Modern America as a Parliamentary Democracy?

[viper37]

On the other hand having MPs head departments would annoy those who like to constantly bitch about the power of 'unelected bureaucrats' whenever they don't get their way on something.

who do you think holds real power over the departments in a parliamentary democracy?  Hint: it's not the Minister (MP).

Deputy-Ministers are not accountable to the Minister.  They do not answer to him, they have no obligation of loyalty toward him, they can not be fired by him and they may chose to obey or disobey his orders as they see fit.  Some unexperienced ministers learned that the hard way.

They are accountable to the Prime Minister's Office only.  If they're too incompetent for one minister, they are sent to another department.

The parliamentary system is a responsible government, meaning the government is accountable to the people of its actions, even if they go contrary to the minister's wishes.  It's a good system for a monarchy, as the Monarch or its representative still get to hold the real theoritical power (it would create a constitutional crisis here or in GB is the Queen or the Governor general refused to sign a bill from parliament), but they let the Prime Ministers worry about the way the country is run, contending themselves with the nominal role of head of state.  All the paycheck for half the responsibilities and no need to answer for the morons the people voted for, so not a chance than an angry mob will pop up at your door demanding - and obtaining your head.  It's a win-win situation for them

I wouldn't say it's superior to the US Republican system, but it's not inferior either.

It's just that non elected bureaucrat still get to hold the real power over here.

[Valmy]

Yes I watched that show to 

[alfred russel]

You are forgetting that the PM isn't the Head of State.

A Trump-like figure is somewhat less likely under our system because the actual head of state can, in such an extreme case where the PM is abusing his or her powers, exercise the "Reserve Powers" to force them to account.

I don't agree--there are many countries with royal reserve powers, but how many times in the post WWII era have they successfully been deployed (the time constraint is because the nature of constitutional monarchies tended to be different in the past, and not so relevant to today)?

The problem is that the US elected Trump, and his popularity rating is still around 40%, in line with where most recent presidents have been at least at some point in their presidency.

It is hard to see a figurehead head of state exercise reserve powers based on what Trump has done. My opinion of the situation is that nothing has come to light yet that warrants a removal from office, either through royal reserve powers (if they existed) or the impeachment process that we have.

However, there is one major advantage in the US system when dealing with President Trump: the separation of the legislative and executive branches. Many of his major campaign promises are not being implemented because of legislative non cooperation--in spite of his party holding the legislature. it is in serious doubt whether a wall will ever be built, and it is also doubtful that Trumpcare will ever been enacted. His budget was declared dead on arrival after its proposal. 

[Zanza]

The parliamentarian system of the Weimar Republic had the president as an Ersatz-Kaiser with extremely strong reserve powers...

[Valmy]

The parliamentarian system of the Weimar Republic had the president as an Ersatz-Kaiser with extremely strong reserve powers...

So long as he doesn't die everything will be fine.

[Zanza]

The parliamentarian system of the Weimar Republic had the president as an Ersatz-Kaiser with extremely strong reserve powers...

So long as he doesn't die everything will be fine.

The Enabling Act and Gleichschaltung happened while Hindenburg was still alive and in office.

EDIT: It's actually fascinating to study the first half year of the Nazi regime as they systematically dismantled just about any organisation in society that could have resisted them and established a totalitarian one-party state, abolished the millenia old administrative boundaries and dissolved the federal states, abolished trade unions, etc.

[Malthus]

You are forgetting that the PM isn't the Head of State.

A Trump-like figure is somewhat less likely under our system because the actual head of state can, in such an extreme case where the PM is abusing his or her powers, exercise the "Reserve Powers" to force them to account.

I don't agree--there are many countries with royal reserve powers, but how many times in the post WWII era have they successfully been deployed (the time constraint is because the nature of constitutional monarchies tended to be different in the past, and not so relevant to today)?

The problem is that the US elected Trump, and his popularity rating is still around 40%, in line with where most recent presidents have been at least at some point in their presidency.

It is hard to see a figurehead head of state exercise reserve powers based on what Trump has done. My opinion of the situation is that nothing has come to light yet that warrants a removal from office, either through royal reserve powers (if they existed) or the impeachment process that we have.

However, there is one major advantage in the US system when dealing with President Trump: the separation of the legislative and executive branches. Many of his major campaign promises are not being implemented because of legislative non cooperation--in spite of his party holding the legislature. it is in serious doubt whether a wall will ever be built, and it is also doubtful that Trumpcare will ever been enacted. His budget was declared dead on arrival after its proposal.

You can see from the link that they can, and have, been used - or threatened (with the government backing down) - in both New Zealand and Australia, the two countries most similar to Canada, post-WW2.

Australia:

2.On 11 November 1975, when the Governor-General of Australia Sir John Kerr dismissed the Commonwealth Government.

In both cases an election was held very soon afterwards and, again in both cases, the dismissed government was massively defeated by popular vote.

In Queensland in 1987, during a tense period of leadership succession, the Governor of Queensland, Sir Walter Campbell, exercised reserve power in declining to exercise vice-regal authority on the advice of the Premier, Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen. Campbell initially refused to redistribute ministerial portfolios on the sole advice of the premier, who lacked the confidence of his cabinet. Subsequently, during a period when Queensland had a "Premier who is not leader" and the governing party had a "Leader who is not Premier",[4] there was speculation on the potential exercise of vice-regal reserve power by Campbell, in dismissing the premier in the absence of a parliamentary motion of no confidence. Ultimately, Campbell was praised for his handling of the undesirable situation.[5]

These are among several exercises of the reserve powers in Australia in the 20th century at state and federal levels.[6]

New Zealand:

Almost a century later, in 1984, there was a brief constitutional crisis. The outgoing Prime Minister, Sir Rob Muldoon, had just lost an election, but refused to advise the Governor-General, Sir David Beattie, to make urgent regulations desired not only by the incoming Prime Minister, David Lange, but also by many in Muldoon's own party and cabinet. At the time, the option of Beattie dismissing Muldoon and replacing him, without waiting for Muldoon's resignation, was reportedly discussed. Muldoon eventually relented under pressure from his own cabinet, making use of Beattie's reserve powers unnecessary.

In contrast, how many times have Presidents been impeached, post-WW2? The only one I know of is Clinton.

Yet the fact that it has only happened once isn't proof that it is worthless according to you - is it?

The problem in the US isn't that Trump has provably done stuff for which he ought to be removed.

The problem is that, no matter what he does, it appears he can't be removed, as the only mechanism to do so is impeachment and Congress is fully owned by Republicans who have, apparently, lost any vestige of courage and country-above-party feeling, and so will, seemingly, accept whatever Trump does as valid - meaning no impeachment is likely pretty well no matter what he does.

You mention his approval rating is at 40%. The benefit of reserve powers is that it isn't dependent on such matters.

[Valmy]

Are there any of our Presidents who should have been impeached but weren't?

[Valmy]

The parliamentarian system of the Weimar Republic had the president as an Ersatz-Kaiser with extremely strong reserve powers...

So long as he doesn't die everything will be fine.

The Enabling Act and Gleichschaltung happened while Hindenburg was still alive and in office.

EDIT: It's actually fascinating to study the first half year of the Nazi regime as they systematically dismantled just about any organisation in society that could have resisted them and established a totalitarian one-party state, abolished the millenia old administrative boundaries and dissolved the federal states, abolished trade unions, etc.

Yeah it is pretty sick. The greatest trainwreck in history. It is hard to look away.

[Malthus]

Are there any of our Presidents who should have been impeached but weren't?

Certainly. Nixon. But he resigned before he could be impeached.

The point is that the situations in which such powers ought to be exercised are pretty rare, and so an argument premised on 'they haven't been used since X, ergo they are useless' must fail.

In this particular case - of the US - the concern is that the weakness of Congress has undercut the utility of the protection offered by impeachment, and this weakness is a relatively recent thing.

[alfred russel]

Malthus: I don't fully understand the Australia examples, but they don't seem to have prevented a Trump like figure. The New Zealand example seems to be more of an issue with the commonwealth constitutional arrangements as to why an intervention would even be contemplated (but also didn't prevent a Trump like figure).

Clinton was the only president impeached, but Nixon resigned in the face of a likely impeachment and removal from office.

I don't think that anything is worthless, I just would not rely on reserve powers to stop a recently elected populist inclined to authoritarian tendencies, barring massive unpopularity. I'd say the same about impeachment.

However, a separation of the legislative and executive, while not very sexy, does have some effectiveness.

[Valmy]

Ah I see what you are saying Malthus.

Taking down the government as a GG seems like an almost suicidal move to me unless the government was clearly unpopular. I don't think Trump is unpopular enough that a GG would pull the trigger, which is basically why Congress has not. But I could be wrong.

[Oexmelin]

I note that the examples from Australia and New Zealand show Premiers who lost the confidence of their cabinets, and were massively unpopular. It's quite possible to imagine a US-like scenario in a British Parliamentary regime, with a PM who enjoys the confidence of the cabinet and is not-too-massively unpopular, to cast doubt on whether or not vice-regal powers would indeed be used.

[Malthus]

Malthus: I don't fully understand the Australia examples, but they don't seem to have prevented a Trump like figure. The New Zealand example seems to be more of an issue with the commonwealth constitutional arrangements as to why an intervention would even be contemplated (but also didn't prevent a Trump like figure).

Clinton was the only president impeached, but Nixon resigned in the face of a likely impeachment and removal from office.

I don't think that anything is worthless, I just would not rely on reserve powers to stop a recently elected populist inclined to authoritarian tendencies, barring massive unpopularity. I'd say the same about impeachment.

However, a separation of the legislative and executive, while not very sexy, does have some effectiveness.

Sure, but we are arguing about two different separations.

You are arguing that the separation of legislative and executive offers certain advantages. I might agree on that.

However, I'm arguing that the separation of the executive from the head of state offers certain other, completely different advantages. One of which being that it would act as a "check" on unbridled populist power on the part of the executive in the unusual circumstance where the legislature has completely lost its mojo.

That, unfortunately, happens to be the exact circumstance happening right now in the US.

Now, maybe the legislature will regain its mojo if the popularity of the executive sinks into single digits. The problem is that, because the sickness of partisan bickering has sunk deep, and a whole culture has emerged in which facts are simply denied or invented at will without any concern, that seems nearly impossible no matter what he does.

[Malthus]

I note that the examples from Australia and New Zealand show Premiers who lost the confidence of their cabinets, and were massively unpopular. It's quite possible to imagine a US-like scenario in a British Parliamentary regime, with a PM who enjoys the confidence of the cabinet and is not-too-massively unpopular, to cast doubt on whether or not vice-regal powers would indeed be used.

The unusual circumstances are these: a figure who behaved as Trump behaves would usually guarantee unpopularity and loss of cabinet confidence.