Coup attempt in Turkey

[OttoVonBismarck]

The War in Afghanistan was definitely conducted in a large part with heavy use of our German bases, but that goes back to more a convenience factor, we already had bases in Germany.

For something like Afghanistan the real value in a base in between us and Afghanistan (in say, Germany) is all the men and equipment we move from the U.S. to Afghanistan it's nice to be able to stop in Germany. We wouldn't necessarily need a huge military presence to do that, though. Just a few air bases. Assuming we remained NATO allies with Germany I doubt there would be a problem maintaining a few of those for logistics. Like I said, my preferred outcome isn't that we have 0 soldiers in Europe and complete leaving of NATO, just a shift in what the alliance is and how the U.S. works within NATO.

Like Afghanistan was a full NATO operation, ISAF is under the aegis of NATO, so in theory if we were to do something like that in the future where NATO was in full agreement we'd ostensibly be able to use each other's resources for logistics. Something like Afghanistan wouldn't be something we'd push off to Europe, we were going after the guys who just killed 3,000 Americans and had broad support to do so.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Afghanistan is actually a good example of NATO working well for the United States with broad cooperation. Even Germany contributed significantly to the ISAF mission, both in men and material.

[Zanza]

Looking at this list, almost all the 36.000 troops you have left in Germany sound to me like support, intelligence or headquarter units:
http://www.eur.army.mil/organization/units.htm

Out of that list only the 2nd Cavalry and the 10th Army & Missile Defense Command sound like combat troops.

EDIT: There is also the 52nd Fighter Wing in Spangdahlem AFB, but that's apparently planned to leave already.

[The Minsky Moment]

Look what our strategic competitors do.  Russia and China have spent obsecene amounts of resources chasing 3rd tier basing/alliance agreements like Russia's horribly exposed facility at Tartus (courtesy of the tottering Assad regime) or China's boondoggle basing investment with the Pakistanis at Gwadar.  The PRC in particular would give their collective left nuts to have even a fraction of the benefits the US gets through its European and North Asian alliances.  There is a reason why Putin's foreign policy revolves to a significant extent around trying to weaken NATO and it's not because he wants to do a favor for Uncle Sam.

The whole complaint about burden sharing is a mystery to me.  NATO, Korea, and Japan all provide very substantial financial contributions to support the cost of the US facilities on their territories.  Total US spending on those bases is under $10 billion/year - compare for example to the nearly $50 billion PRC is committing alone to the Pakistan economic corridor which at the end of the day will likely yield marginal strategic benefits at best.  Yes it would be nice to see the NATO countries spend a little more on their militaries, but undermining the alliance would just whittle down the one stick that has any effectiveness in that effort.  The notion that a Europe cut loose from a US alliance would bulk up security spending substantially and then deploy those capabilities in the US interest is a double fantasy.

[Valmy]

It is nice when Minsky swoops in and says what I have been trying to say better than I can.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Look what our strategic competitors do.  Russia and China have spent obsecene amounts of resources chasing 3rd tier basing/alliance agreements like Russia's horribly exposed facility at Tartus (courtesy of the tottering Assad regime) or China's boondoggle basing investment with the Pakistanis at Gwadar.  The PRC in particular would give their collective left nuts to have even a fraction of the benefits the US gets through its European and North Asian alliances.  There is a reason why Putin's foreign policy revolves to a significant extent around trying to weaken NATO and it's not because he wants to do a favor for Uncle Sam.

The whole complaint about burden sharing is a mystery to me.  NATO, Korea, and Japan all provide very substantial financial contributions to support the cost of the US facilities on their territories.  Total US spending on those bases is under $10 billion/year - compare for example to the nearly $50 billion PRC is committing alone to the Pakistan economic corridor which at the end of the day will likely yield marginal strategic benefits at best.  Yes it would be nice to see the NATO countries spend a little more on their militaries, but undermining the alliance would just whittle down the one stick that has any effectiveness in that effort.  The notion that a Europe cut loose from a US alliance would bulk up security spending substantially and then deploy those capabilities in the US interest is a double fantasy.

This would make sense if our argument was solely about saving money, or if we were advocating outright leaving NATO and closing all our European basis. Since that isn't it, I question the relevance of this statement.

[Valmy]

This would make sense if our argument was solely about saving money, or if we were advocating outright leaving NATO and closing all our European basis. Since that isn't it, I question the relevance of this statement.

He directly addresses the fact that our strategic partners are a massive advantage that other countries would kill for and would hurt our interests if we threw them away. Seems relevant to me.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Looking at this list, almost all the 36.000 troops you have left in Germany sound to me like support, intelligence or headquarter units:
http://www.eur.army.mil/organization/units.htm

Out of that list only the 2nd Cavalry and the 10th Army & Missile Defense Command sound like combat troops.

EDIT: There is also the 52nd Fighter Wing in Spangdahlem AFB, but that's apparently planned to leave already.

I had read that it was 62,000, if it's really down to 36,000 then we may not be able to cut much more, I'd need to look into it.

I also don't want to be perceived as having the position "zomg fuck Europe let's take all our troops away", that isn't actually the position. Actually being deployed in Europe costs us very little (same for South Korea), in fact since there is cost-sharing with overseas bases between host country and us it can sometimes cost less to have a soldier housed in a foreign country than in the United States.

It's about the strategic commitment, not what bases we keep open or shut. Our strategic commitment to Europe should be defensive, and we should maintain whatever bases necessary to satisfy that role; but I'd argue our actual use of our European assets for the past 20 years has largely been interventionist. Sometimes in affairs where we essentially acting for the Euros (Balkans/Libya/Syria), but sometimes too in American lead efforts like the war in Iraq and other such things.

I want to scale down to whatever the desired commitment level is for our role in Europe to be purely defensive. And I also would still pressure the other NATO members to meet their minimum expected defense spending requirement.

[OttoVonBismarck]

This would make sense if our argument was solely about saving money, or if we were advocating outright leaving NATO and closing all our European basis. Since that isn't it, I question the relevance of this statement.

He directly addresses the fact that our strategic partners are a massive advantage that other countries would kill for and would hurt our interests if we threw them away. Seems relevant to me.

It's not a great comparison, I mean let's say Russia had a nice big base in say, Egypt. What exactly is Russia going to do with it? Russia has some force projection capability, at least compared to Europe which aside from Britain and France has virtually none (and France has very little.) It's a false comparison, America needs bases all over the globe because we're expected to send our military in all over the globe, moreover, we ourselves feel we need to do this. That's not a feature--that's a problem. I also don't remember advocating we shut down every European base and kill our logistic capability. The main value in having bases in a country where you don't expect to ever fight is for logistical reasons (Russia's Naval base in Syria was a refueling station, back when Syria was a stable country.) I don't see any credible reason why a strategic shift away from intervening in Europe/North Africa/Levant region would mean all of a sudden we no longer have any bases in Europe and thus no more logistics capacity there.

[The Minsky Moment]

This would make sense if our argument was solely about saving money, or if we were advocating outright leaving NATO and closing all our European basis. Since that isn't it, I question the relevance of this statement.

You proposed exiting the alliance outright if the 2% commitment wasn't made.  That is advocating leaving outright.   You also referenced "big commitments" which I presume to be referencing money.

I think I am responding to the arguments being made, if not, feel free to clarify.

[LaCroix]

Would the US actually put more forces elsewhere outside the continental US if it would withdraw them from Europe? Are you currently not deploying more troops in MENA or APAC because of your committments in Europe? I was under the impression that the US already had bases and troops everywhere it deemed them useful.

yeah, a few garrison soldiers and a handful of nukes aren't really material assets. it's not like we have a full army permanently based in turkey.

Post Cold-War Turkey, for us, is almost exclusively useful as an airfield. Nothing else could easily replace it in Syria/Iraq unless we built a new air base in Iraq, which as I mentioned has problems.

my post was in reference to the argument that we could shift assets around. the assets in that turk base aren't all that material. wasn't arguing the base itself isn't strategically important.

[The Minsky Moment]

It's about the strategic commitment, not what bases we keep open or shut. Our strategic commitment to Europe should be defensive, and we should maintain whatever bases necessary to satisfy that role; but I'd argue our actual use of our European assets for the past 20 years has largely been interventionist. Sometimes in affairs where we essentially acting for the Euros (Balkans/Libya/Syria), but sometimes too in American lead efforts like the war in Iraq and other such things.

But that is a matter of US choice.  Why blame the alliance for policy the US elects to pursue using the alliance?  it's not like the other members are forcing us into these interventions.  Even in Libya, the US could have made it clear it had no interest, instead even the more limited "lead from behind" strategy made it explicit we would backstop France and the UK.

I won't quote your other post just above - but it is more of the same - criticizing US policy for being overly interventionist.  There is nothing in the structure of the alliances or commitments that compels this result.

[OttoVonBismarck]

This would make sense if our argument was solely about saving money, or if we were advocating outright leaving NATO and closing all our European basis. Since that isn't it, I question the relevance of this statement.

You proposed exiting the alliance outright if the 2% commitment wasn't made.  That is advocating leaving outright.   You also referenced "big commitments" which I presume to be referencing money.

I think I am responding to the arguments being made, if not, feel free to clarify.

I said this after I said that:

I would say my "preferred" form of NATO would be we maintain the concept that an attack on one member is an attack on all--I have no real problem if France/Germany/Italy/Spain (despite being the worst NATO members) were legitimately attacked, in America coming to defend them. I cannot fathom any country actually attacking them, because none have the force projection capabilities. The border states like the Baltics are in genuine threat, and I'm fine guaranteeing their safety. But NATO is more than just a defensive pact now, it's the major tool of military intervention in the Europe/MENA region, often times with the United States, frankly, paying the price in blood and money to achieve primarily European goals.

I wouldn't be opposed to outright leaving NATO, but that would only be if we couldn't find a way to reform it to a degree that it allows the U.S. to not be required to conduct interventionist wars for Europe. To be honest I don't know that the 2% spending requirement really is the key factor, it's more the fact the Europeans don't spend their defense money on the type of military force that is capable of independent action, and they don't appear to have anything approaching a unified defense policy.

[OttoVonBismarck]

It's about the strategic commitment, not what bases we keep open or shut. Our strategic commitment to Europe should be defensive, and we should maintain whatever bases necessary to satisfy that role; but I'd argue our actual use of our European assets for the past 20 years has largely been interventionist. Sometimes in affairs where we essentially acting for the Euros (Balkans/Libya/Syria), but sometimes too in American lead efforts like the war in Iraq and other such things.

But that is a matter of US choice.  Why blame the alliance for policy the US elects to pursue using the alliance?  it's not like the other members are forcing us into these interventions.  Even in Libya, the US could have made it clear it had no interest, instead even the more limited "lead from behind" strategy made it explicit we would backstop France and the UK.

I won't quote your other post just above - but it is more of the same - criticizing US policy for being overly interventionist.  There is nothing in the structure of the alliances or commitments that compels this result.

I'm not blaming the "alliance" for anything, I'm advocating for a shift in American policy. In so much as I "blame" NATO for anything, what I'm really blaming is U.S. NATO policy, not "the alliance" itself. I mean we're the majority of military and political force in NATO anyway, so any problems in NATO are largely our baby. I do broadly condemn Europe for being so feckless and weak, but that's not me "blaming" anyone for anything. NATO made a ton of sense for the United States for 50 years. Less sense for 10, and even less sense for the 10 after that, in its present form.

We need to shift away from interventionist policies in general. This is independent of NATO. But specific to NATO, we have a situation where a collection of European states we consider our friends and allies, frankly would lose their military capacity if we did this. Maybe they're fine with that, but it's something that needs mentioned. My thought is that if they want to maintain those capabilities they will need to develop a unified defense plan and probably spend more on defense. But if they don't want to, then they do not have to, obviously.

American disengagement from European-regional interventionism is independent of my claim that NATO allies don't do their fair share. I'm saying we need to shift away regardless of what they do, I don't view it as a tit-for-tat.

[Zanza]

I am not sure I get your argument why the US is "required" to conduct interventionist wars for Europe. What happens if you say no?