The EU thread

[Josquius]

There recently was a case in Poland where a pregnant woman died. Her fetus would not have been able to survive, but the doctors were afraid to terminate the pregnancy because of the strict abortion laws. They waited for the dfetus to die; the mother died of sepsis.

Depressing that such woman killing laws continue to exist.

[The Larch]

Serbia Votes 'Yes' to Judiciary Constitution Changes

Against the urgings of many opposition parties, most Serbian voters on Sunday backed proposed changes to the constitution – announced as a way towards the depoliticisation of the judiciary, which the EU has said it wishes to see.

Serbian citizens voted to change the country's constitution and accept a judicial reform package, with 60.48 per cent voters saying "Yes" to the proposals in Sunday's referendum, according to the first results on Sunday night.
(...)
Some of the most important changes in the referendum are about the way judges and prosecutors will be elected in future. Parliament will now elect only the Supreme State Prosecutor and five out of 15 Constitutional Court judges. All other judges and prosecutors will be elected by two judicial councils.

Four members of each council will be so called "prominent lawyers", chosen by parliament. Unlike now, the justice minister will be a member only of the prosecutorial council, while representatives of parliament will not be members of either council any more.

Experts said the changes were a needed step – but were not enough to guarantee that the Serbian judiciary will be independent of political influence.

Most opposition parties and some professionals urged a "No" vote in the referendum, saying that there was not enough legitimacy when parliament – with barely any opposition parties present – adopted the amendments. They insist there is still a real possibility of political influence on the judiciary.

Serbia's 2006 constitution was adopted at a time of high tension over the future of Kosovo, a former Serbian province that was then a ward of the United Nations, but pushing for independence.

The constitution affirmed Serbia's claim to Kosovo as an integral and inviolable part of its territory, despite which Kosovo declared independence in 2008 and has since been recognised by mosty EU states.

The voted changes on Serbia's judicial system are part of the EU's requiriments for the accession process, which Serbia seems to still be keen on progressing with. The referendum seems to have passed with 60% votes in favour (still provisional results, but a clear indication on the referendum's success), albeit with a really low participation (around 30%, but there was no minimum participation requiriment for it to be valid).

[The Larch]

Is the Zuckerbot bluffing or will they actually pull Facebook and Instagram from the EU?

Meta Renews Warning to EU It Will Be Forced to Pull Facebook
European regulators are currently re-working data regulations
Company said exit may be option if it couldn't rely on rules

Meta Platforms Inc. has once again threatened to pull Facebook and Instagram from Europe if it is unable to keep transferring user data back to the U.S., amid negotiations between regulators to replace a scrapped privacy pact.

European Union regulators have for months been stuck in negotiations with the U.S. to replace a transatlantic data transfer pact that thousands of companies relied on, but which got struck down by the EU Court of Justice in 2020 over fears citizens' data isn't safe once shipped to the U.S.

In its annual report published Thursday, Meta said that if it couldn't rely on new or existing agreements -- such as so-called standard contractual clauses -- to shift data, then it would "likely be unable to offer a number of our most significant products and services, including Facebook and Instagram, in Europe."

Meta has already warned in its previous annual report that if it is not allowed to use standard contractual clauses, it would be "unable to operate" parts of its business in Europe, without naming its two key social media platforms.

"We have absolutely no desire and no plans to withdraw from Europe, but the simple reality is that Meta, and many other businesses, organizations and services, rely on data transfers between the EU and the US in order to operate global services," a Meta spokesman said in an emailed statement.

The latest comments highlight the increasing tension between the social media company and lawmakers over the ownership of user data. The stock suffered a 26% plunge Thursday over fears about Facebook's outlook, which produced the biggest value wipeout in stock market history. Meta shares fell as much as 4.5% in trading in New York on Monday. 

"Digital giants must understand that the European continent will resist and affirm its sovereignty," French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire said in Paris on Monday.

The European Commission said data transfer negotiations with Washington have intensified, but they "take time given also the complexity of the issues discussed and the need to strike a balance between privacy and national security," a commission spokesperson wrote in a statement to Bloomberg on Monday.

"Only an arrangement that is fully compliant with the requirements set by the EU court can deliver the stability and legal certainty stakeholders expect on both sides of the Atlantic," the spokesperson added.

Intensifying Discussions

Privacy campaigner Max Schrems has long been challenging Facebook in the Irish courts -- where the social media company has its European base -- arguing that EU citizens' data is at risk the moment it gets transferred to the U.S.

In 2020, Facebook sought a judicial review of the Irish Data Protection Commission's preliminary decision that the company may have to halt trans-Atlantic data transfers using standard contractual clauses. An Irish court last year rejected the social network's challenge, saying it didn't establish "any basis" for calling into question the Irish watchdog's findings.

Data protection authorities are increasingly scrutinizing these kinds of supplementary security measures that have allowed companies to send data back and forth in the absence of a new agreement, according to Patrick Van Eecke, a partner and head of cyber and data at law firm Cooley LLP.

"I am not surprised companies outside of Europe are reconsidering whether or not it makes sense to continue offering services to the European market as there are not many options left any longer," said Van Eecke.

It is not the first time Facebook has threatened to withdraw its services. In 2020 it said it plans to block people and publishers in Australia from sharing news, in an attempt to push back against a proposed law forcing the company to pay media firms for their articles.

The company has also previously affirmed its commitment to Europe.

Nick Clegg, the company's head of global affairs, said at an event in 2020: "Let me also be absolutely crystal clear. We have absolutely no desire, no wish, no plans to withdraw our services from Europe. Why would we?"

[Jacob]

Oh no! Whatever will the EU do? Wouldn't it be a shame if some other company moved in to fill the void for a Facebook and Instagram-like platforms in Europe?

I mean, it would probably boost Tiktok, which isn't grand... but more seriously, how big a blow would this be to the EU? Does FB contribute significantly to the economy in a way that won't be replaced? Are there significant number of folks who'll be sufficiently outraged by FB leaving that it'll impact the decisionmakers?

[Sheilbh]

Facebook, WhatsApp, Insta - I think there'd be plenty of users who'd be annoyed.

It is very arrogant though and assumes that there wouldn't be a replacement developed in Europe's tech scheme.

It would have a pretty huge impact on the economy of news media and publishers because FB are one of the very biggest players. On the other hand publishers want to move away from reliance on FB/Google so it's a mixed blessing - but I'm not sure how many could really afford to survive the interim period. In the industry we're at a bit of a tipping point around what online advertising looks like in the future and the reality is no-one knows - which is exciting and slightly alarming at the same time The other key bit of context on their report is that a lot of those losses, they say, are attributable to changes to the Apple OS that makes it easier to stop tracking.

For what it's worth - I think Europe is moving towards data localisation, which I'm not sure is a good thing generally. It's also not, in my view, what the EU legislator intended - and I've heard someone from the Commission argue this very persuasively because I think they find the regulators especially take a very academic approach to this. I remember discussing some of these issues with a Dutch lawyer who pointed out that it is also massively hypocritical because EU data protection laws, in general, do not apply to member state surveillance/monitoring by law enforcement or security agencies (there is some) because the EU has no competence over those bodies and they are broadly excluded from GDPR. So the requirement is on private companies to make sure there is an "essentially equivalent" level of protection for data leaving the EEA - but it is essentially equivalent to a theorectical level of protection that data processed in Europe doesn't actually receive.

But the direction of travel in Europe is basically towards localisation - not just here but there's also been various decisions by different regulators and about 100 complaints by privacy campaigners across the entire EEA.

[The Larch]

Facebook, WhatsApp, Insta - I think there'd be plenty of users who'd be annoyed.

Personally it'd be Whatsapp the one that would screw me over the most, but there's always Line. On a personal level, losing FB and IG would really hurt my ability to get in touch with many international friends, but would not have a massive day-to-day impact. For lots of businesses (advertising and media) it'd be a pretty big blow, I imagine. Even small places would be affected, as lots of hole in the wall restaurants and bars basically use their FB pages as their main website.

The other key bit of context on their report is that a lot of those losses, they say, are attributable to changes to the Apple OS that makes it easier to stop tracking.

That's what my understanding was, that Apple's change in their tracking system (basically giving people the possibility to opt out of it) was a massive hit to FB's business model. I mean, they've just suffered the biggest one day loss in market value of a US company due to this.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

let him, but he'll have to swallow a bit more then a 25% drop on the stockmarket if he does I guess.

[Sheilbh]

Personally it'd be Whatsapp the one that would screw me over the most, but there's always Line. On a personal level, loosing FB and IG would really hurt my ability to get in touch with many international friends, but would not have a massive day-to-day impact. For lots of businesses (advertising and media) it'd be a pretty big blow, I imagine. Even small places would be affected, as lots of hole in the wall restaurants and bars basically use their FB pages as their main website.

Yeah - I mean the entire reason I have Instagram is to follow London food people and find new restaurants. Having a good Insta is something loads of food businesses really focus on so it must drive diners - I imagine it's even more the case in retail where you can purchase through Instagram.

Personally WhatsApp would be the big loss - I imagine people would move to Signal or Telegram (I'm not sure if they'd have similar issues around data transfers out of Europe though). I can do without Facebook. I have one friend who still uses it a lot including Facebook messenger so I keep it to keep in touch with her. Insta would be a loss for building my spreadsheet of food places but I'm sure I'd survive. And I've no doubt the European tech scheme would come up with alternatives, especially because we all know what they'd need to design/replace.

I'm not sure on numbers but as someone who works in data and media - Facebook's ad revenue disappearing would be absolutely huge. As I say the online advertising model that exists is dying but no-one quite knows what the future looks like and which of the multiple alternatives is going to win - obviously I'm hoping the publishers win. But I'm not sure and I think the adjustment will be bumpy. If Facebook also stopped being a thing at the same time it would be huge.

let him, but he'll have to swallow a bit more then a 25% drop on the stockmarket if he does I guess.

Maybe. Europe's about 25% of Meta revenue so it's not wildly off. But I think this is largely about the Apple changes which are global.

[Josquius]

Losing WhatsApp would be briefly annoying as everyone is forced to use sms to arrange with the people they actually speak to which other app to download.

Or is whatsapp alone in linking so neatly to your phone address book?

[The Larch]

Poland gets slapped on the wrist for ignoring EU sentences.

Commission moves to cut Polish funds over unpaid coal mine fine
Warsaw says it will use 'all possible measures' not to pay.

The European Commission has launched an unprecedented procedure to reduce budget payments for Poland over an unpaid court fine.

The budget cut, which is expected to amount to approximately €15 million, comes after Polish authorities didn't pay a €500,000 daily fine over failure to comply with an order from the Court of Justice of the EU in a dispute with the Czech Republic over the Turów open pit coal mine.

While Warsaw struck a deal with Prague last week to settle the Turów dispute, the Commission said it was still legally obligated to act on Warsaw's unpaid fines. Poland owes a total of more than €68 million.

"The Commission has informed Poland that it would proceed with the offsetting of payments for penalties due," a spokesperson for the Commission confirmed on Tuesday, adding: "The Commission will proceed with the offsetting after 10 working days from this notification."

The move comes at a sensitive moment for Warsaw's troubled relationship with Brussels.

Some Polish officials, including President Andrzej Duda, have sought to de-escalate tensions over rule-of-law problems. But the country has yet to concretely address Brussels' concerns over the independence of its judiciary, and a separate daily fine of €1 million over an illegal disciplinary regime for judges remains unpaid.

The current offsetting process in the Turów case covers penalties imposed from September 20 until October 19, the spokesperson said.

"When performing offsetting, the Commission fulfils its legal obligation to collect financial penalties imposed by the Court in accordance with its order of 20 September 2021. In this regard, the Commission follows the rules set out in the Financial Regulation, in the absence of payment by the Member State," the spokesperson added.

The Polish government, however, criticized the Commission's decision.

"Poland will use all possible legal measures to appeal against the plans of the European Commission, the more so that an agreement has been reached between the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic," government spokesperson Piotr Müller told the Polish Press Agency.

"This is particularly important in the context of the current geopolitical threats from Russia. From the very beginning, Poland emphasized that the decisions taken by the [Court of Justice] had no legal or factual basis. They go beyond the EU treaties and violate the treaty guarantees of energy security," Müller said, adding: "We want to emphasize that the smooth implementation of projects from EU funds is not threatened."

[HVC]

Hmm, think this is the first time I'm I've seen a government getting their wages garnished lol

[Sheilbh]

I've put this in this thread because it touches on other EU policy areas - China and Turkey especially - but also I don't want to distract from the war news. But bit a barnburner on the Berlin establishment by Tyson Barker who is Head of technology and foreign policy at the German Council on Foreign Relations.

The France using (or wanting to use Europe) as an "iron man" suit and Germany using it as a cloaking device strikes particularly true:

The Berlin elite's Ukraine dilemma
After promising a sea-change in German foreign policy ⁠— a Zeitenwende ⁠— Olaf Scholz is reverting to type.
By Tyson Barker

BERLIN – Recently the Berliner Ensemble has been staging a revival of the Bertolt Brecht-Kurt Weill classic, Threepenny Opera, at the theatre in the German capital where it first appeared in 1928. The musical play is known for the ominous line: "Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral." The line, roughly translated as "first comes the devouring, then come the virtues", captures a truism of human nature: that often animalistic desires precede morality in the hierarchy of needs. The interests of Germany's most adroit political animals lie in political survival, relevance and power, which often flow from party loyalty and fealty to the status quo, so the play is a fitting one in Berlin, Europe's most important political capital.

In many ways, the present moment is best clarified by the controversy around Kyiv's decision not to accept an offer by the German president, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, to visit Ukraine. Although the reasons for the decision are unclear, discontent in Berlin is less about the man or the presidency as a symbol of German democracy than the perceived attack on a political system, of which Steinmeier is the best example: the kind of party man that many in Berlin's political elite aspire to be, somebody who can survive it all and have it all. Call it the Steinmeier system.

Kyiv also struck a nerve. Germany's commitment to Ukraine has been softening and there are growing questions around the speech by Olaf Scholz, the chancellor, on 27 February proclaiming a Zeitenwende — a taboo-busting sea change in German foreign policy that set it on the path to an emergency military modernisation, defence spending, energy independence from Russia, lethal assistance for Ukraine and EU financing for weaponry. In fact, in a press conference on 19 April, Scholz decelerated Germany's provision of heavy weapons to Ukraine and cast a cloud of doubt over the Zeitenwende and its spirit.

The Steinmeier controversy is the perfect prism through which to understand Berlin's shifting posture toward Russia's war on Ukraine. Steinmeier is a totemic figure in German politics but he is, first and foremost, a party man — forged in a 30-year career in the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Steinmeier is affable, hard-working and effective, but also anodyne, ferociously loyal and morally malleable.

He is part of the so-called Hanover Mafia of protégés of the former chancellor Gerhard Schröder. He was first the director of Schröder's personal office in Lower Saxony in 1993, before accompanying him to Berlin where he would eventually become Schröder's chief of staff and then Germany's foreign minister in the first Merkel grand coalition. As such, Steinmeier criticised European missile defence and US nuclear posture as designed to give Nato first-strike capabilities against Russia. During the Merkel era he was perceived as the balancing force in German politics — an opposition leader for a party that was, in fact, part of the government. Steinmeier, like Angela Merkel but more so, embodies a consensus-based political culture with a demobilised base of voters largely satisfied with the status quo and a business elite invested in preserving Germany's privileged access to markets in authoritarian states.

During the 2014-2015 Ukraine crisis and the Russian annexation of Crimea, when he was once again foreign minister, Steinmeier played a broker role seeking to de-escalate tensions, dutifully enforcing the Euro-Atlantic consensus on sanctions and strengthening Nato in central Europe, while also keeping the door open for "change through trade" ("Wandel Durch Handel") as Germany and Russia deepened their energy relationship at the expense of Ukraine.

In February 2015 Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine drew up the second of the two Minsk agreements intended to put an end to the fighting in eastern Ukraine. It required both sides to withdraw heavy equipment from the Donbas, cauterise the Ukrainian border and ultimately set up elections to enable potential constitutional reform that could give Russian-controlled areas more autonomy within Ukraine. Within months, a consortium of companies backed by Russia and Germany signed the Nord Stream 2 (NS2) agreement.

In 2016 Steinmeier was also the architect of the so-called Steinmeier Formula. This would have allowed for elections in the Donbas under the supervision of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, but blurred the sequencing on whether elections in eastern Ukraine should be held before or after the withdrawal of Russian forces. If elections took place before the departure of Russian troops, it would have given Moscow preponderant control over their outcome, a fact clear to Kyiv, Washington and Brussels at the time. In one brisk moment, Russia's February 24 invasion of Ukraine smashed Minsk II, the Steinmeier Formula and NS2, and with them the notion of Wandel Durch Handel.

The SPD is still coming to terms with the limits of Wandel Durch Handel. More than a foreign policy, it was a moral worldview the Social Democrats had invested in for decades. It allowed them to both "do good" (transforming the lives of citizens behind the veil of authoritarianism, perhaps even the system itself) and to "do well" (making money hand over fist for Germany Inc, which became the world's largest exporter with a 7 per cent GDP current account surplus). In many ways, the moral awakening is similar to what Silicon Valley underwent in the past decade as the 2012 sheen of techno-utopianism gave way to a reality of democracy-destroying disinformation, surveillance capitalism and a new class of unaccountable American oligarchs. Steinmeier himself has half-heartedly acknowledged past mistakes in the pursuit of Russo-German ties — including NS2 gas diplomacy — which discounted the security interests of Germany's central European allies and Russia's slide into authoritarianism.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine could have opened the debate about whether or not Steinmeier has the standing to represent the moral centre of Germany. It has not. Instead, the perceived attack on Steinmeier led not only to a rally around the man and the Schröder-Merkel system of geo-economic realism he represents, but it also opened up a window for the proponents of something closer to the status quo ante in how Berlin governs.

Rather than eliciting an outpouring of self-reflection, the perceived snub generated a fierce backlash against Ukraine across the political spectrum. Scholz called Kyiv's decision "irksome". Attacks on Ukraine's ambassador to Berlin have been particularly relentless. Florian Post, a former SPD Bundestag member, tweeted: "Not a day goes by that it doesn't occur to the Ukrainian ambassador what types of weapons Germany could provide to Ukraine. I would recommend that he expand — and limit — his vocabulary to the following two words: "PLEASE and THANK YOU..."

It was not limited to the party of Steinmeier and Scholz. The Russo-curious Green politician Jürgen Trittin inexplicably called it a "propaganda victory for Vladimir Putin", before condescendingly stating that "we expect that Ukraine will win it back". Wolfgang Kubicki, deputy chairman of the Free Democratic Party and Russlandversteher, haughtily stated that sympathy with Ukraine's leadership "has its limits". Numerous others piled on.

The backlash is emblematic of several shifts in Germany's political posture. Aside from allowing Germany's most ardent Russia-sympathisers to re-enter the political debate, it precipitated a snap back to a default position of delayed action to support Ukraine — at times couched in terms of serving "European interests".

This is particularly important when compared with Germany's key European ally, France. Whereas France often uses "Europe" as a kind of Ironman suit, Germany uses "Europe" as a kind of cloaking device. France speaks about Europe as a means of power projection for French national interests on the global stage. In contrast, Germany disguises some of its most egregious pursuits of "Germany First" policies as being in the European interest — primarily aimed at pacifying German domestic public opinion. This is how German politicians sold NS2 as a "European initiative" even as Ukraine, the European Commission and central Europe passionately argued against it. It was also the case for the Comprehensive Investment Agreement with China, the capstone of Germany's 2020 EU presidency. The same is true for the morally dubious 2016 EU-Turkey deal to stem the flow of Syrian refugees, which was largely foisted on Brussels by Berlin.

And it is for this reason that Scholz regularly warns that Germany would not act unilaterally but in co-ordination with European allies and the United States when considering any delivery of heavy weapons to Ukraine. On 13 April, when pressed on this spurious line with the fact that the Czech Republic had announced it would send tanks, Slovakia S-300 long-range missile systems, and the UK, Poland and the US heavy artillery, Scholz dismissed such provisions as essentially faulty equipment that Nato allies did not want. In fact, Ukrainian troops are familiar with this equipment. The German government has since announced that it will provide an additional €2 billion to finance the Ukrainian military. However, the Scholz government continues to delay decisions on providing the tanks, anti-ship missiles, long-range artillery and helicopters the Ukrainian government has requested. Scholz repeated the false narrative that Germany would not "go it alone" without Europe in his 19 April press conference.

The Wende 

Deferred action has long been the default political setting for Germany. In contrast, French politics is full of policy entrepreneurship, big ideas and grand visions. Limits are mostly imposed by the parameters of its capacities as a middling power and the French street, which works as an important brake. German politics is the opposite. Plodding and iterative, Germany has preferred to ride the brakes. In fact, Helmut Schmidt, the chain-smoking, Diet Coke-drinking former Hamburg mayor turned Social Democratic chancellor (and model for Olaf Scholz), famously said that people who have visions should get their eyes checked. Merkel was cut from the same cloth. Over the course of her 16-year chancellery, Merkel cultivated an image as a cautious Mutti, a steady hand who approached problems "schritt für schritt" (step by step).

There is a particular moment in which a brand of strong German executive leadership can punctuate the country's political equilibrium to ram through a transformative policy. Like a sword of Excalibur, the Wende is the German moment in which a strong executive wields the power of the state. It has happened at pivotal points in recent German history: the Covid-recovery EU fund that Europeanised stimulus (2020); Merkel's decision to let in more than a million Syrian and Iraqi refugees (2015); the post-Fukushima Energiewende that led to the decision to phase out nuclear energy (2011) and even the original Wende, the "Wende of all Wenden", German reunification (1989-90).

In each of these, Germany's Wendepolitik followed five basic precepts. First, it is always triggered by seismic external events rather than an ideological or political agenda. Second, it displays a bias towards action in the immediate aftermath. Third, it takes advantage of a fleeting moment in German public opinion before the riptide of public opinion knocks out. Fourth, the response is sweeping, reactive and not subject to the astringent effects of democratic debate. Finally, it mobilises the entire German political establishment to build up a strategic justification ex post facto. In the past, Wendepolitik has tended to stick.

The Zeitenwende has seemed to fit these precepts. It is closing the door to Nord Stream 2; laying the timetable for diversification away from Russian coal (now set for August), oil (now set for the end of the year) and gas (now set for 2024); implementing comprehensive changes to the German military; opening the door to support for Ukraine, a democratic European nation under siege by a dictatorial aggressor; and elevating Germany's security responsibility in Nato, the EU and Europe.

But as mentioned, it is softening. The Zeitenwende numbers do not exactly run. At €50.1 billion, the 2022 budget request keeps defence spending essentially flat as a proportion of GDP. If the €100 billion special purpose appropriation is meant to bridge the difference, it will be exhausted by 2025, the moment in the political cycle when Germany will be headed into federal elections. February's promises are inconsistent with absorption capacity issues, unanswered questions about long-term planning, a sclerotic procurement bureaucracy and even sticking points around taxation. A big point in its durability will be anchoring defence spending of 2 per cent of GDP — the target for Nato countries — in the German constitution.

Now the political basis for the Zeitenwende seems to be weakening as well. Scholz is losing both the moral high ground and cohesion within his coalition — particularly with the Greens — as he seeks to shore up his Social Democrats and the political system that has kept them in power (at times as the senior, at times the junior coalition partner) for 20 of the past 24 years. Perhaps, in his wavering, Scholz hears the dictum of Homo Berlinicus, a political twist to Bertolt Brecht's famous words: Erst kommt die Partei — und der Status Quo — dann kommt die Moral.

Interesting that it's so focused on the SPD - because I also saw this by the always interesting Alex Clarkson on the SPD/Schroeder/Lower Saxony interests etc. I saw this morning that Maas has said there is a majority for more support to Ukraine by the CDU/CSU, Greens and FDP - I imagine that's incredible unlikely - but I'm really surprised how much of Germany's "issue" on this seems tied to the SPD struggling to deal with a new reality:
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30482/in-buying-russian-gas-germany-were-played-for-fools

[Admiral Yi]

It is very arrogant though and assumes that there wouldn't be a replacement developed in Europe's tech scheme.

It's only arrogant if you think they're bluffing.  The possibility does exist that Europe is no longer profitable for them.

[Sheilbh]

It's only arrogant if you think they're bluffing.  The possibility does exist that Europe is no longer profitable for them.

My point on arrogance there is that their system/product is irreplaceable and something new wouldn't emerge.

But they more or less immediately walked it back, so I think they were bluffing.

More generally I think this happens with ever big American tech giant/company lobbying the EU. Microsoft learned their lesson and now very effective at lobbying in Brussels - I think Apple is broadly in that basket too. Faceebook especially, but also Google are still very aggressive in a way that just doesn't work in the EU system and, if anything, makes things worse.

[Sheilbh]

Meanwhile in Euro-elections - there was one in Slovenia today too and the democratic backsliding (but very good on Ukraine) government lost.

They'll be replaced by a coalition led by a new party Freedom - which is liberal/green populist - and the social democrats.

While I like the sound of that I am intensely suspicious of a green party called "Freedom" that was founded (and is chaired) by a billionaire, one of Slovenia's richest men, who looks a little like a Bond villain