Jutland, Jellico, Beatty and Castles of Steel

[The Brain]

What did the AARs of the two sides say about how happy or not they were with the outcome? I assume that the British AAR survives, but does the German? I know that an AAR might not talk that much about grand strategy considerations, but still.

[Maladict]

What did the AARs of the two sides say about how happy or not they were with the outcome? I assume that the British AAR survives, but does the German? I know that an AAR might not talk that much about grand strategy considerations, but still.

The diaries of the German torpedo boat squadrons survive, I doubt there will be anything like that in them though.

[Tamas]

Perhaps they posted them in the generic "Warships" folder instead of opening a separate AAR one.

[The Brain]

What did the AARs of the two sides say about how happy or not they were with the outcome? I assume that the British AAR survives, but does the German? I know that an AAR might not talk that much about grand strategy considerations, but still.

The diaries of the German torpedo boat squadrons survive, I doubt there will be anything like that in them though.

What's the general status of the Imperial German navy archives? Did they survive WW2?

[Threviel]

A lot of imperial navy records were bombed in WWII.

[The Brain]

Fucking WW2.

[Berkut]

What did the AARs of the two sides say about how happy or not they were with the outcome? I assume that the British AAR survives, but does the German? I know that an AAR might not talk that much about grand strategy considerations, but still.

You don't really need to go to an AAR - you can just see what Scheer actually did once he realized that he had not successfully managed to engage just a portion of the Grand Fleet, but rather his main fleet was up against the british main fleet - he fled. He was not dumb, and he knew that absent him successfully getting away, the HSF was doomed the next morning.

From the moment he realized the reality of the situation, his goal was to save his ships and get them back to port, and get out of this fight as quickly as he could, and that is exactly what he did, aided by some incredible luck and really astoundingly poor British communication.

This was never a fight the Germans wanted, but was definitely a fight the Brits were happy to have, because there was very, very little chance they would lose, having a roughly 50% larger fleet. And being able to read the German codes sure didn't hurt. I mean, hell - the entire war up to that point from the side of the British admirals revolved around "How do we bait the HSF to come out and fight us?" and from the German admirals it was "How do we take the entire HSF out and engage just a portion of the GF so we can get an even fight later?"

The outcome was about as good as the Germans could have hoped for under the circumstances - a clash of the both fleets, but it was not a fight the Germans wanted, and for good reason - they had no chance of winning it. If they had even an outside chance, they *should* have taken that fight, since winning it would be strategically devastating to the British, while losing it would be poliically devastating to the Germans, but actually strategically not really worse then just not fighting it.

But as some American naval officer put it "The prisoner tried to break out of jail, punched the jailer in the face, and then ran back to his cell".

After it was all over, the balance between the fleets was still heavily in the Brits favor (and massively so while they repaired the nearly destroyed German BC squadron and the damage to Konig and the BBs that were under fire), the blockade of Germany was still on, and the Kriegsmarine basically decided that there was no chance of changing that through any kind of surface action - Scheer said after a couple more attempts where the HSF went out but never was convinced they were not going to be pounced on by the combined GF, that there was no way he was going to trick the Brits into engaging him without the entire fleet, and he could not defeat the entire fleet.

That led to them basically letting the HSF rust while they focused on unrestricted submarine warfare, which of course led to the US entry into the war, etc., etc.

Jutland was a disaster for the Germans, but it was really just making clear a reality that had been true all along. Building a surface fleet that was *almost* able to match the British navy was a huge mistake.

[grumbler]

I think focusing on "sinkings" is a bit misleading as well.

(snip)
By the time the damage from Jutland was repaired and the scouting squadron able to sail as a unit again, the Brits were easily able to make up for the loss of their three battlecruisers.

The Germans set out to change the ratio of ships. They failed to do so, and the blockade continued.

Both sides went into the battle in order to inflict losses on the other side, so saying "focusing on "sinkings" is a bit misleading" seems... a bit misleading.  The British never made up for the loses of the battlecruisers (they added two more during the war, but not a third).  Given that both sides went into the battle of Jutland with the intention of sinking enemy ships, focusing on success in sinking enemy ships seems perfectly leading.

Again, the question is not whether the UK or Germany won WW1, but whether either, neither, or both accomplished their aims in any significant degree at Jutland.  You could argue for neither, but I don't think that you can argue that the British accomplished what they wanted to at Jutland.  They could have gotten the outcome they historically got by staying at anchor.  You can make a tiny case for the HSF, in that they wanted to pummel a portion of the GF, and did so (though not to the extent that they desired). 

Not that it greatly matters.  The chances that any single action would have had a significant impact on the outcome on the war were very tiny, and neither side had a plan that would do that.

[grumbler]

What did the AARs of the two sides say about how happy or not they were with the outcome? I assume that the British AAR survives, but does the German? I know that an AAR might not talk that much about grand strategy considerations, but still.

The Germans were happy with the outcome, the British were not.  The Germans afterwards tried to repeat the recipe, but the British wouldn't come out and play.

The Germans were never NOT going to run away before the battle they wanted ended with the GF showing up, so the argument that the British won the battle because the Germans retreated isn't an argument either side used.

In a strategic sense, the Germans couldn't win, of course.  The distant blockade strategy placed the elements of the RN that were actually hurting Germany out of the reach of the HSF.

[Berkut]

The Germans were never NOT going to run away before the battle they wanted ended with the GF showing up, so the argument that the British won the battle because the Germans retreated isn't an argument either side used.

"It is not customary for the victor to run away"

It was very much an argument the side that did not run away used.

[Berkut]

The Germans were happy with the outcome, the British were not.  The Germans afterwards tried to repeat the recipe, but the British wouldn't come out and play.

The Brits most certainly DID come out to play - the Grand Fleet sailed when the HSF came out again, and when Scheer found out it was out, he, again, turned around and went back home - and pretty much stopped trying.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Action_of_19_August_1916

Do you mean they would not come out to play in that they would not agree to fight the entire HSF with just part of the GF?

The HSF came out once more, and the GF raised steam to intercept if needed, but the Germans went home after being attacked by submarines.

From 18 to 19 October, Scheer led a brief sortie into the North Sea which British intelligence gave advance warning; the Grand Fleet declined to prepare an ambush, staying in port with steam raised, ready to sail. The German sortie was abandoned after a few hours when SMS München was hit by a torpedo fired by E38 (Lieutenant-Commander J. de B. Jessop) and it was feared other submarines might be in the area. Scheer suffered further difficulties when in November he sailed with Moltke and a division of dreadnoughts to rescue U-20 and U-30, which had become stranded on the Danish coast. British submarine J1 (Commander Noel Laurence) managed to hit the battleships Grosser Kurfürst and Kronprinz. The failure of these operations reinforced the belief, created at Jutland, that the risks were too great for such tactics, because of the danger from submarines and mines.[12]

The Brits after Jutland were perfectly happy to have a repeat engagement, as long as they could do so on the terms they wanted all along - a fleet on fleet engagement that would be very, very likely to win. The Germans wanted the same thing THEY wanted all along - to bait some significant portion into a fight where they could use their entire fleet against some fraction of the British fleet, and wipe it out such that the overall balance would allow them to fight that battle that the Brits wanted on more even terms, and potentially break the British blockade.

We probably agree that neither side was really going to get what they wanted. The Brits were too careful to let the HSF engage a portion of their fleet without backup from the rest, and the Germans knew doing anything else would be suicide.

[Berkut]

BTW, we are mostly arguing about nothing - I don't even mind the basic claim that Jutland was in fact a minor tactical loss for the Brits, just based on actual losses.

I just don't think there is a credible argument to be made that it was anything other then a very minor tactical loss, and a significant strategic setback for the Germans - at least insofar as it kind of put a definitive answer to the question they probably already knew but was kind of left to proving.

The Germans definitely won the propaganda part of it though, but I think the professionals on both sides knew the reality.

It was actually an American newspaper that made the comment about the jailer and jails...

[Maladict]

Perhaps they posted them in the generic "Warships" folder instead of opening a separate AAR one.

[grumbler]

The Germans were never NOT going to run away before the battle they wanted ended with the GF showing up, so the argument that the British won the battle because the Germans retreated isn't an argument either side used.

"It is not customary for the victor to run away"

It was very much an argument the side that did not run away used.

The position of First Lord of the Admiralty is British, not German.  The First Lord is not able to speak for the Germans.

And it is a moronic statement to begin with.  The Japanese "ran away" after Pearl Harbor, but no one claims the US was the victor in that battle.

[Berkut]

You said it was not an argument "either side" used. That is wrong - it is most certainly an argument that one of the sides used.

And nobody claims that the Japanese ran away after Pearl harbour, and THAT is an argument that neither side used, because it was a raid.

And plenty of people have in fact pointed out that the Japanese victory at PH was considerably less complete then it could have been  had they stuck around and hit again, targeting the repair and fueling facilities, for example.

But I think the damage disparity at PH was rather different then Jutland, the goals of the Japanese were different, and the goals of the Americans were different. And again, I've never heard anyone characterize the Japanese retreat back to Japan as "running away", so I am not sure how that is relevant.

The Germans, most certainly, ran away. Their actions the night of the battle were entirely about trying to make sure that the battle was not rejoined the next morning, because they knew the outcomes would be very, very bad for them.