The EU thread

[Jacob]

So Merz has apparently gotten the memo:

"What we once called the normative West no longer exists in this form," Merz said at an event for employers in Berlin on Tuesday. "At best, it is still a geographical designation, but no longer a normative bond that holds us together."

It's on Bloomberg, which requires a subscription - so here's a link to reddit commenting on the Bloomberg article.

[Sheilbh]

I think that's a mirage.

Russia has agency in the Ukraine in the sense that they can and have chosen to burn the lives of hundreds of thousands of men to occupy some extra square miles of dirt and wrecked urban infrastructure, and manifest their frustrations in mass civilian atrocities.  But they utterly failed to impose their will on a smaller, weaker, and political fragile nation.  Being willing and able to do utterly stupid and counterproductive things isn't a sign of agency.

The Middle Eastern policy is shambles; they put their chips on Assad and went bust.  They are dicking around pointlessly in Libya.  They are basically meaningless in Africa; a handful of the more unsavory dictators have used some of their pseudo-mercs to bully the locals.  No one takes them seriously compared to China.

On these I don't agree.

So I do think agency or freedom and ability to act includes bad decisions, or morally wrong ones. Again to put the counterpoint of Europe - there is not a single European NATO deployment on our Eastern frontier that does not rely on American logistical support. Similarly I bang on about this because I think it's important (and actually reflects the state of European infrastructure), the former US Army in Europe commander has said that there is not enough "transport capacity, or infrastructure that enables the rapid movementof NATO forces across Europe." Germany - which is the linchpin in the middle, has the capacity to move "one and a half armoured brigades simultaneously at one time, that's it."

I think if you are not able to move more than 6,000 troops at one point and you do not have logistical infrastructure to sustain them (in peacetime) - you are not able to conduct any significant form of military operation. In this case I'm even talking about it primarily in the context of self-defence. Russia has military force and is capable of moving and sustaining them - it may be for something that's wrong and bad. But I think that is a material difference in agency and power. Take the point on political sustainability that in the long(er)-run I think the war challenges the political settlement of Putin's regime.

I kind of agree on the Middle East and Africa. But even there I think it's more complicated. So with Syria I think we should avoid reading backward from what was an improbable collapse of the regime - the month before Assad fell the EU was discussing an Italian proposal to actually recognise Assad again because they'd clearly won. Russia was able to intervene decisively for a period. From everything I've read about the collapse that was very much on Assad and his regime - if it had been able to be even marginally less cruel and less corrupt it would probably have been able to survive with the Russian and wider support it had (it also wouldn't be the Assad regime any more). Russia also got its client out and have him comfortably living in Moscow - I read that he's apparently got into online gaming in a big way.

With Syria and Libya and Africa I also think one "benefit" for Russia is that it is able to manipulate migration flows to Europe and generate destabilising crises. There is strong evidence they do this both at points like the Polish-Belarussian border, but also through the networks crossing the Sahara, in Libya and that the did it in Syria too. This is why I'd frame it in the context of competition as it's not for nothing that the first EU uniformed force is FrontEx and the first EU deployments to other countries is about trying to stem the flow of migrants particularly in Africa and the Middle East.

With Africa, in general, I think there's more complexity. I think Russia is still able to play on a legacy of associations with the Soviets and support for anti-imperial/national liberation movements. And I think there has been further propaganda wins from associating with anti-French/next wave of anti-imperial movements. I think that propaganda side does matter - with the US dividing over I think Europe (and Canada and Australia etc) is the only part of the world that feels the way we all do about Ukraine and I think that should maybe cause a bit of self-reflection. In terms of real benefits I think it's pretty minimal but there has been competition with France over it. I also think it is actually one of the areas where they have something to offer China becuse very often there's something of an informal handover (a bit like from British imperial power to American power in some parts of the post-war world).

In a hard-edged, hard power multipolar world, Russia is a Chinese vassal, transferring oil at below market prices in return for some diplo cover and desperately needed imports. Russia is leaning hard on China to make its play for some continuing relevance in the West as Chinese commercial interests tighten their grasp on the resources of Russia's far eastern provinces.

I agree. But I think there's a question of timelines. At a very basic level from what I've read China's leaders were shocked at Russia invasion as they had not been forewarned even at relatively recent senior meetings. I don't tink that's the behaviour of a vassal back in 2022 - but I think since then Russian dependency on China is increasing incrementally. I think it's something they're very aware of but that there's a generational divide with Putin and his cohort being totally focused on Ukraine even at the expense of future weakness/dependence on China while I think the generation who will take over from them are more alarmed at the implications. But I think that's because we're not there yet.

On the oil isn't that largely because of the oil price cap?

"Europe" may be politically dysfunctional at the level of unified diplomatic presence but whether looked at collectively or at the larger individual states, they embody centers of manufacturing prowess, technical competence, significant players in global commerce and finance, and an affluent consumer market. Russia has none of these things.  It can play the nuclear blackmail card, which has already been overplayed.

I agree with a lot of this - especially actually the technical competence. Europe does not have global competitors in the digital area generally - Breton's point was correct. But there's lots of technical and technological areas, especialy around manufacturing, where Europe absolutely has world leading companies and centres.

I think my argument is that isn't enough. What matters is the ability to leverage those capacities into agency: the ability to decide to do something and then do it. I think Europe, collectively and at individual state level (for different reasons), is less than the sum of its parts. It's unable to turn its advantages and resources into effective levers of power.

[The Minsky Moment]

Similarly I bang on about this because I think it's important (and actually reflects the state of European infrastructure), the former US Army in Europe commander has said that there is not enough "transport capacity, or infrastructure that enables the rapid movement of NATO forces across Europe." Germany - which is the linchpin in the middle, has the capacity to move "one and a half armoured brigades simultaneously at one time, that's it."

Let's dig down about what this means.   OK let's assume they can't presently "enabl[e] the rapid movement of NATO forces across Europe" in accordance with US standards.  But if NECESSARY, they could improvise. The Krauts could move a lot more than 1.5 brigades at a time if they really wanted to.  They have a fantastic highway system and lots of flat land. Would it look great?  Perhaps not.  Would the military end result be optimal.  Perhaps not.  But they could do it.

Russia is no better; they tried to cram down a bunch of armor from Belarus down Kiev and despite years of planning and months of pre-positioning ended up with the century's worst traffic jam and a military fiasco of world historical proportions.  You can call that agency.  You can also say the Yuros have agency because they choose to avoid such obvious disasters.

The Russians like to compare their invasion to Ukraine to the "Great Patriotic War" but the better WW2 era analogue is Italy's invasion of Yugoslavia. In comparative world power terms, Russia c.2022 is about the same level as Italy c. 1940.  Both sought to boost themselves up by invading what appeared to be a vulnerable neighbor and found themselves in a quagmire.  Putin has no Wehrmacht to bail him out.

Mussolini impressed a lot of people at the time with bellicose talk and a military that looked impressive on paper, but like Russia now, Italy couldn't sustain the burden of even medium scale war without leaning on a stronger power.  It looked like Fascist Italy was exercising its agency, but like with Russia, it was a mirage.  It could exercise a power to choose but the cost of that exercise was accepting dependency on greater powers.

So with Syria I think we should avoid reading backward from what was an improbable collapse of the regime - the month before Assad fell the EU was discussing an Italian proposal to actually recognise Assad again because they'd clearly won. Russia was able to intervene decisively for a period.

It's the Middle East; all alliance system based on Arab regimes are built on sand. It's just a matter of when.  The bigger question is what was the overall strategy?  Getting an air base in?  Chasing the dream of a naval base in Med?  Manipulating refugee flows was an improvised response to a situation and one where what mattered was Russian control over its remaining Euro satellites, not some proconsular presence in the ME.  There's always going to be refugees from somewhere at sometime or another.

On the oil isn't that largely because of the oil price cap?

That's the mechanism but if Russia had the requisite clout or influence it could evade it by negotiating subsidized imports back from China.  They don't.

I think my argument is that isn't enough. What matters is the ability to leverage those capacities into agency: the ability to decide to do something and then do it. I think Europe, collectively and at individual state level (for different reasons), is less than the sum of its parts. It's unable to turn its advantages and resources into effective levers of power.

That's true but by choice.  There is agency, just not agency at the level of national executives.  It's the agency of populations that prefer the comforting illusion of national sovereignty over external effectiveness.

[The Minsky Moment]

Now where Russia does have some real levers is outside the realm of direct hard power. They are a shitposting superpower. They really have mastered the art of post-modern propaganda in the age of social media. They've refined the old Soviet art of exploiting western plutocratic influence over politics and manipulation of greed. They are at the heart of international criminal networks: money laundering, arms dealing, cyber crime, trafficking of every kind.  Those are real capabilities and what Putin has used to keep Russia punching well above weight.

[Duque de Bragança]

You obviously meant Italy's invasion of Greece, not Yugoslavia, to nitpick, in true Languish style. 
Not arguing with the rest.

[The Minsky Moment]

Yes of course, probably got mixed up with an old Hearts of Iron game.

[Zoupa]

Have to agree with Minsky here. They're shipping donkeys to the front and are using tampons to stuff bullet wounds. There's no need to overanalyse and work ourselves up. The only reason they've had a modicum of success is because life has little value to russians and they just throw more meat at the problem.

[Sheilbh]

Sure but isn't that part of the calculation? It feels like it's having it both ways because on one side of the ledger we discount the political constraints while on the other we're acknowledging them.

What I mean is that Europe has the building blocks of power but is temporarily embarrassed by delusions of national sovereignty. Russia doesn't have those advantages (but has some other, different, ones particularly on energy) and is sustained a higher level of indifference to the life of their own citizens or the suffering of their own people.

I don't totally agree with the framing but that's sort of my point. Europe has all the capacity to be able to defend itself in real terms - but it is not in that place now because of political obstacles and decisions (which I mean broadly and not to diminish them), and I don't see urgency in changing that. Similarly Russia has a lower base but for a variety of reasons is able to leverage more from that because people will accept a higher level of suffering (and I get Minsky's point on Italy but I do think a history of victory through national suffering like the Great Patriotic War or Napoleonic Wars isan important rhetorical/political/propaganda resource).

I agree Russia's not the Soviet Union but this was true in WW2 as well. The Soviets (and Nazis) were profoundly indifferent to human life. The Western allies weren't and in different ways had different, but deep aversions to casualties. The response was to shape the way they fought the war to maintain that political support and avoid casualties. From very early in the war they're focusing on the production of equipment and material precisely to preserve life, minimise casualties and maintain political support for fighting. Again I don't see the evidence that Europe is doing this - or that it is willing to fight a Russian style war. That to me seems relevant - and is still part of NATO. That is what we mean by American standards is a lot of steel around our boys.

Again I think that is where the longer-term challenge for Russia is. Even with their indifference to life a lot of production and spending is being re-directed to war production. That means there's less money for everything else. I think this is staring to undermine the political basis of consent to Putinism - there is a question of how long that can be sustained in the long run (plus I think the next generation of leaders are anxious about China). But I think we are talking in the next 5-10 years which may include further conflict with Europe. I also think Russia is absolutely leveraging power in things like crime and that will have long term costs.

I think it's also to Minsky's point on European NATO forces moving to American standards - where's the threshold on necessity and the willingness to see European troops moving or fighting at a lower standard than that? I've mentioned it before and I think it was pre-Ukrain and this would change if there was an incident but the polling on the willingness of different European countries to fight if countries like the Baltics or Poland were invaded. It was alarmingly low in most countries. So I think there's a question, to Minsky's point, of when that sense of necessity would kick in and what might make it fall away.

I'd add that on Yugoslavia, I think that is actually a comparison as well. Yugoslavia had an insanely large arms industry after the Cold War. It was able to go to war and commit genocide and war crimes on the European continent. At the point of the first Balkan wars I think Jean-Claude Juncker famously said "this is Europe's moment" - and Europe had far more military capability as we weren't as far into exploiting the peace dividend as we are now. Europe did not have the military capacity or will to stop that war and end a genocide without American support (the same was true in Kosovo). I think Europe is in a weaker position militarily and it's economy is less essential/central to the world than it was in 1995 and Russia is a more signficant problem than Serbia.

Edit: Very long winded but basically if power isn't just a spreadsheet of economy and population etc but an ability to leverage the capacities you have, isn't the pain threshold a really key part of that? If it's high you can do more with less, if it's low you need to build up more.

[Zoupa]

Broadly agree but the truth is Europe would not fight the russian way, so the comparison feels inadequate. Ukraine doesn't fight the soviet way. If it did, it would have lost years ago.

Just 4 HIMARS batteries crippled russian logistics in the summer of 2022, arguably stalling their advance. The russian threat is much more salient in how they can wreck our societies internally, not really how they're gonna be marching on Berlin.

[Sheilbh]

I agree - and to be clear I think Ukraine absolutely has sovereignty and agency. I think it is above all Ukrainian willingness to fight that has been key.

In terms of wrecking our societies internally and not marching on Berlin I agree. But there isn't a hierarchy of Europe. Estonia and the Baltics and Poland are in the EU - Estonia and the Baltics are in the Eurozone. From a purely EU perspective they are as core as Denmark or Italy. And I think it's important not to underestimate the peril to everything in Europe if Europe (whether through non-American NATO or the EU) is not able to meaningfully deter and defend its frontier. It's about whether we're able to deter or stop an attack on Tallinn - because I'm not sure what happens to the EU, the Euro or non-American NATO, or even just opposition to divvying up Europe with that type of loss of credibility. I think the consequences of America, at best not caring, and Eastern expansion of the last 25 years is Europe needs to be able to defend that 100 miles from Russia to Tallinn just as much as a march on Berlin.

So I don't think it's a threat of marching on Berlin but that you don't need to in order to blow it all up and be in a position of picking off states that feel weak and isolated one by one. I go on about it but the public assessments of European intelligence agencies are that within 2-5 years of a deal in Ukraine, Russia would be in a position to engage in a lighter conflict in the Baltics or 5-10 years a broader European conflict. Mark Rutte on this literally yesterday saying many in Europe are: "quietly complacent, and too many don't feel the urgency. Nato's own defences can hold for now but with its economy dedicated to war, Russia could be ready to use military force against Nato within five years."

Edit: And this is why I think that point of how quickly can Europe move forces and whether we have the logistics to sustain deployments in the Baltics and Poland is really key. Because I don't think Europe can survive it becoming a question of how many Eastern EU member states, Euro countries, NATO members we can write off before Europe can stabilise a line. I think if it's that point we will have already lost - albeit, perhaps, a rather strange defeat.

[Zoupa]

I agree that Tallinn is just as important as Berlin. Then again, the Finns could thunder-run to Mourmansk. The Poles could rush Minsk. Romanians could be in Tiraspol in 2 hours. We're not feckless. Exercises simulating that can be a deterrent.

I think that Macron was once again right and that we need strategic ambiguity when it comes to russia. Yes, maybe the French Marines could be in Odesa next month. Never rule out anything. You can just DO things. During the blockade of Berlin, the Soviets built a watchtower right before the landing strip at Tegel I believe, preventing planes from landing safely. The French blew it up the next day. When the Soviet ambassador complained to the French commander, crying that it was in the Soviet sector and "How could you do this?", he responded "With French Sappers and dynamite, Mr Ambassador".

[Tamas]

Yeah good point there Zoupa. I agree with Sheilbh as well.

What is frustrating is that the challenge from Russia and the abandonment by Daddy America, at this stage, could be leveraged into a rallying cry of more European unity. Maybe it will happen. I just don't see any movement toward that.

[Tonitrus]

The Poles could rush Minsk

Hopefully after clearing the Kaliningrad pocket. 

[Tonitrus]

I agree that Tallinn is just as important as Berlin. Then again, the Finns could thunder-run to Mourmansk. The Poles could rush Minsk. Romanians could be in Tiraspol in 2 hours. We're not feckless. Exercises simulating that can be a deterrent.

I think that Macron was once again right and that we need strategic ambiguity when it comes to russia. Yes, maybe the French Marines could be in Odesa next month. Never rule out anything. You can just DO things. During the blockade of Berlin, the Soviets built a watchtower right before the landing strip at Tegel I believe, preventing planes from landing safely. The French blew it up the next day. When the Soviet ambassador complained to the French commander, crying that it was in the Soviet sector and "How could you do this?", he responded "With French Sappers and dynamite, Mr Ambassador".

They were in the French sector (albeit operated by the Soviets). 

https://www.nytimes.com/1948/12/17/archives/french-blow-up-towers-of-russias-berlin-radio-temporarily-silence.html

The sentiment is still good though.

[Josquius]

Again I really do think we need some scary training exercises on the Finnish-Russian border.
Speak to Japan about the Northern Territories and arrange some exercises with them practicing amphibious landings in Hokkaido too.
Not that we're going to do anything.... but make Russia spared its resources and remind them where the balance of power truly lies.