretty clear to me that Jellico did exactly what he set out to do, and the Brits won, and why does anyone need to be blamed? Beatty (mostly) did his job as well, drawing the HSF into the British trap. I don't really even understand why there was any kind of blame game needed at all.

In fact, given what they all knew at the time they knew it, I don't think there is much to fault any of the admirals on either side on. Some tactical details to be sure, but basically both sides went out and did what they intended to do.

But if I had to pick between Beatty and Jellico, it is no contest. Jellico had a plan, he executed on that plan, and he won. If you want to fault him for turning away from the torpedo attack, then you have to honestly claim that is a bad idea BEFORE it happened - Beatty did not do that. Jellico had published his orders and battle expectations, and he knew his #1 goal was always, always, always to preserve the superiority of the Grand Fleet over the High Seas Fleet. Destroying the HSF was secondary to that. So he said before the battle that in such a situation, he would expect to turn away from such a torpedo attack, and when it happened, that is just what he did. I don't see how you can fault him for that unless you were arguing before the battle that those plans were bullshit.

One thing you can most definitely fault Beatty for, however, is his lack of communication both within his force, and more importantly, back to Jellico. He failed on multiple occasions to keep Jellico informed on what was going on, and had pretty sloppy control of his own ships. And these are things that prior to the battle WERE expected of him.

But I still don't see why there was even much of a controversy to begin with. The Brits won, and won clearly. Bitching about what might have been seems just an exercise in ego more then anything else. Maybe politics?

Assuming that the British won, which is a bit of a reach, one can still see that the two major British commanders had very different policies and styles of command, which clashed at Jutland. 

Jellico was a very methodical commander who tried to direct everything from his flagship, even though he didn't have (and knew he didn't have) the command and control necessary to centrally direct things with any efficiency.  His was what he thought was the least-bad solution, one that might prevent decisive victory but would also prevent decisive loss.

Beatty was more of an informal, "follow my lead" kind of leader.  He improvised (in the case of his improvements to firing speeds, disastrously) and tended to have his own, informal rules.  He didn't communicate those well to people outside his inner circle, though, which left poor Admiral Evans-Thomas behind twice because Beatty didn't ever talk to E-T before the battle, and tell him that the Battlecruiser Fleet didn't follow Royal navy signaling procedures.

OTOH,  the US admirals and captains who served in the Grand Fleet under Beatty thought that he was a brilliant commander and motivator, able to maintain high morale in the fleet under the most boring of conditions, and they were sure he would decisively crush the Germans if they came out.

Yes, the book definitely gave one that impression - that Beatty was a brilliant tactical commander, agressive, and his men worshipped him.

I actually look at it and think that both men were exactly where they needed to be. Beatty as the commander of the "fast" portion of the GF (the BCs and the most modern BBs that could keep up with him), and Jellico in overall command.

[Berkut]

Also, not Jutland, but the entire story around Spree and his little squadron and the Brits stomping on their own dicks trying to get him was awesome.

Not so awesome for the crews of Good Hope and Monmouth.  Massie was wrong, by the way, in asserting that those ships were mostly manned by recently-activated reservists.  More recent research shows that.

Well war is never ACTUALLY awesome in reality. It is a bunch of people dying and suffering for rather dubious purposes.

[The Minsky Moment]

The idea that the German High Seas Fleet never came out again is one of those persistent myths that is incorrect.  The Germans, in fact, had two more fleet sorties in 1916 and two in 1917.

And how did that work out?

By 1918, there was only sufficient boiler-quality coal for one more operation.

Why was that?

[grumbler]

Jellico was happy to have a battle where he took the entire GF up against the HSF, because that was a battle he was very, very likely to win.

The Germans wanted a battle where they could peal off piece of the GF and beat just it - they failed to get that battle.

I think Jellico would have LOVED to have another fleet on fleet battle, because even after Jutland, he still had a significant advantage in number of ships.

It's true that Britain could not win the war by destroying the HSF, and Germany could have won (in theory) by some kind of amazing outcome where they take on and destroy the GF while not having the HSF destroyed. But that outcome was incredibly unlikely unless they managed to win a preliminary fight more on their terms, which is what they were trying to do - and they failed.

Jellicoe did have a battle where he had the entire GF against the HSF, and he lost 6 major and 8 minor ships to sink 2 major and 9 minor ships, suffering more than twice the casualties and almost twice the tonnage he inflicted. 

The British wanted a battle where they could sink the entire HSF, and didn't get it.  The Germans, as you note, wanted to cut off a portion of the GF and defeat it - which they sorta got, given that they brought the BCF under the fire of the HSF and sank 1/3 of it.

The presumption that Jellicoe would have wanted a re-engagement because he would assuredly have won is marred only by the fact that when he got his engagement, he didn't win.  Another outcome like the historical one would have seen the British reduced to just 3 battlecruisers, while the Germans would also be down to three, but much better ones.

I don't think that the evidence shows that the British won at Jutland.  I think that they suffered a tactical defeat, but one which was meaningless in the strategic picture.

[grumbler]

The idea that the German High Seas Fleet never came out again is one of those persistent myths that is incorrect.  The Germans, in fact, had two more fleet sorties in 1916 and two in 1917.

And how did that work out?

By 1918, there was only sufficient boiler-quality coal for one more operation.

Why was that?

Red herring much? 

[The Minsky Moment]

Let's imagine a hypothetical battle, Schmutland, which is exactly like Jutland, except that the ship type and tonnage sinkings are reversed. That I suppose everyone would agree would be a clear British victory.  And yet in terms of strategic impact on the war, Schmutland would be almost indistinguishable from Jutland.    A point which a great mind already made in this thread:

There would have been significant benefits to the UK had they won at Jutland, but the cost of defeat (which would only have come had Jellicoe been lured into torpedo range of the German light forces without his own light forces to defend himself) clearly outweighed any benefit that the British could gain through victory.  A minor loss was still a win for Jellicoe, once the decision to seek an action was taken.

You can argue that Jellicoe had the easier task, in that all he had to do was get the Germans to sail back to port while avoiding catastrophe.  Yet there are enough historical examples of catastrophe to give one pause.  The ability not to screw things up beyond repair should not be under-estimated.

[Berkut]

I think focusing on "sinkings" is a bit misleading as well.

The Germans built some damn fine battle cruisers that did not sink, but were pretty much effectively destroyed and useless for the fight. In terms of the outcome of the battle, they lost Derfflinger (out of action for like  4 months?), Lutzow was sunk, Moltke had 4 working guns, Seydlitz was a wreck, and I think Van Der Tann was heavily damaged as well.

Kudos to the Germans for building them tough, but looking at just what actually sank doesn't tell the entire story of the battle and its outcome. They left because they had lost their ability to have any chance of winning the next morning, and had they stuck around, the high seas fleet would have been destroyed.

If the Germans and Brits fought another Jutland a day later, the British would still have more battle cruisers available then the Germans. If they fought a week later, they would have had more. A month? More. 6 months? More.

By the time the damage from Jutland was repaired and the scouting squadron able to sail as a unit again, the Brits were easily able to make up for the loss of their three battlecruisers.

The Germans set out to change the ratio of ships. They failed to do so, and the blockade continued.

[Tamas]

Great, now I have to play Rule the Waves 2 again!