Modern America as a Parliamentary Democracy?

[Zanza]

It's interesting that the viceroys seem to have more actual constitutional power than the Queen herself seems to have in Britain. Not sure if she can even theoretically remove a prime minister, but it would be a massive constitutional crisis for sure.

[alfred russel]

However, I'm arguing that the separation of the executive from the head of state offers certain other, completely different advantages. One of which being that it would act as a "check" on unbridled populist power on the part of the executive in the unusual circumstance where the legislature has completely lost its mojo.

That, unfortunately, happens to be the exact circumstance happening right now in the US.

Now, maybe the legislature will regain its mojo if the popularity of the executive sinks into single digits. The problem is that, because the sickness of partisan bickering has sunk deep, and a whole culture has emerged in which facts are simply denied or invented at will without any concern, that seems nearly impossible no matter what he does.

I disagree with your assessment of the situation. I don't think that there is sufficient cause to remove Trump from office under the US system, so it is not, imo, the situation in the US right now.

However, if you were to put a Trump like figure as head of government in Canada now, with similar popularity and policy, I also think the removal of the prime minister would be massively controversial to such an extent to make the action counterproductive.

[garbon]

I note that the examples from Australia and New Zealand show Premiers who lost the confidence of their cabinets, and were massively unpopular. It's quite possible to imagine a US-like scenario in a British Parliamentary regime, with a PM who enjoys the confidence of the cabinet and is not-too-massively unpopular, to cast doubt on whether or not vice-regal powers would indeed be used.

The unusual circumstances are these: a figure who behaved as Trump behaves would usually guarantee unpopularity and loss of cabinet confidence.

But we don't really know that would be the case. I mean, we are talking about an instance where someone like Trump would come to power in Canada.

[Oexmelin]

The unusual circumstances are these: a figure who behaved as Trump behaves would usually guarantee unpopularity and loss of cabinet confidence.

I am far from convinced. Trump behaves as he does in a very specific context that empowers him, and makes him palatable to many voters, as well as other elected officials. British Parliamentary systems are not immune to similar contexts.

[grumbler]

Are there any of our Presidents who should have been impeached but weren't?

Certainly. Nixon. But he resigned before he could be impeached.

The point is that the situations in which such powers ought to be exercised are pretty rare, and so an argument premised on 'they haven't been used since X, ergo they are useless' must fail.

In this particular case - of the US - the concern is that the weakness of Congress has undercut the utility of the protection offered by impeachment, and this weakness is a relatively recent thing.

I don't understand the argument.  You say that reserve powers have averted crises in parliamentary systems even though you only provide one example of such action actually being taken.  You assert then that the US system is weak because it was only used once (though it was used effectively in at least one additional case, forcing Nixon's resignation, and the threat of impeachment surely impacted the decision-making of other presidents.

This sounds like you are arguing differences without distinctions.

[CountDeMoney]

I don't think that there is sufficient cause to remove Trump from office under the US system, so it is not, imo, the situation in the US right now.

Sure there is.  His direct profiting of his office is an irreconcilable conflict of interest.  There has been sufficient cause to remove him from office since the moment of his inauguration. 

[DGuller]

You're being sarcastic, but our whole system is set up to limit the power of the government, especially the Federal government.

Which it hasn't done. Instead it has limited the effectiveness of the government.

I'll live with the ineffectiveness as long as it limits the power.  I much prefer the model of human and civil rights we have here to that they have in the UK.  I'll grant that I would be happier if the government's power were even more limited.

That model worked out really well for certain class of people in certain parts of the country.  It's as if the federal government is the only type of government that can make the rights spelled out in constitution a legal fiction.

[mongers]

Surprising given the apparent piss-poor thread topic, why so many of your fuckers are posting about it. 

[dps]

Surprising given the apparent piss-poor thread topic, why so many of your fuckers are posting about it. 

Not really.  A really bad car wreck will attract more attention than a minor fender bender, so it's no surprise a really stupid thread gets more attention than a typical dumb Timmay thread.

[crazy canuck]

The unusual circumstances are these: a figure who behaved as Trump behaves would usually guarantee unpopularity and loss of cabinet confidence.

I am far from convinced. Trump behaves as he does in a very specific context that empowers him, and makes him palatable to many voters, as well as other elected officials. British Parliamentary systems are not immune to similar contexts.

And it is that very specific context that would make Trump very difficult to replicate in a Westminster Parliamentary system.  Perhaps not immune but significantly resistant.

Consider the manner in which Trump won the nomination of his party as the anti party, anti establishment candidate.  That would be very difficult to replicate in a system where party leaders are selected on a riding level.  Not having wide party support would make a riding level election all but impossible.

Also, the major difference that has seemed to have been lost in all of this is that while Americans directly elect their President, voters in a Parliamentary system do not elect their PM.  One of the many significant effects of this is that a sitting MP can become PM without the need for an election.  As a result there is an incentive for sitting MPs to replace an incompetent PM and the more ambitious ones will definitely have the knives out at the first signs of weakness.  There is no equivalent in the US system.  Even if the President is impeached the VP steps in.  There is no real incentive for ambitious Senators or Congressmen to force the removal of the President.  They will still have to bide their time and wait for the proper election cycle timing to make their own bid for the job.

Lastly, while an unpopular President can be bad news for some running for re-election in that particular cycle, others not involved in that cycle may not care as much.  In a Parliamentary system, all MPs care because all will be impacted by an unpopular PM or opposition leader in the next election.  That is why unpopular PMs and opposition leaders are forced out.  The Americans don't have the equivalent mechanism.  Instead they have a very legalistic process - as befitting their culture - where the only way to force out a President is through a formal impeachment process.


For all the talk of the American system of checks and balances, really what they have is a President with significant power to do a great deal of harm to the country who is very difficult to remove.

[viper37]

Yes I watched that show to 

The former Minister of transport for Quebec, Jacques Daoust, had a problem with a deputy minister.

She didn't give her last two ministers critical information pertaining to alleged corruption in her minister.  She censored information given to MPs studying the case in the National Assembly.  The media made a big fuss.  She was interrogate by the commission where she said: "I do not answer to the minister".  So she was suspended.  With pay.  Now, she's working elsewhere in another department, I think, or still receiving her wage until the time she decides to retire.

Yet, she was cleared of all wrongdoing.  She does not answer to the minister.  She answers to someone named by the PMO.

She has done nothing wrong in censoring information to the MPs because they are not her "bosses".

For a minister, he relies heavily on his chief of cabinet.  However, they do are not named by him, they are assigned to him.  When a controversy arises, the chief of cabinet is temporarily removed from his functions, then placed elsewhere in the same assignment.

[Valmy]

So who is it that does the assigning? 

[Malthus]

Are there any of our Presidents who should have been impeached but weren't?

Certainly. Nixon. But he resigned before he could be impeached.

The point is that the situations in which such powers ought to be exercised are pretty rare, and so an argument premised on 'they haven't been used since X, ergo they are useless' must fail.

In this particular case - of the US - the concern is that the weakness of Congress has undercut the utility of the protection offered by impeachment, and this weakness is a relatively recent thing.

I don't understand the argument.  You say that reserve powers have averted crises in parliamentary systems even though you only provide one example of such action actually being taken.  You assert then that the US system is weak because it was only used once (though it was used effectively in at least one additional case, forcing Nixon's resignation, and the threat of impeachment surely impacted the decision-making of other presidents.

This sounds like you are arguing differences without distinctions.

You have it exactly reversed. I was arguing against the argument that had been previously raised that the reserve powers were worthless because they had not been used since WW2.

I pointed out that, in fact, they had been used - rarely - just as impeachment had been used - rarely. So my argument was that the rareness of its use isn't a good criterion for determining its worth.

I never argued that impeachment was "weak" because it was only used once (and, as you point out, effective as a threat in another case). I am arguing that the US system suffers from a narrow flaw, one that is apparent right now, when the check it relies on - impeachment - is undermined by a congress obsessed with partisanship, and both congress and voters willing to accept 'alternative facts'. This latter issue seems to have gotten worse since Nixon's day. 

[Malthus]

However, I'm arguing that the separation of the executive from the head of state offers certain other, completely different advantages. One of which being that it would act as a "check" on unbridled populist power on the part of the executive in the unusual circumstance where the legislature has completely lost its mojo.

That, unfortunately, happens to be the exact circumstance happening right now in the US.

Now, maybe the legislature will regain its mojo if the popularity of the executive sinks into single digits. The problem is that, because the sickness of partisan bickering has sunk deep, and a whole culture has emerged in which facts are simply denied or invented at will without any concern, that seems nearly impossible no matter what he does.

I disagree with your assessment of the situation. I don't think that there is sufficient cause to remove Trump from office under the US system, so it is not, imo, the situation in the US right now.

However, if you were to put a Trump like figure as head of government in Canada now, with similar popularity and policy, I also think the removal of the prime minister would be massively controversial to such an extent to make the action counterproductive.

The assessment of whether he's done enough to deserve impeachment up to the present moment isn't the relevant argument though. The issue is that it appears that no matter what he does, there does not appear to be a significant chance that congress will impeach him - because it is dominated by Republicans who, so far at least, have shown zero willingness to stand up and challenge him.

It is hard to imagine an exact parallel to a Trump-like figure in Canada. Not because Canada is immune to populism, but rather because of the way the Canadian party system works - the PM is the head of the Party and so must be acceptable to party insiders; he can - and will - lose their confidence if he fucks up.

[Malthus]

The unusual circumstances are these: a figure who behaved as Trump behaves would usually guarantee unpopularity and loss of cabinet confidence.

I am far from convinced. Trump behaves as he does in a very specific context that empowers him, and makes him palatable to many voters, as well as other elected officials. British Parliamentary systems are not immune to similar contexts.

And it is that very specific context that would make Trump very difficult to replicate in a Westminster Parliamentary system.  Perhaps not immune but significantly resistant.

Consider the manner in which Trump won the nomination of his party as the anti party, anti establishment candidate.  That would be very difficult to replicate in a system where party leaders are selected on a riding level.  Not having wide party support would make a riding level election all but impossible.

Also, the major difference that has seemed to have been lost in all of this is that while Americans directly elect their President, voters in a Parliamentary system do not elect their PM.  One of the many significant effects of this is that a sitting MP can become PM without the need for an election.  As a result there is an incentive for sitting MPs to replace an incompetent PM and the more ambitious ones will definitely have the knives out at the first signs of weakness.  There is no equivalent in the US system.  Even if the President is impeached the VP steps in.  There is no real incentive for ambitious Senators or Congressmen to force the removal of the President.  They will still have to bide their time and wait for the proper election cycle timing to make their own bid for the job.

Lastly, while an unpopular President can be bad news for some running for re-election in that particular cycle, others not involved in that cycle may not care as much.  In a Parliamentary system, all MPs care because all will be impacted by an unpopular PM or opposition leader in the next election.  That is why unpopular PMs and opposition leaders are forced out.  The Americans don't have the equivalent mechanism.  Instead they have a very legalistic process - as befitting their culture - where the only way to force out a President is through a formal impeachment process.


For all the talk of the American system of checks and balances, really what they have is a President with significant power to do a great deal of harm to the country who is very difficult to remove.

Exactly. You put it better than I did.