Pickett's Charge

[viper37]

Lincoln seemed to think otherwise, that's why Grant was put in charge shortly after this (Grant would win a huge victory over the South the next day).

Well Meade was never actually replaced, Grant actually took the job of Meade's boss General-in-Chief Henry Halleck. Meade not only succeeded in not losing the war, he also succeeded in not losing his job.

He kept his job, but Grant was micro-managing him, apparently.  Sort of like a carreer bureaucrat being sidelined but still keeping his pay.

[The Brain]

Prospects for success.....hmmmm.

I think I am going to defer to the opinion of someone who was there. A confederate in fact, who was considering the prospects of success, and probably, maybe....had some idea of those prospects, and was, by all accounts, perhaps one of maybe a dozen human beings at that time who could best evaulate such things. He was, in fact, the Major General who was in charge of the attack itself. General James Longstreet.

He said, BEFORE the attack, to Lee, arguing that they should leave the field:

General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know, as well as any one, what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arranged for battle can take that position.

Damn he was low energy.

[jimmy olsen]

I suggest read Gettysburg by Sears. He has excellent books on Chancellorsville and Antietam as well.

https://www.amazon.com/Stephen-W-Sears/e/B000AP6ZW2/ref=dp_byline_cont_book_1

[viper37]

On the other side, for reasons I don't really understand, Lee seems to have thought that the Union Army hadn't fully reached the battlefield. There is some evidence that the vantage point on the Lutheran Seminary appears to give a great view of the union line on Cemetery Ridge, but actual conceals a significant portion of it. Putting those together, if the Union really had 25% less troops on Cemetery Ridge, Pickett's Charge would have had prospects for success.

- The charge only started toward 1pm.
- The soldiers had to walk/run 3/4 of miles under artillery fire, and close fire of a well entranched bunch of soliders once they got close to their target.
- The North likely had reserves to fill the gaps in the center.
- The artillery did not have sufficient ammunitions to sustain a heavy artillery barrage on the ennemy well before the attack and while the attack was taking place.

Even with 25% less Union soldiers, I fail to see how that charge could have succeeded.  Advancing with no artillery support while continuously taking ennemy fire and relying on the braveness of your soldiers is usually a recipe for disaster.

Granted, Lee did not think there was so many soldiers.  He probably expected Longstreet to attack early in the morning and underestimated the required time to prepare the divisions for combat.  Stuart failed to provide adequate reconnaissance.  But he should have at least known there wasn't enough ammo for his plan to succeed.

I understand not wanting to listen to Longstreet, he's the senior commander, his mind his set.  But a great leader knows to listen to his subordinates.  Lee failed there.

His plan was sound on paper with everything perfectly aligned.  More guns and more canon balls at the ready, better coordination of his artillery corps, better coordination with Longstreet, less well entranched union troops, etc, etc, etc.  But since the only chance for success relied on everything being perfect on his side and everything being imperfect on the other side, he most likely made a mistake.

Of course, it's easy to judge from my armchair general's position, but it's not saying he was a bad tactician that he committed a mistake at some point.  He committed it at the worst possible time, but mistake happens.  Longstreet had had a better view of the field and of the opposing force than him, and he should have taken his advice under consideration.

[alfred russel]

Prospects for success.....hmmmm.

I think I am going to defer to the opinion of someone who was there. A confederate in fact, who was considering the prospects of success, and probably, maybe....had some idea of those prospects, and was, by all accounts, perhaps one of maybe a dozen human beings at that time who could best evaulate such things. He was, in fact, the Major General who was in charge of the attack itself. General James Longstreet.

He said, BEFORE the attack, to Lee, arguing that they should leave the field:

General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know, as well as any one, what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arranged for battle can take that position.

Obviously there was disagreement by the military men at the time - hence the attack was made. Also, Longstreet was looking at the world as it was, not with the union forces reduced 25%.

There was a mathematical model looking at this.

Data from conflict used to build model

That debate was the starting point for research I conducted with military historian Steven Sondergren at Norwich University. (A grant from Fulbright Canada funded my stay at Norwich.) We used computer software to build a mathematical model of the charge. The model estimated the casualties and survivors on each side, given their starting strengths.

We used data from the actual conflict to calibrate the model's equations. This ensured they initially recreated the historical results. We then adjusted the equations to represent changes in the charge, to see how those affected the outcome. This allowed us to experiment mathematically with several different alternatives...

Finally, we considered the Union Army. After the battle, critics complained that Meade had focused too much on preparing his defences. This made it harder to launch a counter-attack later. However, our model estimated that if he had put even one less infantry brigade in his defensive line, the Confederate charge probably would have succeeded. This suggests Meade was correct to emphasize his defense.

https://theconversation.com/picketts-charge-what-modern-mathematics-teaches-us-about-civil-war-battle-78982

Confederate losses are debatable of course, but wikipedia puts killed at 1,123 and wounded at 4,019. What really increased the losses for confederates was the large number of captured (presumably connected to the retreat/defeat). If you reduce the 5,142 killed and wounded by 25% (a conservative estimate - one would expect that reducing the enemy 25% would reduce casualties by more than 25%), the confederates would have taken 3,857 killed and wounded, probably about 30% of the attacking force. That is high, but it isn't catastrophic.

[11B4V]

I was reading some stuff online about Pickett's Charge, and I thought this forum is always good for some additional info on the topic. So much is written about the details of the deployment of the confederate side, but the union side seems a bit harder to figure out. A few questions:

-The general theme seems to be that the Union had 7 Corps and 90k men at the battle, while the Confederates had 3 Corps and 70k men. I've seen estimates that the Union had between 6k and 10k to repulse Pickett's Charge. The question I have: if they only had 6-10k, where were the other ~80k men? I realize some were casualties or captured, and there were a couple Corps on Cemetery Hill, but were all the other Corps in reserve (besides II Corps on the ridge)?
-I've seen estimates that the Confederates had 120-150 artillery pieces involved in the pre attack bombardment, but Henry Hunt estimated only 75 Union cannon were in position to respond. The Union had over 300 artillery pieces in the area...considering I'd think that almost all the artillery in the line should be able to respond, where were the rest?
-Exactly how did the Confederates expect to disable the Union artillery? Kill the artillerymen? It doesn't seem likely that you would destroy the actual cannon from a mile away--how would you even do that?

Books are great

https://www.amazon.com/Gettysburg-First-Day-Civil-America/dp/0807871311

https://www.amazon.com/Gettysburg-Second-Day-Civil-America/dp/0807847305/ref=pd_lpo_14_img_0/133-3885716-9778356?_encoding=UTF8&pd_rd_i=0807847305&pd_rd_r=6e4ff1da-3f40-440d-976c-780dc58cdb91&pd_rd_w=oG5Pq&pd_rd_wg=X6hed&pf_rd_p=7b36d496-f366-4631-94d3-61b87b52511b&pf_rd_r=SJRMV422Z1PW45TRWHJE&psc=1&refRID=SJRMV422Z1PW45TRWHJE

https://www.amazon.com/Gettysburg-Culps-Hill-Cemetery-Harry-Pfanz/dp/0807849960/ref=pd_bxgy_img_3/133-3885716-9778356?_encoding=UTF8&pd_rd_i=0807849960&pd_rd_r=b1ca6df2-509b-4d58-93cb-047a51b6c713&pd_rd_w=v2Ttt&pd_rd_wg=L3Pvd&pf_rd_p=4e3f7fc3-00c8-46a6-a4db-8457e6319578&pf_rd_r=2EE1MJK7EQB2EV7ASF4H&psc=1&refRID=2EE1MJK7EQB2EV7ASF4H

[Berkut]

Prospects for success.....hmmmm.

I think I am going to defer to the opinion of someone who was there. A confederate in fact, who was considering the prospects of success, and probably, maybe....had some idea of those prospects, and was, by all accounts, perhaps one of maybe a dozen human beings at that time who could best evaulate such things. He was, in fact, the Major General who was in charge of the attack itself. General James Longstreet.

He said, BEFORE the attack, to Lee, arguing that they should leave the field:

General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know, as well as any one, what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arranged for battle can take that position.

Obviously there was disagreement by the military men at the time - hence the attack was made.

By that logic, every attack, or defense, or military action ever taken of any kind, if justifiable, since some military man did it.

The attack was foolish. It was Lee's ego, his inability to believe that he could be beaten, that no matter how crazy his plan, it would work.

And the past fooled him. He had done things before that made no real sense in a sober analysis at the time. Chancellorsville, just a few months earlier, was fucking crazy, and it worked.

He did not make that attack because his military training made him think it could work, or would work. He ordered that attack because his ego would not let him believe that he had been beaten. That he could pull off another crazy move, and somehow the Union would follow his plan, and voila! victory.

He had rolled the dice on low odds moves before, and it had worked, mostly because the Union commanders had been reactive and, well, stupid. Meade was not some brilliant commander, but he wasn't stupid, and he wasn't reactive. He was careful, and whatever he did, there was no way he was going to let Lee pull another Chancellorsville on him. Which was very much the exactly right way to fight Lee in that moment.

Longstreet was right, and I don't care what "modern model" say about single brigades. There was no fucking way that attack on that day against the Union Army was going to work. They can re-run that scenario 100 times, and the Union wins 90 of them. The battle was over on the second day. Hell, it might have been over on the first when Ewell failed to take the hills above Gettysburg and Lee wasn't capable of just pulling off the field and going operational (which was how to beat Meade). The third day was just ego killing a lot of men to no purpose.

[The Brain]

They can re-run that scenario 100 times, and the Union wins 90 of them.

In these kind of things lie parts of the key, is my impression. I know dick about the ACW, but my impression is that the Confederacy was in a fairly desperate situation. I wouldn't be surprised if Lee reasoned that only spectacular battlefield victories might offer a chance of victory. If the alternative you see is ultimate defeat, how insane odds are you willing to brave? Mistakes made before that day were regrettable, but you have the moment you have. If you don't buy that lottery ticket you KNOW you're not gonna hit the jackpot.

[alfred russel]

By that logic, every attack, or defense, or military action ever taken of any kind, if justifiable, since some military man did it.

Absolutely not. I posited that if the union had 25% less strength to repulse attack it would have had prospects of success, and you disagreed quoting Longstreet's belief the attack had no prospects. My point was that is not a sufficient argument because:

1) Longstreet was talking about the attack as it was, not with a hypothetically reduced Union force, and
2) If the chief reason you are citing for an attack being doomed is a well educated, experienced, and informed military man saying so before the attack, it is worth pointing out the position wasn't universally shared by an equally (or even better) placed military man.

The attack was foolish. It was Lee's ego, his inability to believe that he could be beaten, that no matter how crazy his plan, it would work.

And the past fooled him. He had done things before that made no real sense in a sober analysis at the time. Chancellorsville, just a few months earlier, was fucking crazy, and it worked.

He did not make that attack because his military training made him think it could work, or would work. He ordered that attack because his ego would not let him believe that he had been beaten. That he could pull off another crazy move, and somehow the Union would follow his plan, and voila! victory.

He had rolled the dice on low odds moves before, and it had worked, mostly because the Union commanders had been reactive and, well, stupid. Meade was not some brilliant commander, but he wasn't stupid, and he wasn't reactive. He was careful, and whatever he did, there was no way he was going to let Lee pull another Chancellorsville on him. Which was very much the exactly right way to fight Lee in that moment.

Longstreet was right, and I don't care what "modern model" say about single brigades. There was no fucking way that attack on that day against the Union Army was going to work. They can re-run that scenario 100 times, and the Union wins 90 of them. The battle was over on the second day. Hell, it might have been over on the first when Ewell failed to take the hills above Gettysburg and Lee wasn't capable of just pulling off the field and going operational (which was how to beat Meade). The third day was just ego killing a lot of men to no purpose.

So...what percentage do you judge is needed to reduce Union strength against Pickett's Charge to give the attack prospects of success?

(though bizarrely I will note that you say "they can re-run that scenario 100 times, and the Union wins 90 of them"...which seems to mean that you think the Confederates had prospects of success even with everyone at full strength.)

[Berkut]

By that logic, every attack, or defense, or military action ever taken of any kind, if justifiable, since some military man did it.

Absolutely not. I posited that if the union had 25% less strength to repulse attack it would have had prospects of success, and you disagreed quoting Longstreet's belief the attack had no prospects. My point was that is not a sufficient argument because:

1) Longstreet was talking about the attack as it was, not with a hypothetically reduced Union force, and
2) If the chief reason you are citing for an attack being doomed is a well educated, experienced, and informed military man saying so before the attack, it is worth pointing out the position wasn't universally shared by an equally (or even better) placed military man.

The attack was foolish. It was Lee's ego, his inability to believe that he could be beaten, that no matter how crazy his plan, it would work.

And the past fooled him. He had done things before that made no real sense in a sober analysis at the time. Chancellorsville, just a few months earlier, was fucking crazy, and it worked.

He did not make that attack because his military training made him think it could work, or would work. He ordered that attack because his ego would not let him believe that he had been beaten. That he could pull off another crazy move, and somehow the Union would follow his plan, and voila! victory.

He had rolled the dice on low odds moves before, and it had worked, mostly because the Union commanders had been reactive and, well, stupid. Meade was not some brilliant commander, but he wasn't stupid, and he wasn't reactive. He was careful, and whatever he did, there was no way he was going to let Lee pull another Chancellorsville on him. Which was very much the exactly right way to fight Lee in that moment.

Longstreet was right, and I don't care what "modern model" say about single brigades. There was no fucking way that attack on that day against the Union Army was going to work. They can re-run that scenario 100 times, and the Union wins 90 of them. The battle was over on the second day. Hell, it might have been over on the first when Ewell failed to take the hills above Gettysburg and Lee wasn't capable of just pulling off the field and going operational (which was how to beat Meade). The third day was just ego killing a lot of men to no purpose.

So...what percentage do you judge is needed to reduce Union strength against Pickett's Charge to give the attack prospects of success?

(though bizarrely I will note that you say "they can re-run that scenario 100 times, and the Union wins 90 of them"...which seems to mean that you think the Confederates had prospects of success even with everyone at full strength.)

You have to throw in the 10% because you never know what crazy shit might happen in a battle. Some dumbass Union corps commander might decide that his corp is better situated a few hundred yards back or forward, and ignoring orders to the contrary, move all his men off to some idiotic position. For example.

I don't know how much you would need to reduce Union strength, or what that even means. The Union lines were well positioned that deal with an attack along their frontage - do you mean what would happen if the Union on Day 3 had 25% less men than they did everywhere? Or at the point of attack?

If they had 25% less men everywhere, that would mean they had taken radically higher casualties in the first two days, and hence likely would not have the same positions they had - I'm not sure how to evaluate that counter-factual, since it would presumably also mean the rebel troops likely took fewer casualties?

As far as Lee *thinking* there were fewer men there....that is kind of silly. None of these men knew within 25% how many men were across the other line, and they didn't make decisions based on having that level of precision in specific battlefield alignments because they would never actually know that in most conditions. The best they could know was that the Union had about a certain number of units total, and they can certainly look across and see occupied positions. But they would not be able to say how many men and cannon occupied those positions beyond the most general sense (ie, their knowledge of standard alignments and frontages).

Given the information they had:

1. Their army was badly mauled, low on ammunition, but still able to fight. Many units however, were basically useless without rest, refit, and re-organization.
2. They had a large division, well led, or veteran troops that for a variety of reason was fresh.
3. The enemy was bloodied, but probably no moreso than themselves.
4. The enemy started the campaign with more men.
5. The enemy has had plenty of time to re-arrange their lines, so there is no reason to think that the point of your attack is weak.
6. The terrain is incredibly favorable to the defender. Lee would be very aware of just how difficult it would be to attack a prepared position, and Longstreet even more so - his division anchored the line when the Union attacked the left flank at Fredericksburg.

And my point here is that in this moment, Lee was NOT better placed to make that determination, because he stopped thinking like a military tactician, and let his ego drive his decision. Longstreet was right. There were no 15,000 men who could take that position, and the results pretty much speak for themselves. It didn't take some amazing or lucky turn of events for the Union to stop the attack with catastrophic casualties for the rebels.

[alfred russel]

So in summary...in the portion of Cemetery Ridge the Union attacked, the Union had the II Corps (3 divisions) and some beat up remains of a couple divisions of the I Corps.

You don't want to speculate regarding the amount of those forces that could have been redeployed before the attack to other parts of the battlefield with the line still holding, so are just going to keep saying the attack was doomed to fail as it actually happened. Never mind there have been studies to examine just this point.

[Berkut]

So in summary...in the portion of Cemetery Ridge the Union attacked, the Union had the II Corps (3 divisions) and some beat up remains of a couple divisions of the I Corps.

You don't want to speculate regarding the amount of those forces that could have been redeployed before the attack to other parts of the battlefield with the line still holding, so are just going to keep saying the attack was doomed to fail as it actually happened. Never mind there have been studies to examine just this point.

I am saying that your speculation is amatuer hour stuff. What would the line look like with 25% fewer men? I don't know, and neither do you, and neither do people who run simulations. You are asking that we speculate on something that had it been true would have had many OTHER consequences as a result, but we are asked to pretend those other things would not change as well. What is the point of that? And what would it mean for ME, today, to answer "I think if the line had had 29% fewer troops, it still could have held, but 30% fewer and it could not!". That would be a dumb thing to say, because I have no idea what the actual numbers needed would be anymore than you do. Obviously it is some sliding scale of success versus actual men and ammunition and cannon there. The specifics of that curve though, are completely speculative, and what is more, Lee did not know about the numbers anyway.

The attack was doomed to fail as it actually happened, and damn near everyone involved knew it. Lee ordered it anyway because he didn't know what else to do given his refusal to simply accept defeat and retreat. These kinds of mistakes happen all the time in military history, so I don't really know why you are working so hard to figure out a way to claim it was a reasonable decision to make. It was not. People with experise before the attack knew it was not, and the actual attack exactly bore that out.

Lee did not know there were 25% fewer men, nor did he suspect it. He had a basic idea of how many men were opposing him, the same way Longstreet had the same, basic idea. They had fought on that very battlefield against those same units for two days straight. This was not an error in intelligence, not on day 3. He didn't even have the men at that point to launch a spoiling attack to try to draw men from the main attack. He just basically hoped that elan and spirit would overcome the technical reality of humans and rifle bullets and grapeshot.

Note: There have been other studies using mathematical models of how Pickets Charge could have worked. They mostly involve Lee have like 4 more fresh brigades then he had, and they STILL tend to result in an outcome where the assault "works" but cannot actually be held as Union troops counter attack and drive off the briefly "victorious" troops. Lee had no reserves, nobody to throw in to exploit a successful assault anyway. His plan was that he would attack, Pickets and Pettigrews men would shatter the center, and then turn north and attack Hays division on its flank.

Even that just doesn't make any fucking sense. Troops that just marched over a mile into concentrated fire, even if they succeed, are going to be exhausted. Their officers are going to be wounded, their formations a shambles. There would be no way they could then turn and make ANOTHER attack. You would need more, fresh troops to follow up and exploit the assaulters success. No such troops actually existed, while the Union actually had ample reserves, especially once Meade realizes that his flanks are not threatened, and he would shift men to the center just like he shifted them to the left on day 2. The only reason this didn't happen historically is that the entire thing was over in an hour - the assault failed with 50% casualties in a matter of just a few decisive minutes. Once the men reached about 400 yards from Union lines and came under concentrated cannister fire from both flanks along with rifle fire, it was over in a matter of minutes.

Not even to mention that of course they would not be attacking the flank of Hays division anyway, since he would simply pivot to refuse his left, since he wasn't being threatened from his right.

The entire thing doesn't make any damn sense.

[alfred russel]

I am saying that your speculation is amatuer hour stuff.

I don't understand the insult--to my knowledge there isn't a professional military historian participating on the forum. All speculation from you, and from me, is amateur.

What wasn't amateur was the analysis I linked to that the attack would have been successful had the union been a brigade weaker. Note:

"That debate was the starting point for research I conducted with military historian Steven Sondergren at Norwich University. (A grant from Fulbright Canada funded my stay at Norwich.) We used computer software to build a mathematical model of the charge. The model estimated the casualties and survivors on each side, given their starting strengths."

We have a lot more information than the generals at the time had. You know Longstreet's statement about "no 15,000 men"...? As you know, modern scholarship puts the number of Confederates participating at significantly less than that. Longstreet estimated the strength at 15,000--it looks like he was wrong. It isn't a stretch to assume that Lee was as well. The point being--there was tremendous uncertainty even regarding their own side.

[Berkut]

It was not meant as an insult, just that the analysis is amateur.

Longstreet said 15,000 and the actual amount was about 12,500. It is pretty hard to count even today though, since it depends on how you count - do the men in the supporting brigades count? If they do, the number IS 15,000, but of course they never really engaged until the charge failed. But then, coordinating multi-division attacks is insanely hard, so the fact that some of the 15000 did not engage until after it had failed is not at all surprising, nor would be surprising to Lee or Longstreet. Nor is the difference between 12,500 and 15,000 the critical point, since Longstreet saying 15k cannot do it, doesn't mean an attack with LESS troops was a better idea.

Had all 15k gone in together...then it would still have failed. The model you cite says that. And it is a silly point anyway. It's like saying the attack was a great plan, it just wasn't executed well...when the people involved know exactly how hard it is to actually execute an attack like this perfectly. It almost never happened. It is like the speculation that maybe it would have worked if the rebel artillery had not run low on ammunition, and noting that in fact they actually had more ammo, it just wasn't available because of some errors made by the quartermasters. So? Errors happen. That is what we know (and Lee knew) about military operations. You don't get to fight with what you would have if everything went perfectly, and the enemy acts according to your plan. It is a fools errand to speculate.

I mean, if you are looking for someone to say "Had everything gone perfectly, and every possible variable gone in Lee's way, and Lee had more men,  and the Union had made many more mistakes than they did, and had fewer troops than they did, could the assault have possibly worked?" Then I guess the answer is "yes, it is possible". But I don't think you've learned anything, or taken away one iota of the responsibility for ordering a stupid, stupid attack from Lee. And in fact, for most people, you have likely actually misled them into thinking something that simply is not true - that the assault was anything other than a doomed effort foolishly ordered to no possible good effect.

But the outcome that DID happen was catastrophic. One of the most lopsided attacks seen during the war. Fredericksburg level of futility and result.

[Berkut]

In regards to your original question, which seemed to be "Where was everyone else????",  take a look at this:


https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/A-Cutting-Edge-Second-Look-at-the-Battle-of-Gettysburg-1-180947921/


It is a pretty nice, interactive battle map through time.


The answer was that everyone else was, well, right there in the battle. The number of men available to Meade on the third was something around 60k or so, after the losses of the previous two days, disorganization, wounded, missing, etc. That number is rather hard to really pin down, of course. But the 7 Corps were all in line. It was a long line, to be sure, and Lee thought it might be thin in the center. But Meades position was actually pretty compact, and he could (and did) shift troops using his interior lines effectively.


The reason so few union troops were "involved" in Pickets Charge is that the number of troops attacked were the number of troops in position at the time of the attack...and they defeated the attack so quickly and thoroughly there wasn't even time for the battle to develop such that more troops would be brought in to reinforce them. Depending on how you count them, somewhere between 13k and 18k Confederate troops attacked, and were soundly crushed by a bit more than 1 union corps. But they weren't really crushed because the Union had some number of troops, they were crushed because they had to mount an attack across open ground while being hammered from both flanks by artillery and canister fire, and then once they got close enough to actually mount the assault (I think Confederate lines by the time they reached rifle/ musket range had contracted from about 1 mile long to less then half a mile) by massed rifle and cannister fire to their front.


That is why I don't like talking about "If the union was 25% weaker". The problem with the attack was not that there were so many Union troops, it was that attacks that require your men to march about a mile across largely open terrain into a held enemy position where they will be exposed to artillery fire the entire way, then once they get halfway are going to be exposed to flanking artillery fire, and the amount of flanking fire and direct fire they are exposed to increases radically as they get closer....culminating in a final need to charge with whoever is left into massed rifle fire and cannister from artillery and infantry that has been observing your entire attack from the beginning....


The problem with this plan isn't about how many men the Union had. It's a terrible, hopeless, desperate plan regardless of whether there are 1x Union troops are 0.75x Union troops.